Laeven, LucBeck, Thorsten2012-06-212012-06-212006-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8661There is a wide cross-country variation in the institutional structure of bank failure resolution, including the role of the deposit insurer. The authors use quantitative analysis for 57 countries and discuss specific country cases to illustrate this variation. Using data for over 1,700 banks across 57 countries, they show that banks in countries where the deposit insurer has the responsibility of intervening failed banks and the power to revoke membership in the deposit insurance scheme are more stable and less likely to become insolvent. Involvement of the deposit insurer in bank failure resolution thus dampens the negative effect that deposit insurance has on banks' risk taking.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTINGBANK EARNINGSBANK FAILUREBANK FAILURE RESOLUTIONBANK FAILURESBANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTSBANK HOLDING COMPANYBANK INSOLVENCYBANK MONITORINGBANK REGULATIONBANK RISKBANK RUNSBANK SUPERVISIONBANKING CRISESBANKING CRISISBANKING INDUSTRYBANKING SUPERVISIONBANKING SYSTEMBANKING SYSTEMSBANKRUPTCYBANKSCAPITAL ADEQUACYCAPITAL BASECARCENTRAL BANKCLOSED BANKSCOMMISSIONSCOMPETITIVENESSCONFLICT OF INTERESTCORPORATE INSOLVENCYCORPORATE SECTORCORPORATIONSCURRENCY CRISESDEBTDEPOSIT INSURANCEDEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGEDEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMESDEPOSIT PROTECTIONDEPOSITORSDEPOSITSDEREGULATIONECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMICSEXPLICIT COVERAGEFEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCEFEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATIONFINANCIAL CRISESFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL DISTRESSFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL INTERMEDIATIONFINANCIAL RATIOSFINANCIAL RESTRUCTURINGFINANCIAL STATEMENTSFINANCIAL SYSTEMSHOUSINGIMPAIRED ASSETSINFORMATION DISCLOSUREINSOLVENCYINSOLVENCY REGIMEINSOLVENCY REGIMESINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTINSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREINSURED DEPOSITSINSURERSINTEREST INCOMEINTERVENTION POWERSINVESTIGATIONLEGAL FRAMEWORKLIMITEDLIMITED DEPOSIT INSURANCELIQUID ASSETSLIQUIDATIONLIQUIDITYLIQUIDITY OF BANKSLOAN CLASSIFICATIONMARKET DISCIPLINEMEASURES OF PROFITABILITYMERGERSMORAL HAZARDOPERATING INCOMEPENALTIESPRIVATE COMMERCIAL BANKSPROBABILITY OF DEFAULTPROBLEM BANKSPROXYPUT OPTIONRATESREGULATORY AUTHORITYREGULATORY FORBEARANCERELATIONSHIP LENDINGRESOLVING BANKING CRISESRETURN ON ASSETSRISK MANAGEMENTRISK TAKINGSAVINGSSMALL BANKSSOCIETYSTOCK MARKETSTOCK MARKETSSUPERVISORY AGENCIESSUPERVISORY FRAMEWORKSYSTEMIC BANKING CRISESTRADINGTRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICYTRINIDAD AND TOBAGOUNIONVOLATILITYWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3920