Keefer, PhilipMilanovic, Branko2014-12-122014-12-122014-12https://hdl.handle.net/10986/20701This paper advances research on inequality with unique, new data on income distribution in 61 countries, including 20 Latin American countries, to explore the effects of political parties on redistribution. First, consistent with a central -- but still contested -- assumption of the political economy literature, left-wing governments redistribute more. In addition, consistent with recent research on the importance of party organization and the organizational differences between younger and older parties, older left-wing parties are more likely to internalize the long-run costs of redistribution and to be more credible in their commitment to redistribution, leading them to redistribute less. With entirely different data, the paper also provides evidence on mechanisms: left-wing governments not only redistribute more, they tax more; older left-wing parties, though, tax less than younger ones.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOAGGREGATE INEQUALITYAVERAGE INCOMEBARRIERS TO ENTRYCASH PROPERTY INCOMECASH TRANSFERSCOLLECTIVE ORGANIZATIONCOMMODITYCOUNTRY CHARACTERISTICSCOUNTRY FIXED EFFECTSCOUNTRY OBSERVATIONSDATA SETDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEPENDENT VARIABLEDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDEVELOPMENT POLICYDISPOSABLE INCOMEDISPOSABLE INCOMESDISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICSECONOMIC ACTIVITYECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC RESEARCHECONOMIC REVIEWECONOMIC STRUCTUREECONOMY LITERATUREEMPIRICAL TESTEXPORTSFISCAL POLICIESFISCAL POLICYFUTURE RESEARCHGDPGINI COEFFICIENTGROSS INCOMEGROSS INCOMESHIGH INEQUALITYHIGHER INEQUALITYHOUSEHOLD DATAHOUSEHOLD INCOMEHOUSEHOLD SURVEYSINCENTIVE EFFECTSINCOMEINCOME = GROSSINCOME DATAINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME FLUCTUATIONSINCOME GROUPINCOME GROUPSINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME QUINTILESINCOME REDISTRIBUTIONINCOME SHAREINCOME SHARESINCOME STUDYINCOME TAXINCOME TAXATIONINCOME TAXESINCOME TRANSFERSINCOMESINDUSTRIAL COUNTRIESINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIESINEQUALITYINEQUALITY MEASURESINSURANCEINVERSE RELATIONSHIPJOB CREATIONLABOR MARKETSLABOUR MARKETLACK OF INFORMATIONLOW INCOMEMACROECONOMICSMARKET INCOMEMARKET INCOME INEQUALITYMARKET INCOMESMARKET SHAREMEDIAN INCOMEMEDIAN VOTERMEDIAN VOTER HYPOTHESISMIDDLE CLASSMIDDLE CLASS INCOME SHAREMIDDLE QUINTILESNEGATIVE EFFECTNEGATIVE RELATIONSHIPOLD AGEOLIGARCHYOPEN ECONOMIESPAYROLL TAXESPENSIONPENSION CONTRIBUTIONSPENSION INCOMEPENSIONSPER CAPITA INCOMEPERSONAL INCOMEPOLICY DISCUSSIONSPOLICY OUTCOMESPOLICY RESEARCHPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTABILITYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL REGIMEPOLITICAL SCIENCEPOLITICAL SYSTEMPOLITICAL UNRESTPOORPOSITIVE EFFECTPOWER PARITYPRIVATE INVESTMENTPRIVATE TRANSFERSPROGRAMSPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONPUBLIC EXPENDITUREPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC PENSIONSPUBLIC POLICIESPUBLIC POLICYPURCHASING POWERRANDOM EFFECTSREDISTRIBUTION POLICIESREDISTRIBUTION POLICYREDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIESREPUTATIONREPUTATIONSRURALRURAL AREASRURAL INHABITANTSSIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCESSIGNIFICANT EFFECTSOCIAL TRANSFERSSTATE PENSIONSTAXTAX REVENUESTAX STRUCTURETAX SYSTEMTRANSFER PROGRAMSUNEMPLOYMENTURBANIZATIONVOTERSWAGESWORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS10.1596/1813-9450-7129