Mavroidis, Petros C.Hoekman, Bernard2014-08-012014-08-012002-10https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19221At the recent World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Doha, Qatar, WTO members called for the launch of negotiations on disciplines relating to competition based on explicit consensus on modalities to be agreed at the fifth WTO ministerial meeting in 2003. WTO discussions since 1997 have revealed little support for ambitious multilateral action. Proponents of the WTO antitrust disciplines currently propose an agreement that is limited to "core principles"-nondiscrimination, transparency, and provisions banning "hard core" cartels. The authors argue that an agreement along such lines will create compliance costs for developing countries without addressing the anticompetitive behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions. To be unambiguously beneficial to low-income countries, any WTO antitrust disciplines should recognize the capacity constraints that prevail in these economies, make illegal collusive business practices by firms with international operations that raise prices in developing country markets, and require competition authorities in high-income countries to take action against firms located in their jurisdictions to defend the interests of affected developing country consumers. More generally, a case is made that traditional liberalization commitments using existing WTO fora will be the most effective means of lowering prices and increasing access to an expanded variety of goods and services.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTCOMPETITION POLICYWORLD TRADE ORGANIZATIONINTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTSNONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONSCARTELSCOMPLIANCETRANSACTION COSTSMULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISESANTITRUST LAWCAPACITY CONSTRAINTSCOLLUSIONBUSINESS ENVIRONMENTINTERNATIONAL BUSINESSPRICINGLOW INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIESCONSUMER PROTECTIONMARKET LIBERALIZATIONTRADE LIBERALIZATIONTRADE NEGOTIATIONSINTERNATIONAL COMPETITIONSPILLOVER EFFECTSTERMS OF TRADEMARKET ACCESSMERGERSGENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS & TRADEANTIDUMPINGINTELLECTUAL PROPERTYSERVICESINTERNATIONAL STANDARDSPRODUCT QUALITYPROCUREMENTAGRICULTURAL EXPORTSLINKAGES ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICESANTIDUMPINGANTIDUMPING CASESANTIDUMPING DUTIESANTITRUST AUTHORITIESANTITRUST DISCIPLINESANTITRUST ENFORCEMENTANTITRUST LAWANTITRUST LAWSANTITRUST LEGISLATIONANTITRUST RULESBARRIERS TO COMPETITIONBARRIERS TO ENTRYCARTELCARTELSCLOSED ECONOMIESCOLLUSIONCOMPETITION AUTHORITIESCOMPETITION CRITERIACOMPETITION LAWCOMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENTCOMPETITION LAWSCOMPETITION LEGISLATIONCOMPETITION POLICIESCOMPETITION POLICYCOMPETITION PRINCIPLESCOMPETITION REGIMESCOMPETITIVE MARKETSCOMPETITIVENESSCOMPLIANCE COSTSCONCESSIONSCONSUMERSCONTESTABILITYCOUNTRY MARKETSDEREGULATIONDEVELOPING COUNTRY CONTEXTDIFFERENTIAL PRICINGDISPUTE SETTLEMENTDOMESTIC COMPETITIONDOMESTIC INDUSTRYDOMESTIC ORIGINDOMESTIC PRODUCTSECONOMIC ANALYSISECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC EFFICIENCYECONOMIC WELFAREECONOMIES OF SCALEECONOMISTSEMPIRICAL EVIDENCEEMPIRICAL STUDIESEXPLOITATIONEXPORT CARTELSEXPORT MARKETSEXPORTSEXTERNALITIESFACTORS OF PRODUCTIONFOREIGN COMPETITIONFOREIGN FIRMSFOREIGN MARKETSFOREIGN PRODUCTSFOREIGN SUPPLIERSFREE TRADEGDPGLOBAL MARKET POWERGOVERNMENT REGULATIONHARMONIZATION OF RULESHOME MARKETIMPERFECT COMPETITIONIMPORT COMPETITIONIMPORT PENETRATIONIMPORTSINCOMEINCREASING RETURNSINCREASING RETURNS TO SCALEINTERNATIONAL SPILLOVERSINTERNATIONAL TRADEINVESTMENT LIBERALIZATIONLEGISLATIONANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES10.1596/1813-9450-2917