Reichhuber, AnkeCamacho, EvaRequate, Till2012-03-302012-03-302009Environment and Development Economics1355770Xhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/4882We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.ENEconomic Development: AgricultureNatural ResourcesEnergyEnvironmentOther Primary Products O130Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets Q120Land Ownership and TenureLand ReformLand UseIrrigationAgriculture and Environment Q150Agricultural PolicyFood Policy Q180Renewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply (the Commons) Q210A Framed Field Experiment on Collective Enforcement Mechanisms with Ethiopian FarmersEnvironment and Development EconomicsJournal ArticleWorld Bank