World Bank2013-07-232013-07-232004-04https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14465The report identifies several areas for reform: 1) sanctions and enforcement should be credible deterrents to help align business practices with the legal and regulatory framework, in particular with respect to related party transactions and insider trading; 2) the current institutional framework places the oversight of listed companies partly with the Department of Company Affairs (DCA), partly with the Securities and Exchange Bard of India (SEBI), and partly with the stock exchanges. This fragmented structure gives rise to regulatory arbitrage and weakens enforcement; 3) Board practices need to be strengthened; 4) institutional investors acting in a fiduciary capacity should be encouraged to formulate a comprehensive corporate governance policy, including voting and Board representation. Together with the detailed policy recommendations, these measures will help implement reforms, and provide opportunities for issuers to signal good practices to investors and the market.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYARBITRAGEAUTHORIZATIONBANKRUPTCYBENCHMARKSBIDCAPITAL MARKETSCASH SETTLEMENTCHARTERED ACCOUNTANTSCOMPANYCOMPANY LAWCONFEDERATIONCORPORATE CONTROLCORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GROWTHCORPORATE OFFICERSCORPORATE PERFORMANCECORPORATE STRATEGYCORPORATIONCORPORATIONSCREDIT RATING AGENCIESDEBTDISCLOSUREDIVIDENDSECONOMIC RESEARCHEMPLOYMENTENFORCEMENT POWERSEXPENDITURESFINANCIAL CONTROLFINANCIAL INFORMATIONFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL RECONSTRUCTIONFIRMSFOREIGN INVESTORSFOREIGN SHAREHOLDERSGDPGUARANTEE FUNDSINSIDER DEALINGINSIDER INFORMATIONINSIDER TRADINGINSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKINSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENTINSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSINTRINSIC VALUELAWYERSLEASINGLEGAL FRAMEWORKLEGISLATIONLISTED COMPANIESMERGERSMINORITY SHAREHOLDERSMUTUAL FUNDMUTUAL FUNDSOFFERINGSORGANIZATIONAL FORMOWNERSHIP STRUCTUREPORTFOLIOPORTFOLIO MANAGERSPREEMPTIVE RIGHTSPRESIDENCYPRIVATE SAVINGSPROFIT MAXIMIZATIONPROFIT MOTIVEREGULATORY FRAMEWORKRIGHT OF APPEALRISK MANAGEMENTSECURED CREDITORSSHAREHOLDER MEETINGSHAREHOLDER MEETINGSSHAREHOLDERSSHAREHOLDERS RIGHTSSHAREHOLDINGSTATE OWNED ENTERPRISESSTATEMENTSTATEMENTSTAKEOVERTAX COMPLIANCETOTAL MARKET CAPITALIZATIONTRANSPARENCYVALUATIONVETOVOTINGVOTING SHARESWEALTHWorld Bank10.1596/14465