Francisco, ManuelaPontara, Nicola2012-06-082012-06-082007-12https://hdl.handle.net/10986/7570This paper seeks to understand whether Mauritanian firms deem corruption as an obstacle to operate and grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more likely to make informal payments, and to quantify the size of these payments. The results of the analysis show that perceptions of corruption can be potentially misleading. Corruption is not considered to be one of the most taxing factors impeding the growth of firms in Mauritania. Yet, its cost to firms is significant and greater than in the comparator group countries. This means that corruption is internalized by firms and considered an accepted practice. Alternatively, firms may fear reporting corruption practices for fear of retaliation. Econometric evidence on the propensity and intensity of bribes suggests that medium-size firms suffer the most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger firms are more established and connected, do not fear exiting the market, and are less likely to be harassed. Smaller firms are less visible and may be able to escape the control of public officials by operating largely in the informal sector. Medium-size firms are the most likely to pay bribes and to pay the highest amounts as a percentage of their total annual sales, which places a heavy burden on their ability to grow.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCESS TO CREDITACCESS TO FINANCEACCOUNTABILITYADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMAGGREGATE GOVERNANCE INDICATORSANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICESAUTHORITYBANK CREDITBARRIERS TO GROWTHBORROWINGBRIBEBRIBE PAYERSBRIBERYBRIBESBUREAUCRACYBUREAUCRATBUREAUCRATIC CONTROLBUREAUCRATIC PROCEDURESBUREAUCRATIC SYSTEMBUSINESS ENVIRONMENTBUSINESS OPERATIONSBUSINESS OWNERSHIPBUSINESS PEOPLEBUSINESSMENCAPITAL STOCKCIVIL LIBERTIESCOMPANYCOMPETITORSCOMPOSITE GOVERNANCE INDICATORSCONSTITUENCIESCORRUPTCORRUPT PRACTICESCORRUPTIONCORRUPTION DATACORRUPTION PERCEPTIONCORRUPTION VARIABLESCOUNTRIES % FIRMSCOUNTRY REPORTSCPICREDIT ACCESSCRIMEDECISION-MAKINGDEGREE OF CORRUPTIONDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIZATIONECONOMIC AGENTSECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC REFORMSEMBEZZLEMENTEMPLOYEEEMPLOYMENTENTREPRENEURSEXPANSIONEXPLOITATIONFAMILIESFAMILY BUSINESSFIGHTING CORRUPTIONFINANCIAL COSTFINANCIAL MANAGEMENTFINANCIAL MARKETSFIRM SIZEFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTFOREIGN FIRMSFOREIGN OWNERSHIPGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE INDICATORSGOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESSGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSGOVERNMENT REGULATIONSGOVERNMENT SERVICESGRAFTGROWTH RATEGROWTH RATESHUMAN RIGHTSINCOMEINEQUALITYINFORMAL PAYMENTINFORMAL PAYMENTSINFORMAL SECTORINFORMATION TECHNOLOGYINSURANCE SERVICESINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL TRADEINVESTMENT CLIMATEKEY CHALLENGEKICKBACKSLACK OF COMPETITIONLATIN AMERICANLEADERSHIPLISTED COMPANYLOANMEASURING CORRUPTIONMEASURING GOVERNANCEMEDIUM ENTERPRISESMICRO ENTERPRISESMONOPOLIESNATURAL RESOURCESNEW BUSINESSOBSTACLES TO GROWTHOFFICE HOLDERSOLIGARCHYPARTYPATRONAGEPERCEPTION OF CORRUPTIONPERSONAL GAINPETTY CORRUPTIONPOLITICAL CORRUPTIONPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL STABILITYPOLITICIANSPREFERENTIALPRIVATE GAINPRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENTPROCUREMENTPROCUREMENT POLICIESPROFITABILITYPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONPUBLIC CONTRACTSPUBLIC FINANCEPUBLIC FINANCESPUBLIC INVESTMENTPUBLIC OFFICIALPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC RESOURCESPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SPENDINGREAL ESTATERED TAPEREGULATORY BURDENREGULATORY POLICIESREGULATORY QUALITYRULE OF LAWSKILLED WORKERSSMALL FIRMSSOURCE OF INFORMATIONSTATE CONTROLSUB-SAHARAN AFRICATAX INSPECTIONSTAX RATETAX RATESTAX REVENUESTERM CREDITTRANSPARENCYUNOFFICIAL ECONOMYVIOLENCEWEALTH CREATIONWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4439