Singh, Raju JanBodea, CristinaHigashijima, Masaaki2014-12-032014-12-032014-11https://hdl.handle.net/10986/20607This paper explores the conditions under which public spending could minimize violent conflict related to oil wealth. Previous work suggests that oil can lead to violent conflict because it increases the value of the state as a prize or because it undermines the state's bureaucratic penetration. Yet, little has been said on how oil wealth could be used to prevent the onset of violent conflict through public spending by buying off citizens and elites, increasing state legitimacy by providing basic services, or strengthening the military and security apparatus. The empirical analysis (148 countries over 1960-2009) shows that higher levels of military spending are associated with lower risk of small- and large-scale conflict onset in countries rich in oil and gas. By contrast, in economies with little natural resources, increases in military spending are associated with a higher risk of conflict. Welfare expenditure is associated with lower risk of small-scale conflict, irrespective of the level of oil revenue. However, general government spending does not appear to have any robust mitigating effects.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOADEQUATE EDUCATIONADULT LITERACYARMED CONFLICTARMED FORCEARMED FORCESARMSBASIC HUMAN NEEDSBATTLECITIZENCITIZENSCIVIL CONFLICTCIVIL CONFLICTSCIVIL LIBERTIESCIVIL PEACECIVIL SERVICECIVIL UNRESTCIVIL WARCIVIL WARSCOERCIONCOLD WARCONFLICTCONFLICT MANAGEMENTCONFLICT PREVENTIONCONFLICT RESEARCHCONFLICT RESOLUTIONCONFLICT RISKCONFLICT RISKSCONFLICTSCOST OF REBELLIONDEATHSDEMOCRACYDEMOCRACY SCOREDEPENDENCEDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT POLICYDISPUTESDOMESTIC VIOLENCEDURATION OF CONFLICTDURATION OF PEACEECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIESECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYEDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTENERGY CONSUMPTIONETHNIC DIVISIONSETHNIC GROUPETHNIC HETEROGENEITYETHNIC POLITICSFERTILITYFIGHTINGFOUNDATIONSGENOCIDEGOVERNMENT POWERHEALTH SECTORHIGH RISKHUMAN CAPITALHUMAN CAPITAL FORMATIONIMFINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME PER CAPITAINCREASE IN RISKINFANTINFANT MORTALITYINTERNAL CONFLICTINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONINTERNATIONAL SECURITYINTERNATIONAL STUDIESINTERNATIONAL WARINTERPERSONAL SKILLSINVESTMENT IN EDUCATIONJOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTIONLACK OF DEMOCRACYLEVEL OF POVERTYLIMITED RESOURCESLINGUISTIC FRACTIONALIZATIONLITERACY RATESLIVING STANDARDSMATERIAL RESOURCESMILITARIZATIONMILITARY BUDGETSMILITARY EXPENDITUREMILITARY EXPENDITURESMILITARY FORCESMILITARY OPPOSITIONMILITARY PERSONNELMILITARY REGIMESMILITARY SPENDINGNATIONAL DEFENSENATIONALISMNATIONSNATURAL GASNATURAL RESOURCENATURAL RESOURCESOBSERVEROPPORTUNITY COSTPEACEPEACE RESEARCHPENSIONSPERSONAL ENRICHMENTPOLICEPOLICY DISCUSSIONSPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPERPOLITICAL CHANGEPOLITICAL INSTABILITYPOLITICAL LEADERSHIPPOLITICAL OPPOSITIONPOLITICAL PARTICIPATIONPOLITICAL PROCESSPOLITICAL RIGHTSPOLITICAL STABILITYPOLITICAL SUPPORTPOLITICAL VIOLENCEPOPULATION SIZEPOPULOUS COUNTRIESPOST-CONFLICTPROGRESSPUBLIC SERVICEPUBLIC SERVICESQUALITY OF LIFEREBELREBEL GROUPREBEL GROUPSREBEL RECRUITMENTREBELLIONREBELSRECONSTRUCTIONRELIGIOUS FRACTIONALIZATIONRESOURCE MOBILIZATIONREVOLUTIONSRISK OF CONFLICTRISKS OF CONFLICTRURAL AREASSAFETY NETSSANITATIONSECONDARY EDUCATIONSECURITY FORCESSERVICE DELIVERYSOCIAL COHESIONSOCIAL EXPENDITURESSOCIAL MOBILITYSOCIAL POLICIESSOCIAL SECTORSSOCIAL SECURITYSOCIAL WELFARESTATE UNIVERSITYTERRORISMTOLERANCEUNEMPLOYMENTVICTIMSVIOLENT CONFLICTVIOLENT CONFLICTSVIOLENT MEANSWAR DURATIONWAR ECONOMYWAR PROJECTWARFAREWORLD DEVELOPMENTYOUNG MALEYOUNG PEOPLEYOUNG SOLDIERSOil and Civil Conflict : Can Public Spending Have a Mitigation Effect?10.1596/1813-9450-7100