Estache, AntonioGuasch, Jose-LuisIimi, AtsushiTrujillo, Lourdes2012-03-302012-03-302009Review of Industrial Organization0889938Xhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/5698Multidimensional auctions are a natural, practical solution when governments pursue more than one objective in their public-private-partnership transactions. However, multi-criteria auctions seem difficult to implement and vulnerable to corruption and opportunistic behavior of both parties involved. Using data from road and railway concessions in Latin America, the paper examines the probability of renegotiation in connection with the selected award criteria. It shows that auctioneers tend to adopt the multidimensional format when the need for social considerations, such as alleviation of unemployment, is high. But more renegotiations would likely happen when the multidimensional format is used. Good governance, particularly regulatory quality and anti-corruption policies, can mitigate the renegotiation problem.ENPublicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets H440National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: InfrastructuresOther Public Investment and Capital Stock H540Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920Formal and Informal SectorsShadow EconomyInstitutional Arrangements O170Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural AnalysesTransportation O180Transportation Systems: Government and Private Investment AnalysisRoad Maintenance, Transportation Planning R420Journal ArticleWorld Bank