Ararat, MelsaDallas, George2012-08-132012-08-132011-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/11071What should investors do when scholarly research on corporate governance in emerging markets does not provide conclusive evidence on which aspects of governance matter most across all the emerging markets and how they affect firm performance? A researcher and a practitioner team up to offer guidelines and recommendations that focus on board independence and business group affiliation. Every day, institutional investors in emerging markets must make practical decisions on the basis of incomplete and at times conflicting information. So, it is critically important that they make the best use of this imperfect knowledge. Moreover, investors too often enter emerging markets with misguided perceptions of the underlying realities. And worse, they may cling to a conceptual framework of governance that does not allow them even to consider the searching questions they should be asking. This Private Sector Opinion, by the authors, explicitly highlights this problem. The authors identify a serious gap in research on emerging markets between high-level cross-country studies, with their inconclusive findings on good governance indicators at the macro level, and the separate effort to establish firm-level or country-specific governance metrics, typically based on what works 'in the West.' Unfortunately, less than one percent of the research papers available on corporate governance focus on emerging markets.CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGOACCOUNTINGACCOUNTING STANDARDSAGENCY COSTSAGENCY PROBLEMASSET GROWTHASSET MANAGEMENTAUDIT COMMITTEEBOARD MEETINGSBOARD MEMBERSBOARDS OF DIRECTORSBONDHOLDERSBRIBERYBUSINESS ETHICSBUSINESS LAWYERCAPITAL MARKETCAPITAL MARKETSCAPITAL RATIOCARBON DISCLOSURECASH FLOWCEOCEOSCHARTERED ACCOUNTANTSCHECKSCHIEF EXECUTIVESCOMPANY LAWCOMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCECONFLICTS OF INTERESTCONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERCONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERSCORPORATE BEHAVIORCORPORATE BOARDSCORPORATE CULTURECORPORATE FINANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODESCORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMSCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMCORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDSCORPORATE OWNERSHIPCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITYCORPORATE TRANSPARENCYCORPORATIONSCORRUPT PRACTICESCORRUPTIONCOUNTRY TO COUNTRYCREDITORSCRITICAL MASSDERIVATIVEDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDIRECTOR INDEPENDENCEDIVERSIFIED PORTFOLIODOMESTIC COMPANIESDUMMY VARIABLEECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC PERFORMANCEEMERGING ECONOMIESEMERGING MARKETEMERGING MARKET COMPANIESEMERGING MARKET FIRMSEMERGING MARKETSEQUITY INVESTORSEQUITY PRICESEXPROPRIATIONFAMILY BUSINESSFAMILY FIRMFAMILY FIRMSFINANCE CORPORATIONFINANCIAL CAPITALFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL MARKETFINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENTFINANCIAL MARKETSFINANCIAL STATEMENTSFINANCIAL STUDIESFINANCIAL VOLATILITYFIRM PERFORMANCEFIRM STRUCTURESFIRM-LEVEL CORPORATE GOVERNANCEFIRM-LEVEL GOVERNANCEFRAUDGLOBAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCEGLOBAL ECONOMYGLOBAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCTGLOBAL INVESTORGLOBAL PRIVATE SECTORGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTSGOVERNANCE CHALLENGEGOVERNANCE INDEXESGOVERNANCE INDICATORSGOVERNANCE ISSUESGOVERNANCE MECHANISMGOVERNANCE MECHANISMSGOVERNANCE PRACTICESGOVERNANCE RESEARCHGROUP COMPANIESGROUP OF INVESTORSGROWTH RATEHOLDINGHOLDING COMPANYHUMAN CAPITALILLIQUIDITYINCENTIVE STRUCTURESINCOMEINDEPENDENT BOARDSINDEPENDENT DIRECTORSINDEPENDENT OVERSIGHTINDIVIDUAL COMPANIESINDIVIDUAL INVESTORSINFORMATION ASYMMETRYINFORMATION FLOWSINSIDER TRADINGINSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKINSTITUTIONAL INVESTORINSTITUTIONAL INVESTORSINSURERSINTERESTS OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERSINTERNATIONAL BUSINESSINTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONSINTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCEINTERNATIONAL FINANCEINTERNATIONAL INVESTORSINVESTIGATIONINVESTMENT DECISIONSINVESTMENT POLICIESINVESTOR CONFIDENCEINVESTOR PERSPECTIVEINVESTOR PROTECTIONINVESTOR PROTECTIONSINVESTOR RISKSJOURNAL OF CORPORATION LAWJURISDICTIONSLABOR MARKETLABOR MARKETSLAW ENFORCEMENTLEGAL INFRASTRUCTURESLEGAL REGIMESLEGAL SYSTEMSLIENLIMITEDLIQUIDITYLOANLOCAL INSTITUTIONSMAJORITY SHAREHOLDERSMANAGERSMARKET COMPETITIONMARKET DOWNTURNSMARKET GOVERNANCEMARKET PRICEMARKET VALUEMINORITY INTERESTSMINORITY INVESTORMINORITY INVESTORSMINORITY OWNERMINORITY SHAREHOLDERMINORITY SHAREHOLDERSMONETARY FUNDOWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP STRUCTUREOWNERSHIP STRUCTURESPARTYPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL INTERFERENCEPORTFOLIOPORTFOLIO HOLDINGSPORTFOLIO INVESTMENTPROXYPROXY VOTINGPUBLIC COMPANIESPUBLIC GOVERNANCEPUBLIC OFFICIALSREGULATORSREGULATORY QUALITYREPAYMENTRETURNRETURN ON ASSETSRISK FACTORRULE OF LAWSALES GROWTHSAVINGSSHAREHOLDERSHAREHOLDER ACTIVISMSHAREHOLDER VALUESHAREHOLDER VOTESSHAREHOLDERSSOCIETIESSOCIETYSTOCK RETURNSSUBSIDIARIESSUBSIDIARYSUSTAINABLE INVESTMENTTAXTRANSACTIONTRANSACTION COSTSTRANSITION ECONOMIESTRANSPARENCYTRUST FUNDVALUATIONVALUATIONSWEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCEWEAK CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMSWorld Bank10.1596/11071