Keefer, Philip2013-08-052013-08-052004-03https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14786The author reviews how three pillars of political economy-collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections-help us answer the question: Why do some countries develop and others do not? Each makes tremendous advances in our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOPOLITICAL ECONOMYECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTCOLLECTIVE ACTIONINSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC POLICYVOTERSPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AGRICULTUREANTI-CORRUPTIONAUTHORITYBARRIERS TO ENTRYCABINETCABINET GOVERNMENTSCITIZENCITIZENSCOLLECTIVE ACTIONCOLONIESCONSTITUENCIESCONSTITUENCYCONSTITUENTSCONSTITUTIONCORRUPTIONCORRUPTION DATACOUNTRY DATADECISION MAKERSDECISION MAKINGDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEREGULATIONDICTATORSHIPDISTRICTSECONOMIC ACTIVITYECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC EFFECTSECONOMIC POLICIESECONOMIC POWERECONOMIC RENTSELECTIONELECTORAL RULESELECTORAL SYSTEMSELECTORATEEMPIRICAL EVIDENCEEXECUTIVE BRANCHFINANCIAL CRISESFORMAL INSTITUTIONSFRANCHISEGOVERNMENT ACTIONGOVERNMENT CREDIBILITYGOVERNMENT DECISIONGOVERNMENT DECISION MAKINGGOVERNMENT PERFORMANCEGOVERNMENT POLICYGOVERNMENT SPENDINGGROWTHINCOMEINEFFICIENCYINEQUALITYINSOLVENTINSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTSLAWSLEGAL OBSTACLESLEGISLATIONLEGISLATIVE COMMITTEESLEGISLATIVE ELECTIONSLEGISLATORLEGISLATORSLEGISLATURELEGISLATURESLESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIESLOWER HOUSEMINISTERSMONETARY POLICYMOTIVATIONSNATIONAL BUDGETNATIONAL INTERESTNATIONAL POLICYNATIONSNATURAL RESOURCESPARLIAMENTPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMSPARTY DISCIPLINEPER CAPITA INCOMEPER CAPITA INCOMESPOLICY MAKERSPOLICY MAKINGPOLICY OUTCOMESPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORMPOLITICAL INSTABILITYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL LEADERSPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL RISKPOLITICAL SYSTEMPOLITICIANSPRESIDENTSPRICE CONTROLSPRIME MINISTERPRIVATE GOODSPRODUCER INCENTIVESPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSPUBLIC INTERESTPUBLIC INVESTMENTPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC SPENDINGPURCHASING POWERPURCHASING POWER PARITYREPRESENTATIVESRULE OF LAWSAVINGSSENATESEPARATION OF POWERSSKILLED WORKERSSTANDING ORDERSSTATE GOVERNORSTAX RATETAXATIONTECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONTRADEOFFSVETOVETO POWERVOTER PREFERENCESVOTERSVOTINGWEALTHWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3250