Beck, Thorsten2014-05-092014-05-092003-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18210Deposit insurance schemes and bank failure resolution systems are asked to fulfill conflicting public policy objectives: on the one hand, they are supposed to protect small depositors and prevent contagion risks from bank runs; on the other hand, they are supposed to minimize aggressive risk taking by banks. Beck discusses the incentive-compatible design and interaction of both components of the financial safety net and describes and compares three countries with different safety net arrangements-Brazil, Germany, and Russia.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYADVERSE SELECTIONAGENTSAPPLICATIONSAUDITINGAUDITSBALANCE SHEETBANK DEPOSITSBANK FAILUREBANK FAILURE RESOLUTIONBANK FAILURESBANK INSOLVENCYBANK MANAGEMENTBANK REGULATIONBANK RUNSBANK SUPERVISIONBANKING CRISESBANKING CRISISBANKING INDUSTRYBANKING SECTORBANKING STRUCTUREBANKING SYSTEMBANKRUPTCYBANKSCAPITAL BASECENTRAL BANKCOINSURANCECOMMERCIAL BANKSCOMPENSATIONCONTAGIONCOOPERATIVE BANKSCOUNTRY COMPARISONSCROSS-COUNTRY EXPERIENCEDEPOSIT INSURANCEDEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGEDEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMESDEPOSITOR PROTECTIONDEPOSITORSDEPOSITSEXPLICIT COVERAGEFINANCIAL FRAGILITYFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL INTERMEDIATIONFINANCIAL LIBERALIZATIONFINANCIAL RISKFINANCIAL STABILITYIMPAIRED ASSETSINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTINSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTINSURANCEINSURANCE FUNDSINSURED DEPOSITSINSURERSINTEREST RATESJUDICIAL SYSTEMSLAWSLENDER OF LAST RESORTLIQUID ASSETSLIQUIDATIONLIQUIDATION OF BANKSLIQUIDITYLOOTINGMANDATESMARKET DISCIPLINEMORAL HAZARDPENALTIESPREMIUMSPRIVATIZATIONPUBLIC POLICYREGULATIONREGULATORY FORBEARANCERISK ASSESSMENTRISK MANAGEMENTRISK PREMIUMRISK TAKINGSAVINGSSAVINGS BANKSSHAREHOLDERSSMALL BANKSSTOCK PRICESSUBORDINATED DEBTSUPERVISORY AUTHORITIESTRANSPARENCY DEPOSIT INSURANCEPUBLIC POLICYSAFETY NET POLICIESCREDITORSBANK MANAGEMENTMARKET EQUILIBRIUMAUDITINGINSURANCE PREMIUMSSHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTSTRANSPARENCYDEPOSIT INSURANCE10.1596/1813-9450-3043