Barrera-Osorio, FelipeRaju, Dhushyanth2015-07-162015-07-162015-06https://hdl.handle.net/10986/22180This paper presents evidence from the first three years of a randomized controlled trial of a government-administered pilot teacher performance pay program in Punjab, Pakistan. The program offers yearly cash bonuses to teachers in a sample of public primary schools with the lowest mean student exam scores in the province. Bonuses are linked to three school-level indicators: the gain in student exam scores, the gain in school enrollment, and the level of student exam participation. Bonus receipt and size are also randomly assigned across schools according to whether or not the teacher is the school’s head. On average, the program increases school enrollment by 4.1 percent and student exam participation rates by 3.4 percentage points, both in the third year. The analysis does not find that the program increases student exam scores in any year. Mean impacts are similar across program variants. The positive mean impact on school enrollment is mainly seen in urban schools and the positive mean impact on student exam participation rates is only seen in rural schools.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOSKILLSSCHOOL SYSTEMEMPLOYMENTPUBLIC PRIMARY SCHOOLSCOEDUCATIONAL SCHOOLSSCHOOL TEACHERSLEVEL OF SKILLTEACHERSEDUCATION MANAGEMENTACHIEVEMENT TESTSSTUDENT-TEACHER RATIOSCHOOL HEADEARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENTENROLLMENTDISTRICT EDUCATIONSCHOOL ENROLLMENTGROUPSHIGH SCHOOLHEAD TEACHEREDUCATION OUTCOMESCLASSROOM RATIOPAPERSTEACHER PERFORMANCESCHOOL CENSUSTEACHER COMPETENCYSCHOOL LOCATIONSCHOOL INDICATORSEXAMSEXAMHIGH SCHOOLSOPEN ACCESSEDUCATION SECTOREDUCATION FOR ALLTECHNICAL ASSISTANCESCHOOL EFFECTIVENESSTRAININGEDUCATORSPERFORMANCE INDICATORSEFFECTIVE TEACHINGPRIVATE SCHOOLSGRADUATEACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTECONOMICS OF EDUCATIONSCHOOL VISITSSECONDARY SCHOOLEDUCATION DEPARTMENTSTUDENT OUTCOMESPROVINCIAL EDUCATIONPRIMARY SCHOOL STUDENTSHIGH SCHOOL DIPLOMASTUDENT ACHIEVEMENTOFFICIAL CURRICULUMLEARNINGSCHOOL QUALITYRESEARCHTEACHER SALARIESFIRST GRADESCHOOL STUDENTSPUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMPRIMARY SCHOOLENROLLMENT FIGURESTEACHINGPASS RATESCHOOL LEVELPRIMARY SCHOOLSSCHOOL MANAGEMENTEDUCATION SYSTEMSEXAM SCOREENROLLMENT BY GRADESCHOOL PARTICIPATIONSCHOOL YEAREXAM QUESTIONSRURAL SCHOOLSPROFESSIONAL TRAININGSCIENCEVALUESTEACHER WORKFORCEPRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERSSTUDENTSCHOOLSHEAD TEACHERSPARTICIPATIONEFFECTIVE TEACHERSEDUCATION REFORMURBAN SCHOOLSENROLLMENT DATAENROLLMENT RATESCHOOL LEADERSRESEARCHERSPRIMARY SCHOOL LEVELEARLY CHILDHOODSTUDENT SCORESNUTRITIONSCHOOL SYSTEMSGRADE EXAMEDUCATION GOALSLEARNING OBJECTIVESSMALL SCHOOLSCURRICULUMTEACHERSCHOOL NUTRITIONTEACHER SHORTAGESEDUCATIONAL OUTCOMESTEACHER RATIOCHILDRENEDUCATION DEPARTMENTSFUNCTIONAL SCHOOLSEDUCATIONSTUDENT TEACHER RATIOSCHOOL PERFORMANCEHUMAN RESOURCESRURAL AREASPRIVATE SCHOOL TEACHERSSCHOOL TEACHERTEACHER EFFECTIVENESSCHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENTGIRLSACADEMIC QUALIFICATIONSPUBLIC SCHOOLPUBLIC SCHOOLSSCHOOL ADMINISTRATORSUNIVERSITYSTUDENTSPRIMARY LEVELLEADERSHIPSCHOOL EDUCATIONINTERVENTIONSNET ENROLLMENTNUMBER OF STUDENTSSTUDENTS PER TEACHEREDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTSNET ENROLLMENT RATEPRIMARY EDUCATIONREADERSCLASSROOMCLASSROOMSSCHOOLHIGHER GRADESNUMBER OF TEACHERSSTUDENT LEARNINGEDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESSANNUAL SCHOOL CENSUSPARTICIPATION RATESUNIVERSITIESHUMAN DEVELOPMENTPRIVATE SCHOOLSCHOOL AGETeacher Performance PayWorking PaperWorld BankExperimental Evidence from Pakistan10.1596/1813-9450-7307