Shah, Anwar2012-06-222012-06-222006-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8805This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralized local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long run. This is because localization helps to break the monopoly of power at the national level by bringing decisionmaking closer to people. Localization strengthens government accountability to citizens by involving citizens in monitoring government performance and demanding corrective actions. Localization as a means to making government responsive and accountable to people can help reduce corruption and improve service delivery. Efforts to improve service delivery usually force the authorities to address corruption and its causes. However, one must pay attention to the institutional environment and the risk of local capture by elites. In the institutional environments typical of some developing countries, when in a geographical area, feudal or industrial interests dominate and institutions of participation and accountability are weak or ineffective and political interference in local affairs is rampant, localization may increase opportunities for corruption. This suggests a pecking order of anticorruption policies and programs where the rule of law and citizen empowerment should be the first priority in any reform efforts. Localization in the absence of rule of law may not prove to be a potent remedy for combating corruption.CC BY 3.0 IGOABUSESABUSES OF POWERACCOUNTABILITY IN GOVERNANCEADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMYADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURESANTI-CORRUPTIONANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGYANTICORRUPTIONANTICORRUPTION AGENCIESANTICORRUPTION EFFORTSAUTHORITYBANKING SYSTEMBRIBERYBRIBESBUREAUCRATBUREAUCRATIC CORRUPTIONCAMPAIGN FINANCINGCITIZENCITIZEN NEEDSCITIZENSCIVIL SERVANTSCIVIL SERVICECOLLUSIONCONTRACT ENFORCEMENTCONTROLLING CORRUPTIONCORRUPT ACTSCORRUPT COUNTRIESCORRUPT OFFICIALSCORRUPT PRACTICESCORRUPTIONCRIMECRITICAL IMPORTANCEDECENTRALIZATIONDECISION MAKINGDECISION-MAKINGDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONSDEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATIONDEMOCRATIC PROCESSDEMOCRATIC SYSTEMDISCRETIONDISTRICTSDYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNANCEECONOMIC ACTIVITYECONOMIC POLICIESELECTED OFFICIALSELECTORAL COMPETITIONELECTORAL SYSTEMSETHICSEXECUTIVE BRANCHFIGHTING CORRUPTIONFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL RUINFISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONFOREIGN EXCHANGEFOREIGN INVESTMENTFORMAL ECONOMYFRAUDGOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENTGOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITYGOVERNMENT AGENCIESGOVERNMENT DECISIONGOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONSGOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSGOVERNMENT PERFORMANCEGRAND CORRUPTIONINCOMEINEQUALITYINFANT MORTALITYINFORMATION ACCESSINSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTINTEGRITYINTEREST GROUPSJUDICIAL SYSTEMSJUDICIARYJUSTICELAWSLEGAL FRAMEWORKLEGISLATIONLEGISLATORSLEGISLATURELEGITIMACYLEVELS OF GOVERNMENTLOCAL GOVERNANCELOCAL GOVERNMENTLOCAL GOVERNMENTSLOCAL LEVELSLOCAL POLITICIANSMACROECONOMIC STABILITYMALFEASANCENATIONAL ELECTIONSNATIONAL GOVERNMENTSNATIONAL LEVELNATIONALIZATIONNEWS MEDIAPARLIAMENTPETTY CORRUPTIONPOLICE FORCESPOLICY DESIGNPOLITICAL CONTESTABILITYPOLITICAL CORRUPTIONPOLITICAL INTERFERENCEPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL REFORMSPOLITICIANSPOOR GOVERNANCEPREFERENTIALPREFERENTIAL TREATMENTPRIORITIESPROCUREMENTPROSECUTIONPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONPUBLIC AWARENESSPUBLIC BUREAUCRACYPUBLIC EXPENDITURESPUBLIC FUNDSPUBLIC GOVERNANCEPUBLIC HEALTHPUBLIC HEALTH CAREPUBLIC MANAGEMENTPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC RESOURCESPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SECTOR CORRUPTIONPUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENTPUBLIC SERVICEPUBLIC SERVICE PROVISIONPUBLIC SERVICESPUNISHMENTREGULATORY CAPTUREREMEDIESREVOLUTIONRULE OF LAWSERVICE DELIVERYSOCIAL INTERACTIONSSTATE POWERSTATE PROPERTYTAX BASETAX RATESTAXATIONTRANSPARENCYUPPER HOUSEVETOVETO POWERWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3824