World Bank2015-10-082015-10-082015-08https://hdl.handle.net/10986/22749The state-owned enterprise (SOE) landscape has become increasingly diverse. There used to be some relatively well-defined criteria, but with the growing complexity of state participation in the economy, there is no longer a uniform definition, and especially because the definition of a SOE has always been country-specific. SOE reforms can have major positive impacts not only by reducing fiscal risks by decreasing hidden subsidies, direct transfers, and overstaffing, but also by strengthening competition and developing capital markets. SOE reforms in developing countries began in the 1960s because of the poor performance of many of the SOEs. The reform movement sought to strengthen the internal capacity of SOEs. To enrich the discussion about possible avenues for performance-enhancing SOE reforms, this report presents the main principles of good governance of SOEs with references to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs (OECD 2005). This document is divided into six parts: (1) an effective legal and regulatory framework for SOEs; (2) the state as an owner; (3) equitable treatment of shareholders; (4) relations with stakeholders; (5) transparency and disclosure; and (6) the responsibilities of the boards of SOEs.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOPRIVATIZATION PROCEEDSREGULATORY FRAMEWORKREVOLUTIONDISCLOSURE OF INFORMATIONPRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATIONEMPLOYMENT GENERATIONPUBLIC PROCUREMENTFINANCINGFINANCIAL MANAGEMENTLEGAL STRUCTURESFOREIGN OWNERSHIPDECISION-MAKING PROCESSPUBLIC INVESTMENTSPUBLIC SECTORSTATE PARTICIPATIONGOVERNMENTGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSFINANCIAL ASSISTANCENATIONSRESPONSIBILITYLOCAL GOVERNMENTSPOLITICIANSGOOD GOVERNANCESOCIAL SAFETY NETHUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENTAUTHORITIESCORRUPTIONDISCLOSUREINDEPENDENCEPUBLIC FUNDINGOVERSIGHTMINISTERSSTATE BANKSFINANCIAL AUTONOMYADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMYINSTITUTIONAL ANALYSISFINANCIAL AUDITSREGULATORY BODYHUMAN RESOURCEPUBLIC POLICYSTATESFOREIGN TRADESTATE FUNDINGLACK OF TRANSPARENCYSTATE OWNERSHIPEXECUTIONLEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORKFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONAUTHORITYINFORMAL ECONOMYDECREEPUBLIC FUNDSEMBEZZLEMENTPOLITICAL POWERLABOR PRODUCTIVITYSOCIAL SAFETYMINISTRIESFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSCENTRALIZATIONLEGISLATIONPUBLIC FINANCEREPRESENTATIVESSOCIAL RETURNSFINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONLEGAL FRAMEWORKPUBLIC INVESTMENTFISCALHUMAN CAPITALACCOUNTABILITYTRANSPARENCYPRIVATE OWNERSHIPMANAGERIAL AUTONOMYPUBLIC POLICIESNATIONALIZATIONSTATE ENTERPRISESPOLITICAL CONTROLSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISESFOREIGN INVESTMENTFINANCIAL DISCIPLINEGOVERNMENT REVENUEFINANCIAL PERFORMANCELEGAL FORMDECISION-MAKINGPOLITICAL INTERFERENCEINSTITUTIONAL CAPACITYREGULATORY BODIESPUBLIC INSTITUTIONSREPRESENTATIONSTATE BUDGETBUREAUCRATIC POWERCITIZENSPOLITICAL ELITESPREFERENTIAL TREATMENTPUBLIC DEBTREGULATORY REGIMESSOCIAL POLICIESCONSTITUTIONGOVERNANCEENFORCEMENTPUBLIC RESOURCESFINANCIAL CONTROLPUBLIC MANAGEMENTSTATEGOVERNMENT AGENCIESGOVERNMENT OWNERSHIPREGIONSSTATE SUBSIDIESSTATE CONTROLENTERPRISE REFORMHUMAN RESOURCESINTERNAL AUDITMINISTRY OF FINANCEFINANCIAL INFORMATIONFINANCIAL RISKSNATIONALISMSTATE ASSETSSTATE INTERVENTIONLAWRISK MANAGEMENTAUDITPOOR GOVERNANCEPRIVATE SECTOR GROWTHGOVERNMENTSPUBLIC SERVICECORPORATE GOVERNANCEReportWorld Bank10.1596/22749