Torgler, Benno2012-03-192012-03-192011-12-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3680This study tries to remedy the current lack of tax compliance research analyzing tax morale in 10 Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004 or 2007. By exploring tax morale differences between 1999 and 2008, it shows that tax morale has decreased in 7 out of 10 Eastern European countries. This lack of sustainability may support the incentive based conditionality hypothesis that the European Union only has a limited ability to influence tax morale over time. The author observes that events and processes at the country level are crucial to understanding tax morale. Factors such as perceived government quality and trust in the justice system and the government are positively correlated with tax morale in 2008.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTINGADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURESADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMALLOCATION OF RESOURCESAUDITSAUTHORITARIANISMBANK POLICYBUREAUCRACYCAPITAL STOCKCASH MANAGEMENTCENTRAL GOVERNMENTSCHECKSCITIZENSCOEFFICIENTSCOMMON MARKETCOMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIESCOMMUNISMCOMMUNISTCONFIDENCE OF INVESTORSCONSUMER GOODSCORRUPTIONCOUNTRY DUMMIESCOUNTRY RISKCOUNTRY TO COUNTRYCREDIBILITYDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATIONDEMOCRATIZATIONDEMOGRAPHICDEREGULATIONDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDICTATORSHIPDIRECT PAYMENTECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMIC REFORMSECONOMIC STRUCTURESENFORCEMENTSEQUIPMENTEXCHANGE CONTROLSEXCHANGE SYSTEMEXPENDITUREEXPENDITURE NEEDSEXPORTERSFEDERAL STATESFEDERALISMFINANCIAL AUTONOMYFINANCIAL STABILITYFISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONFISCAL FEDERALISMFISCAL INSTITUTIONSFISCAL POLICIESFISCAL POLICYFOREIGN CAPITALFOREIGN INVESTMENTFRAUDGLOBAL ECONOMYGLOBALIZATIONGOVERNMENT AUTHORITYGOVERNMENT BUDGETGOVERNMENT LEGITIMACYGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSGOVERNMENT REVENUEGOVERNMENT SERVICESGOVERNMENT STRUCTURESGOVERNMENT TRUSTHUMAN DEVELOPMENTINCENTIVE STRUCTUREINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME TAXINCOME TAX REFORMINFORMATION SYSTEMINSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTSINSTITUTIONAL REFORMSINSTRUMENTINSURANCEINSURANCESINSURERSINTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONSINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL ECONOMICSINVESTMENT DECISIONSJUSTICE SYSTEMLAW ENFORCEMENTLEGAL REGULATIONLEGAL STRUCTURESLEGAL SYSTEMLEVELS OF GOVERNMENTLIVING STANDARDSLOCAL AUTONOMYLOCAL GOVERNMENTLOCAL TAXESMARGINAL TAX RATESMARKET ECONOMYMARKET REFORMSMEMBER STATESMONETARY FUNDMUNICIPALITIESNATIONSOUTPUTPERSONAL INCOMEPERSONAL INCOME TAXPLEDGESPOLICY CHANGESPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL ELITESPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL RISKPOLITICAL STABILITYPOLITICAL SYSTEMPOLITICIANSPOST OFFICEPRIVATIZATIONPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC ECONOMICSPUBLIC FINANCEPUBLIC INSTITUTIONSPUBLIC MANAGEMENTPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC SERVICEREPUBLICSREPUTATIONRETURNREVENUE ADMINISTRATIONREVENUE ASSIGNMENTREVENUE AUTHORITIESREVENUE NEEDSREVENUE PERFORMANCERULE OF LAWSOCIAL CAPITALSOCIAL COSTSSOCIAL LEARNINGSOCIAL NORMSSOCIAL SECURITYSOCIALISMSTATE APPARATUSSTATE CAPTURESTATE INSTITUTIONSSTATE PROPERTYSTATE REVENUESSUB-NATIONALSUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTSTAXTAX ADMINISTRATIONTAX ADMINISTRATION SYSTEMTAX ADMINISTRATIONSTAX ASSESSMENTTAX AUTHORITYTAX AVOIDANCETAX BASESTAX BURDENTAX CHANGESTAX COLLECTIONTAX COMPLIANCETAX COMPLIANCE COSTSTAX CONCESSIONSTAX EFFORTTAX EVADERSTAX EVASIONTAX INCENTIVESTAX INSTRUMENTSTAX LAWSTAX LEGISLATIONTAX LIABILITIESTAX OFFICESTAX POLICIESTAX POLICYTAX REFORMTAX REFORMSTAX REPORTSTAX RETURNSTAX STRUCTURETAX SYSTEMTAX SYSTEMSTAXATIONTAXPAYERSTRANSACTIONTRANSACTION COSTSTRANSITION COUNTRIESTRANSITION COUNTRYTRANSITION ECONOMIESTRANSITION ECONOMYTRANSPARENCYVETOWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-5911