Elbadawi, Ibrahim A.Sambanis, Nicholas2014-08-272014-08-272000-09https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19794The authors combine an empirical model of external intervention, with a theoretical model of civil war duration. Their empirical model of intervention allows them to analyze civil war duration, using "expected" rather than "actual" external intervention as an explanatory variable in the duration model. Unlike previous studies, they find that external intervention is positively associated with the duration of civil war. They distinguish partial third-party interventions that extend the length of war, from multilateral "peace" operations, which have a mandate to restore peace without taking sides - and which typically take place at war's end, or at least when both sides have agreed to a cease-fire. In a future paper, the authors will examine whether partial third-party interventions - whatever their effect on a war's duration - increase the risk of war's recurrence. If that proves true, then even if interventions reduce the length of civil war, they may do so at the cost of further destabilizing the political system, and sowing the seeds of future rebellion.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOBOUNDARIESCIVIL CONFLICTSCIVIL WARCIVIL WAR DATACIVIL WAR DATABASECIVIL WARSCOLD WARCOMBATCOMBAT BETWEEN GROUPSCOMMODITY PRICE UNCERTAINTYCONFLICTCRIMEDEBTDURATION OF CONFLICTSECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC MODEL OF GUERRILLA WARFAREECONOMICS OF DEFENSEEFFECTIVENESS OF REBELSETHNIC CONFLICTSETHNIC DIVERSITYETHNIC FRACTIONALIZATIONETHNIC FRAGMENTATIONETHNIC GROUPETHNIC POLARIZATIONETHNICALLY DIVERSE SOCIETIESEXTERNAL INTERVENTIONEXTERNAL INTERVENTIONSEXTERNAL THIRD PARTYFOREIGN INTERVENTIONFOREIGN INVESTORSFORM OF MILITARYGOVERNMENT ARMYGOVERNMENT REPRESSIONGUERRILLA WARFAREHAZARD FUNCTIONHAZARD OF WARHOMOGENOUS SOCIETIESINTERNATIONAL SECURITYINTERNATIONAL WARINTRASTATE CONFLICTSJOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTIONMASSIVE ONSLAUGHTSMILITARY CAPABILITYMILITARY PERSONNELNEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTSPEACEPEACE ENFORCEMENTPEACE RESEARCHPEACEKEEPINGPEACEMAKINGPOLARIZATIONPOLITICAL RIGHTSPOLITICAL VIOLENCEPREDATOR-PREY MODELPROBABILITY OF DURATION OF WARREBEL COHESIONREBEL FIGHTING FORCEREBEL FORCESREBEL MOVEMENTREBEL ORGANIZATIONSREBEL VICTORYREBELLIONREBELLIONSREBELS FORCESRISK OF WARSOCIAL POLARIZATIONSOLDIERSSTATE CONFLICTSTATE CONFLICTSSTOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTETERRORISMWAR COUNTRYWAR DURATIONWAR PROJECTWAR THEORY10.1596/1813-9450-2433