Araujo, M. CaridadFerreira, Francisco H.G.Lanjouw, PeterÖzler, Berk2012-06-262012-06-262006-08https://hdl.handle.net/10986/9289This paper provides evidence consistent with elite capture of Social Fund investment projects in Ecuador. Exploiting a unique combination of data-sets on village-level income distributions, Social Fund project administration, and province level electoral results, the authors test a simple model of project choice when local political power is unequally distributed. In accordance with the predictions of the model, poorer villages are more likely to receive projects that provide excludable (private) goods to the poor, such as latrines. Controlling for poverty, more unequal communities are less likely to receive such projects. Consistent with the hypothesis of elite capture, these results are sensitive to the specific measure of inequality used in the empirical analysis, and are strongest for expenditure shares at the top of the distribution.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCESS TO SERVICESAGRICULTUREANTI-POVERTYBASIC INFRASTRUCTUREBENEFICIARIESBENEFICIARY ASSESSMENTSCIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONSCOMMUNITY GROUPSCOMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONSCOMMUNITY PARTICIPATIONCORRUPTIONDECENTRALIZATIONDEMAND-DRIVEN APPROACHDEMOCRACYDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEECONOMETRIC ANALYSISECONOMIC STATUSEQUILIBRIUMESTIMATES OF POVERTYFOOD FOR EDUCATIONGEOGRAPHIC TARGETINGGLOBAL DEVELOPMENTHIGHER INEQUALITYHOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTIONHOUSEHOLD LEVELHOUSEHOLD SURVEYHOUSEHOLD SURVEYSINCIDENCE OF POVERTYINCOMEINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME LEVELSINCOME TRANSFERSINDICATOR OF POVERTYINEQUALITYINFORMATION SYSTEMIRRIGATIONLAND INEQUALITYLARGE POPULATIONSLOCAL COMMUNITIESLOCAL GOVERNMENTSLORENZ CURVEMACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENTNATIONAL LEVELNGONUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDSNUTRITIONPARTICIPATORYPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPERPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL PROCESSPOLITICAL SUPPORTPOORPOOR AGENTSPOOR COMMUNITIESPOOR HOUSEHOLDSPOOR INDIVIDUALSPOOR PEOPLEPOPULATION CENSUSPOVERTY INCIDENCEPOVERTY LINEPOVERTY MAPPOVERTY PROGRAMSPOVERTY REDUCTIONPRODUCTION FUNCTIONPROGRESSPROJECT MONITORINGPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC SPENDINGRESOURCE ALLOCATIONRESPECTRICHER PEOPLERURALRURAL ECONOMYRURAL POVERTYRURAL POVERTY RATESRURAL SECTORSANITATIONSCHOOL BUILDINGSSOCIAL FUND PROJECTSSOCIAL FUNDSSOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURESOCIAL SERVICESSOCIAL WELFARESPATIAL DISTRIBUTIONSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENTSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMSTARGETINGURBAN AREASUTILITY FUNCTIONVALUATIONVOTERSWEALTHLocal Inequality and Project Choice: Theory and Evidence from EcuadorWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3997