Keefer, Philip2012-06-252012-06-252005-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8940This paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.CC BY 3.0 IGOAUTOCRACYBANKSBONDSBUREAUCRACYCENTRAL AMERICANCENTRAL GOVERNMENTCITIZENSCONSTITUENCIESCONSTITUENCYCONSTITUENTSCORRUPTIONCORRUPTION INDICATORDECISION MAKERSDECISION MAKINGDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC REGIMEDEMOCRATIZATIONDEVELOPMENT PROJECTSDISECONOMIESECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMIC RESOURCESEDUCATION OUTCOMESELECTED OFFICIALSELECTIONELECTIONSELECTORAL COMPETITIONELECTORATEEMPIRICAL EVIDENCEEMPLOYMENTETHNIC HETEROGENEITYEXECUTIVE BRANCHEXPENDITUREEXPENDITURESEXPENDITURESFORMAL INSTITUTIONSFRANCHISEGOVERNMENT CREDIBILITYGOVERNMENT DECISIONGOVERNMENT DECISION MAKINGGOVERNMENT EFFORTSGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURESGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURESGDPGOVERNMENT OWNERSHIPGOVERNMENT PERFORMANCEGOVERNMENT POLICIESGOVERNMENT POLICYGOVERNMENT PROTECTIONGOVERNMENT SPENDINGHUMAN RIGHTSINCOMEPARTY RANKSPATRONAGEPOLICY MAKINGPOLICY RESEARCHPOLITICAL DECISION MAKINGPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL LEADERSPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL RISKPOLITICAL SUPPORTPOLITICIANSPOSITIVE EFFECTSPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC EMPLOYMENTPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSPUBLIC INVESTMENTPUBLIC INVESTMENT/GDPPUBLIC POLICIESPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC SERVICESPUBLIC SPENDINGSUFFRAGEUNIVERSAL SUFFRAGEVOTERSVOTINGWAGES/GDPWEALTHWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3594