Anson, JoseCadot, OlivierOlarreaga, Marcelo2014-04-252014-04-252003-10https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18046The authors provide a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. They build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behavior between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. The authors show theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, the econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines, it increased it in Argentina, and did not have significant impact in Indonesia.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOCORRUPT PRACTICESCUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONTARIFF POLICYINSPECTIONSFRAUDCOLLUSIONCUSTOMS OPERATIONSCUSTOMS OFFENCESINVOICESTAX ADMINISTRATIONINFORMATION COLLECTIONSHIPMENT OF GOODSCUSTOMS VALUATION AIRPORTSBARGAINING POWERBILATERAL FLOWSCAPITAL EQUIPMENTCIFCLEARANCE TIMESCUSTOMSCUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONCUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONSCUSTOMS CLEARANCECUSTOMS CORRUPTIONCUSTOMS DOCUMENTSCUSTOMS INSPECTIONCUSTOMS OFFICERSCUSTOMS REFORMDOMESTIC MARKETDOMESTIC REGULATIONSEXPORT FLOWSEXPORT PROCESSING ZONESEXPORTERSEXPORTING COUNTRYEXPORTSIMPORT DUTIESIMPORTING COUNTRYIMPORTSINTERNAL INCENTIVESOUTSOURCINGPORTSPRIVATE SECTORPRODUCT CATEGORIESPSISHIPMENTSHIPMENTSSMUGGLINGTARIFF LINESTARIFF RATETARIFF RATESTARIFF REVENUETARIFF STRUCTURETAX BASETAX COLLECTION FUNCTIONSTECHNICAL KNOWLEDGETRADE BARRIERSTRADE DEFLECTIONTRADE LIBERALIZATIONTRADE REGIMEVERAIRPORTSCUSTOMS VALUATION10.1596/1813-9450-3156