Eaton, KentKaiser, KaiSmoke, Paul J.2012-03-192012-03-192011-06-24978-0-8213-8840-2https://hdl.handle.net/10986/2336This volume presents a preliminary framework designed to help international development partners consider the relevance of political economy issues for their programmatic support to decentralization and local government reform. The intention is neither to advocate decentralization in general or in any particular form, nor to presume or privilege any particular decentralization objective. Instead, the purpose is to document the potential value of better understanding how (primarily national and intergovernmental) political and institutional dynamics do or could affect the scope for realizing decentralization reforms aligned with commonly advocated service delivery, governance, and poverty reduction goals. The underlying premise is that systematic analysis of these issues can productively complement the dominantly technical diagnostic work typically carried out by development partners. Specifically, development partners can benefit from better understanding the practical significance of motives that drive politicians and bureaucrats to support or oppose reform at various stages of the decentralization process, from making an initial reform decision to detailed design and implementation. In addition, the framework addresses how these incentives can weaken, strengthen, or shift in response to changes in political and economic conditions that arise after reform begins. A general approach to conducting political economy of decentralization analysis is outlined, recognizing the need to tailor such analysis to the particular country context. This volume is based on literature reviews and knowledge derived from selected country experiences.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYADMINISTRATIVE COSTSADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATIONAUTONOMYBAILOUTSBROKERSBUDGET DEFICITSBUREAUCRACYCENTRAL GOVERNMENTCENTRAL GOVERNMENTSCENTRALIZINGCIVIL SOCIETYCOMPARATIVE ANALYSISCONSTITUTIONAL REFORMSDECENTRALIZATIONDECENTRALIZATION OBJECTIVEDECENTRALIZATION OBJECTIVESDECENTRALIZATION POLICIESDECENTRALIZATION POLICYDECENTRALIZATION PROCESSDECENTRALIZATION REFORMDECENTRALIZED SERVICESDECISION MAKINGDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT STRATEGYDEVOLUTIONDISTRICTDISTRICTSDURABLEECONOMIC CONDITIONSECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC MODELSFEDERALISMFISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONFUTURESGOVERNMENT DECENTRALIZATIONGOVERNMENT REFORMGOVERNORSHOLDINGINFLATIONARY PRESSURESINSTRUMENTINTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSINTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCEJUDICIAL INSTITUTIONSLABOR UNIONSLEGAL FRAMEWORKLEGAL FRAMEWORKSLEGISLATIONLEVYLOCAL AUTHORITIESLOCAL COUNCILSLOCAL GOVERNMENTLOCAL GOVERNMENTSLOCAL OFFICIALSMARKET REFORMSMAYORSMINISTRY OF INTERIORMONETARY FUNDMORAL HAZARDMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTSMUNICIPALITIESPOLICY GOALSPOLITICAL CONTROLPOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATIONPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL SYSTEMPOLITICAL SYSTEMSPOLITICIANSPOST-DECENTRALIZATIONPRICE CHANGESPROVINCESPROVINCIAL COUNCILSPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTSPUBLIC BUDGETINGPUBLIC EXPENDITURESPUBLIC POLICYRETURNSREVENUE SHARINGSERVICE DELIVERYSOCIAL RELATIONSSTATE GOVERNORSSUBNATIONALSUBNATIONAL AUTHORITIESSUBNATIONAL ELECTIONSSUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTSUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMYSUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTSSUBNATIONAL JURISDICTIONSSUBNATIONAL REGIONSSUBSIDIARYTAXATIONTRANSPORTTURNOVERURBANIZATIONVILLAGEVOTERSWEALTHThe Political Economy of Decentralization Reforms : Implications for Aid EffectivenessWorld Bank10.1596/978-0-8213-8840-2