Beath, AndrewChristia, FotiniEnikolopov, Ruben2013-09-262013-09-262013-06https://hdl.handle.net/10986/15869Using data from a field experiment in 500 villages, this paper studies how local institutions affect the quality of governance, as measured by aid distribution outcomes. In villages where elected councils exist and manage distributions, aid targeting improves. However, if the distribution is not clearly assigned to either the council or customary leaders, the creation of elected councils increases embezzlement and makes decision-making less inclusive. Requiring that women manage the distribution jointly with customary leaders also increases embezzlement. Thus, while elected councils can improve governance, overlapping mandates between new and existing institutions may result in increased rent-seeking.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOABUSE OF POWERACCOUNTABILITYCAUSAL EFFECTSCENTRAL GOVERNMENTCITIZENSCIVIL WARCOLLECTION ACTIVITIESCOLLECTIVE ACTIONCOMMUNISTCOMMUNITIESCOMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTCOMMUNITY GOVERNANCECOMMUNITY MEMBERSCOMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENTCONSENSUSCONSULTATIONCONSULTATIONSCORRUPTIONCOUNCILSCOUNTRYSIDECREDIBILITYDATA ANALYSISDATA COLLECTIONDECISION MAKERSDECISION-MAKERSDECISION-MAKINGDECISION-MAKING PROCESSDECISION-MAKING PROCESSESDECISIONMAKINGDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC ELECTIONSDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONSDEMOCRATIZATIONDISTRICT LEVELDISTRICTSDRINKING WATERECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC POLICYELECTORAL RULESEMBEZZLEMENTFACTOR ENDOWMENTSFEMALEFIELD EXPERIMENTFIGURESFINANCIAL SUPPORTFOOD SHORTAGESFORMAL EDUCATIONGENDERGOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONSGOVERNANCE OUTCOMESGOVERNANCE QUALITYGOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIONHOUSEHOLDSHUMAN CAPITALINCOMEINEQUALITYINFANT MORTALITYINSTITUTION BUILDINGINSTITUTIONAL CHANGEINSTITUTIONAL REFORMINSTITUTIONAL REFORMSINSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURESINTENDED BENEFICIARIESINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTINTERVENTIONINTERVENTIONSLEGITIMACYLEVELS OF PARTICIPATIONLINE MINISTRIESLIVESTOCKLOCAL BODIESLOCAL GOVERNANCELOCAL GOVERNMENTSLOCAL INSTITUTIONSLOCAL PARTICIPATIONMARGINALIZED GROUPSNATIONAL LEVELPARTICIPATION OF WOMENPOLITICAL AUTHORITYPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICIANSPOWER-HOLDERSPREPARATIONPROJECT IMPLEMENTATIONPROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTPUBLIC POLICIESPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC RESOURCESPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCEPUBLIC SERVICEQUANTITATIVE DATARECONSTRUCTIONREHABILITATIONRENT-SEEKING BEHAVIORRENTSREVOLUTIONRURAL AREASRURAL POPULATIONSEPARATION OF POWERSSOCIAL CAPITALSOCIAL COHESIONSOCIAL DEVELOPMENTSOCIOECONOMIC DATASUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENTSTAXATIONTRANSPARENCYVILLAGEVILLAGE ELDERSVILLAGE LEVELVILLAGERVILLAGERSVILLAGESYOUTHDo Elected Councils Improve Governance? Experimental Evidence on Local Institutions in AfghanistanWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-6510