Bird, Richard M.2015-12-182015-12-182015-11https://hdl.handle.net/10986/23464Excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco have long been a dependable and significant revenue source in many countries. More recently, considerable attention has been paid to the way in which such taxes may also be used to attain public health objectives by reducing the consumption of products with adverse health and social impacts. Some have gone further and argued that explicitly earmarking excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco to finance public health expenditures—marrying sin and virtue as it were—will make increasing such taxes more politically acceptable and provide the funding needed to increase such expenditures, especially for the poor. The basic idea—tax “bads” and do “good” with the proceeds—is simple and appealing. But designing and implementing good “sin” taxes is a surprisingly complex task. Earmarking revenues from such taxes for health expenditures may also sound good and be a useful selling point for new taxes. However, such earmarking raises difficult issues with respect to budgetary rigidity and political accountability. This note explores these and other issues that lurk beneath the surface of the attractive concept of using increased sin excises on alcohol and tobacco to finance “virtuous” social spending on public health.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOREGRESSIVE TAXESTAX LAWRISKSEVASIONPRODUCT TAXESACCOUNTINGTAX RATESEXCISE TAXESPEOPLEADDED TAXPUBLIC ECONOMICSPUBLIC REVENUESTAX BURDENSPSYCHOLOGYLAWSTAX CHANGESSOCIAL RESEARCHEXCHANGESPENDINGLOCAL GOVERNMENTSTAX INCIDENCELOCAL FINANCESERVICESTAX BASESHEALTH CAREREVENUESTAX EVASIONSALES TAXESHEALTHTAX CHANGESMACROECONOMIC CONDITIONSTAX SYSTEMSTAX STRUCTURESTAXSIN TAXESEXCISE TAXCRIMETAX RECEIPTSSMOKERSTAX REDUCTIONINFLATIONINTERNATIONAL BANKREVENUE SOURCESSIN TAXECONOMIC ANALYSISPUBLIC HEALTHUNIFORM TAXESKNOWLEDGEPASSIVE SMOKINGSOCIAL POLICYTAX SYSTEMTAX ADMINISTRATIONEXERCISESTOBACCO TAXESTAX POLICIESSMOKINGINTERVENTIONPUBLIC FUNDSTAX BURDENSSIN TAXESLOCAL GOVERNMENTSSALES TAXESEXTERNALITIESVALUE ADDED TAXHEALTH OUTCOMESMARKETINGUSE TAXESREVENUE SOURCESTAX BASETAX REFORMLABORTAX REVENUESPERTAX BASEECONOMIC EFFICIENCYREGRESSIVE TAXESTAX REVENUESFINANCETAX BASESHEALTH PROMOTIONTAX RECEIPTSPUBLICTAX POLICIESTAXESTAX COMPETITIONHEALTH SPENDINGEXPENDITUREEARMARKED TAXHEALTH SPENDINGALCOHOL TAXESEXCISE TAXESEQUITYALCOHOL TAXATIONSIN’ TAXESGOODTAX RATETOBACCO TAXESAGEDTRANSPARENCYTAX REVENUEPASSIVE SMOKINGHEALTH POLICYTAX INCREASESHEALTH EFFECTSSOCIAL POLICYHEALTH OUTCOMESUNIFORM TAXESTAX STRUCTURESPUBLIC EXPENDITURESSTRESSEXPENDITURESEXCISE TAXSIN’ TAXESALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAXECONOMIC EFFICIENCYTAX COMPETITIONTAX EVASIONTAX RATESVALUE ADDED TAXNUTRITIONMARKETDIFFERENTIAL TAXATIONEARMARKED TAXESREGULATIONALCOHOL TAXESTAX RATESOCIAL WELFARETAX REVENUELEVYMANAGEMENTTAX INCREASESTAXATIONWEIGHTECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTHEALTH EFFECTSTAX LAWECONOMIC ANALYSISGOODSEFFECTIVE TAX RATESCHILDRENINDIRECT TAXATIONTAX SYSTEMMACROECONOMIC CONDITIONSALCOHOL TAXATIONISOLATIONADDICTIONTAX POLICYSIN’ TAXTAX ADMINISTRATIONREVENUETAX POLICYTAX REFORMALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAXEARMARKED TAXESPUBLIC HEALTHFAMILIESGAMBLINGGOVERNMENTSPRODUCT TAXESUSE TAXESALCOHOL CONSUMPTIONIMPLEMENTATIONALCOHOL CONSUMPTIONSIN TAXEARMARKED TAXTOBACCO TAXTOBACCO TAXPUBLIC FUNDSALCOHOLISMHEALTH PROMOTIONWorking PaperWorld Bankhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-7500