Zara, StefanoDinar, ArielPatrone, Fioravante2012-06-222012-06-222006-11https://hdl.handle.net/10986/8850This paper provides a review of various applications of cooperative game theory (CGT) to issues of natural and environmental resources. With an increase in the level of competition over environmental and natural resources, the incidents of disputes have been at the center of allocation agreements. The paper reviews the cases of common pool resources such as fisheries and forests, and cases of environmental pollution such as acid rain, flow, and stock pollution. In addition to providing examples of cooperative solutions to allocation problems, the conclusion from this review suggests that cooperation over scarce environmental and natural resources is possible under a variety of physical conditions and institutional arrangements. CGT applications to international fishery disputes are especially useful in that they have been making headway in policy-related agreements among states and regions of the world. Forest applications are more local in nature, but of great relevance in solving disputes among communities and various levels of governments.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACID RAINAPPROPRIATIONASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONBIOLOGICAL MODELSBIOLOGICAL PRODUCTIVITYBIOMASSCOASTAL AREACOASTAL STATECONSUMER PREFERENCESCONSUMERSCOOPERATIVE EQUILIBRIUMCOST FUNCTIONSCPRDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDISCOUNT RATEECONOMIC THEORYECONOMIC VALUEECONOMICSECONOMICS RESEARCHECONOMISTSECOSYSTEMEMISSIONSENFORCEMENT MECHANISMSENVIRONMENTALENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGESENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICSENVIRONMENTAL GOODSENVIRONMENTAL ISSUESENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENTENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMSENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCESENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLESEQUILIBRIAEQUILIBRIUMEXCLUDABILITYEXPLOITATIONEXTERNALITIESFISHFISH PRODUCTSFISH RESOURCESFISH STOCKSFISHERIESFISHERIES ISSUESFISHERIES MANAGEMENTFISHERIES SECTORFISHERYFISHERY MANAGEMENTFISHERY RESOURCESFISHERY STATISTICSFISHESFISHINGFISHING EFFORTFISHING GEARFISHING UNITSFORESTFOREST MANAGEMENTFORESTSFREE RIDERFREE RIDER PROBLEMGAME THEORYHIGH SEASHIGH SEAS FISHERIESMARKET MECHANISMNASH EQUILIBRIUMNATURAL RESOURCESNATUREOPEN ACCESSPOLLUTANTSPOLLUTIONPOPULATION DYNAMICSPRESENT VALUEPRIVATE GOODSPRODUCTIVITYPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSQUOTASRENEWABLE RESOURCESEASEASSIDE PAYMENTSSOLESPECIESSTOCK LEVELSUBTRACTABILITYSUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENTTOTAL ALLOWABLE CATCHTRAGEDY OF THE COMMONSTRANSFER PAYMENTSTUNAWATER RESOURCEWATER RESOURCESWHALESWHALINGWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4073