Straub, StephaneGuasch, J. Luis2012-03-302012-03-302009Utilities Policy09571787https://hdl.handle.net/10986/5804Numerous renegotiations have plagued water and transport concession contracts in Latin America. Using a panel dataset of over 300 concession contracts from Latin America between 1989 and 2000, we show that country-level corruption is a significant determinant of these renegotiations and that the effect of corruption varies depending on the type of renegotiations considered. While a more corrupt environment clearly leads to more firm-led renegotiations, it significantly reduces the incidence of government-led ones. The paper then discusses and tests the likely channels through which these different effects of corruption arise, looking in particular at the interactions between country-level corruption and relevant microeconomic institutions.ENBureaucracyAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsCorruption D730Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law K420Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L920Gas UtilitiesPipelinesWater Utilities L950Formal and Informal SectorsShadow EconomyInstitutional Arrangements O170Economic Development: Regional, Urban, and Rural AnalysesTransportation O180Journal ArticleWorld Bank