Docquier, FrédéricFaye, OusmanePestieau, Pierre2012-05-302012-05-302008-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6716Assuming a given educational policy, the recent brain drain literature reveals that skilled migration can boost the average level of schooling in developing countries. This paper introduces educational subsidies determined by governments concerned by the number of skilled workers remaining in the country. The theoretical analysis shows that developing countries can benefit from skilled emigration when educational subsidies entail high .fiscal distortions. However when taxes are not too distortionary, it is desirable to impede emigration and subsidize education. The authors investigate the empirical relationship between educational subsidies and migration prospects, obtaining a negative relationship for 105 countries. Based on this result, the analysis revisits the country specific effects of skilled migration upon human capital. The findings show that the endogeneity of public subsidies reduces the number of winners and increases the magnitude of the losses.CC BY 3.0 IGOADMINISTRATIVE COSTSAGE STRUCTUREBENCHMARKBRAIN DRAINBRAIN GAINCAPITAL ACCUMULATIONCAPITAL FORMATIONCAPITAL INVESTMENTSCAPITAL STOCKCIVIL WARCONSEQUENCES OF MIGRATIONCONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALECORRUPTIONCREDIT MARKETDEMOGRAPHICDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSECONOMIC COOPERATIONECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHEDUCATION LEVELEDUCATION LEVELSEDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENTELASTICITYEMIGRATIONEMIGRATION RATEEMPIRICAL ANALYSISEXPECTED RETURNSEXPENDITUREEXPENDITURESEXTERNALITIESFERTILITYFUNCTIONAL FORMSGDPGDP PER CAPITAGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE INDICATORSGOVERNMENT BUDGETGROWTH RATEHOST COUNTRYHUMAN CAPITALIMMIGRANTSIMMIGRATIONIMMIGRATION POLICYIMPACT OF MIGRATIONINDIVIDUAL DECISIONSINTEREST RATEINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONINVESTMENT IN EDUCATIONLABOR SUPPLYLEVEL OF EDUCATIONLIQUIDITYLOW-INCOME COUNTRIESMEXICAN IMMIGRANTSMIDDLE-INCOMEMIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIESMIGRATIONMIGRATION COSTSNUMBER OF ADULTSNUMBER OF EMIGRANTSOPEN ECONOMYPHYSICAL CAPITALPOLICY IMPLICATIONSPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPERPOLITICAL TURMOILPOPULATION DENSITYPOPULATION GROWTHPOPULATION GROWTH RATESPOPULATION SIZEPOPULATION STRUCTUREPRODUCTION FUNCTIONPROGRESSPUBLIC EDUCATIONPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC SUBSIDIESPUBLIC SUBSIDYREMITTANCESRESPECTRETURN MIGRATIONRISK NEUTRALRULE OF LAWSECONDARY SCHOOLINGSKILL LEVELSKILLED MIGRANTSSKILLED MIGRATIONSKILLED WORKERSSOCIAL CAPITALSOCIAL COSTSSOCIAL OPTIMUMSOCIAL RETURNSSOCIAL WELFARESUB-SAHARAN AFRICATAXTECHNOLOGICAL CHANGETERTIARY EDUCATIONTERTIARY LEVELSTOTALITARIAN REGIMESTURNOVERUNITED NATIONS POPULATION DIVISIONUNSKILLED MIGRATIONURBANIZATIONWORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORSWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4614