Hoff, KarlaMilanovic, BrankoHorowitz, Shale2012-06-012012-06-012008-10https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6932The authors develop and implement a method for measuring the frequency of changes in power among distinct leaders and ideologically distinct parties that is comparable across political systems. The authors find that more frequent alternation in power is associated with the emergence of better governance in post communist countries. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms seek durable protection from the state, which implies that expected political alternation is relevant to the decision whether to invest in influence with the governing party or, alternatively, to demand institutions that apply predictable rules, with equality of treatment, regardless of the party in power.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYASSASSINATIONAUTHORITARIANISMAUTHORITYBINDING CONSTRAINTBRIBEBRIBERYBRIBESCITIZENSCIVIL SOCIETYCOALITIONSCOLLAPSECOLLAPSESCOMMUNISMCOMMUNISTCOMMUNIST PARTYCOMPOSITE INDICATORSCONFIDENCECONSTITUENCIESCONSTITUENTSCONSTITUTIONALISMCONTRACT ENFORCEMENTCORPORATE GOVERNANCECORRUPTCORRUPTIONCOUNTRY DUMMIESCOUNTRY FIXED EFFECTCOUNTRY FIXED EFFECTSCREDIT RATINGCRIMINALCRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONSCULTURAL IDENTITYDECREEDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC SYSTEMSDEMOCRATIZATIONEAST EUROPEANECONOMIC ACTIVITYECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMIC REFORMSELECTIONELECTIONSELECTORAL COMPETITIONELECTORAL RULESEMERGING MARKETSFINANCIAL SUPPORTFREE TRADEGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE INDICATORSGOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONSGOVERNANCE MEASUREGOVERNANCE MEASURESGOVERNANCE OUTCOMESGOVERNMENT ACTIONSGOVERNMENT SERVICESGRAND CORRUPTIONIDEOLOGIESIMPROVING GOVERNANCEINCOME LEVELINEQUALITYINSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTSINSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONSINSTITUTIONAL REFORMINTERNATIONAL CAPITALINTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWSINTERNATIONAL MARKETSINTERNATIONAL PEACEJAILJUDICIAL DECISIONSJUDICIARYLABOR UNIONSLAW INDEXLAW INDICATORLAWSLEGAL INSTITUTIONSLEGISLATIONLEGISLATURELIBERALIZATIONLIBERALIZATIONSLOCAL LEVELSLOWER HOUSEMACROECONOMIC POLICYMARKET ECONOMYMEDIANATIONAL LEVELNATIONALISMNATURAL RESOURCENATURAL RESOURCESNEW MARKETOWNERSHIP RIGHTSPARLIAMENTPARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACYPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONSPATRONAGEPER CAPITA INCOMEPETTY CORRUPTIONPOLICY ISSUESPOLITICAL CHANGEPOLITICAL COMPETITIONPOLITICAL CORRUPTIONPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTABILITYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL LEADERSPOLITICAL LEADERSHIPPOLITICAL MOBILIZATIONPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL PARTYPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHERPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL POWERSPOLITICAL PROCESSPOLITICAL PROCESSESPOLITICAL REGIMESPOLITICAL RISKPOLITICAL STABILITYPOLITICAL SYSTEMPOLITICAL SYSTEMSPOLITICIANPOLITICIANSPREFERENTIALPREFERENTIAL ACCESSPREFERENTIAL TREATMENTPRESIDENCYPRESIDENTSPRIME MINISTERPRIVATE GAINPRIVATE OWNERSHIPPRIVATIZATIONPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC FUNDINGRATE OF RETURNREGIME CHANGEREPUBLICSRESOURCE CURSERULE OF LAWSAFETY NETSSANCTIONSSEPARATION OF POWERSSOCIALISMSTATE ASSETSSTATE CAPTURESTATE CONTROLSTATE GOVERNMENTSTATE OWNERSHIPSTRONG GOVERNANCETAXATIONTRANSITION COUNTRIESTRANSITION ECONOMIESTURNOVERTURNOVERSUPPER HOUSEURBANIZATIONURBANIZATION RATEVETOVETO POWERWESTERN EUROPEWORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORSWORLD POLITICSWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4747