Doepke, MatthiasTertilt, Michele2012-03-192012-03-192011-06-01https://hdl.handle.net/10986/3479Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? The authors develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. Then they assess the policy implications of these models. The authors find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.CC BY 3.0 IGOASSET HOLDINGSASSETSBUDGET CONSTRAINTBUDGET CONSTRAINTSCAPITAL ACCUMULATIONCAPITAL INVESTMENTCASH PAYMENTCASH TRANSFERCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGECONFLICT OF INTERESTCONSUMER EXPENDITURECONSUMPTION EXPENDITURESCONSUMPTION INCREASESCREDIT ASSOCIATIONCREDIT MARKETCREDIT MARKETSCREDIT PROGRAMSCROSS-SECTIONAL DATADECISION MAKINGDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT POLICIESDEVELOPMENT POLICYDISCOUNT RATEDISCOUNT RATESDISCRIMINATIONDIVORCEDYNAMIC SETTINGECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC MECHANISMECONOMIC MODELSECONOMIC POLICYECONOMIC THEORIESECONOMIC THEORYEMPIRICAL EVIDENCEEMPIRICAL FINDINGSEMPIRICAL LITERATUREEMPIRICAL RESEARCHEMPOWERMENTEQUAL INCREASEEQUALITYEQUILIBRIUMEXOGENOUS CHANGESEXPENDITUREEXPENDITURESFACE VALUEFAMILIESFEMALEFINANCIAL SUPPORTFUTURE RESEARCHGENDERGENDER DIFFERENCESGENDERSHEALTH OUTCOMESHOLDINGHOMEHOUSEHOLD DATAHOUSEHOLD INCOMEHOUSEHOLD SAVINGSHUMAN CAPITALHUSBANDHUSBANDSIMMUNIZATIONIMMUNIZATIONSIMPERFECT SUBSTITUTESINCOMEINCOME DIFFERENCESINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME EFFECTINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME REDISTRIBUTIONINCOME SHAREINCOME TRANSFERINCOMESINEFFICIENCYINEQUALITIESINEQUALITYINEQUALITY AVERSIONINSTRUMENTINTEREST RATEINTERNATIONAL BANKINVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIESLABOR MARKETLIVING STANDARDSLOCAL GOVERNMENTMARGINAL PROPENSITY TO SAVEMARKET ACCESSMARRIAGESMARRIED WOMENMICRO-CREDITMICRO-ENTERPRISESMICROCREDITMULTIPLIERSNASH EQUILIBRIUMNET EFFECTOLD-AGE PENSIONOPTIMIZATIONPARETO EFFICIENCYPARETO OPTIMUMPENSIONPENSION SYSTEMPENSIONSPERMANENT INCOMEPOLICY DISCUSSIONSPOLICY IMPLICATIONSPOLICY INTERVENTIONPOLICY INTERVENTIONSPOLICY RESEARCHPOSITIVE EFFECTPOVERTY REDUCTIONPRIVATE CONSUMPTIONPRIVATE GOODSPRODUCT MARKETSPRODUCTION FUNCTIONPUBLICPUBLIC CONSUMPTIONPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSPUBLIC SPENDINGRELATIVE CHANGERELATIVE IMPORTANCERELATIVE INCOMERELATIVE INCREASERELATIVE WAGESRETURNRETURNSRISK AVERSERISK AVERSIONROADSSEXSHARE OF ASSETSSIGNIFICANT EFFECTSIGNIFICANT IMPACTSINGLE WOMENSINGLE-PARENT HOUSEHOLDSTAXTRANSFER PAYMENTSUTILITY FUNCTIONUTILITY FUNCTIONSUTILITY MAXIMIZATIONWAGESWEALTHWIDOWWIFEWILLWIVESWOMANWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-5714