McCulloch, RachelBown, Chad P.2013-01-022013-01-022012-09https://hdl.handle.net/10986/12039While the original justification of the antidumping laws in the industrial economies was to protect domestic consumers against predation by foreign suppliers, by the early 1990s the laws and their use had evolved so much that the opposite concern arose. Rather than attacking anti-competitive behavior, dumping complaints by domestic firms were being used to facilitate collusion among suppliers and enforce cartel arrangements. This paper examines the predation and anti-competitiveness issues from the perspective of the "new users" of antidumping -- the major emerging economies for which antidumping is now a major tool in the trade policy arsenal. The paper examines these concerns in light of important ways in which the world economy and international trading system have been changing since the early 1990s, including more firms and more countries participating in international trade, but also more extensive links among suppliers and consumers through multinational firm activity and vertical specialization.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOAGGREGATE TRADEAGGREGATE TRADE FLOWSAGGRESSIVE TRADE POLICYANTI-DUMPING CASEANTIDUMPINGANTIDUMPING ACTIONSANTIDUMPING BEINGANTIDUMPING CASESANTIDUMPING DUTIESANTIDUMPING DUTYANTIDUMPING FILINGSANTIDUMPING LAWSANTIDUMPING MEASURESANTIDUMPING PETITIONSANTIDUMPING POLICIESANTIDUMPING POLICYANTIDUMPING RULESANTITRUST AUTHORITIESANTITRUST LAWANTITRUST LAWSANTITRUST POLICYAPPARELAPPAREL EXPORTSAPPLIED TARIFFBARRIERS TO ENTRYCARTELCOLLUSIONCOMPETITION RULESCOMPETITIVE MARKETSCOMPETITIVENESSCOMPETITIVENESS CONCERNSCONSUMERSCOUNTERVAILING DUTIESDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDEVELOPMENT POLICYDISPUTE SETTLEMENTDOMESTIC ANTIDUMPING LAWDOMESTIC COMPETITIONDOMESTIC COMPETITORSDOMESTIC INDUSTRIESDOMESTIC INDUSTRYDOMESTIC MARKETDOMESTIC MARKETSDOMESTIC PRODUCERSDOMESTIC SUPPLIERSECONOMIC EFFECTSECONOMIC JUSTIFICATIONECONOMIC RELATIONSECONOMIC RESEARCHECONOMIC THOUGHTECONOMICSELASTICITYELASTICITY OF DEMANDEMERGING MARKETEMERGING MARKETSEUROPEAN UNIONEXPORT GROWTHEXPORT INCENTIVESEXPORT MARKETEXPORT MARKETSEXPORT PRICEEXPORT PRICESEXPORT QUANTITIESEXPORT SALESEXPORT SUPPLYEXPORTERSEXPORTING COUNTRIESEXPORTING COUNTRYEXPORTSFAIRFIXED COSTFIXED COSTSFOREIGN COMPETITIONFOREIGN COMPETITORSFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTFOREIGN EXPORTERSFOREIGN FIRMFOREIGN FIRMSFOREIGN MARKETFOREIGN PRODUCERFOREIGN PRODUCERSFOREIGN SOURCESFOREIGN SUPPLIERSFREE TRADEGDPGDP PER CAPITAGLOBAL ECONOMYGLOBAL TRADEHOME MARKETIMPERFECT COMPETITIONIMPORT COMPETITIONIMPORT PENETRATIONIMPORT PRODUCTSIMPORT PROTECTIONIMPORT RESTRICTIONSIMPORTED PRODUCTSIMPORTING COUNTRIESIMPORTING COUNTRYINCOMEINDUSTRIAL ECONOMIESINDUSTRIAL POLICYINDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIESINJURIOUS DUMPINGINTERMEDIATE INPUTSINTERMEDIATE PRODUCTSINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL BUSINESSINTERNATIONAL LAWINTERNATIONAL TRADEINTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEMMANAGED TRADEMARGINAL COSTMARKET COMPETITIONMARKET CONDITIONSMARKET ECONOMIESMARKET FORCESMARKET POWERMARKET PRICEMARKET SHAREMARKET STRUCTUREMATERIAL INJURYMONOPOLYMULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONSMULTINATIONAL FIRMMULTINATIONAL FIRMSNATIONAL ANTIDUMPING LAWSOIL IMPORTSOPENNESSORGANIZATIONAL FORMPATENTSPERFECT COMPETITIONPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY TOOLPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOTENTIAL BENEFITSPREDATORY PRICINGPRICE DISCRIMINATIONPRICE OF IMPORTSPRODUCTION COSTSPRODUCTION PROCESSPROFIT MARGINPROTECTION CANPROTECTIONISMPROTECTIONIST DEVICEPROTECTIONIST PRESSURESPUBLIC RELATIONSQUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONSSAFEGUARD ACTIONSAFEGUARD ACTIONSSAFEGUARD PROTECTIONSALESALESSPREADSUBSTITUTESUBSTITUTESSUBSTITUTIONSUPPLIERSUPPLY CHAINSUPPLY CHAINSTARIFF EQUIVALENTSTARIFF PROTECTIONTARIFF RATESTARIFF REDUCTIONSTOTAL REVENUETOTAL SALESTRADE AGREEMENTSTRADE BARRIERTRADE BARRIERSTRADE EFFECTSTRADE LIBERALIZATIONTRADE MEASURESTRADE PATTERNTRADE POLICIESTRADE POLICYTRANSITION ECONOMYTRIPLE DAMAGESURUGUAY ROUNDVALUE OF IMPORTSVERTICAL SPECIALIZATIONVOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINTSWORLD MARKETWORLD PRICESWORLD TRADEWTOWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-6197