Gradstein. MarkMilanovic, Branko2014-08-072014-08-072002-08https://hdl.handle.net/10986/19266The effect of the distribution of political rights on income inequality has been studied both theoretically and empirically. The authors review the existing literature and, in particular, the available empirical evidence. The literature suggests that formal exclusion from the political process through restrictions on the voting franchise appears to have caused a high degree of economic inequality. And democratization in the form of franchise expansion has typically led to an expansion in redistribution, at least in the small sample of episodes studied. In a less pronounced way, albeit more emphatically compared with the ambiguous results of earlier research, recent evidence indicates an inverse relationship between other measures of democracy, based on civil liberties and political rights, and inequality. The transition experience of Eastern European countries, however, seems to some extent go against these conclusions. This opens possible new vistas for research, namely the need to incorporate the length of democratic experience and the role played by ideology and social valuesen-USCC BY 3.0 IGOTRANSITION ECONOMIESDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC VALUESINEQUITYPOLITICAL RIGHTSINCOME INEQUALITIESPOLITICAL FREEDOMVOTING POWERREDISTRIBUTIONCIVIL LIBERTIESIDEOLOGYSOCIAL VALUES ADVANCED COUNTRIESAVERAGE INCOMECAPITAL MARKETCAPITAL MARKETSCITIZENSCIVIL LIBERTIESCIVIL SOCIETYCOMMUNISMDATA AVAILABILITYDATA BANKSDATA COLLECTIONDATA SETDATA SETSDECISION MAKINGDECREASING FUNCTIONDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONSDEMOCRATIC REGIMESDEMOCRATIZATIONDEVELOPMENT POLICIESDISPOSABLE INCOMEDISTRIBUTIONAL CONFLICTSECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC INEQUALITYECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMIC THEORYECONOMY LITERATUREEGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONELECTIONSEMPIRICAL EVIDENCEEMPIRICAL RESEARCHEMPIRICAL STUDIESEMPIRICAL SUPPORTEQUAL DISTRIBUTIONFACTOR INCOMEFREE PRESSFREEDOMGDPGINI COEFFICIENTGINI INDEXHIGH CONCENTRATIONHIGH CORRELATIONHIGH INEQUALITYIMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETSINCOMEINCOME DIFFERENCESINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME GROWTHINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME LEVELSINCOME SHARESINCOMESINCREASED INEQUALITYINDEPENDENTINDIVIDUAL COUNTRIESINEQUALITYINEQUALITY DATAINEQUALITY EQUATIONINEQUALITY MEASURESINTEREST GROUPSINTERNATIONAL COMPARISONSINVERSE RELATIONSHIPLABOR INCOMELABOR PRODUCTIVITYLEFT-WINGLITERACY RATESLOBBYINGLOW INCOMEMASS MEDIAMEASUREMENT PROBLEMSMEASURING INCOME INEQUALITYMEDIAN VOTERNEGATIVE EFFECTNEGATIVE RELATIONSHIPNET INCOMEPOLICY RESEARCHPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL ECONOMY CHANNELPOLITICAL FACTORSPOLITICAL FREEDOMPOLITICAL INFLUENCEPOLITICAL LIBERALIZATIONPOLITICAL LIBERTIESPOLITICAL PARTICIPATIONPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL PROCESSESPOLITICAL REFORMSPOLITICAL RIGHTSPOLITICAL SCIENTISTSPOLITICAL STRUCTUREPOLITICAL STRUCTURESPOLITICAL VARIABLESPOPULAR SOVEREIGNTYPOSITIVE CORRELATIONPOSITIVE EFFECTPOSITIVE RELATIONSHIPPRE-TAX INCOMEPRIVATE PROPERTYPROGRAMSPURCHASING POWERREAL LEVELREDISTRIBUTIVE POLICYREDUCING INEQUALITYREDUCING POVERTYRELATIVE INCOMERIGHT TO VOTESELECTION BIASSIGNIFICANT CORRELATIONSIGNIFICANT NEGATIVESIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPSOCIAL EQUALITYSOCIAL TRANSFERSSOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTSUFFRAGETAX REVENUESTAX SYSTEMTOLERANCETRADE UNIONSTRANSITION ECONOMIESUNIONSVOTINGVOTING RIGHTSWAGES10.1596/1813-9450-2875