World Bank2014-01-102014-01-102013-06-18https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16559After the double-dip recession, as a group the six South East European countries (SEE6)- Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia-are now making a fragile recovery. Last year the recession in the Eurozone had adverse impact on external demand and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in SEE6 and the severe winter and a summer drought crippled agriculture and affected trade, energy, and economic activity overall. However, the recovery in SEE6 is still tentative. In some countries nonperforming loans, sluggish credit recovery, continued deleveraging, and fiscal consolidation are exerting a drag and recovery in SEE6 is unlikely to accelerate as long as the Eurozone remains in recession. The SEE6 region is projected to grow 1.7 percent in 2013, signaling the end of the 2012 double-dip recession. Even though growth will in general be fragile, it will be on the upswing in all six countries. Kosovo again is expected to have the highest growth (3.1 percent), thanks to major public investments and a significant inflow of remittances. Against the backdrop of this tentative and fragile recovery, SEE6 countries should, as argued in the last report, intensify their efforts to reform structural areas. Fiscal consolidation efforts should become easier now that the output and revenue outlook is improving. The investment climate needs to be improved substantially, especially in the main areas of weaknesses: construction permits and licenses, barriers to entrepreneurship, and skills and infrastructure. One of the main worries in this nascent recovery is that SEE6 economies are plagued by high unemployment, especially youth unemployment, and they are not creating jobs fast enough to absorb new entrants into the labor force. Emigration continues as the current environment for doing business exacerbates the difficult labor market conditions.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCESS TO INFORMATIONACCESS TO JOBSACCOUNTABILITYACCOUNTINGARREARSASSET OWNERSHIPBANK DEPOSITSBANK LENDINGBANK OF GREECEBANKING INSTITUTIONSBANKING REFORMBANKING SECTORBANKING SECTOR ASSETSBANKSBENEFICIARIESBONDBUSINESS ENTRYBUSINESS STARTUPCAPITAL ADEQUACYCAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIOSCAPITAL FLOWSCAPITAL MARKETSCDSCENTRAL BANKCENTRAL BANK BILLSCENTRAL BANKSCLAIMANTSCOMMERCIAL BANKSCONSOLIDATIONCORRUPTIONCREDIT DEFAULTCREDIT DEFAULT SWAPCREDIT GROWTHCREDIT POLICIESCREDIT RATINGSCREDIT SUPPORTCURRENT ACCOUNTCURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITSDEBTDEBT CRISISDEBT INSTRUMENTSDEBT POLICIESDEBTSDEMAND-SIDE FACTORSDEMOGRAPHIC FACTORSDEMOGRAPHIC PROFILESDEPOSITDEPOSIT INSURANCEDEPOSITSDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDISABLEDDISBURSEMENTSDOMESTIC BANKSDOMESTIC CURRENCIESDOMESTIC CURRENCYDOMESTIC DEBTEARNINGSECONOMIC ACTIVITIESECONOMIC ACTIVITYECONOMIC CLIMATEECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC OPPORTUNITYEMERGING MARKETSEMPLOYEEEMPLOYERSEMPLOYMENTEMPLOYMENT GROWTHEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIESENTREPRENEURENTREPRENEURSENTREPRENEURSHIPETHNIC MINORITIESEXCHANGE RATEEXCHANGE RATESEXPENDITURESEXPORT GROWTHEXPORT PERFORMANCEEXTERNAL DEBTEXTERNAL MIGRATIONEXTREME POVERTYFACTORINGFEDERAL RESERVEFINANCESFINANCIAL CAPITALFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL MARKETFINANCIAL MARKETSFINANCIAL SECTOR REFORMSFISCAL DEFICITFISCAL DEFICITSFISCAL POLICYFOREIGN CURRENCYFOREIGN CURRENCY DEBTFOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTFOREIGN EXCHANGEFOREIGN FINANCINGFORMAL WORKFORCEGENDERGENDER EQUALITYGENDER GAPSGOVERNMENT DEBTGROUP OF FIRMSHOME OWNERSHIPHOST COUNTRYHOUSEHOLDSHOUSINGHUMAN DEVELOPMENTILLITERACYIMPEDIMENTS TO BUSINESSINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME GROWTHINCOME LEVELSINCOME TAXINDEBTEDNESSINEQUALITYINFLATIONINFLATION RATESINFORMAL WORKERSINSTITUTIONAL BARRIERSINSTITUTIONAL REFORMSINSURANCE AGENCIESINSURANCE PROTECTIONINTEREST RATEINTEREST RATESINTEREST RATES ON LOANSINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL BONDSINTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSINTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETSINTERNATIONAL MARKETSINVESTMENT CLIMATEINVESTMENT PLANSINVESTOR CONFIDENCEISSUANCEJOB CREATIONJOB OPPORTUNITIESLABOR COSTSLABOR FORCE PARTICIPATIONLABOR MARKETLABOR MARKETSLABOR MOBILITYLAWSLEGAL SYSTEMSLENDING CONDITIONSLIBERALIZATION OF TRADELIMITED ACCESSLIQUID ASSETSLIQUIDITYLIVING STANDARDSLOANLOAN MARKETSLOAN QUALITYLOAN-TO-DEPOSIT RATIOSLOCAL CURRENCYLOCAL ECONOMYLOCAL MARKETLONG-TERM EXTERNAL DEBTMACROECONOMIC STABILITYMARKET CONDITIONSMARKET DATAMATURITIESMATURITYMICRO ENTERPRISESMICRO-DATAMIGRATIONMINIMUM WAGEMINISTRIES OF FINANCEMONETARY FUNDMONETARY POLICYNATIONAL BANKNATIONAL BANKSNEW BUSINESSESNEW ENTRANTSNEW MARKETSNONPERFORMING LOANSNPLPERSONAL INCOMEPOLICY DESIGNPOLITICAL UNCERTAINTYPORTFOLIOPORTFOLIOSPRIVATE BANKPRIVATE INVESTMENTPRIVATIZATIONPRODUCTIVE INVESTMENTPRODUCTIVITYPROFITABILITYPUBLIC DEBTPUBLIC DEBT INSTRUMENTSPUBLIC FINANCESPUBLIC INVESTMENTSPUBLIC POLICIESPURCHASING POWERPURCHASING POWER PARITYREAL EXCHANGE RATESRECAPITALIZATIONRECEIPTSRECESSIONREGIONAL BANKSREGISTRATION REQUIREMENTSREMITTANCESRESIDENTIAL MORTGAGESRETURNRETURN ON EQUITYRETURNSSAFETY NETSAFETY NETSSAVINGSSELF-EMPLOYMENTSHORT-TERM DEBTSOCIAL SECURITYSOVEREIGN DEBTSTART-UPSSTATE GUARANTEESSTOCK MARKETSSTOCKSSUBSIDIARYT-BILLST-BONDSTAX BURDENTAX BURDENSTAX CREDITSTAX SYSTEMTAXATIONTRADE BALANCESTRADINGUNEMPLOYMENTURBAN AREASURBAN DEVELOPMENTVULNERABLE GROUPSWAGESWELFARE DEPENDENCEFrom Double-Dip Recession to Fragile RecoveryNga recesioni i dyfishte tek rimekembja e brishte Od drugog talasa recesi je ka slabom oporavku Od dvostruke recesije do slabog oporavkaWorld Bank10.1596/16559