Jin, SongqingDeininger, KlausYadav, Vandana2013-01-282013-01-282012-12https://hdl.handle.net/10986/12185Although transfer of agricultural land ownership through land reform had positive impacts on productivity, investment, and political empowerment in many cases, institutional arrangements in West Bengal -- which made tenancy heritable and imposed a prohibition on subleasing -- imply that early land reform benefits may not be sustained and gains from this policy remain well below potential. Data from a listing of 96,000 households in 200 villages, complemented by a detailed survey of 1,800 owner-cum tenants, point toward binding policy constraints and large contemporaneous inefficiency of share tenancy that is exacerbated by strong disincentives to investment. A conservative estimate puts the efficiency losses from such arrangements in any period at 25 percent.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTINGADVERSE SELECTIONAGRARIAN REFORMAGRICULTURAL LANDAGRICULTUREBARGAININGBARGAINING POWERBENEFICIARIESBORROWINGCAPITAL STOCKCLAIMANTSCONTRACT ENFORCEMENTCONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTSCONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPSCREDIT ACCESSCREDIT CONSTRAINTSCREDIT MARKETCREDIT MARKETSCREDIT RATIONINGDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDEVELOPMENT POLICYECONOMETRIC ANALYSISECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMICSECONOMIES OF SCOPEELASTICITYEMPLOYMENTEMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIESEQUIPMENTFAMILY LABORFINANCIAL SUPPORTFIXED EFFECT MODELGENERAL EQUILIBRIUMHOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTHOUSEHOLD FIXED EFFECTSHOUSEHOLDSHOUSESHUMAN DEVELOPMENTINCOMEINEFFICIENCYINSTITUTIONAL CREDITINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTINSURANCEINSURANCE MARKETSINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTINVESTMENT DECISIONINVESTMENT DECISIONSISSUANCELAND OWNERSHIPLAND POLICIESLAND PRICESLAND REFORMLAND REFORMSLAND TENURELAND USELAND VALUESLANDLORDSLEASE AGREEMENTSLEASESLEASINGLEGAL CONSTRAINTSLEGAL RIGHTSLIMITED LIABILITYLOCAL GOVERNMENTLONG-TERM INVESTMENTLONG-TERM INVESTMENTSMARGINAL BENEFITSMARKET OPERATIONMARKET TRANSACTIONSMORAL HAZARDMOTIVATIONOPPORTUNITY COSTOUTPUT LOSSPERFECT INFORMATIONPOINTSPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENTPOLITICAL POWERPRODUCTION FUNCTIONPRODUCTIVITYPRODUCTIVITY GROWTHPRODUCTIVITY INCREASESPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC FINANCERENTSRISK AVERSESAVINGSSIDE EFFECTSTENANTSTOTAL OUTPUTTRANSACTIONTRANSACTION COSTSTRANSFER OF PROPERTY RIGHTSWEALTHWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-6293