Vagliasindi, Maria2012-05-292012-05-292008-03https://hdl.handle.net/10986/6508This paper aims to shed some new light on the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of Boards of Directors of state owned enterprises with a focus on infrastructure sectors. In the case of developing countries, empirical studies have found evidence of positive links between the composition of the Board of Directors and financial performance. Yet the lack of solid theoretical foundations, and in some cases poor data availability, makes the conclusions of most studies weak. Several policy recommendations emerge from the review of the economic literature and evidence from case studies. First, the introduction of a sufficient number of independent directors emerges as an important corporate governance milestone. Empowering them to exercise effective monitoring of management, however, may prove to be a formidable challenge for of state owned enterprises. More attention to board procedures, particularly related to the Board selection and evaluation process, is essential, to produce the necessary insulation of Boards from government interference. Ensuring sufficient continuity of services to directors is particularly crucial to improve corporate governance. In addition, other factors that may reduce directors' ability to monitor corporate activities, such as the age profile and the number of Boards on which they sit, need to be handled more carefully.CC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITYALLEGIANCEARTICLE OF ASSOCIATIONARTICLES OF INCORPORATIONAUDIT COMMITTEEAUDIT COMMITTEE INDEPENDENCEAUDIT COMMITTEESAUDITSAUTHORITYBANKRUPTCYBANKRUPTCY LAWBARGAINING POWERBOARD MEMBERBOARD MEMBERSBOARD MEMBERSHIPBOARDS OF DIRECTORSBONDSBUDGET DEFICITBUSINESS DEVELOPMENTBUSINESS LAWYERCAPITAL EXPENDITURECAPITAL MARKETCAPITAL MARKETSCEOCEOSCHARTERSCHIEF EXECUTIVECHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICERSCIVIL CODECOMMON LAWCOMPANIES ACTCOMPANYCOMPANY LAWCOMPANY LAWSCONFLICT OF INTERESTCONFLICTS OF INTERESTCONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTSCONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERCORPORATE BOARDCORPORATE BOARDSCORPORATE FINANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECTCORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODESCORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAWCORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMSCORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDSCORPORATE LAWCORPORATE LAW REFORMSCORPORATE PERFORMANCECORPORATE SCANDALSCORPORATIONCORPORATIONSCOST OF CAPITALCUSTOMER SERVICEDATA AVAILABILITYDECISION MAKINGDECISION-MAKINGDELAWAREDELEGATION OF POWERSDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPING MARKETSDIRECTOR INDEPENDENCEDISCLOSUREDIVIDENDDIVIDEND POLICYDIVIDENDSDOMESTIC COMPANIESDUTY OF CAREDUTY OF LOYALTYECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTEMERGING MARKETSEMPLOYMENT CONTRACTSENTERPRISE REFORMEQUITY CAPITALEQUITY MARKETEX POSTFEDERAL SECURITIESFIDUCIARY DUTYFIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITIESFINANCIAL AUTONOMYFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL DISCLOSURESFINANCIAL MANAGEMENTFINANCIAL PERFORMANCEFINANCIAL STATEMENTFINANCIAL STATEMENTSFIRM PERFORMANCEFIRM-LEVEL GOVERNANCEFISCAL BURDENFISCAL POLICIESFOREIGN FIRMSGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTSGOVERNANCE GUIDELINESGOVERNANCE INDEXESGOVERNANCE PRACTICEGOVERNANCE PRACTICESGOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITIESGOVERNANCE SYSTEMGOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTGOVERNMENT MINISTRIESGOVERNMENT'S BUDGETINCENTIVE COMPENSATIONINCENTIVE PROBLEMSINCOMEINCORPORATEDINDEPENDENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEESINDEPENDENT DIRECTORINDEPENDENT DIRECTORSINDIVIDUALSINSIDE INFORMATIONINSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTINSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKINTERNAL CONTROLSINVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIESINVESTOR PROTECTIONJOINT STOCK COMPANIESJOINT STOCK] COMPANIESLABOR UNIONSLARGE SHAREHOLDERLARGE SHAREHOLDERSLEGAL ENVIRONMENTLEGAL TRANSPLANTSLEGISLATIONLEGISLATURELEVELS OF GOVERNMENTLIMITEDLITTLE ATTENTIONLOCAL GOVERNMENTSMACROECONOMIC STABILITYMANAGERSMARGINAL COSTMARKET STRUCTURESMINISTERSMINISTRY OF FINANCEMONOPOLYMORAL HAZARDNATIONSNON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONSOUTPUTOWNERSHIP CONCENTRATIONOWNERSHIP STRUCTUREPERFORMANCE MEASUREPERFORMANCE MEASURESPOLITICAL INTERFERENCEPOLITICAL STABILITYPOLITICIANSPORTFOLIOSPRICE DISTORTIONSPRINCIPAL-AGENTPRIVATE ENTERPRISESPRIVATE ENTITYPRIVATE PARTNERSHIPSPRIVATIZATIONPROXYPUBLIC CORPORATIONPUBLIC FUNDSPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPSPUBLIC SECTORPUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONSRATIONALIZATIONREGULATORREPRESENTATIVESREPUTATIONREPUTATIONSREVENUE COLLECTIONREVOLUTIONRIGHT OF SHAREHOLDERSRISK MANAGEMENTSCANDALSECURITIES LAWSSECURITIES MARKETSSECURITIES REGULATORSSEPARATION OF OWNERSHIPSHARE PRICESHAREHOLDERSHAREHOLDER APPROVALSHAREHOLDER INFLUENCESHAREHOLDER INTERESTSSHAREHOLDER RIGHTSSHAREHOLDER VALUESHAREHOLDER WEALTHSHAREHOLDERSSTAKEHOLDERSSTATE AIDSTATE CORPORATE LAWSTATE ENTERPRISESSTATE-OWNED ENTERPRISESSTOCK EXCHANGESTOCK EXCHANGESSTOCK OPTIONSSTOCK PRICESUCCESSOR COMPANIESSUCCESSOR ENTITIESSUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENTTAXATIONTRANSPARENCYTRANSPARENT PROCEDURESTREASURYTURNOVERTURNOVERSUNIVERSAL ACCESSURBAN DEVELOPMENTThe Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises in Developing CountriesWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-4579