Henning, Christian H.C.A.Struve, CarstenBrockmeier, Martina2017-09-072017-09-072008-11-02https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28181This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOAGRICULTURAL POLICIESAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIONBARGAININGBARGAINING POWERCETERIS PARIBUSCONSUMERSCULTURAL CHANGEDECISION MAKINGDECISION-MAKINGDEMOCRACYDEMOGRAPHIC FACTORSDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT POLICYECONOMIC ANALYSISECONOMIC BEHAVIORECONOMIC CONDITIONSECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUMECONOMIC FACTORSECONOMIC MODELSECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMIC SYSTEMECONOMIC SYSTEMSECONOMIC THEORYECONOMICSENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONEXPECTED UTILITYEXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICSFORECASTSFUTURE RESEARCHGENERAL EQUILIBRIUMGENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELSGLOBAL POLICYHUMAN BEINGSIDEOLOGYIMPERFECT INFORMATIONIMPORT QUOTASINCENTIVE PROBLEMSINCOMEINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSINTEREST GROUPINTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTEINTERNATIONAL TRADELEGISLATORSLOGROLLINGMACROECONOMIC POLICIESMOTIVATIONNASH EQUILIBRIUMNATIONAL COUNCILNEW POLITICAL ECONOMYPARTY PLATFORMPOLICY CONCERNPOLICY DECISIONSPOLICY DEVELOPMENTSPOLICY IMPLICATIONSPOLICY RESEARCHPOLICY RESPONSEPOLITICAL DECISIONPOLITICAL ECONOMICSPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIESPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL PARTICIPATIONPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL SCIENCEPOLITICAL SUPPORTPOLITICAL SYSTEMSPOTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONPREFERENCE FUNCTIONSPRICE POLICIESPRODUCTION FUNCTIONSPRODUCTIVITYPROGRAMSPROGRESSPROTECTIONISMRESOURCE ALLOCATIONRISK AVERSERURAL DEVELOPMENTSOCIAL POLICIESTRADE POLICIESTRADE-OFFTREATYURBAN POPULATIONUTILITY FUNCTIONUTILITY FUNCTIONSUTILITY MAXIMIZATIONVOTERSWAGE RATESWTOWorking PaperWorld Bank10.1596/28181