Cantens, ThomasKaminski, JonathanRaballand, GaƫlTchapa, Tchouawou2014-03-182014-03-182014-02https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17335Based on extensive interviews with informal importers and brokers in Cameroon, this paper explains why customs reform aimed at reducing fraud and corruption may be difficult to achieve. Informal traders and brokers (without licenses) follow various business models and practices, which are product-specific. Overall, what matters first are customs brokers' practices. Information asymmetries mark transactions between brokers and importers and are accompanied by misperceptions of the costs and risks of informal brokers working among informal importers. In a low-governance environment with widespread informal practices, blanket policies should be avoided in order to discourage activities of unprofessional and systematic bribe-taker brokers. It is also essential that customs officials disrupt information asymmetries and better disseminate information to informal importers on customs processes and official costs. Finally, customs should more strongly sanction some informal brokers in order to reduce collusion with some customs officers.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTINGAMOUNT OF DUTIESAREA OF CUSTOMSBANK ACCOUNTBARRIER TO ENTRYBARRIERS TO ENTRYBOTTLENECKSBROKERBROKERAGEBROKERSBUSESBUSINESS ENVIRONMENTBUSINESS FORMATIONBUSINESS MODELBUSINESS MODELSBUSINESS RELATIONSBUSINESS RELATIONSHIPSBUSINESS SERVICESBUSINESSESCARCARSCHECKSCOLLATERALCOMMERCECOMMODITYCOMPUTER HARDWARECOMPUTERSCREDIT ASSOCIATIONSCREDIT MARKETCUSTOMER BASECUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPSCUSTOMSCUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONCUSTOMS ADMINISTRATIONSCUSTOMS AGENTCUSTOMS AREACUSTOMS BROKERSCUSTOMS CLEARANCECUSTOMS CONTROLCUSTOMS DUTIESCUSTOMS INFORMATIONCUSTOMS OFFICECUSTOMS OFFICERSCUSTOMS OFFICESCUSTOMS OFFICIALSCUSTOMS PROCESSCUSTOMS REFORMCUSTOMS REGULATIONSCUSTOMS REVENUESDAY-TO-DAY MANAGEMENTDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT BANKDIRECT SALESECONOMIC ACTIVITYELECTRONIC DEVICESEND CUSTOMERSENTRY POINTFINANCIAL CONSTRAINTSFINANCIAL INCENTIVESFINANCIAL RESOURCESFOREIGN TRADEFRAUDFREIGHTIDIMAGEINFORMATION ASYMMETRIESINFORMATION ASYMMETRYINFORMATION FLOWSINFORMATION SHARINGINFORMATION TECHNOLOGYINTEREST RATEINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL TRADELEVEL OF RISKLIABILITYLICENSELICENSESLITIGATIONMANUFACTURINGMARKET DEMANDMARKET FAILURESMARKET SEGMENTMARKET STRUCTUREMARKETINGMARKETING STRATEGIESMATERIALMEDIUM ENTERPRISESMIDDLEMENMORAL HAZARDNECESSARY SKILLSNEIGHBORHOODSNETWORKSOPEN ACCESSOPERATIONAL EFFICIENCYPERFORMANCESPERSONAL INCOMEPETROLEUM PRODUCTSPOLICEPOLITICAL ECONOMYPORT AUTHORITYPRODUCT CATEGORYPRODUCTIVITYPROFIT MARGINSPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONREBATESREGIONAL NETWORKSRELIABILITYRESULTRESULTSRETURNRISK EXPOSURERISK PROFILEROUTESAVINGSSAVINGS RATESERVICE PROVIDERSMALL BUSINESSSOCIAL CAPITALSPOT MARKETSPOT MARKET TRANSACTIONSSTANDARDIZATIONSTOCKSSUPPLY CHAINTAXTAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERTAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERSTAX RATESTAXATIONTELEPHONETIRESTRACEABILITYTRADE FACILITATIONTRADINGTRANSACTIONTRANSITTRANSIT SERVICETRANSIT SERVICE PROVIDERTRANSIT SERVICESTRANSPORTTRANSPORT POLICYTRUEVALUE CHAINVEHICLEVEHICLESWAGESWAREHOUSEWAREHOUSESWEBWORKING CAPITALCustoms, Brokers, and Informal Sectors : A Cameroon Case Study10.1596/1813-9450-6788