Hess, DavidImpavido, Gregorio2014-04-302014-04-302003-08https://hdl.handle.net/10986/18125An understanding of corporate governance theory can promote the adoption of appropriate governance tools to limit agency problems in public pension fund management. The absence of a market for corporate control hinders the translation of lessons from the private sector corporate world to public pension governance. The establishment of a fit, and proper governing body for public pension funds, thus may be even more important than the maintenance of a comparable body for private sector corporations. In particular, behavioral controls should be carefully designed.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOADMINISTRATIVE COSTSADVERSE SELECTIONAGENCY PROBLEMSASSET DIVERSIFICATIONASSETSAUDITSAUTHORITYBANK DEPOSITSBANKRUPTCYBANKSCIVIL SERVICECOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGECOMPETITIVENESSCORPORATE GOVERNANCECORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMCORRUPTIONCOST OF LIVINGCOST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTSCREDIT RATINGSDECISION-MAKERSDECISION-MAKINGECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC EFFICIENCYECONOMIES OF SCALEEFFECTIVE GOVERNANCEEMPIRICAL EVIDENCEEMPIRICAL RESEARCHEXTERNAL AUDITORSFINANCIAL HEALTHFINANCIAL INCENTIVESFINANCIAL INTERESTSFINANCIAL MARKETSFINANCIAL PERFORMANCEFINANCIAL SECTORFOREIGN MARKETSGOVERNMENT BONDSGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSGOVERNMENT SERVICESHOUSINGINCENTIVE EFFECTSINCOMEINFLATIONINSOLVENCYINSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTSINSURANCEINSURANCE PREMIUMSINTEREST RATEINTEREST RATESINTERNAL AUDITINTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTIONINTERNAL CONTROLSLABOR MARKETLARGE SHAREHOLDERSLAWSLEGISLATIONLIQUIDITYLOCAL GOVERNMENTMANDATESMORAL HAZARDMOTIVATIONSMUNICIPAL BONDSNATIONALPENSIONSPOLITICAL INTERFERENCEPROPERTY VALUESPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOVERNANCEREPRESENTATIVESRESOURCE ALLOCATIONRETIREMENTRETURN ON ASSETSRISK AVERSIONSAVINGSSAVINGS ACCOUNTSSHAREHOLDERSSOCIAL SECURITYSTATETRUSTEESUNEMPLOYMENTWEALTH GOVERNANCE CAPACITYPUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMSPENSION FUNDS ADMINISTRATIONCORPORATE GOVERNANCEPRIVATE SECTOR MANAGEMENTREGULATORY BODIESREGULATORY CONTROLWEALTHGOVERNANCE CAPACITYGovernance of Public Pension Funds : Lessons from Corporate Governance and International Evidence10.1596/1813-9450-3110