Lecocq, FranckHourcade, Jean-Charles2014-03-272014-03-272003-12https://hdl.handle.net/10986/17431In a one-period model, whether or not individual weights in the welfare function are based on initial endowments dictate who provides public goods. But with long-term public goods, banning wealth redistribution still allows for several equilibriums depending on Parties' willingness to acknowledge changes in negotiating powers over time, and on whether or not they care only for their own descendants. Adaptative and universal mandates lead to far more robust equilibrium. In all cases, a simple rule of thumb for allocating expenditures at first period emerges, independent of both the optimal level of public goods and the second-period distribution of expenditures.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOABATEMENTABATEMENT COST FUNCTIONSABATEMENT COSTSATMOSPHEREBENCHMARKBIODIVERSITYCARBONCLIMATECLIMATE CHANGECOST FUNCTIONSDAMAGESDEVELOPED COUNTRIESDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDISCOUNT RATEDISCOUNT RATESDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTHECONOMIC CONSEQUENCESECONOMICSECONOMISTSEMISSIONEMISSION RIGHTSEMISSIONSEMISSIONS RIGHTSEMISSIONS TRADINGENGINEERINGENTITLEMENTSEQUATIONSEQUILIBRIUMEXPENDITURESEXPERIMENTSEXTERNALITYFRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGEGDPGLOBAL WARMINGGREENHOUSE GASESGROWTH RATEINCOMEINCOME DISTRIBUTIONINCOME LEVELSINTERGENERATIONAL EQUITYMARGINAL ABATEMENTMARGINAL ABATEMENT COSTSMARGINAL BENEFITSMARGINAL COSTMARGINAL COST OF PRODUCTIONMARGINAL DAMAGE FUNCTIONMARGINAL UTILITYMULTIPLIERSNATIONAL INCOMEOZONEOZONE LAYERPER CAPITA INCOMEPOLITICAL ECONOMYPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSSUB-SAHARAN AFRICATEMPERATUREUNCERTAINTYUTILITY FUNCTIONUTILITY FUNCTIONSWEALTHWELFARE FUNCTION10.1596/1813-9450-3180