Rausser, Gordon C.Roland, Gérard2017-09-082017-09-082009-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/28251This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTINGACCOUNTING STANDARDSADVERSE SELECTIONAGRICULTUREALTERNATIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTSASSET DIVERSIFICATIONASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONBANK POLICYBIDBRIBERYBUREAUCRATIC QUALITYCANDIDATESCHECKSCOALITION GOVERNMENTCOALITION GOVERNMENTSCOLLUSIONCOMPETITIVENESSCONDITIONALITYCONFIDENCECONFLICT OF INTERESTCONSTITUENCIESCONSTITUENCYCONTRACT ENFORCEMENTCORPORATE TAXESCORRUPTCORRUPT OFFICIALSCORRUPTIONCOUNTRY RISKCREDIBILITYCRIMEDECISION MAKINGDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITYDEMOCRATIC REGIMESDEMOCRATIC SOCIETIESDEVELOPED COUNTRIESDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT BANKDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDYNAMIC ANALYSISECONOMETRICSECONOMIC ANALYSISECONOMIC CONSEQUENCESECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC EFFECTSECONOMIC GROWTHECONOMIC HISTORYECONOMIC RESEARCHECONOMIC TRENDSECONOMICSECONOMISTSELASTICITIESELECTED REPRESENTATIVESELECTIONSELECTORAL PROCESSELECTORAL SYSTEMSELECTORATEEMPIRICAL ANALYSISEMPIRICAL STUDIESENDOGENOUS VARIABLESENFORCEABILITYENFORCEABILITY OF CONTRACTSENTERPRISE PERFORMANCEENVIRONMENTALEQUILIBRIUMEXCHANGE RATEEXECUTIVE BRANCHEXPENDITUREEXPENDITURESEXPLOITATIONEXPORTSEXTERNALITIESGDPGINI COEFFICIENTGOVERNMENT EXPENDITURESGOVERNMENT SPENDINGGROWTH RATEHIDDEN ACTIONSHIDDEN INFORMATIONHUMAN CAPITALHUMAN RIGHTSINCOME INEQUALITYINCOME LEVELINEFFICIENCYINSTRUMENTINTELLECTUAL PROPERTYINTERMEDIATE INPUTSINVESTIGATIONINVESTIGATIONSJUDICIAL INDEPENDENCEJUDICIAL PROCESSJUDICIARYLABOR MARKETLAWSLEADERSHIPLEGAL FRAMEWORKLEGAL SYSTEMLEGISLATIONLEGISLATIVE DECISIONSLOBBYINGLOCAL MARKETMARKET DISTORTIONSMARKET FAILURESMARKET PRICEMARKET STRUCTUREMEDIAMONOPOLYMORAL HAZARDOPTIMIZATIONPARLIAMENTPARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACYPARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONSPARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMSPARTICIPATION CONSTRAINTSPATRONAGEPENALTYPOLICY INSTRUMENTSPOLICY MAKINGPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL POWERPOLITICAL RIGHTSPOLITICAL RISKPOLITICAL SYSTEMPOLITICAL SYSTEMSPOLITICIANPOLITICIANSPREFERENCE ANALYSISPRICE CONTROLSPRIVATE GAINPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLIC EXPENDITURESPUBLIC FINANCEPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC GOODSPUBLIC INTERESTPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC SERVICESPUBLIC SPENDINGQUOTASREPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACYREPRESENTATIVESRULE OF LAWSTATISTICAL ANALYSISTAXTAX COLLECTIONTAX REVENUETAX REVENUESTAX SYSTEMTAXATIONTERRORISMTRADE POLICYTRANSACTIONTRANSACTION COSTSTRANSPARENCYTRUST FUNDSTURNOVERUNFAIR COMPETITIONVIOLENCEVOTER PREFERENCESVOTERSWEALTHWorking PaperWorld Bank10.1596/28251