Laeven, Luc2013-06-212013-06-212004-03https://hdl.handle.net/10986/14121The author uses a political economy framework to analyze cross-country differences in deposit insurance coverage. He finds supporting evidence of the significance of private interest theories in explaining coverage of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance coverage is significantly higher in countries where poorly capitalized banks dominate the market and in countries where depositors are poorly educated. The author does not find that coverage is significantly related to political-institutional variables, such as the degree of democracy or restraints on the executive, or to proxies for the general level of institutional development, such as per capita income or property rights. These results provide evidence in support of the private interest view, according to which risky banks lobby for extensive coverage.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYBANK CAPITALBANK DEPOSITSBANK REGULATIONBANK RISKBANK SIZEBANKING INDUSTRYBANKING STRUCTUREBANKING SYSTEMBANKING SYSTEMSBANKSBRANCH BANKINGCAPITALIZATIONCENTRAL BANKSCOALITION GOVERNMENTSCOMMERCIAL BANKSCOMPETITIVENESSCORPORATE GOVERNANCECREDIT UNIONSDEPOSIT INSURANCEDEPOSIT INSURANCE COVERAGEDEPOSIT INSURANCE PREMIUMSDEPOSIT INSURANCE SCHEMESDEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEMSDEPOSITOR PROTECTIONDEPOSITORSDEPOSITSECONOMICSFINANCIAL CRISISFINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSFINANCIAL SERVICESFINANCIAL STABILITYFINANCIAL STRUCTUREFISCAL POLICYINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTINSTITUTIONAL SETUPINSURANCE ACTIVITIESINSURANCE AGENCIESINSURANCE COMPANIESINSURANCE DESIGNINSURANCE INDUSTRYINSURANCE LIMITSINSURANCE POLICIESINSURANCE PRODUCTSINSURANCE REGULATIONINTERNATIONAL BANKSLAWSLEGAL PROTECTIONLIQUID ASSETSMORAL HAZARDNONPERFORMING LOANSPRIVATE BANKSPUBLIC DEBTRATESRISK OF BANK FAILURESAVINGSSHAREHOLDERSSMALL BANKSSOCIAL SECURITYSOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMSSOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMSSTOCK MARKETS DEPOSIT INSURANCEBANK DEPOSITSDEPOSITORSDEPOSITORS SAFETYFOREIGN BANK ACCOUNTSBANKSCONFIDENCE IN BANKSPROXYSHAREHOLDERSWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-3247