Keefer, PhilipHanusch, Marek2014-02-042014-02-042013-10https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16868Vote-buying is pervasive, but not everywhere. What explains significant variations across countries in the greater use of pre-electoral transfers to mobilize voters relative to the use of pre-electoral promises of post-electoral transfers? This paper explicitly models the trade-offs that politicians incur when they decide between mobilizing support with vote-buying or promises of post-electoral benefits. Politicians rely more on vote-buying when they are less credible, target vote-buying to those who do not believe their political promises, and only buy votes from those who would have received post-electoral transfers in a world of full political credibility. The enforcement of a prohibition on vote-buying reduces the welfare of those targeted with vote-buying, but improves the welfare of all other groups in society.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOVOTE BUYINGCLIENTELECTION ADMISNITRATIONCREDIBLE COMMITTMENTPOLICITAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT BENEFITSBUDGET CONSTRAINTGOVERNMENT SPENDINGBUDGET CYCLEGOVERNMENT FINANCINGBUSINESS CYCLEGENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURECAMPAIGN EXPENDITURESCOLLECTIVE ACTIONVOTERSCONSUMPTION EXPENDITURESNATIONAL INCOMEDEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITYDEMOCRATIC POLITIESECONOMIC GROWTHELECTIONELECTION FRAUDELECTORAL PROCESSEXPENDITURECONSUMPTION EXPENDITUREEXPENDITURESFINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITUREFISCAL TRANSPARENCYGENERAL GOVERNMENT FINAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITUREGOVERNMENT FINANCINGGOVERNMENT POLICIESGOVERNMENT POLICYGOVERNMENT PROGRAMSGOVERNMENT RESOURCESGOVERNMENT SPENDINGGOVERNMENT SYSTEMSMODERN ECONOMIC GROWTHNATIONAL BUDGETNATIONAL INCOMENEW DEMOCRACIESPARTY LEADERSPOLITICAL BUSINESS CYCLEPRESIDENTIAL RACEPOLITICAL INCENTIVESPOLITICAL PARTIESPOLITICAL SCIENCEPRESIDENTIAL RACEPUBLIC GOODSOCIAL WELFARETAX REVENUESTRANSFER PROGRAMSVOTER BEHAVIORVOTINGVOTING BEHAVIORVOTING BLOCSWELFARE BENEFITSWELFARE CONSEQUENCESWELFARE LOSS TRANSFER PROGRAMSWELFARE SERVICESWorld Bankhttps://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-6653