Jack, William2014-02-202014-02-202001-04World Bank Research Observerhttps://hdl.handle.net/10986/17130This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds.en-USCC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGOADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATIONADVERSE SELECTIONAGENCY PROBLEMSAUCTIONAUCTIONSAUTONOMYBENEFICIARIESBRIBESCAPACITY BUILDINGCENTRAL GOVERNMENTSCIVIL SERVANTSCIVIL SOCIETYCOLLUSIONCOMPARATIVE ADVANTAGECOMPETITIVE BIDDINGCORRUPTCORRUPTIONDECENTRALIZATIONDECONCENTRATIONDEVELOPING COUNTRIESDEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCEDEVELOPMENT BANKDEVELOPMENT ECONOMICSDEVELOPMENT PROJECTSDEVOLUTIONDISCRETIONECONOMIC CONDITIONSECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTECONOMIC SYSTEMSECONOMICS RESEARCHEMPLOYMENTEXPENDITUREEXPROPRIATIONEXTERNAL FUNDINGEXTERNALITIESFINANCIAL STRUCTUREFINANCIAL SUPPORTFISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONFISCAL FEDERALISMFUNGIBLEGOOD GOVERNANCEGOVERNMENT GRANTSGOVERNMENT OFFICIALSHOUSINGHUMAN DEVELOPMENTHUMAN RESOURCESINCOME INEQUALITYINSTITUTIONAL CAPACITYINSTITUTIONAL DESIGNINSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICSINSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKINSTITUTIONAL STRUCTUREINSTRUMENTINSURANCEINTERNATIONAL BANKINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTINVESTMENT FUNDINVESTMENT FUNDSLOANLOCAL CAPACITYLOCAL GOVERNMENTLOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALSLOCAL GOVERNMENTSLOCAL LEVELLOCAL OFFICIALSMEDIAMINISTERSMINISTRIES OF FINANCEMISAPPROPRIATIONMORAL HAZARDMORAL HAZARDSMUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTOPTIMAL CONTRACTORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURESPENALTIESPERFECT INFORMATIONPERSONAL INCOMEPHYSICAL ASSETSPOLICEPOLICE OFFICERPOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATIONPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPORTFOLIOPOVERTY REDUCTIONPROCUREMENTPRODUCTION EFFICIENCYPROPERTY RIGHTSPUBLICPUBLIC CHOICEPUBLIC GOODPUBLIC INSTITUTIONSPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC ORGANIZATIONSPUBLIC PROJECTSPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SECTORSPUBLIC SERVICESPUBLIC SPENDINGPUBLIC WORKSRATE OF RETURNRETURNRETURNSRISK TAKINGSANCTIONSSOCIAL CAPITALTAXTAXATIONTRANSACTIONTRANSACTION COSTSTRANSITION COUNTRIESTRANSITION ECONOMIESTRANSPORTURBAN AREASURBAN DEVELOPMENTURBAN INFRASTRUCTUREUSER CHARGESJournal ArticleWorld Bank10.1596/17130