Frank, Jonas2013-03-142013-03-142010-05https://hdl.handle.net/10986/12737The decentralization game in Bolivia has been altered quite significantly with the presence of new bargainers at the departmental level. Two, opposing groups have emerged and which follow intricate strategies to enforce their claims. The highland departments are strongly aligned to the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party and the charismatic leadership of the country's first indigenous leader Evo Morales. The Media Luna departments in the lowlands demand autonomy and seek a greater share of the national pool of hydrocarbon revenue. The paper discusses how a fiscal pact can be forged to bring agreement around the most pressing issues. It considers several bargaining packages which could be crafted and analyzes the extent to which decentralization principles need to be sacrificed in order to achieve agreement among competing actors. It is likely that these agreements may eliminate some inefficiency, but also create others. An important insight is that the fiscal pact should be renegotiated at certain pre-defined times, in order to provide flexibility and adjust to the constraints of actors to engage in inter-temporal commitments. Explicit exit options would enhance the possibilities for agreement.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOACCOUNTABILITYADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLSASSIGNMENT OF EXPENDITURESBALANCE SHEETSBANKSBORROWINGBROKERBUDGET CONSTRAINTBUDGET POLICYBUDGETINGCENTRAL GOVERNMENTCITIESCIVIL SERVICECOLLECTIVE ACTIONCOMMODITY PRICESCOMPENSATION FUNDCORPORATE INCOME TAXDEBT RULESDEBT SERVICEDEBT STOCKDECENTRALIZATIONDECENTRALIZATION PROCESSDEVELOPMENT BANKDISTRICTSDOMESTIC FINANCIAL MARKETECONOMIC REFORMELECTRICITYEXPENDITUREEXPENDITURE ASSIGNMENTSEXPENDITURE DECENTRALIZATIONEXPENDITURE NEEDSEXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIESEXPENDITURESEXTERNALITIESFEDERAL COUNTRIESFINANCESFINANCIAL MANAGEMENTFINANCIAL SUPPORTFISCAL ADJUSTMENTFISCAL COORDINATIONFISCAL DECENTRALIZATIONFISCAL INFORMATIONFISCAL MANAGEMENTFISCAL RESPONSIBILITYFISCAL SURPLUSESFLOATING DEBTGOVERNORGOVERNORSHARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTSHEALTH SERVICESHOUSINGHUMAN RESOURCEINCENTIVE CONSTRAINTSINCOME TAXINDEBTEDNESSINSTITUTIONAL CAPACITYINTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL RELATIONSINTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTINTERNATIONAL STANDARDSLABOR UNIONSLAND REFORMLAWSLEVEL OF GOVERNMENTLOCAL FISCAL CAPACITYMACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTMAYORSMINISTRY OF ECONOMYMINISTRY OF FINANCEMUNICIPALMUNICIPAL DEBTMUNICIPALITIESNATIONAL BUDGETNATIONAL TAXESNATURAL RESOURCESNEGATIVE EXTERNALITIESODIOUS DEBTOIL PRICESOUTSTANDING DEBTPERSONAL INCOMEPOLITICAL AUTHORITYPOLITICAL DECENTRALIZATIONPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL POWERPOSITIVE EXTERNALITIESPREFECTURESPRIVATE BANKSPRIVATE SECTORPRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATIONPROPERTY OWNERSHIPPROPERTY RIGHTSPROVINCESPROVINCIAL LEVELPROVISIONSPUBLICPUBLIC EMPLOYEESPUBLIC EXPENDITURESPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SECTOR EXPENDITURESPUBLIC SERVICEPUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERYPUBLIC SERVICESREDISTRIBUTIONREFERENDAREFERENDUMRENEGOTIATIONRENEGOTIATIONSRETURNREVENUE LOSSREVENUE SHARINGREVENUE STREAMSREVENUE YIELDROADSSECTOR MINISTRIESSEWAGESOCIAL SERVICESSUB-NATIONALSUBNATIONALSUBNATIONAL DEBTSUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTSSUBNATIONAL UNITSTAXTAX AUTHORITYTAX AUTONOMYTAX BASESTAX DECENTRALIZATIONTAX RATESTAX REFORMTAX REVENUETAX REVENUESTAXATIONTAXES ON PROPERTYTOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURESTRANSPARENCYURBAN SERVICESWAGESWorld Bank10.1596/12737