Cruz, CesiKeefer, Philip2014-02-052014-02-052013-11https://hdl.handle.net/10986/16926Bureaucratic reform is a priority of donor organizations, including the World Bank, but is notoriously difficult to implement. In many countries, politicians have little interest in the basic financial and personnel management systems that are essential to political oversight of bureaucratic performance. To explain this, this paper presents a new perspective on the political economy of bureaucracy. Politicians in some countries belong to parties that are organized to allow party members to act collectively to limit leader shirking. This is particularly the case with programmatic parties. Such politicians have stronger incentives to pursue public policies that require a well-functioning public administration. Novel evidence offers robust support for this argument. From a sample of 439 World Bank public sector reform loans in 109 countries, the paper finds that public sector reforms are more likely to succeed in countries with programmatic political parties.en-USCC BY 3.0 IGOADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUSADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITYADMINISTRATIVE REFORMSADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEMSAGREEMENTSANALYTICAL CAPACITYBANKBENEFICIARIESBEST PRACTICEBORROWINGBUDGET ENVELOPEBUDGET MANAGEMENTBUDGET PLANNINGBUDGET PREPARATIONBUDGET REFORMSBUDGETSBUREAUCRATIC DISCRETIONCASH TRANSFERSCIVIL SERVICECIVIL SERVICE REFORMCIVIL SERVICE REFORMSCIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMCOLLAPSECOMPETITIONCONFIDENCECONFLICTS OF INTERESTCONTRACTSCORRUPTIONCOSTS OF SERVICE PROVISIONDEBTDEBT MANAGEMENTDECENTRALIZATIONDEMOCRACIESDEMOCRACYDISCRETIONDONOR AGENCIESDONOR COLLABORATIONECONOMIC PERFORMANCEECONOMIC POLICYECONOMIES OF SCALEEDUCATION PROGRAMSFINANCEFINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITYFINANCIAL MANAGEMENTFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMSFINANCIAL RESOURCESFISCAL SUSTAINABILITYGOVERNANCEGOVERNANCE REFORMGOVERNMENTSHEALTH CAREHEALTH PROGRAMINCENTIVESINFORMATION ASYMMETRIESINFRASTRUCTUREINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTINSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IMPACTINSTITUTIONAL REFORMINSTITUTIONAL SETTINGINVESTIGATIONJUDICIAL REVIEWLANDLEADERSHIPLOANSLOCAL GOVERNMENTMACROECONOMIC MANAGEMENTMANAGEMENTMEDIAMINISTERMINISTERSMINISTRY OF FINANCENATIONAL BUDGETNATURAL RESOURCESOPERATIONAL PROCESSESORGANIZATIONSOUTCOME INDICATOROUTCOMESPATRONAGEPERPER CAPITA INCOMEPERFORMANCE MANAGEMENTPERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PROCESSPERSONNEL MANAGEMENTPERSONNEL SYSTEMSPOLICEPOLITICAL ECONOMYPOLITICAL INSTITUTIONSPOLITICAL INTERESTPOLITICIANPOLITICIANSPOLITICSPRIVATE GOODSPROCUREMENTPROCUREMENT SYSTEMSPROJECTSPROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATIONPUBLICPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONPUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORMPUBLIC CHOICEPUBLIC ECONOMICSPUBLIC EXPENDITUREPUBLIC GOODSPUBLIC HEALTHPUBLIC OFFICIALSPUBLIC POLICIESPUBLIC POLICYPUBLIC RESOURCESPUBLIC SECTORPUBLIC SECTOR CAPACITYPUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENTPUBLIC SECTOR ORGANIZATIONPUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCEPUBLIC SECTOR REFORMPUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AREASPUBLIC SECTORSREDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIESREFORM PROJECTREFORM PROJECTSREGULATIONREPORTSRESOURCE MANAGEMENTREVENUEREVENUESRULE OF LAWRULING PARTYSANCTIONSSECTORAL OBJECTIVESSERVICE PROVISIONSERVICE QUALITYSERVICESSOCIAL PROGRAMSSPENDINGSTATESSTRATEGIESSTRATEGYSUBSIDIESTAXTAX ADMINISTRATIONTAX INCIDENCETAX LAWTAX POLICYTAX SYSTEMSTAXATIONTAXPAYERSUNCERTAINTYUNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITSVOTERSWorld Bank10.1596/1813-9450-6686