72677 v2 © 2011 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 Telephone: 202-473-1000 Internet www.worldbank.org E-mail feedback@worldbank.org All rights reserved. This volume is a product of the Chief Economist‟s Office of the Middle East and North Africa Region and the Concessional Finance and Global Partnerships Vice Presidency of the World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. 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V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................................................. VII INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 1 MENA’S MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK ................................................................................................... 5 Growth outlook for 2011 – better than expected in May ............................................................... 5 Fiscal outlook for 2011 – worse than expected in May .................................................................. 9 Risks to the outlook ......................................................................................................................... 16 INVESTING FOR GROWTH .......................................................................................................................... 21 MENA’s investment record ............................................................................................................. 21 Investment and growth .................................................................................................................... 24 Should the dominant role of public investment in MENA be a cause for concern? ....................... 25 Investment efficiency in MENA ....................................................................................................... 29 Foreign direct investment, growth and employment ....................................................................... 30 GROWTH AND JOB CREATION .................................................................................................................... 35 Pace of job creation relative to growth .......................................................................................... 35 Economic activities and employment ............................................................................................. 39 Engines of economic and employment growth ............................................................................... 42 KEY MESSAGES........................................................................................................................................... 47 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................... 51 ANNEX ......................................................................................................................................................... 53 LIST OF BOXES Box 4.1 Maintaining and building infrastructure as a vehicle for job creation .................................. 45 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 Average growth and investment performance during typical successful transition .............. 2 Figure 2.1 Growth outlook (percent) ...................................................................................................... 5 Figure 2.2 Industrial production (% change, 3m/3m, seasonally adjusted annualized rate) .................. 7 Figure 2.3 Tourist arrivals (percent change over same period of the previous year) ............................. 7 Figure 2.4 Unemployment rates (percent) .............................................................................................. 8 Figure 2.5 Fiscal outlook for 2011 (fiscal balance as a share of GDP) .................................................. 9 Figure 2.6 Inflation rates (percent) ......................................................................................................... 15 Figure 2.7 Real growth in MENA, US and EU .................................................................................... 16 Figure 2.8 Equity markets (indexes)....................................................................................................... 19 Figure 2.9 Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) ................................................................................ 19 Figure 3.1 Gross fixed capital formation (average, % of GDP) ............................................................. 21 Figure 3.2 Private gross fixed capital formation (averages, % of GDP) ................................................ 22 Figure 3.3 Private gross fixed capital formation by country (averages, % of GDP) .............................. 22 Figure 3.4 Foreign and other investment (averages, % of GDP) ............................................................ 23 Figure 3.5 Growth in oil prices and FDI inflows to MENA ................................................................... 24 i Figure 3.6 Changes in average private investment and growth rates in MENA .................................... 25 Figure 3.7 Public gross fixed capital formation (averages, % of GDP) ................................................. 25 Figure 3.8 Public gross fixed capital formation by country (averages, % of GDP) ............................... 26 Figure 3.9 Ratio of private to public investment .................................................................................... 26 Figure 3.10 Annual per capita GDP growth and public investment, 2000-05 ........................................ 28 Figure 3.11 Investment efficiency in MENA region (average ICORs for the 2000s) .............................. 29 Figure 3.12 Private investment and growth ............................................................................................. 30 Figure 3.13 FDI inflows and FDI-related job in MENA by sector during 2003-11 ................................. 32 Figure 3.14 FDI-related jobs by country during 2003-11......................................................................... 34 Figure 4.1 Employment-growth elasticities for 2004-08 ...................................................................... 36 Figure 4.2 Value added shares by sector in the oil exporters (period averages in the 2000s, percent) .. 36 Figure 4.3 Employment elasticity to growth vs. share of informal workers in developing MENA in the 2000s ..................................................................................................................................... 37 Figure 4.4 Average growth rates in developing MENA countries in the 2000s (percent) ..................... 38 Figure 4.5 Employment shares by sector (period averages in the 2000s, percent) ................................. 39 Figure 4.6 Employment shares – a comparison with fast growing, middle-income developing countries (period averages in the 2000s, percent) ................................................................................. 40 Figure 4.7 Value added share of government and all other services (period averages in the 2000s, percent).................................................................................................................................. 41 Figure 4.8 Sectoral contributions to average annual value added growth (percentage points) .............. 42 Figure 4.9 Sectoral contribution to average, annual employment growth (percentage points) .............. 43 Figure 4.10 Services sectors‟ contribution to average annual value added growth (percentage points) .. 44 Figure 4.11 Sectoral contribution to annual employment and value added growth - an international comparison (percent) ............................................................................................................. 44 LIST OF TABLES Table 2.1. Macro Economic Outlook ..................................................................................................... 6 Table 2.2. Social measures implemented in the region in 2011 ............................................................. 10 Table 2.3. GCC Investment Programs and Projects ............................................................................... 14 LIST OF ANNEX FIGURES Figure 1. Annual per capita GDP growth and public investment, 1995-99.......................................... 54 LIST OF ANNEX TABLES Table 1. Countries with successful transitions .................................................................................... 54 Table 2. Macroeconomic Outlook as of May 2011 ............................................................................. 55 Table 3. MENA‟s employment elasticity to growth ........................................................................... 56 WORLD BANK MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION Economic Developments and Prospects Report, September 2011 MENA INVESTING FOR GROWTH AND JOBS This report was prepared by a team led by Elena Ianchovichina (Lead Economist, MNACE and principal author) and under the guidance of Caroline Freund (Chief Economist, Middle East and North Africa Region). We acknowledge contributions by the following team members. Lili Mottaghi (MNACE) worked on investment and growth as well as the regional macroeconomic outlook jointly with country economists in MNSED. Christina A. Wood (MNACE) made contributions on the employment and growth section. Ravindra Yatawara (MNACE) contributed inputs on foreign direct investment, while Bob Rijker (MNACE) worked on foreign direct investment and employment. We received useful data from Sharmaine Yap Yu (CICIN), Maros Ivanic (DECRG), Jian Zhan (MNACE), Subika Farasi (FPDCE), Elliot (Mick) Riordan (DECPG), and Nadia Spivak (DECPG). Isabelle Chaal- Dabi (MNACE) provided excellent administrative assistance and Malika Drissi (MNSSO) worked on the design of the report‟s cover. We are grateful to Manuela Ferro (Sector Director, MNSED), Stefanie Brodmann (MNSSP), Diego Angel-Urdinola (MNSSP) and Anne Hilger (MNSHD) for their useful comments. We would also like to thank Bernard Funck (Sector Manager, MNSED), and Roberta Gatti (Social Sector Protection Sector Manager and Lead Economist (MNSHD) for their assistance, suggestions and support. The following group of MNSED country economists provided valuable country-specific inputs: Antonio Nucifora, Chadi Bou Habib, Daniela Marotta, Hania Sahnoun, Ibrahim Al Ghelaiqah, John Nasir, Jorge Araujo, Karim Badr, Kevin Carey, Khalid El Massnaoui, Marc Schiffbauer, Nancy Claire Benjamin, Ndiame Diop, Santiago Herrera, Sherine H. El-Shawarby, Sibel Kulaksiz, Stefano Paternostro, Wael Mansour, and Wilfried Engelke. For ease of analysis and exposition, the region is divided into three main groups: the GCC oil exporters, developing oil exporters and oil importers. The first group contains the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. The second group comprises the developing oil exporters such as Algeria, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syrian Arab Republic, and Yemen. Oil importers include countries with strong GCC links (Djibouti, Jordan, and Lebanon) and those with strong EU links and located in North Africa (Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). Developing MENA represents all MENA countries except the GCC oil exporters. iii iv 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs ACRONYMS CDS Credit Default Swap EAP East Asia and Pacific ECA Europe and Central Asia ECB European Central Bank EDP Economic Developments and Prospects report EMBI Emerging Market Bond Index EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment GCC Gulf Cooperation Council GDP Gross Domestic Product GTAP The Global Trade Analysis Project HIC High Income Countries HSBC/Nasdaq Family of Indices tracker ICOR Incremental Capital Output Ratio IFS International Financial Statistics IMF International Monetary Fund ID Iraqi Dinar ILO International Labor Organization IMF International Monetary Fund JD Jordanian Dinar KD Kuwaiti Dinar LAC Latin America and the Caribbean LE Egyptian Pound LNG Liquefied Natural Gas MAD Moroccan Dirham MENA Middle East and North Africa MoF Ministry of Finance MSCI Emerging Markets index NPISH Non-Profit Institutions Services Households OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PDS Public Distribution System S&P Standard and Poor SA South Asia SR Saudi Arabia Riyal SSA Sub-Saharan Africa SWF Sovereign Wealth Funds TDN Tunisian Dinar UAE United Arab Emirates UK United Kingdom UNCTAD United nations Conference on Trade and Development UNSTAT United Nation Statistics US United States of America WBG West Bank and Gaza WDI World Development Indicators v vi 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to average 4.1 percent in 2011 and improve by half a percentage point from our May forecast for the year. This positive development is largely due to increases in public spending that have boosted demand across the region, increases in oil production in most MENA oil exporters, and a quicker than expected pickup in industrial production in Egypt. In addition, Iran‟s growth prospects improved as subsidy reform took effect and efficiency gains started taking place. The slight deceleration in regional growth to 3.8 percent in 2012 is mainly linked to an anticipated global slowdown, which is likely to depress oil production and prices. While this year‟s regional growth outlook has improved relative to the May forecast, uncertainty about it has increased in line with growing risks for a global downturn. Declining demand from Europe would negatively affect North African oil importers as it would threaten their export revenues and remittances. Falling oil prices would reduce growth in MENA‟s oil exporters, but be a relief to developing oil importers. Unlike in 2008, when MENA countries had ample fiscal space to respond to the challenges brought about by the global economic and financial crisis, current political and economic developments have weakened many countries‟ fiscal positions and their ability to respond with additional spending in the event of another global crisis. Within the region, a move to political and macroeconomic stability is therefore critical in order to reduce regional uncertainty and revive investment and economic activity. There is some evidence of expanded activity in the transition countries in recent months. Industrial production in Egypt and Tunisia returned to pre-Arab-spring levels, suggesting that these countries might follow the standard path of political transition. On average, economic growth returns quickly following smooth transitions to democracy. Specifically, growth declined by 3 percentage points during past successful transitions but rebounded to at or above its pre- transition rate within a year or two. Uncertainty during transition also has important implications for investment. Experiences from successful transitions suggest that investment declines with a delay and takes longer to recover than economic activity. Declines are moderate, on average 2 percentage points, but typically take at least 5 years to recover. Similar to these experiences from other regions, the rise in uncertainty stemming from the Arab spring transitions translated into higher risk premiums in counties affected by unrest. As capital became more costly, private investment and growth declined. In countries with limited fiscal space such as Morocco and Jordan, expansions of social programs in response to popular demand have occurred at the expense of public investment programs. By contrast, investment in the GCC countries has not been affected significantly given the dominant role of public investment. The risks there include still anemic credit growth to the private sector and implementation constraints related to public investment projects. vii Executive Summary Given these recent developments, it is imperative to understand whether public investment is likely to facilitate private investment or whether it is likely to crowds it out in the MENA countries during this period. To improve long-run prospects, it is also important to understand why investment has failed to create enough jobs and robust growth in the past. This EDP report explores these issues. A look at MENA‟s investment record over the past decade suggests that the region has been investing at rates which compare favorably with those of other regions. However, in oil exporting countries, investment has been mainly supported by large and expanding public investment. Oil importers have shown more strength in private investment which increased in recent years. The expanding role of public investment is a cause for concern in developing oil exporters, as in economies with weak rule of law there is no evidence that public investment stimulates private investment and growth. In contrast, in countries with an adequate level of property rights protection, accountability, and legal institutions, public investment is strongly linked to growth. In addition, good rule of law helps attract private investment and countries with good rule of law show higher levels of investment efficiency. Similar to oversized public investment, many countries in the region record a large share of jobs in government services as compared with other countries. Of concern is that the contribution of government services to GDP is relatively small. Moreover, in recent years this sector has been unable to support job or income growth. The oil sector shows a pattern opposite to government services, accounting for a large share of value added but not jobs. Consequently, the number of jobs created in the last decade was considerably less than the number needed to address key challenges, such as high youth unemployment, low labor force participation rates, especially among women, and fast-growing labor forces. The report investigates the region‟s job creation problem in light of income growth. Our analysis shows that the region‟s job problem cannot be attributed solely to a slow pace of job creation relative to economic growth. On average the region has been creating jobs at a higher pace, relative to income growth, than other middle-income countries in the 2000s. However, there is some variation within the region, with oil importing countries recording a slower response of job creation to income. Several factors have been associated with this fast pace of job creation in oil exporting countries. Informal employment is highly prevalent in developing MENA. In such economies, new entrants to the labor force can generally find low-productivity, low-quality jobs in the informal sector. Another reason has been the use of special employment programs to support job creation in recent years. This has been the case in Algeria and other countries where there has been sufficient fiscal space and oil wealth. The report also shows that the past decade has been a period of rapid growth of several labor-intensive sectors, including construction, trade, tourism, viii 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs logistics and communication services. But, many of the jobs have been „unattractive‟ to domestic residents in oil exporting countries and have been performed by noncitizens. Thus, in developing oil exporters, the main job problem is one of insufficient growth, while oil importers have a job creation problem. In all countries, job quality has been a particular concern. Jobs in government services have been increasingly difficult to get while finding similar quality jobs in the private sector has been hard. The report shows that nongovernment services and manufacturing can serve as engines of both job creation and income growth. Services have been a source of strength both on income and jobs, in levels and growth, especially in oil importers. Manufacturing has contributed to growth in income and jobs, but its size is small on average in MENA relative to other countries, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. The analysis shows that there is scope for improvement. The report presents evidence that while the majority of FDI received by MENA region flows into the real estate and fuels sectors, the majority of FDI-related jobs are generated in the manufacturing sector. In the 2000s, manufacturing received just around one fifth of all regional FDI inflows but created 55 percent of all FDI-related jobs. Overall, the report highlights the importance of good rule of law. Better governance is necessary for public investment to support income growth, and better governance attracts private investment in areas such as services and manufacturing, which are the main drivers of both income growth and job creation. Improving government institutions is necessary for voice and accountability, it is also necessary for growth and efficient use of resources. ix 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs INTRODUCTION Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa are going through a period of unprecedented political change. A series of pro-democracy movements resulted in quick regime change in Tunisia and Egypt, but triggered conflict in Libya, Syria and Yemen, and demonstrations in a number other MENA countries, including Oman, Bahrain and Morocco. This report first examines how these transitions are affecting the short run outlook for the region, also taking into account fragility in the global outlook. The remainder of the report takes a longer-term perspective, examining the effects of private and public investment on growth, and in turn the relationship between growth and jobs. As highlighted in the previous outlook, the challenges and uncertainty of political change brought about a drop in expected growth in the region. While regional uncertainty has changed little since May 2011, the global economic environment has deteriorated. Growth perceptions changed in August, reflecting downward data revision in high-income countries and weaker than anticipated growth in the second quarter of the year. Financial market turmoil reflects these negative changes in perceptions and debt woes in high-income countries, especially high-income Europe. With growing uncertainty, investment and growth are expected to weaken, while concerns about inflation coming from high commodity prices are expected to become less pronounced. Domestic and global developments subject MENA countries‟ macroeconomic outlook to significant uncertainty and downside risks. So far business disruptions and uncertainty in the region, coupled with strong demand from emerging markets in the first half of the year, had pushed up oil prices. This led to a divergence in the 2011 expected growth rates, with stable oil exporters growing more rapidly than anticipated, while those experiencing short-run challenges of transition slowing down. Going forward however this divergence is expected to narrow, as the global slowdown depresses oil prices and growth rebounds in countries where political stability returns quickly. The rise in uncertainty stemming from Arab spring transitions has translated into higher risk premiums in countries affected by unrest, including Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Yemen. In these countries capital has become more costly while private investment, including foreign direct investment (FDI), and growth have declined. In some countries with limited fiscal space, such as Morocco, expansions of social programs in response to popular demands have occurred at the expense of public investment programs. By contrast, investment in the GCC countries has not been affected significantly given the dominant role of public investment. The risks there include still anemic credit growth to the private sector and implementation constraints related to public investment projects. 1 Introduction Given the important implications of the Arab spring events for investment, this issue of MENA‟s Economic Developments and Prospects report focuses on investment and its role in creating growth and jobs over the past decade. The objective is to take a comprehensive look at investment, paying special attention to its composition, efficiency as well as its effects on growth and employment. Such analytical study is overdue in light of the developments in the region and the absence of recent regional studies on the topic. Experiences from successful transitions to democracy for more than 40 countries around the world give some indication on how long it might take for investment to rebound in countries that manage transitions well. Evidence presented in Figure 1.1 shows that investment takes longer to recover than economic growth. On average growth declines by around 3 percentage points during transition, but rebounds to or above its pre-transition rate within one to two years. In contrast, the average investment rate declines with a delay, by less than 2 percentage points, but it takes at least 5 years to recover. Private investment bottoms out more quickly than public investment and leads the recovery. Figure 1.1 Average growth and investment performance during typical successful transition* 5 22 20.2 12.4 4 21 11.9 19.7 3 20 11.4 2 19.2 19 10.9 1 18.7 10.4 0 18 -5 0 5 -5 0 5 Years before (-) and after (+) the transition year Years before (-) and after (+) the transition year Average gross fixed capital formation % of GDP(LHS) Average GDP growth rates, % (LHS) Average gross fixed capital formation % of GDP(RHS) Average private investment % of GDP (RHS) Source: Freund and Mottaghi (2011). *Note: Mean growth performance during more than 40 successful transitions based on information in the database of the Polity IV Project, which includes an index of regime characteristics, scaled from 0 (authoritarian) to 10 (democracy). Successful transitions are those for which the index must jump by at least 5 points, and the new higher level must be sustained for at least 5 years to qualify as a transition. Thus, this data includes only countries with complete transitions. The graph records performance for a balanced panel of 42 countries with data for 11 years. See Annex Table 1 for the list of countries in the panel. The report examines first how investment promotes growth and jobs; it then turns to the links between growth and job creation. The investment section looks at MENA‟s investment efforts during the past two decades and asks the following set of questions. How did investment rates evolve over time and how do they compare internationally? What types of investment have become more prominent and should the changes observed over the course of the 2000s be a cause for concern? Does the answer to this question differ by country? What should countries do to increase investment‟s potential to create growth and jobs in a sustainable way? 2 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs The section on employment turns to the question of why growth failed to deliver the jobs needed in MENA. It also looks at the sectoral distribution of employment and employment growth, and compares these with sector‟s contributions to income and income growth. The motivation is to understand which sectors provide employment and income, which sectors have contributed to employment growth and income growth, and also compare with other countries to determine whether some sectors could offer promise as regional job creators. Now, the report turns to the regional macroeconomic outlook. 3 4 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs MENA’S MACROECONOMIC OUTLOOK Growth outlook for 2011 – better than expected in May Despite short-term challenges and uncertainty about political transitions, economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa region is expected to average 4.1 percent in 2011 (Figure 2.1) and improve by half a percentage point from our May forecast for the year (see Annex Table 2). This positive development is due to increases in public spending that have boosted demand across the region, increases in oil production in most MENA oil exporters, and quicker than expected pickup in industrial production in Egypt. In Iran growth prospects improved as subsidy reform took effect and efficiency gains started taking place. The short-term costs of the subsidy reform were also minimized by a system of cash transfers. In oil exporters (excluding Libya), growth is expected to reach 4.6 percent in 2011 (Table 2.1) largely due to increases in oil production in an environment of high oil prices. Growth in oil importers is still estimated to be close to 2.5 percent this year with oil importers in North Africa growing slightly faster than expected in May, and those in the Middle East growing slightly slower than the May forecast. The growth deceleration expected in 2012 is mainly linked to the global slowdown which is likely to depress oil production and prices, but also continued political uncertainties in the region. Oil prices have started moving downwards since August when doubts started growing about the recovery in high-income countries. Figure 2.1 Growth outlook (percent) Real growth (percent) Oil prices 6.0 140 MENA (as of Fall 2011) 120 5.0 MENA (as of May 2011) 100 4.0 80 60 3.0 Petroleum, crude 40 ($/bbl) 2.0 20 0 1.0 2008M01 2008M04 2008M07 2008M10 2009M01 2009M04 2009M07 2009M10 2010M01 2010M04 2010M07 2010M10 2011M01 2011M04 2011M07 0.0 2008 2009 2010 2011 est. 2012 proj. Source: World Bank data. Note: May forecast published in World Bank (2011c). Industrial production in Egypt and Tunisia slowed sharply in the first quarter of 2011 (Figure 2.2). A large share of the decline in these two countries is explained by contraction in tourism activity, but also construction and manufacturing in Egypt slowed. Industrial production – which in the oil exporters is dominated by oil – has been less volatile than industrial production in the oil importers. Some of the oil exporters increased production in order to compensate for the collapse of Libya‟s oil output (Figure 2.2). 5 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook Table 2.1. Macro Economic Outlook Real GDP Growth Fiscal balance Current account balance 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010 est. proj. est. proj. est. proj. (Annual percentage change) (in percentage of GDP) (in percentage of GDP) MENA region 5.6 2.1 4.3 4.1 3.8 12.0 -3.7 -0.5 1.4 1.9 14.8 2.3 6.0 8.0 8.5 Oil Exporters 5.2 1.1 4.1 4.6 3.7 15.3 -3.3 0.9 3.6 4.1 18.5 4.2 8.7 11.3 12.0 GCC 7.0 -0.3 4.5 5.8 3.9 23.2 -2.6 2.6 6.4 7.1 23.3 7.4 11.6 15.0 15.2 Bahrain 6.3 3.1 4.5 0.7 2.5 4.9 -8.7 -5.2 -2.4 -0.3 10.6 1.6 3.6 6.0 6.2 Kuwait 6.4 -4.4 2.3 4.5 3.8 19.9 19.3 16.5 17.2 20.9 40.7 26.3 32.0 30.2 31.4 Oman 12.8 1.1 4.8 3.5 3.0 13.9 2.2 6.9 7.6 6.5 8.4 -0.6 8.2 13.9 10.1 Qatar 25.4 8.6 16.3 20.0 7.1 10.6 14.2 9.7 10.2 9.9 29.1 10.2 17.3 24.2 22.6 Saudi Arabia 4.2 0.6 3.3 5.0 3.5 32.5 -6.1 -0.8 2.7 3.3 27.8 6.0 8.1 11.7 12.7 United Arab Emirates 5.3 -3.2 3.2 3.3 3.8 16.5 -12.6 -1.3 6.5 6.9 7.4 3.0 7.7 10.4 10.5 Developing Oil Exporters 1.9 3.5 3.4 2.4 3.3 1.8 -4.3 -1.7 -0.3 -0.4 10.3 -0.5 4.5 6.1 7.2 Algeria 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.6 3.5 7.7 -6.8 -3.9 -1.1 3.0 20.2 0.3 9.4 9.5 17.4 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.6 3.5 3.2 2.5 3.4 0.7 1.0 1.7 2.8 1.3 6.5 3.0 6.0 8.7 8.2 Iraq 9.5 4.2 0.8 9.6 12.6 -1.3 -22.1 -9.1 -8.4 -11.6 19.2 -13.8 -3.2 -1.5 -4.5 Syrian Arab Republic 4.5 6.0 3.2 0.0 -1.0 -2.9 -2.9 -4.8 -7.1 -6.3 0.1 -2.2 -5.7 -8.9 -6.3 Yemen 3.6 3.8 7.8 -5.0 2.5 -3.4 -8.6 -7.0 -5.9 -3.2 -4.1 -6.2 -3.4 -2.2 -3.4 Oil Importers 6.7 4.9 4.7 2.5 3.9 -4.2 -5.5 -6.1 -7.5 -6.7 -3.3 -4.8 -5.1 -5.4 -5.2 Oil importers with GCC links 8.5 7.4 5.3 3.5 4.5 -5.9 -8.3 -4.9 -5.5 -5.1 -12.1 -13.4 -16.3 -17.2 -16.1 Djibouti 5.8 5.0 3.5 4.8 5.1 1.3 -4.6 -0.5 0.4 0.0 -24.3 -9.1 -4.8 -10.4 -11.6 Jordan 7.2 5.5 2.3 2.5 3.5 -2.2 -8.9 -5.6 -5.7 -4.9 -9.3 -4.7 -5.0 -9.5 -8.3 Lebanon 9.3 8.5 7.0 4.0 5.0 -8.8 -8.0 -4.7 -5.5 -5.5 -13.8 -19.3 -24.1 -22.4 -21.3 Oil importers with EU links 6.5 4.5 4.6 2.4 3.8 -3.9 -5.0 -6.3 -7.9 -7.0 -1.8 -3.3 -3.0 -3.2 -3.2 Egypt 7.2 4.7 5.2 1.8 3.5 -6.8 -6.9 -8.2 -9.5 -8.6 0.5 -2.3 -2.0 -1.2 -2.0 Morocco 5.6 4.8 3.7 4.5 4.8 0.4 -2.2 -4.6 -5.5 -4.5 -5.2 -5.4 -4.3 -6.7 -5.4 Tunisia 4.5 3.1 3.0 1.1 3.4 -1.1 -3.0 -1.3 -5.1 -4.7 -3.8 -2.8 -4.8 -5.3 -4.4 Source: World Bank data. 6 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Figure 2.2 Industrial production (% change, 3m/3m, seasonally adjusted annualized rate) GCC oil exporters Developing oil exporters 150 140 United Arab Emirates 120 140 Oman 130 Qatar 100 Saudi Arabia 80 Algeria 120 Iran, Islamic Rep. 110 60 Iraq 100 40 Libya 90 20 Syrian Arab Republic 80 0 2008M01 2008M03 2008M05 2008M07 2008M11 2009M01 2009M03 2009M05 2009M07 2010M01 2010M03 2010M05 2010M07 2011M01 2011M03 2011M05 2008M01 2008M05 2008M07 2008M09 2008M11 2009M01 2009M03 2009M07 2009M11 2010M03 2010M05 2010M07 2010M09 2010M11 2011M01 2011M05 2008M09 2009M09 2009M11 2010M09 2010M11 2008M03 2009M05 2009M09 2010M01 2011M03 Oil importers 110 105 100 95 90 Egypt, Arab Rep. 85 Jordan 80 Morocco 75 Tunisia 70 2008M01 2008M03 2008M05 2008M07 2008M09 2008M11 2009M01 2009M03 2009M05 2009M09 2009M11 2010M03 2010M05 2010M09 2010M11 2011M03 2011M05 2009M07 2010M01 2010M07 2011M01 Source: Datastream. Figure 2.3 Tourist arrivals (percent change over same period of the previous year) Source: UNWTO. 7 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook Industrial production in oil importers started recovering rapidly in the second quarter of 2011. The recovery was driven mainly by rapid expansion of industrial production in Egypt, and to a lesser extent, Tunisia. Recovery was observed in construction, trade and transport in Egypt, and in textiles, electrical and mechanical activities in Tunisia. The agricultural season is also expected to improve in Tunisia, where at the end of July cereals production was double the one registered during the same period last year. The tourism sector has registered losses since the onset of the Arab uprisings and continued uncertainty will weigh on the sector in coming months. MENA countries experienced sharp declines in tourist arrivals following the unrest as travel warnings were issued; tour operators cancelled holidays and repatriated customers. Within MENA, North African countries experienced the largest declines in the numbers of tourist arrivals in the first three months of the year. Total number of arrivals fell by 10 percent in January and February of this year and by another 20 percent in March while most travelers switched to safer routes in the Middle East (Figure 2.3). But not all countries in North Africa have suffered losses in 2011. Morocco‟s tourism sector gained as travelers avoided countries in turmoil. As tensions in Syria escalated the negative impact on tourism spread to the Middle East. In Egypt, tourism contracted by 33 percent in the April-June quarter of 2011 while in Tunisia tourism revenue is expected to decline by 40 percent in the first half of 2011 compared to the same period of 2010. In Egypt and Tunisia, where the tourism sector employs a sizable share of the labor force, unemployment rates jumped by approximately 3 percentage points relative to 2010 (Figure 2.4). Figure 2.4 Unemployment rates (percent) Source: Government statistics. Note: In Egypt 2010 refers to Oct-Dec quarter of 2010 and 2011 refers to Jan-March quarter of 2011. 8 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Fiscal outlook for 2011 – worse than expected in May The fiscal outlook deteriorated relative to the May forecasts (Figure 2.5) as GCC oil exporters and many of the oil importers in the region ramped up spending beyond what was envisioned in May when governments quickly extended supportive policy measures and social transfers to counter rising commodity prices and reduce discontent with economic and social problems. In developing oil exporters, the fiscal deterioration has been limited by buoyant oil revenues. All GCC countries added new social measures since May 2011. Bahrain raised salaries for lowest paid public sector employees and initiated a national dialogue on improving targeting of subsidies to lower income households. Kuwait increased salaries of most public employees. Oman increased the cost of living allowance for all civilian and military employees and increased pensions for all public sector retirees and general pension recipients. Saudi Arabia extended a two-month salary bonus payment to all public sector employees; incorporated a “temporary" cost of living allowance for public sector workers; and a “nature of work" allowance for Saudis working as private security guards (see Table 2.2). In addition, all GCC countries have announced ambitious public investment plans in 2011 (Table 2.3). The extent to which these plans will translate into growth and employment depends on implementation constraints. Fiscal deficits widened in the oil importing countries in North Africa such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, where the fiscal deterioration reflects mainly the higher cost of food and energy subsidies. In Morocco, the government increased salaries of all civil and military public employees and the minimum pensions for retired public employees and their families; support was also extended to the unemployed. As current spending escalated, the government cut public investment spending significantly. To the extent that public investment complements private investment this strategy does not bode well for future growth. Figure 2.5 Fiscal outlook for 2011 (fiscal balance as a share of GDP) 15 May forecast 10 September forecast 5 0 -5 -10 MENA GCC oil exporters Developing oil Oil importers exporters Source: World Bank data. 9 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook Table 2.2. Social measures implemented in the region in 2011 Wages Subsidies Tax cuts Transfers Infrastructure Jobs Total cost GCC OIL EXPORTERS Bahrain Public sector pay increases of up Increase in food subsidies, 25% cut in US$2600 per family. Construction of public 20,000 new jobs at Total cost of to 37 percent for lowest paid, including flour and meat by 44 housing housing by at least 6000 Ministry of Interior. the pay million dinars. National installment units per year. One year tenure increase in Dialogue proposals include payments. required before public sector better targeting of subsidies Expatriate expatriate worker can at 2.5% of towards the lower income labor fee switch jobs without GDP. households but measures are still US$27/ employer approval being studied. worker/month (previously no time suspended for limit). 6 months. Flat pay increase of KD100 Free food for 13 months through US$3600 grant to all US$4 billion for Kuwait (US$360)/month for most public discount price program. Kuwaiti citizens. Special construction of new employees. Additional increases increase in pensions for housing. in allowances for qualifications. military retirees. Oman Unemployment benefit program All increases in prices of Increase in pensions for all A new public sector MoF of US$390 per month; US$520 consumer goods and services public sector retirees and employment program estimates minimum wage. Increase in cost subject to approval by Public general pension recipients covering 50,000 total cost of of living allowance for all civilian Authority for Consumer (bigger % increase for citizens. As follow-up new 2011 and military employees. Protection lower level pension). to 50,000 jobs measures at promise, govt claims 4.5% of 23,000 new jobs GDP or 12% created in public sector increase in and 32,000 in private budget. sector as of August with 20,000 more in pipeline. Qatar Salary, social allowance, and pension increases of 60% (state employees), 120% (military officers) and 50% (general military). Saudi Unemployment allowance was set US$300 million in grants 0.5 million new houses to Add 60,000 new 25% of GDP Arabia at SR2000 (US$530) per month, for charities and needy be built with budget security jobs in the and a SR3000 (US$800) per students, a bonus payment allocation of SR250 billion Ministry of Interior; month. Minimum wage was of 2 months‟ salary/stipend (US$67 billion). add 500 new jobs at instituted for nationals working in to all public employees and Ministry of Commerce the public sector.2 months‟ salary scholarship students.2 and Industry. bonus payment to all public sector month bonus for all public employees. "Temporary" cost of and state pension living allowance for public sector recipients; higher stipends workers from 2008 incorporated for tertiary education in basic pay. 15% "nature of students. work" allowance for Saudis working as private security guards. 10 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Wages Subsidies Tax cuts Transfers Infrastructure Jobs Total cost UAE Combination of subsidies and Special increase in voluntary price controls to return pensions for military prices of bread and rice at co-ops retirees. Special bonus at 2004 levels. Broader payment to UAE nationals agreement with supermarket working as taxi drivers. chains to avoid price increases on 400 commodities during 2011. DEVELOPING OIL EXPORTERSs Algeria Pay increases for public sector Higher state subsidies on flour, Building new houses. Up to 2.5 million Increased workers. milk, cooking oil and sugar. public sector jobs and public Waived value added tax (VAT) sustainable job spending by and customs tariffs on imports of creation in agriculture 25% of cooking oil and raw and white by creating 100000 GDP. sugar. new farms. Iran Removal of subsidies including Every Iranian person is energy, services and basic food eligible to receive bi- subsidies: The government has monthly the equivalent of set up a graduated tariff system, 80 US$. So far (6 month with energy prices increasing later) about 60 million steeply as a function of use. Iranians (80%) received bi- Savings from subsides removal monthly transfers to their is distributed by: 60% to bank accounts. household, 30% subsidized loans, technologies and training programs for firms, 10% to central and local governments to compensate for higher energy prices. Iraq The public sector in Iraq is Direct fuel subsidies have been Valued at market prices, The capital spending The government Iraq‟s wage oversized and the government eliminated. Furthermore, indirect Public Distribution System increased from ID 19.5 intends to stimulate bill as a wage bill is a major component of fuel subsidies have gradually (PDS) provides a per trillion (actual 2010) to ID small projects through percentage current spending. Government declined from 10.6 percent of capita average of ID 33 trillion (budgeted establishing a of total salaries and pensions have been GDP in 2006 to 1.5 percent of 11,606 per month to every 2011). The oil sector is development fund with expenditures consistently above 20 percent of GDP in 2010. household. PDS is a food projected to be the main an initial capital of increased GDP. ration card system which recipient of public ID150 billion at the from 30 makes 99 percent of Iraqis investments (about 21 Ministry of Labor. percent in eligible to receive fixed percent of the total). 2005 to 47 quantities of commodities percent of on a monthly basis. The the Iraqi PDS budget was ID3,500 budget in billion in 2010, absorbing 2009. 4.1 percent of total budget. 11 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook Wages Subsidies Tax cuts Transfers Infrastructure Jobs Total cost Syria Reversed subsidy cuts on Public sector employees‟ 2-3% of energy, lifting heating-oil allowances (especially GDP allowances for public workers fuel) will be increased, and by 72%. poor households will benefit from higher Cash transfers in 2011. Yemen A 25% pay increase for Increased food subsidies. A 50% tax cut Up 4000 Riyals a month Creating jobs for 25% Over 4% of government and military workers. on salaries for for households qualifying of new graduates. GDP government for support by the Social and military Welfare Fund workers. OIL IMPORTERS Jordan Raised the salary of civil servants, Subsidies of US$839 million on: Total of Total of US$57 million. US$35 million 5% of GDP the military, and retirees by JD 20 (i) fixing the prices of oil US$169 Allocating transfers to the Municipality fund to tackle (for all the (US$28) a month for a cost of products (Octane 90, Solar, million. state-run consumer small infrastructure package US$233 million. One time cash kerosene) for 6 months; (ii) Suspending corporations to subsidize bottlenecks in including transfer of JD100 (US$140) for subsidizing gas cylinders used the special the price of sugar, rice and underprivileged areas forgone civil servants, military, retirees for cooking; (iii) wheat and sales tax on frozen poultry, and taxes and and NAF beneficiaries for the barely subsidies. kerosene and implementing income- wage holy month of Ramadan for a cost diesel; generating projects in poor increase); of JD80 million (US$113 million) reducing the areas. 3.1% (for tax on expenditures gasoline from without 18 to 12 wages) percent. Lebanon Total cost estimated at Minimum of US$36 million over three 0.1% of months, renewable: A GDP if valid US$300 per month worth only for one of gasoline provided to taxi quarter. and truck drivers (approved in May and still pending execution). Egypt 15 percent increase in wages and Increase in subsidy of about 0.2 Addition of 150,000 To permanently hire 0.8% of pensions (LE2 billion or 0.17 percent of GDP due to the rise in families to the social the temporary contract GDP. percent of GDP). global food prices (LE2.8 solidarity program (LE100 employees (about billion). million). 450,000). Tunisia Payment of 50 percent employer Food and fuel subsidies where Postponement Adding 15000 more young Accelerating public Recruitment of 20,000 contribution to the mandatory increased increase in February / of the tax people to receive a infrastructure investment new civil servants and regime of social security for the March (lowering food declaration monthly allowance of 80 project and support pilot a plan to have private wages paid. Reduction in hours of consumption prices, and failing and payment dinars in 2011; expansion projects in sector. Create an work. Could you please let us to increase fuel prices in line for 2010 to of direct cash transfers Telecommunications additional 20,000 jobs. know where did this info come with the system). September program to poor families, sector. from? We know that this can 2011 (with from 135,000 to 185,000 apply to firms that have suffered possibility to households; expansion of damages from the revolution, but seek a further free medical insurance not that it was a generalized tax extension to cards to an extra 25,000 relief. March 2012). individuals; provide microcredit or gifts to 12 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Wages Subsidies Tax cuts Transfers Infrastructure Jobs Total cost support home improvements for 20,000 households; one-off lump sum transfer of TDN 400 per person and TDN 600 per family to the Tunisians coming back from Libya. Morocco Salary increases by US$75 net per Injected approximately US$ 1.3 The minimum pension was Set up an employment The annual month for all civil and military billion in subsidies to curb price increased from MAD600 program for educated total cost for public employees, in the central hikes for staples. to MAD1000 per month unemployed. Half of the 2011 level as well as at the local level. for retired public 4303 graduates will be budget of The salary increase measure was employees and their hired by the salary effective as of May 1, 2011. families. This benefited government, while the increase is 90,000 people. The cost to other half will be estimated at the budget is estimated at integrated into US$508 US$54 million annually. autonomous public million and AMAL-2 program for the establishments. The it will cost unskilled unemployed: new budget law has US$760 Provides 100 TDN per provided 18,802 new million in month to approx 25,000 job positions. 2012. people for the year, at a total cost of approx. 30 million for AMAL 2 for one year. Source: World Bank country teams, Reuters and Bloomberg. 13 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook Table 2.3. GCC Investment Programs and Projects Country Project Financing/Other Remarks Saudi Arabia Construction of 0.5 million new homes. Initial budget estimate of US$67 billion. Kingdom Tower, Jeddah (world's tallest building) Cost estimate $1.2 billion. 4 member private consortium using bank financing. Expansion of Grand Mosque in Mecca Cost estimate US$22 billion (half for land purchase). Public project with partial finance through property development. Sadara Petrochemical (Aramco-Dow Chemical JV) US$20 billion, mostly debt financed King Abdullah Economic City -- reinvigoration of Government loan of US$1.3 2nd phase bn to Emaar subsidiary Saudi Electric Company -- new power plants US$13.6 billion interest free 25 year government loan UAE Construction of new town for 60,000 nationals in Joint federal and Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi (Falah) funding Dubai airports expansion (DXB and DWC) US$7.8 billion, mixture of GRE debt and internal funding. Offshore terminal contract component of Khalifa US$0.33bn contract within Port and Industrial Zone (Abu Dhabi) US$7.2 billion ongoing overall project. GRE debt financed. Kuwait Fourth Oil Refinery (reinstated -- had been Cost estimate US$16-20 cancelled in 2009) billion. May be done as PPP. Delays are likely. Qatar Launch of National Development Strategy 2011- 42% of total investment 2016 projecting US$220 billion total investment. comes from public sector. Oman Launch of 8th Five Year Development Plan 2011- All financing is public, but 2015 including new public investment program of plan becomes a static US$15.6bn, continuing PIP projects US$16.6bn, document once released; hydrocarbon public investment of US$17.2bn, and will not reflect revised SOE investments of US$5.7bn investment plans. Bahrain Construction of 50,000 homes over five years. Estimated cost US$5.3 billion, possibly shared with private sector through land grants. May also be financed by debt and new GCC development program. Source: Compiled from various sources. 14 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Inflation is projected to increase slightly in the region in 2011, in line with increases in fuel and food prices, expansionary fiscal policies, and in some countries the dollar peg, which contributes to inflation in times of dollar weakness and robust domestic demand.1 With a fixed exchange rate, when the anchor is weak and domestic conditions are good, imports will be strong and at a relatively high dollar price, which will feed into the inflation rate. The largest increases in inflation rates are registered in the developing oil exporters (Figure 2.6). These increases reflect mainly price increases related to the impact of energy subsidies in Iran and steep price increase of key food staples related to security issues and the protracted political crisis in Yemen. Figure 2.6 Inflation rates (percent) 14 12 2010 2011 10 8 6 4 2 0 GCC economies Developing oil Oil importers MENA exporters Source: National statistical offices, IMF/IFS and ILO. Note: The figure presents median inflation rates for the region and sub-regional groups. The GCC group includes Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia; developing oil exporters – Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen; oil importers – Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. In the GCC and some oil importing countries the inflationary impacts of expansionary fiscal policy, high food and fuel prices, and imported inflation were limited to some extent by expensive subsidies. However, the inflation situation differs by country. Inflation has been more of an issue in Qatar which is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Inflation may be less of a risk in MENA‟s oil importers where economic activity has slowed considerably due to the social turmoil. In UAE and other GCC economies housing prices remain depressed, yet they 1 Countries with pegs to the dollar include Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Djibouti and Iraq. Countries with pegs to a composite include Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Iran and Algeria. Egypt follows a managed float with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate. 15 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook are a source of inflationary pressures in Saudi Arabia where there are supply shortages and high pent up demand from the growing population. Going forward the expectation is that inflation will ease as a result of a global slowdown and the associated, expected decline in commodity prices, including food and oil. The decline implies fiscal savings in those MENA countries where governments extend food and fuel subsidies. Risks to the outlook While uncertainty within the region remains high, the main change since the last forecast is the deterioration in the global outlook. Contagion from developments in high income countries remains limited, but risks have risen in recent months. Worries about the spread of European sovereign debt beyond Greece and Ireland intensified over the summer, while disappointing growth and employment reports in the US, as well as the downgrade of the US credit rating by Standard and Poor‟s in August, have raised doubts about the US recovery and the global growth outlook. As a result the probability of a double-dip recession in the US and Europe is higher now than just a few months ago. For more than a year developing countries had not been affected by the EU debt crisis, but in August contagion spread globally, including to emerging economies. Capital flows to developing countries declined sharply, CDS spreads jumped relative to the beginning of August, and stock- market declines were similar to those in high income countries. Overall, while there will be negative spillover effects to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region should global conditions worsen, consequences from the 2008-2009 financial crisis suggest that MENA countries are less tied to EU and US markets than other developing regions. Growth in MENA largely tracked growth in the EU and US from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. However, MENA showed stronger growth during the 2000s and felt a far smaller impact of the crisis in the last decade (Figure 2.7). Figure 2.7 Real growth in MENA, US and EU Source: WDI 16 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs That said, many MENA countries are already facing difficult economic conditions because of the recent uprisings, implying that a global downturn would be felt more severely now than in 2008 when economic growth in the region was robust. The MENA region will feel the effects of a global recession mainly through the trade channel, especially oil, rather than the financial channel. Oil exporters will face lower demand and weakened growth. Oil importers with EU links will feel the weakness mainly through goods trade, and in some cases through remittances. Oil importers with GCC links will be more shielded, but will still feel indirect effects from lower activity in the GCC. A global recession will primarily be felt through lower oil prices. This process has already started and oil prices have fallen 14 percent since their April peak.2 Growth in GCC economies will slow down and their fiscal and current accounts will weaken. For these countries oil exports account for more than 50 percent of GDP so a negative terms-of-trade shock will have sizable negative growth consequences. Growth in developing oil exporters will be reduced but to a smaller extent than growth in the GCC oil exporters, as these countries‟ economies have bigger nonoil sectors. Oil importers will benefit from the decline in oil prices and this will be reflected in improvement in their import bill. The region has reduced its exposure to EU and US markets over the past decade and increased exports to Asia. The share of non-oil merchandise exports from the region to Asia grew from 14 percent in 1998 to 25 percent in 2008. But exposure to the EU remains significant for MENA‟s oil importing countries. In 2008 roughly half of oil importers merchandise exports were sent to EU markets, compared to 65 percent in 1998 (World Bank, 2011a). A possible future slowdown in Europe and US is expected to have a moderate effect on developing oil exporters, as only about one-fifth of exports go the EU. GCC countries are the least exposed to EU and US markets, sending less than 15 percent of nonoil merchandise exports to the EU and the US in 2008. In addition to trade linkages, migration to the EU and the associated remittances are important in some of the North African countries. Morocco and Tunisia, especially, are much more dependent on the EU for their remittance flows than the rest of the oil importers. According to data for 2000, 72 percent of Morocco‟s emigrants and 75 percent of Tunisia‟s migrants were located in the EU, compared to just 10 percent for Egypt‟s.3 Remittances account for 9.5 and 5 percent of GDP in Morocco and Tunisia, respectively. Developing MENA countries which rely on remittances from the GCC might be somewhat shielded, but they too might feel the impact of second-round effects as a negative terms–of-trade effect in the GCC would imply fiscal contraction and therefore a decline in demand for foreign workers. 2 Here we report the change in oil prices between April and August 2011. 3 Source: World Bank (2010). 17 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook MENA countries‟ financial sectors tend to be small and are relatively less integrated into the EU and global financial markets than other regions‟ financial sectors. Indeed, a sizable share of capital flows in MENA is intra-regional suggesting that the MENA countries have a buffer insulating them to some degree from turmoil in global markets (World Bank, 2011d). Within MENA, the GCC countries are the most integrated into global financial markets, and therefore a global downturn and financial turmoil in Europe could have a negative impact on financial markets and growth in the GCC economies. The GCC also face wealth effects through sovereign wealth funds. Still, as compared with Asia, their funds are relatively diversified, with roughly one third each in US, EU, and emerging markets.4 So far in MENA, there has been little transmission of the sharp correction following the S&P 500 downgrade to MENA stock markets (Figure 2.8 and Figure 2.9). This could be due to a lagged response, but it could also reflect several other factors. MENA countries‟ stock markets are not well integrated into global financial markets. The stock markets in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Qatar do not have emerging market status in the MSCI indices. Such a status will allow them to attract index funds. A decision has been made to upgrade the status but it was deferred to allow a 6-month evaluation of recent settlement infrastructure changes. Analysts believe that the Emirati markets have a reasonable chance of receiving the upgrade at the end of the 6-month period. In developing MENA, for example in Tunisia, strong demand for equities by domestic investors supported the market during the global financial crisis of 2008-09 (World Bank, 2011a). As a result there was relatively weak correlation between Tunisia‟s and global stock market indexes during this period (Figure 2.8). Good fundamentals also matter. In general, low debt and small fiscal imbalances are central to reducing contagion. Research shows that after controlling for direct linkages through trade and ownership, contagion is highest in countries with weak economic fundamentals, poor policies and bad institutions (Bekaert et al. 2011). This could bode poorly for countries with weak and worsening fiscal deficits. By contrast the resource-rich GCC economies have ample fiscal space and pursued sound economic policies as well as policies to deal with the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008-09. UAE, which experienced some of the most complex manifestations of the global financial crisis among the GCC countries, has managed to address some of the contentious issues associated with the crisis in a relatively speedy way. The Dubai World (DW) debt restructuring was completed relatively quickly by GCC standards although broader Dubai Inc. restructuring remains work in progress. UAE entities are gradually returning to the bond and syndicated loan markets after difficult conditions in 2010. Government support has been critical to progress. 4 Monitor, July 7, 2011. Geographical broad distributions are available for Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, Kuwait Investment Authority, Libyan Investment Authority, and UAE Mubadala Development Company. 18 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Figure 2.8 Equity markets (indexes) 200 250 180 160 200 140 150 120 100 100 80 60 50 40 20 0 0 9/13/2005 9/13/2006 9/13/2007 9/13/2008 9/13/2009 9/13/2010 9/13/2011 9/13/2005 9/13/2006 9/13/2007 9/13/2008 9/13/2009 9/13/2010 9/13/2011 DAX 30 PRICE INDEX S&P 500 PRICE INDEX BAHRAIN UAE SAUDI ARABIA DAX 30 PRICE INDEX S&P 500 PRICE INDEX KUWAIT QATAR 400 350 350 300 300 250 250 200 200 150 150 100 100 50 50 0 0 9/13/2005 9/13/2006 9/13/2007 9/13/2008 9/13/2009 9/13/2010 9/13/2011 9/13/2005 9/13/2006 9/13/2007 9/13/2008 9/13/2009 9/13/2010 9/13/2011 DAX 30 PRICE INDEX S&P 500 PRICE INDEX DAX 30 PRICE INDEX S&P 500 PRICE INDEX EGYPT MOROCCO TUNISIA JORDAN LEBANON Source: Bloomberg. Figure 2.9 Sovereign Credit Default Swaps (CDS) 600 Sovereign 1 yr CDS spreads Change in 5 yr CDS spreads between mid September and July end (bps) 500 250 3000 Greece (LHS) 400 2500 200 300 2000 150 200 1500 100 100 1000 50 500 0 0 0 Bahrain Egypt Saudi Arabia Lebanon Qatar Dubai Abu Dhabi Italy Source: Bloomberg. 19 MENA’s Macroeconomic Outlook The MENA countries are shielded from some of the concerns plaguing other emerging markets. Weakness in both the US and EU has led to appreciation and overvaluation in a number of emerging markets with strong fundamentals and flexible exchange rates, especially in Latin America. In Brazil, for example, concerns over appreciation have led to the implementation of new capital controls. This is not an issue in the region largely because exchange rates are tied to the dollar or a dollar-Euro composite. A recent concern in countries with a dollar peg, however, is imported inflation. While pegs are employed precisely to avoid inflation, US weakness and loose monetary policy in the current environment means dollar pegs may now transmit inflation. In recent months, inflation has picked up in the oil exporters (Figure 2.6), and is running well above 10 percent in the developing oil exporters. There is a risk that the current strong fiscal stimulus combined with a weaker dollar will enhance inflationary pressures in these countries. Imported inflation is less of a risk in oil importers, which face a lower oil price (and hence also food prices) and where economic activity has slowed considerably. Debt service will be little affected in the short run. To the extent that external debt is denominated in dollars (euro), there is little immediate gain to the MENA countries from dollar (euro) depreciation for countries pegged to that currency.5 As prices adjust, existing debt could become easier to service. For Egypt and Tunisia, about 40 percent of debt is in dollars and 30 percent is in Euros.6 In sum, the forecast has changed little for the region since May, but uncertainty has increased largely as a result of global conditions. While the elevated regional uncertainty remains roughly unchanged, global risk expanded sharply during this period. This puts more emphasis on the downward risk to the forecast, as a global downturn would exacerbate the balance of payments weaknesses already present in the region. Precisely those countries in transition are also among those most affected by Eurozone weakness. 5 Countries with pegs to the dollar include Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen, Djibouti and Iraq. Countries with pegs to a composite (largely dollar or Euro) include Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, Iran and Algeria. Egypt follows a managed float with no pre-determined path for the exchange rate. 6 Source: Central Bank of Egypt, External Position of the Egyptian Economy 2010/2011 and World Bank data. 20 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs I NVESTING FOR GROWTH MENA’s investment record Over the past two decades, the MENA region has been investing at a relatively good pace and its overall investment rate compares favorably with those of other regions (Figure 3.1). In the 1990s only East Asia had a substantially higher investment rate than developing MENA. South Asia and the developed countries had average total investment rates comparable to MENA‟s rate of 22 percent, while the investment rates of Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub- Saharan Africa lagged behind it. In the 2000s the region‟s investment rate increased to around 23 percent in the 2000s. Developing MENA recorded a rate of close to 25 percent, an increase of close to 3 percentage points. Thus, in the 2000s the average investment rates of MENA and developing MENA were surpassed only by those of East Asia and South Asia regions. Figure 3.1 Gross fixed capital formation (average, % of GDP) 40 40 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 35 35 30 30 25 25 Percent Percent 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 EAP ECA LAC MENA OECD SA SSA GCC oil exporters Oil importers Developing oil exporters MENA Source: IMF/IFS. Note: Numbers are weighted averages for a balanced sample of countries in each region. Investment rates however differ across the MENA region. In the 1990s developing MENA – represented by developing oil exporters and oil importers – had slightly higher investment rates than the GCC oil exporters. Between the 1990s and the 2000s investment accelerated at a faster pace in the developing oil exporters than in the oil importers and the GCC countries. As a result, the spread between the investment rates of the three major sub-regions widened in the 2000s. The average investment rate of the developing oil exporters surpassed 26 percent, the oil importers‟ rate nearly reached 23 percent and the GCC countries‟ rate inched to just below 21 percent (Figure 3.1). Despite high and increasing investment rate, MENA region lags behind others in terms of private investment. While MENA‟s average private investment rate stagnated at slightly below 15 percent between the 1990s and the 2000s, all other developing regions registered increases in 21 Investing for Growth their investment rates, and in the case of East and South Asia the increases were substantial. Private investment rates in MENA‟s oil importers however registered an increase (Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 Private gross fixed capital formation (averages, % of GDP) 25 25 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 20 20 15 15 Percent Percent 10 10 5 5 0 0 EAP ECA LAC MENA OECD SA SSA GCC oil exporters Oil importers Developing oil exporters MENA Source: IMF/IFS. Note: Numbers are weighted averages for a balanced sample of countries in each region. In the 1990s private investment rates were considerably higher in MENA‟s oil importers than in the rest of MENA. At slightly more than 17 percent, private investment rates of the oil importers were even higher than those of other developing regions in this decade. Reforms encouraged private investment in some of the oil importers in the 2000s, pushing the average private investment rate during the decade to just above 19 percent (Figure 3.2). Several countries have been particularly successful in enhancing private sector investment in the 2000s, including Egypt, Morocco and Djibouti (Figure 3.3). Figure 3.3 Private gross fixed capital formation by country (averages, % of GDP) 30 25 Other private, 2000s 1990s 2000s FDI, 2000s 25 20 20 15 15 10 10 5 5 0 0 Egypt Djibouti Jordan Tunisia Lebanon Morocco Source: IMF/IFS and UNCTAD. Note: Other private investment is calculated as private fixed investment net of foreign direct investment. 22 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs In many MENA countries foreign direct investment (FDI) increased markedly between the 1990s and the 2000s (Figure 3.4). The FDI takeoff in the region was apparent after 2002, and in most cases increases in FDI flows happened from a low base. In the oil importers with strong GCC links – Djibouti, Lebanon and Jordan – foreign direct investment has increased so much that it represents a major share of private investment (Figure 3.3). Figure 3.4 Foreign and other investment (averages, % of GDP) 14 FDI, 1990s FDI, 2000s 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 Source: UNCTAD. However, most of FDI has gone to the rich GCC countries which accounted for 56 percent of inflows to MENA during 2003-2007. Developing oil importers received 30 percent of the region‟s FDI inflows during the same period. Furthermore, FDI flows have been concentrated in three countries – Saudi Arabia and UAE which received respectively 23 percent and 22 percent of all MENA FDI inflows, and Egypt which attracted 12.3 percent during this period. There has been a shift in the destination of FDI from MENA‟s oil importers which received over half of all MENA FDI during 1993-97 to MENA‟s oil exporters which received 70 percent of all MENA FDI during 2003-07. The shift towards oil exporters is not surprising given the rising oil prices during most of the 2000s. There is a strong positive relationship between the growth in oil prices and growth of MENA FDI (Figure 3.5). High oil prices make oil exploration more attractive and thus induce FDI into the fuel sector. Other factors that stimulated the rise of foreign investment in MENA region were excess liquidity in global financial markets, reforms in the business environments and the launch of privatization initiatives. 23 Investing for Growth Figure 3.5 Growth in oil prices and FDI inflows to MENA Note: Crude oil price is the simple average of prices of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate (WTI) oil. Source: World Bank, UNCTAD. Investment and growth MENA countries with increases in private investment in the 2000s relative to the 1990s have also gotten a boost to their economic growth, while those that scaled down private investment saw on average a deceleration or stagnation in economic growth (Figure 3.6). A few countries have seen growth accelerations despite a decline in their private investment rates as oil price increases made possible increases in public investment. Throughout the world public investment rates declined in the 2000s relative to the 1990s, but MENA and SSA were exceptions (Figure 3.7). MENA‟s relatively high public investment rate increased to an average of 8 percent in the 2000s, second only to East Asia‟s public investment rate of 20 percent.7 But the change in public investment rates differed within the region. With rising oil and gas prices, fiscal space and public investment rates advanced in many of MENA‟s oil exporters (Figure 3.8). The advance has been particularly pronounced in the developing oil exporters such as Libya and Algeria. In contrast, developing oil importers‟ public investment rate declined as many of these countries faced fiscal pressures. The compression was substantial in Kuwait, Egypt and Lebanon. Djibouti was an exception as the country benefited from its links with GCC countries. Consequently, the composition of investment changed in favor of private investment in oil importers and towards public investment in oil exporters (Figure 3.9). 7 Public investment is defined as gross fixed capital formation undertaken by entities other than private nonfinancial and financial corporations, households and non-profit institutions servicing households (NPISHs). NPISHs consist of NPIs which are not predominantly financed and controlled by government and which provide goods and services to households free or at prices that are not economically significant. 24 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Figure 3.6 Changes in average private investment and growth rates in MENA 8 Change in mean growth between 1990s Qatar Djibouti 6 y = 0.3263x + 1.0602 Libya 4 R² = 0.3212 Morocco and 2000s Algeria Kuwait UAE 2 Saudi Arabia Bahrain Iran Egypt Jordan Oman 0 -6 -4 -2 Tunisia 0 2 4 6 8 10 Syria -2 Yemen Lebanon -4 Change in mean private investment rates between 1990s and 2000s Source: IMF/IFS on private investment and WDI for GDP. Figure 3.7 Public gross fixed capital formation (averages, % of GDP) 25 25 1990s 2000s 1990s 2000s 20 20 15 15 Percent Percent 10 10 5 5 0 0 EAP ECA LAC MENA OECD SA SSA GCC oil exporters Oil importers Developing oil exporters MENA Source: Authors‟ calculations using IMF/IFS. Note: Numbers are weighted averages for a balanced sample of countries in each region. Should the dominant role of public investment in MENA be a cause for concern? The literature suggests that the impact of public investment on economic growth is ambiguous as public investment might crowd out or crowd in private investment. If crowding out is an issue, the relevant question for policy purposes is how to reduce this effect so that developing countries can increase their benefits from public investments. Others however argue that public investment could promote private investment if it provides complementary goods and services that markets fail to provide. If public investment crowds in private investment, then the relevant question in 25 Investing for Growth terms of aggregate social welfare would be how to improve the complementarities by prioritizing public investment projects and focusing on those with highest productivity and those that will address issues of inclusion. Figure 3.8 Public gross fixed capital formation by country (averages, % of GDP) 25 1990s 2000s 20 Increases Declines 15 10 5 0 Source: Authors‟ calculations using IMF/IFS. Figure 3.9 Ratio of private to public investment SSA MENA SA 1990s 1990s OECD 2000s Developing oil exporters 2000s MENA LAC Oil importers ECA GCC oil EAP exporters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Source: IMF/IFS. Another concern is that public investment might be less efficient than private investment. This is likely to be especially relevant in economies characterized by a high level of rent-seeking behavior and where special interests dominate. In particular, under these circumstances, a large share of public funds may be spent on low-productivity projects or bloated budgets. If this is the case, an increase in (measured) public investment would contribute less to growth than an 26 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs equivalent amount of private investment. So a third issue – a combination of the first two – is about the role of public, vs. private investment, on growth. A large literature has examined the effect of public expenditure on medium to long-run growth. Result are mixed, but the majority of papers that use regressions on large cross-sections of countries find some evidence of positive growth effects, especially for infrastructure (see IMF 2004 for a survey). A handful of studies that employ VAR techniques on developed countries are similar, overall offering some evidence of a causal effect of public investment on output. A related literature examines the relationship between public and private investment. Cavallo and Daude (2011) analyze the linkages between public and private investment using a large sample of 116 developing countries with annual observations between 1980 and 2006. Their empirical results - obtained using dynamic panel data techniques which exploit both time series and cross sectional variation in the data – suggest that on average the crowding-out effect dominates, but that this effect is dampened or even reversed in countries with better institutions and that are better integrated with world markets so that there is no financing constraint. Blejer and Khan (1984)8 and Odedokun (1997)9 show that public infrastructure investment is complementary to private investment, while other types of public investment lead to crowding out of private investment. Some studies report evidence on the role of government expenditure on investment efficiency as proxied by the incremental capital-output ratio. Gallagher (1991)10 and King and Levine (1992)11 reported a negative effect of government expenditure on investment efficiency. Odedokun (1997) finds that public infrastructure investment promotes efficiency, while other types of public investment do the reverse. To examine the likely effects of public investment in MENA, we show correlations between per capita growth and public investment rates for countries with good rule of law and weak rule of law. We use the governance indicator for rule of law in Kaufmann, Kraay, Massimo and Mastruzzi (2010) averaged over the 2000s. Countries with good rule of law are defined to be those with an index above the median of the country sample with averages. Countries with weak rule of law are those with an index below the median of the country sample. During the 2000s all the GCC countries and 4 oil importers – Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan – fall in the category of countries with relatively good rule of law, while all MENA developing oil exporters are considered countries with weak rule of law. 8 Blejer and Khan (1984) use a sample of 24 developing countries over the period 1971-1979. 9 Odedokun (1997) uses the approach proposed by Blejer and Khan (1984) but applies it to a larger sample of 48 developing countries over the period 1970-90. 10 Gallagher (1991) uses a cross-section of African countries. 11 King and Levine (1992) employ annual time-series data for the period 1960-1989 for 80 developing countries. 27 Investing for Growth We find that for countries with good rule of law there is a positive and significant correlation between public investment and growth (Figure 3.10).12 For countries with weak rule of law, we find no correlation between public investment and growth (Figure 3.10). In these countries poor governance weakens the impact of public investment on growth. Since the 2000s was a period of extra-ordinary economic ups and downs, we test the relationship between public investment and growth over the period 1995-2005. We find that the same conclusion can be drawn based on the relationship between public investment and growth over the 1995-2005 period, as shown in the figures below (see Appendix Figure 1). Figure 3.10 Annual per capita GDP growth and public investment, 2000-05 20 Countries with good rule of law Countries with weak rule of law 9 y = -0.0361x + 3.3069 8 y = 0.2074x + 1.1709 15 GDP per capita growth rate, %, 2006 -09 (-.43) (5.05) (2.21) (2.08) GDP per capit growth rate, %, 2006 -09 7 QAT R² = 0.0023 R² = 0.0766 6 10 5 EGY OMN LEB BHR JOR 4 MOR 5 DJB Iraq IRN 3 TUN SYR UAE LBY 2 0 YMN ALG 1 KUW SAU 0 5 10 15 20 25 0 -5 -1 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 -2 -10 Public investment % of GDP, 2000-05 Public investment % of GDP, 2000-05 Source: Authors‟ estimates. Note: t-statistics in parenthesis below trend equation. These results suggest in developing oil exporters which represent countries with weak rule of law and relatively small private sectors, the growth impact of public investment is likely to be weakened (Figure 3.10) and investment efficiency is likely to be relatively low. In oil importers which rely mostly on private investment for growth, public investment is likely to crowd in private investment and re-enforce the positive relation observed between private investment and growth. This result builds on the growing literature on the need for complementary reforms to stimulate growth. Bolaky and Freund (2008) show that trade does not promote growth when business conditions are poor. The intuition is that resources cannot move to their most productive uses, subsequent to trade liberalization, when firm entry is restricted and labor mobility is poor. Similarly, in the case of public investment, a lack of accountability means that public investment may flow to low-return projects and is more likely to crowd out private investment. Moreover, 12 This section discusses public investment, but does not analyze public spending issues such as investments in human capital which are beyond the scope of this report, and sources of investment finance that have been covered in a recent finance flagship report. 28 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs weak governance is a double blow to investment, as private investment requires protection of property rights and transparency in legal administration. The report examines next the efficiency of investment using incremental capital output ratios (ICORs).13 Investment efficiency in MENA Investment efficiency improved in all three MENA groups and was much higher in the oil importers and the GCC economies than in the developing oil exporters in the 2000s (Figure 3.11). Weak governance and a host of other policies14 have hurt private returns and growth in developing oil exporters, thus discouraging private investment, while public investment has grown but its impact on growth has been weakened. Libya, Iran and Algeria stand out as developing oil exporters with least efficient investments in the 2000s (Figure 3.11). MENA oil importers and GCC oil exporters used investment more efficiently than the developing oil exporters (Figure 3.11). These countries have better rule of law than the developing oil exporters suggesting that they have a better environment for investment and growth. The GCC oil exporters compare favorably with other emerging economies in terms of investment efficiency in the 2000s, while oil importers as a group compare favorably to Turkey, Malaysia and Brazil, but not to China and India. By contrast, developing oil exporters are far behind successful emerging economies in efficient use of investment (Figure 3.11). Figure 3.11 Investment efficiency in MENA region (average ICORs for the 2000s) 12 8 10 7 Average MENA Average MENA 6 8 5 6 4 4 3 2 2 0 1 0 Developing Turkey Malaysia Brazil Oil GCC oil China India oil exporters importers exporters Source: Authors‟ calculations of ICORs (Incremental Capital Output Ratios) using IFS/IMF data on fixed capital formation and GDP. The less efficient the country is, the higher its ICOR. Average ICORs are computed as the ratio of the average investment rates for the period 2000-2004 to average GDP growth for the period 2005-2009. 13 ICORs are defined as the ratio between investment in some previous period and the growth in output in the subsequent period. 14 World Bank (2011) provides a complete discussion of problems constraining growth. 29 Investing for Growth Figure 3.12 Private investment and growth 2.5 y = 0.0186x + 0.5692 (2.41) (15.84) Log GDP(00-05)-log GDP 95-00 2 R² = 0.0468 1.5 1 0.5 0 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 -0.5 Private investment % of GDP (00-05)-Private investment % of GDP(95-00) Source: Authors‟ estimates using IFS/IMF data on private investment and GDP. So far this analysis shows that MENA has been investing for growth but private investment has remained low and its response to reforms has been relatively weak for the region as a whole. Still, investment rates differ across MENA countries and private investment has increased in some of MENA‟s oil importers in the 2000s. Investment composition also changed with public investment rates increasing in oil exporters, especially developing oil exporters, and declining in many of the oil importers in the 2000s relative to the 1990s. The expanding role of public investment should be a cause for concern in developing oil countries as these are economies with weak rule of law and small private sectors. In such economies, public investment is likely to crowd out private investment with negative consequences for growth and investment efficiency. By contrast, oil importers‟ tendency to rely more extensively on private investment is good news. These economies operate in an environment of limited fiscal space so an increased reliance on private investment will enhance prospects for sustainable growth. As show in Figure 3.12 there is a strong, positive correlation between growth and private investment. Foreign direct investment, growth and employment Investment can affect growth differently depending on its sectoral distribution. Since there are not disaggregate data on investment by sector and by country, the report uses data on foreign direct investment from fDi Markets as a proxy for investment. The objective is to understand which sectors attracted private foreign investment and generated jobs in the process. The data reports FDI flows by source and destination country, and by project, activity and sector from 2003 onwards - a period when MENA‟s FDI rose rapidly (Figure 3.4). Besides being a proxy for investment and a source of direct capital finance, FDI inflows are potentially a source of transfers of vital technology and management know-how that could spur certain activities and allow a country to catch up technologically. Foreign firms tend to be larger, 30 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs more productive and with better access to markets. Thus, they may be more successful than domestic firms in creating jobs. By fostering linkages with domestic firms, FDI has the potential to have spillover benefits to other firms within and outside the sector which receives foreign investment. The literature however suggests that the relationship between FDI, growth, and employment is not settled.15 The FDI implications for productivity growth and employment depend on the particular sector and industry receiving FDI, the impact on employment in competing domestic firms, the nature of FDI and the scope for spillovers. The analysis presented here focuses on the distribution of FDI by sector and its job creation potential, and not on the net impact of FDI on aggregate economic growth and job creation. The report employs fDi Markets data on FDI flows by country and sector drawing on FDI values and FDI-related jobs for 39 sectors during the period 2003-11. For ease of exposition, the 39 sectors are aggregated into 5 sectors – mining, real estate, tourism, other services and manufacturing.16 Mining – also referred to in the text as fuels – represents coal, oil, natural gas and minerals. Real estate stands for real estate activities, building and construction materials. Tourism includes hotels, tourism, leisure, entertainment, and transportation services.17 Other services include communications, business services, financial services, software and IT services, healthcare, space and defense. Manufacturing includes the remaining sectors in the fDi Markets data.18 15 See Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) for a review of the recent literature. 16 Alternative aggregations suggested that business services, communication, construction, government services, transportation, high-tech activities receive negligible shares of FDI at the regional and sub-regional levels. Therefore, these sectors were aggregated with other services. 17 Transportation includes warehousing and storage. 18 These include food and tobacco, automotive OEM and components, non-automotive transport OEM, metals, consumer products, textiles, electronic components, industrial machinery, equipment and tools, consumer electronics, chemicals, business machines and equipment, semiconductors, engines and turbines, plastics, paper, printing and packaging, aerospace, alternative/renewable energy, rubber, pharmaceuticals beverages, wood products, ceramics and glass, medical devices, and biotechnology. 31 Investing for Growth Figure 3.13 FDI inflows and FDI-related job in MENA by sector during 2003-1119 FDI flows Jobs FDI inflows by sector and by region 120% 55% 100% 80% 60% 33% 30% 40% 20% 19% 20% 13% 14% 0% 7% 5% 5% Developing oil GCC oil exporters Oil importers exporters Manufacturing Mining Other Services Real Estate Tourism Manufacturing Mining Other Services Real Estate Tourism FDI flows Employment Number of FDI-related jobs 200000 180000 46% 46% 160000 140000 36% 120000 31% 100000 80000 23% 60000 19% 40000 20000 0 Developing oil GCC Developing Oil exporters importers GCC Oil exporters Oil importers Source: fDi Martkets data. Two sectors – real estate and fuels - attracted the majority of FDI in MENA in the 2000s.20 Each of these sectors received close to a third of FDI inflows during the decade (see top left chart of Figure 3.13). Manufacturing and tourism also attracted FDI flows but the shares attributed to them are much smaller than the ones accruing to real estate and mining. In the GCC economies, real estate, fuels and manufacturing each attracted approximately one fourth of all FDI inflows received by these countries in the 2000s, while tourism attracted close to a fifth (see top right chart of Figure 3.13). Over the same period, the developing oil exporters‟ fuels sector attracted close to half of all FDI inflows while its real estate sector received a third of all FDI inflows. In oil importers the real estate sector was the top FDI recipient accounting for half of all inflows, while the FDI shares of mining, manufacturing and tourism were between 10 and 15 percent. FDI in manufacturing created most of the FDI-related jobs in the region in the 2000s. FDI in manufacturing created 55 percent of all FDI-related jobs. In particular, the labor-intensive food processing, consumer products and textile industries accounted for the largest shares of FDI- 19 The mining sector stands for the coal, oil and gas industry inclusive of petroleum refining. 20 Here the 2000s refers to the period from 2003 to 2011. 32 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs related jobs created in MENA‟s manufacturing sector during the period 2003-11. By contrast, FDI in mining and real estate accounted for just 7 and 5 percent of all FDI-related jobs, respectively (see top left chart of Figure 3.13). The beneficial role of manufacturing FDI for job creation is clear in all three regional sub- groups, with the developing oil exporters showing the smallest share of FDI-related jobs in manufacturing. Given that manufacturing accounts for just a fifth of all FDI inflows in the region, there is a scope for increasing manufacturing-related FDI inflows in the future, and thus boosting job creation in the region, not to mention other likely beneficial impacts including a boost to nonoil exports, access to new technology, and productivity gains.21 The GCC economies attracted nearly half of all FDI and gained nearly half of all FDI-related jobs (see bottom left chart of Figure 3.13). The countries which gained the largest number of FDI-related jobs are UAE (approximately 66 thousand) and Saudi Arabia (42 thousand) (Figure 3.14). Developing oil exporters attracted close to a third of all regional FDI inflows but this FDI generated under a fifth of all FDI-related jobs in MENA (see bottom left chart of Figure 3.13). FDI inflows into developing oil exporters favored the oil and gas sector, and a relatively small share of FDI inflows were directed to manufacturing activities (see bottom right chart of Figure 3.13). Developing oil importers attracted FDI which had the highest payoff in terms of jobs. With less than a quarter of regional FDI they generated nearly 40 percent of all MENA FDI- related jobs. They achieved this outcome largely because of FDI-linked jobs in manufacturing (see bottom charts of Figure 3.13). The oil importers with EU links, such as Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia benefited the most (Figure 3.14). This section showed that while the majority of FDI goes to real estate and fuels, the majority of FDI-related jobs are generated in the manufacturing sector. In the 2000s manufacturing received just around one fifth of all regional FDI inflows but created 55 percent of all FDI related jobs, so there is scope for improvement and a potential for manufacturing FDI to play a much larger role for job creation in the region. Private services other than tourism also have a potential to contribute to job creation. In the 2000s, these sectors received only 5 percent of FDI inflows but these inflows created almost a fifth of all FDI-related jobs in the region. Next section looks at the employment intensity of growth in the MENA countries and the drivers of value added and employment growth in the 2000s. 21 These results are indicative only as they are not derived based on the estimation of a full model with sectoral determinants of employment and foreign capital. Additionally, data issues arise in that the FDI inflows data may refer to commitments as opposed to actual flows. Further, employment data refer to actual or estimated job creation associated with the FDI inflow, and do not reflect any job losses in already existing firms as well as positive job spillovers into sectors other than the sector receiving the capital inflows. 33 Investing for Growth Figure 3.14 FDI-related jobs by country during 2003-11 70000 65933 60000 50000 42418 39019 37943 40000 30000 27211 26901 24595 20918 19198 20000 13687 13327 11747 1164511260 9648 10000 6357 359 1861 0 Source: fDi Markets data. In sum, this chapter finds that investment has been disproportionately tilted towards public investment in oil exporters and that is not growth enhancing without good governance. We also saw that investment efficiency has been low precisely in the countries that rely excessively on public investment. Finally, FDI has gone mainly to just 3 countries, and its job creating potential is highest in manufacturing. 34 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs G ROWTH AND JOB CREATION One of the MENA region‟s key and long-lasting concerns has been job creation. A study by the World Bank (2004) conducted in the early 2000s argued that the region would need to create about 6 million new jobs each year over the next two decades in order to absorb new labor market entrants, and bring down unemployment, especially among youth. The region has been affected by a demographic bulge, which has led to a steep increase in the labor force. Furthermore, MENA countries‟ labor force participation rates, particularly for women, have been among the lowest in the world, and are expected to rise in coming decades. So far the record has been disappointing. In the 2000s, MENA created only 3.2 million jobs per year – considerably less than the estimated 6 to 7 million identified as needed by the region. Has MENA failed to create jobs because of insufficient growth or low pace of job creation relative to growth? Pace of job creation relative to growth The region has been creating jobs at a higher pace than other parts of the world, as measured by the average of MENA countries‟ employment-growth elasticities in the 2000s. These elasticities – discussed less frequently than other key labor market indicators – measure how total employment growth varies with growth in economic output (GDP). An elasticity of one implies that every one percentage point of GDP growth is associated with employment growth of one percentage point over a given period. There is no single accepted benchmark to which countries‟ historical elasticities should be compared. The value of the elasticities depends on the rate of country‟s economic growth, amount of surplus labor and labor force growth rate, the unemployment and labor force participation rates, the level and growth rate of labor productivity, and the structure of production. Other things equal, countries with relatively high economic growth rates do not need as high employment-growth elasticities as countries with low economic growth rates. Countries with high labor force growth and low participation rates require higher employment elasticities than others. Consequently, MENA countries and other developing countries where population and labor force growth rates are high often require higher employment elasticities for a given economic growth rate than high income economies as the former typically have a surplus of labor. Countries with capital-intensive production structures are expected to have lower employment elasticities than countries with relatively labor-intensive production structures. MENA‟s employment-growth elasticity of 0.65 in the second half of the 2000s compares favorably with the employment-growth elasticities of nearly all regions (Figure 4.1, see also Annex Table 3). The elasticity has been especially high in the developing oil exporters and has averaged 0.91 during the same period. This finding is somewhat surprising given that oil exporters‟ production is skewed toward capital-intensive industries because of the dominance of the oil sector. The oil sector accounts for nearly half of GCC countries‟ GDP and approximately 40 percent of developing oil exporters‟ GDP (Figure 4.2). In addition, many of the MENA 35 Growth and Job Creation countries specialize in capital-intensive industrial processing industries as firms benefit from energy subsidies which distort incentives and favor capital-intensive production. In the GCC countries industrial products accounted for close to 80 percent of their nonoil exports in 2008.22 In the developing oil exporters this share was smaller and close to 60 percent. Even in the oil importers, the share of industrial goods in their total exports was close to 50 percent. This has led to perceptions that employment creation is sluggish relative to growth in the region. Figure 4.1 Employment-growth elasticities for 2004-08 0.8 1.80 1.60 0.7 1.40 1.20 0.6 1.00 0.5 0.80 0.60 0.4 0.40 0.3 0.20 0.00 0.2 0.1 0 ECA EAP SAS LAC OECD MENA AFR Source: ILO. Note: Employment is defined as all persons above a specific age who during the reference period were engaged in paid or self employment, whether for pay, profit or payment in kind. Persons temporarily not at their work in line with specified criteria are also counted as employed. Figure 4.2 Value added shares by sector in the oil exporters (period averages in the 2000s, percent) Oil exporters Oil importers 100% 100% 90% 90% 80% 80% 70% 70% 60% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Qatar Saudi UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Algeria Iran Iraq Syria Libya Yemen Egypt Morocco W. Bank and Jordan Lebanon Tunisia Arabia Gaza Agriculture Mining and Utilities Manufacturing Construction Services Agriculture Mining and Utilities Manufacturing Construction Services Source: Authors‟ calculations using UNSTAT national accounts data. Note: Mining includes oil and gas extraction; manufacturing includes petroleum refining. 22 Source: World Bank (2011) Middle East and North Africa: Sustaining the Recovery and Looking Beyond. 36 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Several factors have compensated for these structural features of the MENA economies. First, informal employment is highly prevalent in the developing MENA countries. According to a recent report on informality,23 the average country in the region produces about a third of its GDP and employs two-thirds of its labor force informally. In such economies, new entrants to the labor force can generally find low-productivity and low-quality jobs in the informal sector. This is captured by the relatively strong, positive correlation between the pace of employment creation, as given by the employment growth elasticities, and informality rates in developing MENA in the 2000s (Figure 4.3). Figure 4.3 Employment elasticity to growth vs. share of informal workers in developing MENA in the 2000s 1.60 1.40 Algeria Employment elasticity to growth 1.20 1.00 Yemen Syria 0.80 Egypt Jordan 0.60 Iran 0.40 Tunisia Lebanon Morocco Libya 0.20 0.00 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Informal workers as % of labor force Source: Authors‟ estimation based on ILO data and information from World Bank (2011b). Another reason for the relatively high employment elasticities in oil exporting countries is the use of special employment programs to support job creation in recent years. This has been the case in Algeria and other countries where there is sufficient fiscal space and oil wealth. Moreover, this report shows that the 2000s was a period of rapid growth of several labor- intensive sectors, including construction and trade, tourism, logistics and communication services. Indeed, this report shows that these two sectors were the major engines of employment growth during the past decade (Figure 4.11). By contrast, developing oil importers such as Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon have a job creation problem. These countries have better growth record than the developing oil exporters (Figure 4.4), but display much lower propensity to create employment than the average for the MENA region (Figure 4.1). In these countries governments will need to improve the business environment and promote the private sector, especially labor-intensive, private-sector initiatives. Importantly, emphasis should be placed on the fair implementation of current regulations in order to level the playing field and encourage entrepreneurship. 23 World Bank (2011) The Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and North Africa: Promoting Inclusion and Reducing Vulnerability. 37 Growth and Job Creation Figure 4.4 Average growth rates in developing MENA countries in the 2000s (percent) 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Source: World Bank. Thus, in MENA‟s oil exporting countries the main job problem is one of insufficient economic growth, while oil importers have a job creation problem. Recent simulation analysis24 suggests that economic growth will have to rise above the 4.8 percent for the period 1999-200925 and average 6 percent per year during the next decades in order to address MENA‟s job issue.26 The developing oil exporters in particular will need to grow faster than in the past in order to create the jobs required by a rapidly growing labor force. In all MENA countries poor job quality is a big challenge. Resolving this issue will require increasing access to skills upgrading opportunities and improving the business environment so that all firms get a chance to compete and innovate. It will also involve redesigning pension systems, addressing regulatory barriers in labor markets, realigning pay and benefits packages in the public sector, and removing distortions biasing production towards capital-intensive activities. Iran has already moved in this direction by cutting fuel subsidies and replacing them with targeted cash transfers to the poor. This reform is expected to encourage a switch to labor- intensive and energy-efficient production, and enable the economy to raise oil exports by consuming less of it domestically. One potential issue with taking an elasticity approach is that employment elasticities take into account only information pertaining to historical employment and output growth. The past 24 The analysis featured in a mimeo by Ianchovichina and Mottaghi (2011) assumes that employment response to growth will remain close to the one experienced during the past decade. 25 If growth and the employment response to growth remain close to the ones experienced during the past decade, the region is projected to add 4.8 million jobs per year during the period 2010-20. 26 An increase of the growth rate to 6 percent per annum translates to 6.7 million new jobs per year during the period 2010-20 or more than twice the number of new jobs added per year during the period 1999-2009. 38 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs relationship may not be a good predictor of future trends. Employment elasticities at the country, and even at the regional level, can display considerable volatility from one period to the next.27 Finally, the employment-growth elasticities do not provide information as to how other variables influence employment or overall economic performance. For purposes of gaining further insight into the relationship between output and employment growth, next section discusses the structure of production and employment by sector, and the engines of employment and output growth. The report uses a sectoral lens and does not get into important issues of labor market policy, including labor market segmentation, wage policy in the public sector, migrant vs. domestic workers and performance incentives, and energy subsidy reform. Economic activities and employment The sectoral breakdown of employment and value added enables us to better understand the roles of different sectors for employment and output growth in MENA. The mining sector – which represents the oil industry and accounts for roughly 50 percent of value added (Figure 4.2) – employs directly a negligible share of the labor force in all oil exporting countries (Figure 4.5). Only in Qatar, where gas dominates the fuels industry, the sector‟s share is around 5 percent of total employment (Figure 4.5). The services sector is a major contributor to value added and employment in all MENA countries, with agriculture playing an important role for employment in developing MENA and construction playing a role in the GCC oil exporters (Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.2). Figure 4.5 Employment shares by sector (period averages in the 2000s, percent) 100% 90% Share in total employmentin services 80% 90 70% 80 60% 70 60 50% 50 40% 40 30% 30 20% 20 10 10% 0 0% Gov't administration and social services Trade, tourism, logistics and comunication Agriculture Mining and Utilities Manufacturing Construction Services Financial and real estate services Source: ILO. 27 To address these concerns we have chosen to look at period averages rather than annual values of elasticities. 39 Growth and Job Creation Further decomposition of service sector employment into public sector employment28 and employment in other, mostly commercial services, including trade, transport, communications, tourism, hotels, finance, insurance and real estate services indicates that that the government services sector is indeed a large employer in many MENA countries. It accounts for at least half of the employment in the services sectors in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, WBG, Algeria, Syria and Egypt (Figure 4.5). The government services sector‟s share is relatively small in UAE, Qatar, Iran and Morocco. Trade, tourism, logistics and communications employ the majority of people working outside the public services sector (Figure 4.5). Exceptions are Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE where the financial, insurance and real estate sectors‟ share in total employment is sizable. The employment share of the government services sector in a typical MENA country is much larger than the corresponding share in some fast-growing, resource-rich, middle-income countries such as Brazil, Malaysia, and Indonesia (Figure 4.6). Notable exceptions are UAE, Iran, Qatar and Morocco. In these countries the public sector‟s share in total employment is below 18 percent and is smaller than the public services‟ employment shares in Brazil, Malaysia, and even Turkey. On the other end of the spectrum are Jordan, Saudi Arabia, WBG, Iraq and Algeria where the government services sector employs more than 30 percent of the labor force. In these countries, there is a scope to reduce recurrent expenditures by reducing employment in public services to norms prevailing in other middle-income economies. The comparison also suggests that the employment share of nongovernment services in a typical MENA country is similar to the corresponding share of the comparators shown on Figure 4.6. Figure 4.6 Employment shares – a comparison with fast growing, middle-income developing countries (period averages in the 2000s, percent) 50 110 100 40 90 80 30 70 60 20 50 40 10 30 20 0 10 0 Typical MENA Turkey Malaysia Indonesia Brazil Agriculture Mining and Utilities Gov't admin. and Social Services Other services Manufacturing Construction Trade, Tourism, Logistics and Comunication Financial and Real estate services MENA average government share MENA average commercial services Gov't admin. and Social Services Source: ILO. There are other key differences between the typical MENA country and the middle-income countries used as comparators. Importantly, manufacturing‟s employment share in the typical MENA country is smaller than the corresponding share in Turkey, Malaysia, Indonesia and 28 Public sector employment refers here only to employment in government administration and public services sector and does not include employment in state-owned entities in other sectors of the economy. 40 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Brazil, while the opposite is the case for construction (Figure 4.6). This implies that MENA countries have not been as successful as these other economies in developing their tradable manufacturing activities, and instead have created jobs in the nontradable construction and public sectors. Indeed, as we saw earlier MENA countries attracted relatively little FDI to the manufacturing sectors although this FDI created disproportionately more jobs than FDI in other sectors. In some oil exporting countries, expansion of construction might be a sign of Dutch disease, but dynamism in construction might also be associated with less developed financial sectors in MENA countries where agent‟s investment in real estate and construction is a long- term saving strategy, and demand-side factors unique to the region such as fast-growing and relatively young populations. The UNSTAT data lacks information on value added generated by government services and the finance, insurance and real estate sector (FIRE). To obtain this information we use version 8 of the GTAP data which has sectoral value add data based on input-output tables for 2004 and 2007 for five countries in North Africa, including Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya and Algeria. We compute and apply these sectors‟ GTAP value-added shares to information for the beginning- period and end-period, value-added data available from the UNSTAT National Accounts data base. This way we obtain the sectoral contribution of government services, tourism and FIRE to total value added growth in the 2000s (Figure 4.7). Figure 4.7 Value added share of government and all other services (period averages in the 2000s, percent) 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Morocco Tunisia Libya Algeria Egypt Gov't admin. and Social Services Trade, Tourism, Logistics and Communication Financial and Real estate services Source: Authors‟ calculations using GTAP data bases (version 7 and 8) and UNSTAT data. In all cases, public services accounted for a smaller share of total value added compared to commercial services. In Morocco the public services‟ share in employment (Figure 4.5) is smaller than its share in total value added (Figure 4.7), implying that its public services sector is more efficient compared to Algeria‟s and Egypt‟s, where the opposite is the case. In developing 41 Growth and Job Creation oil exporters such as Algeria and Libya the financial sectors are dominated by the state, and their value added shares are relatively small (Figure 4.7). Engines of economic and employment growth In MENA‟s oil exporters, the two major income generating sectors – fuels and services – were also the major engines of value added growth in the 2000s (Figure 4.8), while services and construction, and in some case agriculture, drove employment growth (Figure 4.9). In MENA‟s oil importers, in addition to services, manufacturing, and in some cases agriculture, were the engines of value growth in the past decade (Figure 4.8), while employment creation was boosted by expansion in services (Figure 4.9). Figure 4.8 Sectoral contributions to average annual value added growth (percentage points) 20 8 7 15 6 5 10 4 3 5 2 1 0 Qatar Saudi UAE Bahrain Kuwait Oman Algeria Iran Iraq Syria Libya Yemen 0 Arabia Egypt Morocco W. Bank and Jordan Lebanon Tunisia -1 Gaza -5 Agriculture Mining and Utilities Manufacturing Construction Services Agriculture Mining and Utilities Manufacturing Construction Services Source: Authors‟ estimates using UNSTAT data on value added by sector. Only services unambiguously matter for growth and employment, but the role of public services differs from that of nongovernment services. The contribution of government services to value added growth was small relative to the contributions of private services, especially the trade, tourism, logistics and communication sectors, and in the case of Egypt, the financial sector (Figure 4.10). Similarly, the contribution of government services to employment was relatively minor, except in Iraq and West Bank and Gaza (Figure 4.9). Most countries in the region, especially the MENA oil importers which have relatively limited fiscal space, have seen limited expansion of public employment. In Morocco, for example, the government sector contributed negatively to total employment growth during the mid 2000s. In most countries, it was the trade, tourism, logistics and communications sector that accounted for the major share of employment creation. 42 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Figure 4.9 Sectoral contribution to average, annual employment growth (percentage points) 30 10 9 25 8 20 7 15 6 5 10 4 5 3 0 2 1 -5 0 -1 Gov't admin and Social services Agriculture Mining and Utilities Manufacturing Trade, Tourism, Logistics and Communication Construction Services Financial and Real estate services Source: Authors‟ estimates using ILO data on employment by sector. The fuels sector is big and generated a major share of growth in 6 of the 12 oil exporters, including Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Algeria, Iraq and Yemen (Figure 4.8). However, its direct contribution to employment creation was negligible (Figure 4.9), but oil revenues have enabled the growth of the nonoil economy through transfers and public investment programs. Manufacturing has started making sizable contributions to value added growth, particularly in the oil importers (Figure 4.8), but not employment creation (Figure 4.9). Finally, construction activities account for a sizable share of employment (Figure 4.5) and job growth (Figure 4.9), but not growth in value added (Figure 4.8). Box 4.1 explores in more detail the potential of maintaining and building infrastructure to create future jobs. The trade, transport, tourism and communication sector was the main engine of value added and employment growth during the 2000s in fast-growing, middle-income economies such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil and Turkey and in the typical MENA economy (Figure 4.11). However, there are significant differences between the typical MENA country and other middle- income countries. Manufacturing has contributed a lot less to growth of value added in the average MENA country than in these other middle-income economies, and instead oil has been a major economic growth engine (see right chart of Figure 4.11). Construction and agriculture made a significant contribution to employment growth in the typical MENA economy, but not in comparator countries. Indeed, in some comparator countries, there was a transition of labor away from agriculture and into services (see left chart of Figure 4.11). Finally, apart from the fuel sector, the contribution to employment growth has been relatively balanced across sectors in the typical MENA country. We cannot say the same for comparator countries where only services and to some extent manufacturing contributed to employment growth. 43 Growth and Job Creation Figure 4.10 Services sectors’ contribution to average annual value added growth (percentage points) 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 Algeria Libya Egypt Morocco Tunisia Gov't admin. and social services Trade, tourism, logistics and communication Financial and real estate services Source: Authors‟ estimates using GTAP and UNSTAT data on value added by sector. Figure 4.11 Sectoral contribution to annual employment and value added growth - an international comparison (percent) Contribution to employment growth Contribution to value added growth 140 100% 120 80% 100 80 60% 60 40 40% 20 20% 0 -20 Typical MENA Malaysia Indonesia Brazil 0% -40 Agriculture Mining and Utilities Typical MENA Turkey Malaysia Indonesia Brazil country Manufacturing Construction Agriculture Mining and Utilities Trade, Tourism, Logistics and Communication Financial and Real estate services Manufacturing Construction Trade, transport, tourism Financial and Real estate services Gov't admin and Social services Gov't admin. and Social Services Source: Authors‟ estimates using ILO data on employment by sector and GTAP and UNSTAT data on value added by sector. 44 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Box 4.1 Maintaining and building infrastructure as a vehicle for job creation Maintaining and building infrastructure has been an important vehicle for job creation, but the scope for further increases in employment is limited Infrastructure services and construction activities provide a significant number of jobs in MENA. Using ILO data on employment in the electricity, water, transport and communication services and construction sector have allowed us to proxy employment needed for maintaining and building infrastructure. In 2009 MENA employed roughly 18 million people in these sectors of which 10.5 million worked in construction, while 7.5 million provided infrastructure services. Most of these 18 million jobs were in the developing oil exporters (9 million), followed by the oil importers (7 million) and the GCC oil exporters (2 million). Importantly, the scope for further increases of employment in these sectors may be limited in MENA. An international comparison reveals that the sectors‟ share in employment is relatively big – a likely evidence of a Dutch disease problem associated with the region‟s reliance on oil wealth. On average, jobs in infrastructure services in MENA represent around 8 percent of the region‟s employment while construction jobs represent around 11 percent. Developing oil exporters are the largest relative employers in these 2 subsectors with construction and infrastructure services accounting for 13 percent and 10 percent of employment, compared to 11 percent and 8 percent in the world at large, respectively. GCC oil exporters and even oil importers also display above average employment share in construction but below average share in infrastructure services. Thus, there is potential to expand employment mostly in infrastructure services in oil importers and GCC economies. Relative Importance of infrastructure services and construction jobs in MENA (2009) Construction Infrastructure services Share in total Total infrastructure and construction Share in total employment employment share GCC 5.8% 12.0% 17.7% Developing oil exporters 9.6% 13.0% 22.6% Oil importers 7.1% 9.4% 16.5% TOTAL for MENA 8.0% 11.3% 19.3% World Average 7.7% 8.4% 16.1% Developed countries 7.2% 8.2% 15.4% Developing countries 7.6% 8.6% 16.2% Source: Author‟s calculation based on ILO. This section shows that the region‟s job problem cannot be attributed solely to a slow pace of job creation relative to economic growth. On average the region has been creating jobs at a higher pace, relative to income growth, than other middle-income countries in the 2000s. There is however significant variation within the region. The oil importing countries have been creating 45 Growth and Job Creation jobs more slowly relative to income growth, and do have a job creation problem. In contrast, the pace of job creation has been particularly high in the developing oil exporters. In these countries therefore the main job problem is one of insufficient growth. In all countries, job quality has been a particular concern. Jobs in government services have been increasingly hard to get while fining similar quality jobs in the private sector has been hard too. We show that nongovernment services and manufacturing can serve as engines of both job creation and income growth. Services have been a source of strength both on income and jobs, in levels and growth, especially in oil importers. Manufacturing has contributed to growth in income and jobs, but its size is small on average in MENA relative to comparators. 46 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs K EY MESSAGES Economic growth in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to average 4.1 percent in 2011 and improve by half a percentage point from our May forecast for the year.  The forecast for 2011 is up by half a percentage point relative to the May forecast due to more expansionary fiscal policies in the region, expanded oil production (excluding Libya), better than expected growth in Iran, and a quicker than anticipated pickup in industrial production in Egypt.  Growth is expected to decline by half a percentage point in 2012 because of lower expected oil prices and slower global growth. While this year‟s regional growth outlook has improved relative to the May forecast, uncertainty about it has increased, in line with growing risks.  Within the region, failure to achieve political and macroeconomic stability would extend the uncertainty and investment and economic activity would continue to be weak, while fiscal balances will deteriorate.  On top of regional concerns, the probability of a global downturn has increased.  The ongoing political and economic uncertainties have put a number of countries in a weaker position for additional response to another global downturn.  With contracting global demand, lower oil prices will put further pressure on fiscal balances in many oil exporters, especially in a period of expanded government spending. Lower oil prices will be a relief to developing oil importers, but this will be offset by lower exports and remittances. The Arab spring events affected investment in the MENA regions.  Risk premiums rose, especially in counties affected by unrest. As capital became more costly private investment, including foreign direct investment and growth declined.  In countries with limited fiscal space such as Morocco and Jordan, expansions of social programs in response to popular demand have occurred at the expense of public investment programs.  Investment in the GCC countries has not been affected significantly given the dominant role of public investment. The risks there include still anemic credit growth to the private sector and implementation constraints related to public investment projects. A look at MENA‟s investment record over the past decade suggests that the region has been investing at rates which compare favorably with those of other regions.  In oil exporting countries, however, investment has been mainly supported by large and expanding public investment. 47 Key Messages  Oil importers have shown more strength in private investment which increased in recent years. The expanding role of public investment is a cause for concern in developing oil exporters.  In economies with weak rule of law there is no evidence that public investment stimulates private investment and growth.  In contrast, in countries with an adequate level of property rights protection and legal institutions, public investment is strongly linked to growth.  In addition, good rule of law helps attract private investment.  Moreover, countries with good rule of law show higher levels of investment efficiency. Similar to oversized public investment, many countries in the region record a large share of jobs in government services as compared with other countries.  Of concern is that the contribution of government services to GDP is relatively small.  Moreover, in recent years this sector has been unable to support job or income growth. The oil sector shows a pattern opposite to government services, accounting for a large share of value added but not jobs. Consequently, the number of jobs created in the last decade was considerably less than the number needed to address key challenges, such as high youth unemployment, low labor force participation rates, especially among women, and fast-growing labor forces. The report investigates the region‟s job creation problem in light of its growth pace and pattern. Our analysis shows that the region‟s job problem cannot be attributed solely to a slow pace of job creation relative to economic growth. On average the region has been creating jobs at a higher pace, relative to income growth, than other middle-income countries in the 2000s. However, there is significant variation within the region. The oil importers show a relatively slow response of jobs to growth as compared with the oil exporters. Several factors have been associated with this fast pace of job creation in oil exporting countries.  Informal employment is highly prevalent in developing MENA. In such economies, new entrants to the labor force can generally find low-productivity, low-quality jobs in the informal sector.  Another reason has been the use of special employment programs to support job creation in recent years. This has been the case in Algeria and other countries where there has been sufficient fiscal space and oil wealth.  The report also shows that the past decade has been a period of rapid growth of several labor-intensive sectors, including construction, trade, tourism, logistics and communication services. 48 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs  But, many of the jobs have been „unattractive‟ to domestic residents in oil exporting countries and have been done by noncitizens. Thus, in developing oil exporters, the main job problem is one of insufficient growth, while oil importers have a job creation problem. In all countries, job quality has been a particular concern. Jobs in government services have been increasingly difficult to get while finding similar quality jobs in the private sector has been hard. The report shows that nongovernment services and manufacturing can serve as engines of both job creation and income growth.  Services have been a source of strength both on income and jobs, in levels and growth, especially in oil importers.  Manufacturing has contributed to growth in income and jobs, but its size is small on average in MENA relative to comparator countries, such as Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey. The report highlights the importance of good rule of law.  Better governance is necessary for public investment to support income growth.  Better governance attracts private investment in areas such as services and manufacturing, which are the main drivers of both income growth and job creation.  Improving government institutions is necessary for voice and accountability, it is also necessary for growth and efficient use of resources. 49 50 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs REFERENCES Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R. and C. Lundblad (2011) “Financial Openness and Productivity��?, World Development 39(1), 1-19. Blejer, M.I. and M.S. Khan (1984) “Government Policy and Private Investment in Developing Countries��?, International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 31(2): 379-403. Cavallo, E. and C. Daude (2011) “Public investment in developing countries: A blessing or a curse?��? Journal of Comparative Economics, vol. 39(1), pages 65-81, March. Freund C. and B. Bolaky (2008) “Trade, Regulations, and Income��?, Journal of Development Economics 87, 309-321. Freund, C. and L. Mottaghi (2011) “Transition to Democracy��?, World Bank, mimeo. Gallagher, M. (1991) Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. Harrison, A. and A. Rodríguez-Clare (2010) “Trade, Foreign Investment, and Industrial Policy for Developing Countries��?, in D. Rodrik (editor) Handbook of Economic Growth 4, forthcoming. Ianchovichina, E. and L. Mottaghi (2011) “Employment-growth scenarios for the Middle East and North Africa region��?, World Bank, mimeo. International Monetary Fund (2004) Public Investment and Fiscal Policy, International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, March. Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay., M. Mastruzzi (2010) “The Worldwide Governance Indicators��?, World Bank, mimeo. King, R. G. and R. Levine (1992) “Financial Indicators and Growth in the Cross Section of Countries��?, Policy Research Working Paper No. 819, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Odedokun, M. O. (1997) “Relative Effects of Public Versus Private Investment Spending on Economic Efficiency and Growth in Developing Countries,��? Applied Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 1325–36. World Bank (2004) Unlocking the Employment Potential in the Middle East and North Africa: Toward a New Social Contract, World Bank, Washington DC. World Bank (2010) Middle East and North Africa: Recovering From the Crisis, Economic Developments and Prospects Report, World Bank, Washington DC, April. 51 References World Bank (2011a) Middle East and North Africa: Sustaining the Recovery and Looking Beyond, Economic Developments and Prospects Report, World Bank, Washington DC, January World Bank (2011b) The Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and North Africa: Promoting Inclusion and Reducing Vulnerability, World Bank, Washington DC, forthcoming. World Bank (2011c) Middle East and North Africa: Facing Challenges and Opportunities, Economic Developments and Prospects Report, World Bank, Washington DC, May. World Bank (2011d) Financial Access and Stability for the MENA Region-A Roadmap, World Bank, Washington DC, March. 52 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs ANNEX 53 Annex Annex Figure 1. Annual per capita GDP growth and public investment, 1995-99 Countries with good rule of law 14 Countries with weak rule of law 10 12 9 y = 0.1456x + 2.0094 y = -0.1271x + 3.7008 GDP per capit growth rate, %, 2000-05 GDP per capita growth ,%, 2000-05 8 (2.17) (4.61) 10 (-1.23) (4.79) R² = 0.0833 7 8 R² = 0.0254 6 6 5 KUW IRN 4 ALG 4 MOR TUN BHR JOR 2 YMN LBY SYR 3 LEB OMN 0 2 EGY DJB SAU -2 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 UAE QAT -4 0 -1 0 5 10 15 20 -6 Public investment % of GDP, 1995-99 Public investment % of GDP, 1995-99 Source: Authors‟ estimates. Note: t-statistics in parenthesis below trend equation. Annex Table 1. Countries with successful transitions SSA EAP ECA LAC MENA OECD SA Benin Fiji Armenia Argentina Lebanon Greece Bangladesh Burundi Indonesia Bulgaria Bolivia Korea South Pakistan Central African Republic Philippines Croatia Brazil Portugal Comoros Thailand Hungary Chile Spain Guinea-Bissau Romania Dominican Rep Taiwan Kenya Turkey Ecuador Liberia El Salvador Madagascar Guyana Malawi Honduras Mali Nicaragua Mozambique Panama Niger Peru Senegal Uruguay Sierra Leone South Africa Zambia Source: Country selection explained in Figure 1.1. 54 2011 Economic Developments and Prospects – MENA Investing for Growth and Jobs Annex Table 2. Macroeconomic Outlook as of May 201129 Real GDP Growth Fiscal balance Current account balance 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2008 2009 2010 est. proj. 2008 2009 2010 est. proj. 2008 2009 2010 est. proj. (Annual percentage change) (in percentage of GDP) (in percentage of GDP) MENA region 5.2 1.8 3.9 3.6 4.2 12.4 -2.8 1.7 4.0 4.7 15.1 1.5 6.3 10.4 9.9 Oil Exporters 4.6 0.7 3.5 4.0 4.3 15.8 -2.1 3.7 6.8 7.6 18.8 3.2 8.9 14.3 13.4 GCC 6.0 0.2 4.2 5.2 4.6 24.2 0.8 7.8 11.3 11.5 23.9 6.7 12.1 17.6 16.5 Bahrain 6.1 2.6 4.0 1.0 3.0 4.9 -8.7 -7.8 0.5 -1.0 10.6 1.6 4.6 9.0 8.0 Kuwait 5.6 -4.4 2.3 4.0 4.0 19.9 19.3 17.5 20.0 22.0 40.7 29.2 31.8 33.0 35.0 Oman 12.3 3.6 4.8 1.0 3.0 13.9 2.2 7.5 11.0 9.0 9.1 -2.2 11.6 12.0 11.0 Qatar 15.8 9.0 16.0 18.6 9.2 10.9 13.0 11.4 12.2 14.3 33.0 15.7 18.7 38.0 34.9 Saudi Arabia 4.2 0.6 3.4 4.5 4.4 32.5 -6.1 7.7 9.0 8.0 27.8 6.1 8.7 14.0 12.0 United Arab Emirates 5.1 -2.0 2.4 3.2 4.0 20.4 0.4 3.3 12.0 13.0 8.5 -2.7 7.3 9.0 9.0 Developing Oil Exporters 2.1 1.6 2.2 1.7 3.6 1.5 -6.3 -2.3 0.1 1.9 10.0 -1.9 4.2 9.5 8.9 Algeria 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.7 3.6 7.7 -6.8 -3.9 -3.3 -1.1 20.2 0.3 9.4 17.8 17.4 Iran, Islamic Republic of 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 -2.7 0.6 3.7 4.3 7.3 4.2 6.0 11.7 10.4 Iraq 9.5 4.2 0.8 9.6 12.6 -1.2 -21.8 -10.8 -4.0 3.5 12.8 -26.6 -6.2 -3.0 -0.4 Syrian Arab Republic 4.5 6.0 3.2 1.7 3.0 -2.8 -2.9 -4.8 -7.3 -5.1 0.1 -5.7 -4.4 -5.3 -4.8 Yemen 3.6 3.9 8.0 3.0 4.0 -3.2 -10.2 -4.0 -7.0 -5.6 -4.6 -10.7 -4.4 -4.0 -4.0 Oil Importers 6.8 4.8 4.7 2.3 3.9 -4.3 -5.5 -6.1 -7.1 -6.9 -3.3 -4.9 -4.2 -5.0 -4.3 Oil importers with GCC links 8.6 6.3 5.6 4.4 4.7 -6.8 -8.1 -4.8 -6.1 -5.7 -12.2 -14.8 -10.9 -12.7 -12.2 Djibouti 5.8 5.0 4.5 5.5 5.7 1.3 -4.6 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -24.3 -9.1 -6.9 -18.2 -15.7 Jordan 7.6 2.3 3.1 3.5 4.0 -4.3 -8.5 -5.3 -6.2 -5.2 -9.6 -5.1 -4.3 -8.0 -6.8 Lebanon 9.3 8.5 7.0 4.8 5.0 -8.8 -8.0 -4.6 -6.2 -6.2 -13.6 -21.5 -15.4 -15.6 -15.6 Oil importers with EU links 6.5 4.5 4.6 1.9 3.7 -3.9 -5.0 -6.3 -7.3 -7.1 -1.8 -3.2 -3.0 -3.6 -2.9 Egypt 7.2 4.7 5.2 1.0 3.5 -6.8 -6.9 -8.2 -9.0 -9.0 0.5 -2.3 -2.0 -2.9 -2.4 Morocco 5.6 4.9 3.3 4.3 4.5 0.4 -2.2 -4.6 -4.5 -4.0 -5.2 -5.0 -4.2 -4.0 -3.5 Tunisia 4.5 3.1 3.7 1.5 3.5 -1.0 -3.0 -1.3 -4.8 -4.1 -3.8 -2.9 -4.8 -6.2 -4.0 Source: World Bank data. 29 Source: World Bank (2011c). 55 Annex Annex Table 3. MENA‟s employment elasticity to growth Elasticity of employment Elasticity of employment Elasticity of employment Country/region to total GDP, 2000-2004 to total GDP, 2004-2008 to total GDP, 2000-2008 Developing oil exporters 0.83 0.91 0.87 Algeria 1.29 1.53 1.41 Iran, Islamic Republic of 0.59 0.56 0.58 Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 0.49 0.38 0.44 Syrian Arab Republic 0.65 1.03 0.84 Yemen 1.12 1.05 1.09 GCC oil exporters 0.75 0.57 0.66 Bahrain 0.44 0.34 0.39 Kuwait 0.41 0.46 0.44 Oman 0.50 0.42 0.46 Qatar 1.26 1.03 1.15 Saudi Arabia 1.00 0.68 0.84 United Arab Emirates 0.88 0.51 0.70 Oil importers 0.62 0.47 0.55 Egypt 0.82 0.57 0.70 Jordan 0.69 0.58 0.64 Lebanon 0.52 0.37 0.45 Morocco 0.50 0.40 0.45 Tunisia 0.55 0.42 0.49 MENA 0.73 0.65 0.69 Source: ILO. 56