DISCUSSION PAPER        								   No. 3 November 2019
Governance Global Practice




Design matters:
CBNRM and democratic
innovation
Graham Smith
Acknowledgements
This paper is one of a series of knowledge products under a World Bank Group program on developing
practical approaches to strengthening forest governance. It is a joint program of the World Bank’s
Sustainable Development and Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions Vice Presidencies and financed
by the Program on Forests (PROFOR).

The author wishes to thank Tiago Peixoto for encouraging the conversation between scholars and
practitioners of CBNRM and democratic innovations. His insights were fundamental to the development
of the report. Mariana Apgar (University of Sussex) and Rikki Dean (Goethe University) offered invaluable
critical reviews of an earlier draft. Early conversations with Brian Child helped clarify potential governance
challenges. Within the World Bank, André Aquino, Stephen Davenport, Asmeen Khan and Arnela
Maússe provided important advice. Any mistakes or misinterpretations lie with the author.

Biographical details
Graham Smith is Professor of Politics and Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the
University of Westminster, UK. He is a specialist in democratic theory and practice and climate politics
and has particular expertise in participatory democratic institutions. He is Chair of the Foundation for
Democracy and Sustainable Development.
Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	                                                     1

    1. RATIONALE FOR THE PAPER	                                        1

    2. CBNRM AND THE PARTICIPATION CHALLENGE	                          2

	      2.1. The devolution agenda	                                     2

	      2.2. Inclusive governance	                                      3

	      2.3. Power dynamics	                                            3

    3. DEFINING DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS	                                4

    4. DESIGN ELEMENTS	                                               6

	      4.1. Democratic goods	                                          6

	      4.2. Task	                                                      7

	      4.3. Mechanisms	                                                8

	      	 4.3.1. Recruitment mechanisms	                                9

		 4.3.2. Interaction mechanisms	                                     10

		4.3.3. Decision-making mechanisms	                                  12

		 4.3.4. Accountability mechanisms	                                  13

	      4.4. Co-design	                                                13

    5. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER – DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS	   14

	      5.1. Participatory budgeting	                                  14

	      5.2. Deliberative mini-publics	                                15

	      5.3. Other designs	                                            17

    6. DESIGN LESSONS FOR CBNRM	                                      17

    7. ENABLING CONDITIONS	                                           18

    8. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND FUTURE WORK	                           20

    9. Resources	21

10. Bibliography	21
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
•	 CBRNM aims to realize sustainable management of resources and improvements in livelihood. A central
   focus is the empowerment of indigenous and local communities through customary or devolved rights
   to common pool resources. Less attention is given to the extent to which inclusive forms of governance
   are realized in CBNRM.

•	 Democratic innovations are institutions designed explicitly to increase and deepen citizen participation
   in political decision-making. A number of exemplary cases around the world provide evidence that
   it is possible to empower citizens in ways that are inclusive and achieve desirable outcomes such as
   redistribution, recognition of marginalized groups and improved livelihoods.

•	 By clarifying elements of the design of democratic innovations – in particular goods, tasks, mechanisms
   and co-design – it is possible to understand how effective forms of participatory governance can be
   crafted.

•	 With careful attention to the endogenous practices of indigenous and local communities and the
   governance structures imposed by public authorities, CBNRM practitioners can draw on these elements
   of democratic design to craft forms of inclusive participatory governance that promote sustainable
   management of resources and improve livelihoods.

•	 A program of collaboration between CBNRM and democratic innovations practitioners would
   contribute to improvements amongst both communities of practice and the communities they serve.


1. RATIONALE FOR THE PAPER
This paper brings community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) into conversation with the
theory and practice of ‘democratic innovations’. The aim of the paper is to explore aspects of design for
participatory governance to help inform the work of CBNRM practitioners.1 CBRNM can be understood
to have three broad objectives. The first is ecological: ensuring the sustainable use of renewable natural
resources. The second is economic: raising the livelihoods of local communities. The third is democratic:
decision-making that is equitable, inclusive and empowering. It is the achievement of the third objective
that motivates this paper. CBNRM practitioners recognize the need for inclusive communication and
free and fair access to decision making across social groups as conditions for effective management of
ecological resources and the achievement of equitable outcomes and wellbeing. But how is this to be
achieved? Practitioners and scholars working on democratic innovation – from participatory budgeting
to citizens’ assemblies – pay close attention to how to design governance arrangements to increase and
deepen citizen participation. This paper draws out lessons on the design of participatory governance
that may inform the work of CBNRM practitioners. Attention to design can affect mobilization,
inclusion, scalability, transparency, impact on political decisions and outcomes such as redistribution and
empowerment.




	While the aim of this paper is to draw lessons for CBNRM from democratic innovations, there is much that the work on
1

 democratic innovations can learn from the experience and practices of CBNRM. This paper represents only the first step in a
 conversation.



                                                               1
2. CBNRM AND THE PARTICIPATION CHALLENGE
CBNRM is a broad family of approaches to ‘sustainable governance’ that emphasizes the devolution
of responsibility for the management of renewable natural resources such as wildlife, forestry and
fresh water fisheries to local communities as a way to improve livelihoods and well-being. Devolution
can be driven by indigenous and local communities claiming rights over natural resources and their
management and/or government-led programs. While the realization of customary or devolved rights to
common pool resources receives significant attention, less consideration is given to how inclusive forms
of governance are realized in CBNRM and how existing shortcomings can be addressed. The design
of participatory governance arrangements has a significant impact on the achievement of sustainable
resource management, empowerment and equitable livelihoods and well-being (Jones et al. 2006). To be
effective, such designs need to be sensitive to power dynamics at play within communities and between
communities and public authorities (Hobley 2006, Nelson 2010, Bixler et al. 2015).

2.1. The devolution agenda
CBNRM is typically promoted in areas of the world rich in biodiversity and disproportionately inhabited by
poor, marginalized and/or indigenous communities. A ‘community-based’ approach has been developed
in response to the limits of top-down management of resources by distant public authorities. Failures in
the governance of natural resources can be traced to the lack of knowledge of and sensitivity to local
conditions by public officials and widespread corruption in many low-income states.
    The aim of CBNRM is to both protect resources and eco-systems and improve community well-being
and rural economies in ways that are inclusive and equitable. Reflecting on the trajectory of community-
based forestry (CBF), Gilmour notes: ‘while collaborative forms of CBF were often originally conceived to
halt and reverse forest degradation, they are now generally expected to achieve an increasingly diverse set
of conservation, social, economic and political objectives… leading to an increasingly complex policy and
operational environment’ (Gilmour 2016: 10).
    CBNRM is influenced particularly by the work of the Nobel prize winning political economist Elinor
Ostrom (1990; Cox et al 2010) who argues that communal regimes can manage effectively common pool
resources. Key to Ostrom’s work is the principle that property rights over local common resources need to
be held by the local community so that they are in control over how those resources are managed. In this
way, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ – the overuse of natural resources because of the absence of political
authority – can be avoided. Common property regimes, according to Ostrom, provides the incentives
for local people to exploit natural resources in a sustainable fashion. Such rights enable the community
to exclude others from their resources and manage the land collectively. These property rights may be
customary (already held by local communities) or defined through legislation.
    Much of the debate within CBNRM understandably concerns the degree of community ownership
and the devolution of rights over resources. In CBF, the extent to which rights are held by indigenous and
local communities leads to different approaches: participatory conservation, joint forest management,
community forest with limited devolution and community forest with full devolution (Gilmour 2016)
  Most countries that have adopted collaborative forms of CBF have policies in place to decentralize and
  devolve rights and responsibilities. However, in practice, decentralization and devolution have been only
  partially realized and many governments retain significant authority over forest management, with the
  result that CBF faces major restrictions…. Without real devolution of power, the objectives of CBF will
  be difficult to achieve because they are premised on this transfer (Gilmour 2016: xxii)


                                                     2
But establishing community control does not in itself necessarily imply inclusive governance is achieved
(Agarwal 2001). Communities claiming rights or having rights and powers devolved to them does not in
itself ensure fair and equal access to decision making across different social groups or the achievement of
equitable outcomes.

2.2. Inclusive governance
While the focus is often on her argument for establishing rights for common pool resources, Ostrom
(1990) continually reiterates the importance of inclusive communication and empowerment in achieving
collective action (see also Cox et al 2010). Communication is the foundation for the creation and
maintenance of social capital (reciprocity and trust) on which cooperation rests and social learning
that allows communities to adapt to changing socio-ecological conditions. For Ostrom, inclusive
communication generates shared norms and sanctions for the management of resources that can be
validated and accepted across the community. As Ostrom comments: ‘simple cheap talk allows individuals
an opportunity to make conditional promises to one another and build trust that others will reciprocate’
(1998: 6). Inclusive communication is also necessary for sensitivity to different forms of knowledge that
can inform the sustainable management of resources, in particular indigenous and local knowledges of
natural resources that are embedded within social, cultural and spiritual practices.
    Inclusion must also be empowered. Communication needs to be tied to decision making power. As
Ostrom argues, effective management of common pool resources requires that ‘most individuals affected
by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules’ (Ostrom 1990: 90).
    Social learning and empowerment are thus central components of inclusive communication and
governance. The inclusion of voices with different perspectives and knowledge in the management of
natural resources is critical if the resilience and adaptation of socio-ecological systems is to be sustained
and equitable livelihoods are to be realized. Empowered inclusion has intrinsic and instrumental value.

2.3. Power dynamics
Ostrom makes visible the endogenous practices of indigenous and local communities – the ways in
which their customary laws and local practices enable the management of common pool resources. Such
customary governance practices can respect diversity within communities and afford a place for traditionally
marginalized voices.2 Equally, existing devolution programs can embed aspects of inclusive governance. But
community-led governance can just as easily perpetuate marginalization and exclusion of the least powerful,
in particular women (Agarwal 2001; Nightingale 2002; Keene 2019). Where rights of common pool
resources are secured, it may simply have the effect of sustaining and reinforcing the social and economic
position of those who already hold power within a community. As Gilmour argues: ‘While collaborative
forms of CBF have sometimes contributed significantly to improving rural livelihoods and livelihood security,
they have not always done this in a way that targets the poorest members of communities; benefits have
often been captured by local elites’ (Gilmour 2016: xxii). Higher level hierarchy is often replaced with local
hierarchy. Where local participatory processes are in place, they may be weak and ineffective and/or co-
opted or undermined by locally powerful or external political and bureaucratic actors (Cox et al 2010).
   The critical literature on CBNRM has been effective in highlighting how ineffective forms of


	See for example recent work on biocultural diversity (Apgar 2017) and the reports by networks such as Indigenous and
2

 Community Conserved Areas and Global Forest Coalition.



                                                              3
participatory governance reinforce inequalities and marginalization (Barnaud et al 2010). But less creative
work exists on how to meet the participation challenge for CBNRM: how to ensure that the governance
of natural resources is inclusive and empowered, leading to equitable outcomes and livelihoods. In some
localities this will require the respect and sustenance of existing endogenous practices; elsewhere hybrid
institutions will need to be crafted in recognition of the limits of existing practices.



3. DEFINING DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS
How to design inclusive and empowering forms of participatory governance has been the central concern of
democratic innovations – a body of practical and theoretical work that focuses on institutions that have been
designed explicitly to increase and deepen citizen participation in political decision making (Smith 2009). The
term democratic innovations captures forms of governance that involve the direct participation of citizens and
represent a departure from the traditional institutional architecture of contemporary democracies (and non-
democracies).
   Democratic innovations are often referred to as ‘invited’ spaces in that they are often sponsored and
crafted by public authorities which then ‘invite’ citizens to participate (Brock et al. 2001; Cornwall and
Schattan Coelho 2007; Cornwall 2017). In development studies, the term ‘induced’ participation has
been proposed (Mansuri and Rao 2012).3 Invited spaces are contrasted with the ‘claimed’ spaces of social
movements. As with most definitions, a hard distinction between invited and claimed spaces breaks down
quite quickly: many ‘invited’ spaces are co-created by public authorities and communities. In a similar
vein, the creation of ‘invited’ spaces can, under certain circumstances, lead to more bottom-up, ‘organic’
forms of civic action (Touchton & Wampler 2014). In his characterization of the broad field of participatory
governance, Dean distinguishes two dimensions (Dean 2017). The first is ‘prescribed-negotiated’:
democratic innovations can be constructed solely by public authorities (the classic ‘invited’ space); but they
can also be negotiated spaces in which citizens are actively involved in shaping the conditions under which
they participate. The second dimension, ‘agonistic-solidaristic’, highlights that democratic innovations can be
spaces of contestation and cooperation, both between citizens and between citizens and public authorities.
   Extensive evidence exists showing that democratic innovations can be effective in engaging and
mobilizing citizens in ways that have significant effect on political decision making and outcomes (Smith
2019; Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015). In Ireland, for example, the Irish Convention on the Constitution and
the Citizens’ Assembly that followed in its wake, enabled randomly-selected citizens to propose changes
to the constitutional status of same sex marriage and abortion that were then supported through national
referendums (Elkink et al, 2017; Suiter et al, 2018)4. In Latin America, participatory budgeting (PB) across
a number of municipalities, has been effective in reversing long standing differentials in participation. The
mobilisation of disadvantaged groups, especially the poor, has led to more equitable redistribution of public
goods and improvements in social wellbeing in areas such as health care and infant mortality rates (Baiocchi,
2003; Wampler 2007; Touchton and Wampler, 2014).5  
   But claims need to be tempered. The tendency – as exhibited above – is to pick out exemplary cases;


	The work by Mansuri and Rao (2013) suggests the need of a distinction between organic participation (endogenous efforts by
3

 civic activists) and induced participation (large-scale efforts to foster public participation through projects).  
4
    https://www.citizensassembly.ie/en/
	Recent research also shows that participatory budgeting has led to an increase in tax revenues (see Touchton et al. 2019).
5




                                                                4
to focus on success stories. Such examples show us what is possible through well-crafted participatory
processes that have strong political support. But this selection bias means that we neglect more mundane
application of participatory processes and failures of attempted democratic innovation (Spada and Ryan,
2017), in particular their misuse and abuse by public authorities. The boundary between democratic
innovations as exemplary forms of participatory governance and more mundane or failed cases of public
participation is not clear cut. The term democratic innovations has been used expansively to capture
all forms of institutionalized public participation in the decision-making processes of public authorities,
however successful; at other times the idea of ‘increasing and deepening citizen participation’ highlights a
more limited class of effective participatory process (Smith 2019).6
    Careful attention to the design of participatory spaces has emerged against the widespread suspicion
and skepticism towards public participation and its effects (Smith 2009: 14-20). Many of these concerns
will resonate with those considering the role of participation in CBNRM. First, participation may simply
reinforce existing social and economic power, with the already politically interested and active dominating
participatory spaces. Whether we look at voting patterns or political engagement activities beyond
elections, we find differential rates of participation across social groups, with the politically marginalized
participating less. The danger is that opening up new avenues for participation provides the already
politically advantaged with further opportunities to advance their interests (Lijphart 1997). Second,
critics focus on the lack of political competence of citizens. Survey data shows that many citizens lack
basic knowledge and skills to participate effectively (Archen and Bartels 2016). The fear is that enhancing
participation leads to ill-informed decisions. Third, too often participation is little more than window-
dressing, used to legitimate decisions that have been made elsewhere. Critics contend that participation
is frequently cooption of the public by political elites (Cooke and Kothari 2001). Where decision-making
powers are shared or held elsewhere by a public authority, reasonable concerns exist that proposals
from citizens will be ignored or ‘cherry-picked’ – often with no explanation.7 Fourth, participation places
unrealistic expectations on participants in terms of the time and inclination to be involved in politics. The
costs of participation are not borne equally: the poorest and those with caring and familial responsibilities
often find it hard to justify political engagement when there are other pressing demands (Warren 1996).
And finally, a common criticism is that participation can only work in small groups. As governance units
increase in size and scale, participation becomes increasingly unmanageable (Dahl 1998).
    The success of celebrated democratic innovations – for example, participatory budgeting and citizens’
assemblies (both discussed in detail in section 5) – show how these concerns can be ameliorated through
careful design. Such participatory institutions may seem a long way from the experience of CBNRM.
Though the context is very different, investigating how practitioners and academics have grappled with
realizing inclusiveness, communication and empowerment in democratic innovations may help inform the
CBNRM community when faced with similar challenges. We often learn most by comparing what at first
sight appear to be very different enterprises.




	Fung offers a more normative categorization of ‘empowered participatory governance’ that he distinguishes from more
6

 educative, advisory or collaborative problem-solving participatory processes (Fung, 2003: 340-1; see also Fung and Wright
 2003). 

	See, for instance, systematic evidence from Spanish local participatory processes (Font et al 2018).
7




                                                                 5
4. DESIGN ELEMENTS
The design of effective democratic innovations has often emerged fairly organically through trial and error.
However, we can disaggregate key elements of design that can help inform the governance of CBNRM:

-	 Goods. A broad set of democratic and institutional qualities that forms of participatory governance
   attempt to realize, including democratic goods such as inclusiveness, popular control, considered
   judgment and transparency; and institutional goods such as feasibility and transferability.

-	 Task. Clarification of the specific governance tasks, with a particular focus on objectives, expectations
   placed on participants and temporal features.

-	 Mechanisms. The building blocks that make up particular designs, in particular recruitment, interaction,
   decision making and accountability mechanisms.

-	 Co-design. The principle that wherever possible, communities should be involved in the ongoing design
   of participatory processes.

Figure 1: Elements of participatory design

              Goods
           Inclusiveness                            Task                             Mechanisms
         Popular control                        Objectives                            Recruitment
       Considered judgment                     Expectations                            Interaction
          Transparency                     Temporal characteristics                 Decision making
             Feasibility                                                             Accountability
          Transferability


                                                  Co-design




4.1. Democratic goods
In Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation (2009), Smith suggests four
democratic goods that we can use to judge the quality of participatory institutions.

-	 Inclusiveness. Participatory institutions should be designed to ensure the presence and voice of different
   social groups, particularly those who tend to be marginalized politically. Being present is important, but
   not enough. Participants must have the capacity to voice their perspectives in ways that are considered
   by others and which are given equal consideration in decision making (Phillips 1995; Young 1990).

-	 Popular control. Participatory institutions should be designed to ensure that they have a material effect
   on the decision-making process: from agenda-setting to decision making to implementation. Participation
   without influence is meaningless (Arnstein 1969). Empowerment gives participants a stake in decision
   making.

-	 Considered judgement. Participatory institutions should not simply aggregate participants’ pre-held
   views. Participation is an occasion to learn about the issue under consideration and come to an
   understanding of the perspectives of others within the community. Intimate knowledge of participants



                                                       6
 contributes to social learning as much as forms of scientific and bureaucratic knowledge (Warren 1996).

-	 Transparency. Participatory institutions need to be transparent to participants, so that they fully
   understand the conditions under which they are participating and the powers they are able to exercise.
   Their activities should also be transparent to the rest of the community and higher levels of governance
   so they can be held to account for decisions (Chambers 2004).

Beyond these democratic characteristics, Smith suggests two institutional goods that need to be carefully
considered in design processes:

-	 Feasibility. A recognition that the virtues and benefits of participation need to be balanced against the
   costs and anxieties that participation can place on participants and the administrative costs to public
   authorities. The particular cost/benefit ratio will vary depending on the design and outcomes of a
   participatory process and between different social groups.

-	 Transferability. A recognition that while it may desirable to transfer democratic designs from one context
   to another, context is a critical consideration. Effective of participatory designs requires an understanding
   of the democratic characteristics of already existing (endogenous) local institutions and practices.
   Democratic innovations are designed in response to perceived weaknesses in existing governance
   arrangements. Too often choices about participatory design are driven by factors exogenous to the
   task at hand – for example the desire to emulate other localities that have adopted a particular form of
   participatory governance (‘isomorphic mimicry’). Participatory mechanisms that operate in one locality may
   well need to be reconfigured for a different context or may be completely redundant. See Section 5.1. for
   a brief discussion of how the history of PB provides important lessons for the limits of transferability.

4.2. Task
The most effective democratic innovations are crafted to tackle specific practical problems. Where
governance arrangements lack a clear task, they tend to lack impact. This is not to suggest that the task
of a participatory process must be set by higher authorities: the task of a participatory process may well be
setting the agenda. Rather, designers (whether in the community or elsewhere) need to be cognizant that
the designs suitable for one task (for example, effective agenda-setting) may well be different from those
suitable for the realization of other tasks (for example, scrutiny, exploring options, decision making).
Clarifying the task requires consideration of objectives, expectations and temporal characteristics:

-	 Objectives. Participatory processes are designed to achieve particular ends; with particular objectives
   in mind. Democratic innovations can be focused on different parts of the decision making cycle, from
   agenda setting through to implementation. They can have the objective of empowering particular
   parts of the community and contributing to decision making in particular ways, whether consultative,
   collaborative or full decision-making power. Fung offers a four-part categorization of participatory
   processes according to their primary objective: (a) educative forums in which participants form,
   articulate, and refine opinions about particular public issues; (b) participatory advisory panels that aim
   to align public policies with the considered preferences of participants; (c) participatory problem-solving
   collaboration that engenders continuous and symbiotic relationships between public authorities and
   communities to solve particular collective problems; and (d) participatory democratic governance that
   seeks to empower citizens in the determination of policy agendas (Fung 2003: 340-342). Dean (2017)



                                                       7
 develops this idea further by differentiating four broad objectives for participatory processes: knowledge
 transfer, collective decision-making, choice and voice and arbitration and oversight.

-	 Expectations placed on participants. The task will assume particular roles on the part of participants.
   Fung (2006) distinguishes between governance arrangements in which participants are expected
   to express pre-existing preferences, develop their preferences, aggregate preferences and bargain,
   negotiate, deliberate or contribute their expertise. In his differentiation between the different objectives
   of participatory processes, Dean (2017) recognizes that they place different expectations on participants:
   (1) knowledge transfer in which the expectation is that citizens articulate their preferences or contribute
   their expertise to inform decision making elsewhere; (2) collective decision-making in which citizens
   are co-authors of decisions realized through processes of reason giving; (3) choice and voice in which
   citizens express their preferences in quasi-market contexts; and (4) arbitration and oversight in which
   citizens are expected to offer impartial judgments. Dean and Fung’s argument is that understanding the
   objective and expectations placed on citizens helps clarify design options.

-	 Temporal characteristics. The nature of the task will have temporal implications: whether its fulfilment
   entails a discrete event (or a number of events) or arrangements that persist over time.

Examples of how these elements of task definition combine can be seen in participatory budgeting
and deliberative mini-publics – both discussed in further detail at Section 5. Participatory budgeting
in Porto Alegre was originally designed with a number of broad objectives: to engage the population
in budgetary decision-making; to overcome prevalent clientalism; to redistribute resources towards
the socially marginalized (Abers 2000). The designers recognized that a number of tasks are at play,
including demand-making, rule-making and oversight. Each of these tasks places different expectations
on participants (from expressing preferences through to impartial judgment on the rules). Rather than
potentially confusing them in a single forum, different institutions were created within the participatory
budget within which participants took on these different roles. The budgeting process works on an annual
cycle (so persists over time), but within that cycle we find individual institutions with different temporal
dynamics. The initial demand making across the population occurs on a single day with participants
expressing their individual preferences. Rule-making is time-limited, but takes place over a number of
meetings, with the task requiring collective and impartial judgment. The oversight function requires
ongoing participation by representatives from each area of the city to ensure implementation of proposals.
The Irish Citizens’ Assembly dealt with the politically controversial issue of the constitutional status of
abortion, alongside four other high-profile and contentious issues. This was a clear task: one that required
a diverse group of citizens to consider a wide range of evidence and come to a collective judgment. While
it took 6 separate weekends to learn, deliberate and come to a judgement on the status of abortion,
this was a time limited exercise. The recommendation was then considered by a binding referendum: the
broader population legitimated the proposal.

4.3. Mechanisms
Democratic innovations are made up of various mechanisms which in combination realize different aspects
of democratic goods. Four broad sets of mechanisms can be distinguished: recruitment, interaction,
decision-making and accountability mechanisms. Where democratic innovations have proved effective,
they have combined mechanisms that are responsive to the task at hand and sensitive to the context in



                                                       8
which they are applied: responding to limitations in (un)democratic systems and institutions in ways that
do not crowd out existing democratic practices.
   In the discussion of these mechanisms, particular attention is paid to the empowerment of
marginalized groups.

4.3.1. Recruitment mechanisms
Who participates is fundamental to the legitimacy of democratic innovations (Smith 2009) and to leverage
the dispersed knowledge within a population (Page 2008, Landemore 2017). A tension often emerges
between the desire to involve large numbers, ensuring a diverse body of participants and selecting a
smaller group to engage in more detailed work. The task assigned to the participatory process generally
affects how the balance between these competing ambitions is drawn. Selection mechanisms, and the
structural incentives that can be applied alongside them, have differential effects on the willingness and
ability of marginalized groups to participate. But as Phillips suggests: ‘when policies are worked out for
rather than with a politically excluded constituency, they are unlikely to engage all relevant concerns’
(Philips 1995: 13).
   The basic options for recruitment are: open to all, elections, random and appointment (Smith 2009: 21).
Open to all. By placing no restriction on who enters a participatory space, open assemblies are often
considered the de facto democratic design. But open processes tend to attract participants who are
already more politically interested and active within a community, in so doing, reinforcing existing power
dynamics. Those who are less politically confident are less likely to participate.

Elected. Where the number of participants is to be restricted (for example, because large numbers are
deemed unmanageable for the particular task), the use of elections is the traditional method of choice
within democracies. Elections offer an accountability mechanism (see 4.3.4), but will again tend to
privilege those who are already politically active within a community.

Random selection. Random selection (or sortition) techniques are increasingly used in democratic
innovations as a way of recruiting a diverse group of participants. A civic lottery is employed in which
citizens receive an invitation to participate. From those who put themselves forward, quota sampling
ensures ensures a body that reflects politically salient characteristics of the relevant population. Typically
demographic criteria such as age, gender, ethnicity, social class, geography – and on occasion attitudinal
criteria – are applied.8 Historically random selection has been employed with rotation to guard against
concentration of power (Owen and Smith 2019; see 4.3.4)

Appointment. Appointment is rarely conceived as a democratic method, but where appointment criteria
and process are transparent, it can be a way of ensuring the presence of participants with particularly
relevant backgrounds, experience and skills who might not otherwise put themselves forward.

Structural incentives. The operation of these selection practices can be mediated significantly by the
application of structural incentives. Making it easier to participate for traditionally marginalized groups is a
simple step. This can be as basic as considering appropriate times and locations of meetings for members
of those groups. Support for those with caring responsibilities can be critical as is compensation for travel.

	Deliberative polling uses simple random selection without the application of quota sampling in part because it involves large
8

 numbers (Fishkin 2018)



                                                                9
The promise of good food has often proved to be a great draw! The attractiveness of open processes
can be radically altered by targeted mobilization within marginalized groups and by linking participation
to outcomes that are particularly valued by those groups. Targeted mobilization will often involve
explicit capacity building and outreach strategies. Lessons from engagement with rural and indigenous
communities in the US suggests that such targeted outreach is most effective when it activates existing
networks and trusted gatekeepers. Inviting people in person has a significant effect (Everyday Democracy
2008). The linking of participation processes to outcomes valuable to marginalized communities seems
obvious, but is often missed by designers who then lament the lack of engagement. Not to consider
intrinsic and extrinsic participants’ motivations is a failure of design. Both active mobilization strategies
and incentive structures that prioritize investment in poorer neighborhoods have been exploited by
designers of participatory budgeting (see Section 5.1.)
    Quotas are a familiar tool within electoral processes to reserve places for representatives from social
groups that are recognized as systematically marginalized and excluded. They indicate the value placed on
the presence of particular social groups amongst the elected body (Phillips 1995; Young 1990). A similar
targeting logic is at play with the use of quota sampling in randomly selected bodies. Less politically active
and interested social groups are often harder to recruit, but the application of quotas ensures that the
final body is reflective of the broader population (however much effort recruitment takes).
    A small number of designs have introduced payment (or honorariums) for participation, particularly in
more intense and demanding formats, such as citizens’ juries and assemblies that run over several days
(Smith 2009: 82). Payment is not without controversy. For critics, it demeans and commercializes what
should be recognized as a civic duty. Proponents suggest that payment both marks the civic importance
of participation (after all, we pay politicians) and acts as an additional incentive for those who may not
otherwise put themselves forward.9
    In all cases, these structural incentives are put in place to promote or ensure a critical mass of
participants from particular social groups. It is recognized that such a critical mass can be important
in building confidence amongst marginalized groups and in achieving recognition and outcomes
in participatory processes. This logic can be further reinforced by the creation of separate bodies or
committees for particular social groups, whether based on gender, ethnicity, social class, age, etc.

4.3.2. Interaction mechanisms
A second set of practices of democratic innovations focus on the form of interaction that occurs within
participatory processes. For a small number of processes, for example direct forms of voting (e.g.
referendum), their defining characteristic is the absence of designed interaction between participants,
although there are increasingly examples of more deliberative processes that are coupled with forms of
direct democracy (Gastil and Richards 2013).

Dialogue and deliberation. The practice and academic study of democratic innovations has been
influenced heavily by deliberative democracy: the idea that legitimate decision-making rests on the
free and fair exchange of reasons between equals. The terms dialogue and deliberation are often used
interchangeably, although for some practitioners and academics, deliberation assumes more rational
analysis, whereas dialogue recognizes the more emotional demands that can be placed on participants

	This is often the case in citizens’ assemblies (see section 5.2). A historical precedent is found in classical Athens, which provided
9

 compensation for those who were selected randomly for the various offices of state.



                                                                  10
when faced with differences in experience and perspectives (Gastil and Levine 2005: 8). For ease of
reference, we will refer to deliberation as an overarching term here, recognizing a shared ambition to
realize mutual understanding.
    Deliberation is often contrasted with strategic bargaining in which participants aim to find common
ground, but without the necessity of reflecting on pre-existing preferences. Advocates argue that through
reflection on our own and others’ perspectives, deliberation leads to more legitimate decisions and better
outcomes that reflect the common good, are epistemically more robust and contribute to more refined
and, at times, transformed preferences. The inclusive ambitions of deliberation have strong resonances
with the type of empowered, open communication articulated by Ostrom.
    While deliberation is often held up as the ideal form of communication, it is recognized that for
politically weak social groups, finding their voice may be a challenging first step and may require the type
of structural support discussed in the previous section (4.3.1). Concerns also exist that more dominant
groups will undermine deliberation and consensus-seeking for their own ends. Deliberation requires a
rough equality of power between participants (Fung and Wright 2003). At times this can be achieved
through facilitation (below) or the threat of veto (Section 4.3.3). However, where structural inequalities are
persistent, supporting ‘enclave deliberation’ within and amongst marginalized groups may be necessary
to build confidence and a shared sense of purpose to challenge social power. Equally spaces may need to
be created for marginalized groups to voice their perspective without immediate challenge. This may be
through storytelling or testimony as an attempt to make their perspective understood and recognized.

Facilitation. Deliberation does not happen ‘naturally’. The tendency is for dominant groups to remain
dominant. This is recognized by designers of democratic innovations – hence the extent to which facilitation
is a key element of many designs as a way of balancing asymmetries of power between participants. The
capacity to facilitate across social groups is a skill that needs to be developed. Community leaders are not
always the best facilitators – leadership and facilitation involve a different set of capacities. In a number of
designs, independent trained facilitators are brought in to ensure fairness of proceedings. In other designs,
facilitators are trained within communities. Stress is then placed on ensuring that facilitators are drawn
from different social backgrounds and experiences. The presence of such skills and capacities can be highly
valuable to the community in the long-term beyond the achievement of a particular governance task
(Everyday Democracy 1998; 2008).
    Recent research in social psychology suggests that engendering diversity and facilitated communication
has positive group effects. For example, where homogeneity can often lead to group polarization,
the presence of diversity and active facilitation enable an orientation towards the common good and
consensus seeking (Grönlund et al. 2015; Sunstein 2002).

Small group work. Deliberation is often best achieved in facilitated small groups – it is easier to promote
voice and active listening. Most people lack the confidence to speak to large assemblies. Everyday
Democracy, which has a reputation of working creatively with rural and indigenous communities and on
issues such as racism, bases much of its work on facilitated small groups, connecting that dialogue to social,
political and policy change.

Managing different knowledge claims. Facilitated processes are often critical for integrating different
knowledge claims, particularly where the knowledge claims from within communities are brought into
dialogue with scientific or bureaucratic expertise. Facilitation typically is necessary for managing the power




                                                       11
dynamics that come into play. This is not to suggest that the only tension is between local community
knowledge and more abstract scientific or bureaucratic knowledge. Some of the most difficult tensions
that need to be managed are between different knowledge claims within communities, especially where
the knowledge of certain social groups is rarely heard or not recognized as significant by more dominant
groups. This can be the case, particularly where activities within communities are highly gendered or
class-based. Examples abound of participatory processes in which intimate and local knowledge is
overwhelmed by the application of scientific or bureaucratic knowledge (Fischer 2003; Petts and Brooks
2006). The most successful participatory processes aim at the co-creation of knowledge, where different
forms of knowledge are brought to bear on a problem and with continual and transparent oversight by
participants (see section 5).

4.3.3. Decision-making mechanisms
Consensus is often viewed as a desirable outcome of participatory processes. Deliberation is generally
considered to be a ‘consensus seeking’ activity, but faced with a plurality of perspectives, it is recognized
that consensus is rarely achievable. An apparent consensus often masks the dominance of the
perspectives of the most influential within the community, with weaker groups unwilling or unable to
challenge out of deference, lack of confidence or fear of retribution (Mansbridge 1980, Urfalino 2014).
Attempts by community leaders to ‘take the sense of the meeting’ can simply reinforce existing dynamics
of social power.
    Given the condition of plurality within most communities, some form of opinion collation or voting
is necessary. In many public meetings, fairly simple voting techniques are used, from a show of hands to
participants placing colored dots against proposals that they support. Such public decision making faces
some of the problems associated with consensus: where voting is public, direct or indirect pressure can
be placed on less powerful participants. Votes can be bought or pressure placed to vote in a particular
direction – or potential dissenters can feel under social pressure to conform. Good democratic reasons
exist for considering secret ballots.
    Different voting systems have different democratic effects. Simple majority rule can mean that
minorities are structurally disempowered: it is difficult for them to influence final decisions. More
protection is offered by the adoption of supermajorities (e.g. 60 percent, 70 percent etc.) and/or
concurrent majorities where majorities are required across different social groups. Delay and veto rules
can help empower minorities. Where a threshold level of objections is reached, the issue is sent back for
consideration. This threshold can be a particular percentage of the population (usually a fairly significant
minority vote) or delay can be triggered by failure to achieve concurrent majorities across defined social
groups. For example, a vote might require a majority amongst men and women, different age groups or
across different geographical locations within a community. The knowledge that a specific group holds
delay or veto power can motivate others to be more receptive to their perspectives in deliberations and
negotiations (Young 1990).
    Where different options are available, forms of preference voting are common in order that
participants can rank options – this allows comparison of first preferences and also more sophisticated
collective ranking across options. Intensity voting has been adopted in Polish citizens’ assemblies, where
a 7-point scale from 1-7 (plus an eighth: ‘it has already been realized to a sufficient degree’) is offered
to participants. The first three points (‘strongly agree’ to ‘I agree, but have certain doubts or objections’)
translate into support for the motion; 4-7 equates to rejection (Gerwin 2019; 72-78).



                                                      12
   A development in participatory budgeting has seen the use of negative (or disapproval) votes: participants
not only have one or more votes for preferred options, but also at least one vote for an option they would
not like to see happen. This capacity to vote against particular options can drastically change outcomes.

4.3.4. Accountability mechanisms
Where participatory governance invests a level of authority amongst a smaller group within the
community, accountability mechanisms need to be in place. Elections embody the most familiar mode of
accountability: on a regular basis, those holding positions of power have to seek authorization to continue
their role. This moment of authorization provides an opportunity for the broader community to make
retrospective judgments on performance to date and prospective judgments as to future promises of
action (Manin 1997). The more regular the elections, the more accountable the process.
    Re-election limits restrict the number of times that a given person can hold a position of authority and
have been used to reduce the tendency for elections to concentrate power (4.3.1.). Holding office for a
specified time period makes it harder to abuse that position.
    Rotation plays a similar role where random selection is in operation. Ancient Athenians introduced
rapid rotation to ensure that positions of authority were not captured by powerful social and economic
interests within society. Lot and rotation embodied the principle of democratic citizenship: citizens had the
opportunity to rule and be ruled in turn (Manin 1997: 28; Sintomer 2010, Owen and Smith 2019).
    Recall provides citizens with a method of removing a representative or group of representatives from
office. By filing a petition with the required number of valid signatures (or a certain number of votes in a
public forum), citizens can force a vote on continued tenure in office. The main argument in favor of recall
is that it provides continuous accountability for those in political power – citizens do not have to wait until
the next election or rotation to remove an incompetent, dishonest, unresponsive or irresponsible public
official or group. Critics, on the other hand, contend that it can be expensive, disruptive and polarizing
(Cronin, 1999: 133-150).
    Public hearings can provide regular occasions for those in authority to give an account of their actions.
In the annual cycle of the original model of participatory budgeting, for example, public authorities were
required to provide an explanation in local assemblies as to their progress on the implementation of the
previous year’s projects (see 5.1). Similarly, PBs have implemented transparency mechanisms that provide
information to communities about the progress of projects. The best randomly selected bodies make sure
that all evidence provided to participants is available and often give an account of how they came to their
recommendations in their final report.
    Where decision making power rests with public authorities rather than local communities, reasonable
concerns exist that proposals from participatory processes will be ignored or ‘cherry-picked’ – selectively
adopted (Font et al 2018). Increasingly advocates of participatory processes are turning their attention to
how participatory processes are ‘coupled’ with decision making processes and how public authorities can
be held accountable in the way that they respond to proposals from citizens (Hendriks 2016).

4.4. Co-design
One of the dangers of participatory governance is the tendency towards ‘isomorphic mimicry’ – the
application of particular designs that enhance external legitimacy rather than improve broader social
outcomes (Andrews et al. 2013). Often public authorities are driven by trends in public participation,
rather than considering the best option for the particular task and context. This means that designs are



                                                      13
often ill-suited for the task at hand. Relatedly, concerns abound that participatory designs are ‘imposed’
on communities which have no opportunity to shape the conditions under which they participate.
    It would be an unfair caricature of the democratic innovations literature to suggest that such a ‘top-
down’ is always prevalent. Terms such as ‘invited’ or ‘induced’ space can certainly give that impression.
But many democratic innovations are the product of negotiated rather than prescribed processes (Dean
2017) and as such the distinction between ‘invited’ and ‘claimed’ spaces tends to break down. Certainly
a limitation of the democratic innovations literature is its general failure to engage creatively with forms
participatory governance that are ‘community-led’ (Hendriks 2017).
    A growing recognition is emerging that examples of ‘co-governance’ need to be more clearly
articulated (Bussu 2019), differentiating public authority-led (or imposed) processes from those which
have been co-designed with participants. Participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre (see 5.1) is a particularly
impressive case in which local social movements collaborated with the municipal authority to develop new
participatory spaces collaboratively (Abers 2000).
    Principles of co-design in participatory processes have not been articulated systematically and co-design
can refer to the whole system design or negotiation around particular elements such as agenda-setting and
decision making. Strong connections can be made with the interest in problem-driven iterative adaption, in
which co-design can play a critical role in embedding rapid feedback loops (Andews et al 2013), ultimately
enabling local knowledge to inform the design process in an iterative and adaptive manner.



5. BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER – DESIGNING DEMOCRATIC INNOVATIONS
Form follows function in democratic innovations. Ensuring clarity of the task informs the way that
participatory mechanisms are then crafted together. One of the downfalls of democratic innovations is
the failure to clarify tasks effectively, or to try to deal with too many tasks within the same participatory
space. Assuming that a single participatory design can deal with a range of different tasks may overload
and confuse participants or open up opportunities for manipulation as different tasks are played off
against each other. Additionally, inappropriate design choices driven by participatory fashions rather than
the nature of the task at hand can undermine democratic potential. A couple of well-known participatory
designs from the world of democratic innovations provide insights into how task (function) and
mechanisms (form) are carefully crafted together.

5.1. Participatory budgeting
PB is practiced across the world, although often in a form that differs significantly from how it was
originally established in Brazil. The common, simplified design involves a three-stage process. First, a public
authority makes a certain budget available to a community. Second, groups within that community put
forward proposals for how the money could be spent. Third, the wider community votes on its preferred
projects. Such an approach is celebrated because it puts agenda-setting and decision making in the hands
of the local community. The principle of PB is that communities are in the best position to know what
investments would improve their locality. But in this simplified form, PB does little to challenge existing
power differentials within the community. Those who are most organized have an advantage.
   The original model of PB that was established in Porto Alegre over 30 years ago was more
sophisticated. As mentioned earlier, the aim of the designers was to create a process that was open to
anyone from within the population to engage, but in such a way that it would overcome clientelism and



                                                      14
corruption and redistribute resources towards the socially and economically marginalized. To achieve these
ends, the designers distinguished between different tasks:
(a) rule-making – decisions about the rules for the division of resources;
(b) demand making – proposals from different parts of the community as to where investments should
	 be made;
(c) oversight of the implementation of the spend.

It was not assumed that these tasks could be fulfilled in a single forum – after all, if rules and demands are
generated by the same group, there is clear danger that the rules will be arranged with satisfaction of the
demands in mind. Rather those rules should be made independent of knowing what the demands are to be.
    Proposals were made in open assemblies in different areas of the city. These were then collated
and prioritized by a smaller group elected from each assembly. A clear incentive for mobilization was
embedded at this point in the process: the more people supporting a proposal, the more representatives
elected for the prioritization process. This area-based elected body was also responsible for overseeing
the implementation of projects once the budget had been decided. Separately, a city-wide body
constituted by two representatives from each locality decided the rules of the budget distribution: for
example, what type of projects should be given priority, or whether particular areas of the city should
be prioritized because of their relative poverty. Importantly, this body set the rules before it knew which
proposals were prioritized from each area. The opportunity for strategic action was thus limited and so
interactions between elected participants were fairly deliberative in character. In the absence of knowing
which projects would be generated, the rules tended to favor more socially just outcomes: redistribution
of resources to poorer neighborhoods and investments critical to basic needs (e.g. sanitation, health
provision, roads). The separation of demand-making and oversight from rule-making ensured that the
rules of the budget were not influenced unduly by the interests of particular groups or communities. The
knowledge that rules tended to support investment in poorer communities meant that mobilization was
particularly high amongst those groups compared to other forms of political engagement.
    Three further characteristics of PB in Porto Alegre are critical. First, the municipal bureaucracy was
reorganized to ensure that projects were delivered as quickly as possible. The demonstration effect helped
mobilize new participants each year as they witnessed the impact of the PB process. Second, resources
were put into community mobilization, especially amongst the poorest communities that had little political
experience. In other cities, special committees have been established to empower marginalized social groups
such as women and young people – both to make demands and to contribute to rule making. Third, at all
points throughout the PB process, the application of technical knowledge was overseen by citizens.
    As PB spread beyond Porto Alegre, particularly outside Latin America, the important distinction
between demand-making, rule-making and oversight was lost. In many designs, rule-making simply
disappeared – or took place in the same forum as demand-making. As such the more radical, equity
outcomes of the original model often disappeared (Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012).

5.2. Deliberative mini-publics
Deliberative mini-publics (DMPs) are tasked with making public judgments on pressing, controversial and
often complex political and constitutional issues. How to craft an institution that ensures that participants
are informed and reflects the variety of perspectives within broader society? For advocates of DMPs, the




                                                       15
answer lies in the combination of two practices: the ancient democratic method of random selection and
facilitated deliberation. DMPs bring together randomly selected citizens to learn, deliberate and make
recommendations on matters of public concern (Grönlund et al 2012; Setälä and Smith 2018). Typically,
these are issues characterized by political deadlock or where politicians are unsure how to progress and
value the informed input of citizens. DMPs vary in size and time-scale. Deliberative polls bring together
hundreds of citizens over a weekend. Smaller citizens’ juries and panels of between 12 to 50 citizens
can meet for anywhere between two to ten days. Citizens’ assemblies have brought together 100-160
citizens who have dealt with significant constitutional issues over several weekends. For example, the Irish
Citizens’ Assembly met across 12 weekends over 18 months.
    By using random selection techniques, DMPs are more diverse than any other political institution. Most
DMPs use some form of quota sampling to ensure the presence of key demographics (e.g. gender, age,
social class, education, geography) and, on occasion political attitudes. Advocates of DMP often argue
that it is the strong resemblance between participants and the diverse characteristics of the broader
population that gives them democratic legitimacy.
    The task of a DMP is typically set by the sponsoring body (e.g. public authority). A steering group
comprised of different interests ensures that the task is acceptable across political divides and oversees the
selection of experts and advocates and the content any briefings provided to participants.
    An independent body is usually commissioned to facilitate to ensure fairness in proceedings – both in
relation to the deliberations between citizens and to ensure no undue interference by public authorities
or special interests. Most DMPs follow the same broad pattern. Participants learn from and are able to
question expert witnesses and advocates. The principle is that members of the assembly are informed,
but are not dominated by experts or advocates. This learning phase is followed by a deliberation phase in
which the participants discuss the issues in small groups and plenary sessions. Great care is taken to make
sure that less experienced and confident participants are able to contribute fully. Finally, the citizens make
a series of recommendations or decisions.
    Recent developments in DMPs mirror lessons from PB. Almost all DMPs to date have been organized at
the behest of government – on issues chosen by those in political power. They are also one-off affairs. While
the Irish Citizens’ Assembly ranged across five different issues (not only abortion, but also climate change,
fixed term parliaments, aging population and the use of referenda), it was a time-limited exercise. The
next stage in the development of DMPs is for them to be ‘institutionalized’. This has two dimensions. First,
becoming a permanent feature of a political systems; second, agendas being set by citizens themselves and
not just the political elite. In 2019 the Parliament of the German-speaking community of Belgium adopted
a permanent mechanism for engaging randomly-selected citizens through two distinct bodies: a citizens’
council which is charged with deciding which topics should be considered (taking recommendations from
parliament and government, but also civil society and the general public) and citizens’ assemblies that are
tasked with learning, deliberating and coming to recommendations on the selected topics. The designers of
the process ensured that the two randomly-selected bodies had clear and unambiguous tasks: a division of
labor between the Council (agenda-setting) and the Assemblies (scrutiny).10
    The evidence from DMPs to date is pretty conclusive that under these conditions ordinary citizens are
able to deal with highly complex and controversial issues when the task is clear, they receive information
from different sources and they have the opportunity to reflect and deliberate before coming to decisions.


10
     http://constitutionnet.org/news/institutionalizing-deliberative-mini-publics-madrid-city-and-german-speaking-belgium-first



                                                                  16
5.3. Other designs
By no stretch of the imagination do participatory budgeting and deliberative mini-publics exhaust the
range of participatory governance arrangements. These are just two examples that are prominent within
the democratic innovations literature and highlight how task and practices can be combined effectively
to craft participatory spaces that promote democratic goods, in particular the interests and livelihoods of
marginalized groups.
      Other designs range from the study circles of Everyday Democracy that aim to mobilize diverse groups
and facilitation from within communities, through forms of petition and direct voting that involve very
little formal deliberation and dialogue. While PB has had significant attention over recent years, other
forms of participatory governance, ranging from community councils to national policy conferences have
developed across Latin America (Avritzer 2009; Cameron et al 2012).11 The global platform Participedia
provides some insight into the diversity of practice in democratic innovations.12
     The resources section at the end of this report suggests further materials where different designs are
presented and interrogated.



6. DESIGN LESSONS FOR CBNRM
The ambition to realize the range of democratic and institutional goods that are articulated within the
democratic innovations literature is shared within the CBNRM community: participatory processes that are
inclusive, empowered, support considered judgment and are transparent; and at the same time recognize
feasibility constraints and transfer practices in ways that can be scaled, but are sensitive to context. The
two communities also share the same concerns about how participation can be undermined by poor
design. This may be through the application of inappropriate designs by higher levels of authority and/
or the failure to recognize the potential of existing indigenous and local governance practices to support
inclusive forms of engagement.
   The way in which design is considered by democratic innovations scholars and practitioners can offer
practical insights to CBNRM. The first step is in relation to task definition. The ‘increasingly diverse set of
conservation, social, economic and political objectives’ (Gilmour 2016) embedded within CBNRM hides a
complexity of tasks. At least three broad objectives can be delineated:

1. Governance of the sustainable use of the natural resource
2. Governance of the distribution of assets resulting from the exploitation of resources within the community
3. Monitoring and oversight of the implementation of decisions from (1) and (2)

The idea that all these tasks might be fulfilled effectively within a single participatory body is unlikely.
Lessons from democratic innovations suggest that the distinctiveness of these objectives may well require
separate institutional spaces. They may well be connected in different ways, but the distinctiveness of
the activities suggests that different designs may be appropriate. The differing objectives place different
demands on citizens. For example, the governance of natural resources will need to draw on the local
knowledge of those familiar with the resource in question – this knowledge is likely to be dispersed across


11
     See also the LATINNO database https://www.latinno.net/en/
12
     http://participedia.net/



                                                                 17
indigenous and local communities. But that form of knowledge is not necessarily so significant for the
second task of distributing assets in a fair and equitable manner. Here CBNRM practitioners may well draw
lessons from PB, thinking creatively about how to separate demand-making and rule-making such that the
interests of more marginalized groups are considered in the process. And in all cases it will be important
to understand how existing endogenous governance practices are already engaged in these tasks and
the extent to which they protect the interests of the most marginalized. It may well be that endogenous
practices outperform favored exogenous designs, or can be integrated into co-designed processes to create
more inclusive hybrid institutions. The importance of designing processes that enable the co-creation
of knowledge from across different knowledge traditions (local, scientific, bureaucratic) is critical to
embedding effective governance (Apgar 2017).
    But consistent concerns emerge across the CBNRM literature that the voice of certain social groups – in
particular women and especially women from lower classes or castes – are not heard or respected (Agarwal
2001; Nightingale 2002; Keene 2019). Often women’s knowledge of resource management is undervalued
in ways that leads to poor outcomes. Where ensuring more marginalized groups are engaged in more
inclusive forms of governance is a critical concern – as it is for many CBNRM scholars and practitioners
– then the various ways in which mechanisms can be combined to craft inclusive participatory processes
are worth exploring. Democratic innovations provide an evidence base on which well-considered choices
can be made in relation to recruitment, interaction, decision making and accountability. Marginalized
groups can be empowered through the adoption of (for example) random selection and rotation, targeted
mobilization and capacity building, active facilitation and delay and veto rights. How such mechanisms are
combined will depend on the nature of the task at hand and the particular power dynamics and context in
the local community.
    Finally, emerging critical work on democratic innovations suggests that the tendency to engage in
isomorphic mimicry – the selection of participatory processes on the basis of current fashion rather than
being guided by the demand of the task – needs to be replaced with more attention to co-design. Again,
this raises the sensitivity that is necessary in designing participatory governance. Scaling up participatory
initiatives across localities has potential advantages, but thinking that ‘one size fits all’ for governance
initiatives misunderstands the importance of responding to existing endogenous governance practices.
Where democratic innovations have proved effective, they have combined mechanisms that are responsive
to the task at hand and sensitive to the context in which they are applied: responding to limitations in
existing (un)democratic systems and institutions in ways that do not crowd out existing democratic practices.
This mirrors the challenge within CBNRM where it is necessary to be sensitive to the existing characteristics
and dynamics of endogenous forms of governance and those imposed by higher levels of governance.



7. ENABLING CONDITIONS
Democratic innovations do not function effectively in isolation – the same will be true for CBNRM. In both
theoretical and practitioner literature, attention is turning to the broader context that needs to be in place
in order to move from a few celebrated cases of democratic innovations to more extensive application of
empowered participatory governance. Within democratic theory, work on deliberative systems makes the
case that we need to consider the deliberative qualities of a broader set of institutions and practices rather
than just the qualities of isolated forums (Burall 2015; Mansbridge et al 2012; Owen and Smith 2015).
   In their influential book, Public Participation for 21st Century Democracy, Nabatchi and Leighninger



                                                      18
(2015) argue that our focus needs to be not just on the design of democratic innovations, but on
strengthening participatory infrastructure.13 Three specific elements of that infrastructure require particular
attention: (1) empowering and activating democratic leaders and networks, (2) assembling participation
building blocks, and (3) providing systemic supports. Participation leaders and networks cut across different
institutions and groups in the public, private and civil society sectors that convene, organize and fund
democratic innovations. The building blocks of a participatory infrastructure are varied and go beyond
the design of a single democratic innovation. They include institutions and processes to disseminate
information, gather input and data, support discussion and connections, enable small-scale and large-
scale decision making and encourage public work. Finally, they point to the need for systemic support
that generates ‘incentives for participation leaders, opportunities for training and skills development,
adequate financial and other resources, clear policies and procedures, and reliable evaluation measures and
benchmarks’ (2015: 67; see also Sirianni and Friedland 2001).
    The codification of participation is gaining traction as a way of embedding a more participatory
system – local and national laws that require participatory processes under particular conditions. In Peru
and the Dominican Republic, for example, participatory budgeting is mandatory for municipalities under
national law. However, law can only take us so far – what is then implemented under the name of PB
varies considerably. It is instructive that in Porto Alegre, the birthplace of PB, activists were resistant to
the codification of the process, arguing that this would be a break to creativity and further innovation
of the design. But that arguably left the process vulnerable to a less supportive incoming mayor when
the Workers’ Party lost control of the city and PB in its birthplace was weakened substantially. A similar
experience seems to be in place for CBNRM, where law and policy is in place, but effective and inclusive
governance is missing (Glimour 2016).
    A second emergent phenomenon that has the potential to improve the quality of the participatory
system is the small cadre of autonomous public organizations dedicated to public participation (APOPPs)
(Bherer et al, 2014). To date, APOPPs have been created by governments with the mandate to organize or
oversee democratic innovations in legally specified areas of policy. Examples include the Oregon Citizens’
Initiative Review Commission, the former Danish Board of Technology (DBT) (Teknologiraadet), French
National Commission on Public Debate (Commission nationale du débat public) (CNDP), Montreal Board
of Public Consultation (Office de consultation publique de Montréal) (OCPM) and Tuscany Participatory
Authority (TPA) (Autorità regionale per la garanzia e la promozione della partecipazione). APOPPs remain
relatively rare and have achieved differential success. But their degree of autonomy and visibility protects
them to some extent from day-to-day political pressures, ensuring a degree of quality and oversight
of participatory arrangements and a competent authority to promote the outcomes of democratic
innovations within decision-making processes. Whether such an organization would be effective within
those states that are promoting CBNRM is an open question worth exploring.
    While advocates argue that the legal status of APOPPs is an important characteristic, many of
its functions could well be played by civil society organizations. Certainly the range of civil society
organizations active across the broad CBNRM field – international organization such as Forest Trends
and the Rights and Resources Initiative and national organizations such as the Namibian Association of
CBNRM Support Organizations (NASCO) – can play a more extensive role in promoting good practice
and learning in participatory governance. Examples do exist – for example, the Community Conservation


13
     This section draws heavily on Smith (2019)



                                                      19
Resilience Initiative – reports on a number of CBNRM initiatives around the world, with particular concerns
about questions of participation and representation and the voice of women. Understandably though,
much of the focus of organizations within this space continues to be on the realization of customary or
devolved rights.
   The engagement of these national and transnational organizations is critical as laws and institutions
will never be enough. Hearts and minds need to be changed – and budgets need to be focused on
creating the participatory infrastructure to support democratic innovations. Embedding questions of the
design of effective and inclusive participatory governance needs to be a central plank of the CBNRM
movement if more sustainable governance that realizes more equitable outcomes is be embedded
systematically. Participatory governance is on the agenda of many civil society and international
organizations. However, it is one element of the broader agenda of CBNRM and, arguably, tends to
receive less attention than the realization of indigenous and local rights to common pool resources and
broader concerns of ecological sustainability.



8. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND FUTURE WORK
The establishment of customary or devolved common property rights and ensuring adequate return
for sustainable management is not enough to achieve more equitable outcomes in CBNRM. What is
important is how decisions are made within communities about the way in which communal rights are
realized and assets distributed in practice. This is where work on democratic innovations can contribute.
    The practical and theoretical work on democratic innovations indicates how design choices – in
particular clarification of tasks and mechanisms – affect the realization of democratic goods and
outcomes. Such insights can help inform CBNRM practitioners and indigenous and local communities in
developing inclusive forms of governance aimed at sustainable management of resources and equitable
livelihoods and well-being. The complexity of governance activities within CBNRM, including tasks
such as the management of resources, the investment and distribution of assets and oversight, and
sensitivity to endogenous social, cultural and spiritual practices, means that the design task is not simple.
In some communities, inclusive governance practices that empower marginalized social groups may be
well developed; in other contexts, such practices may be lacking. There is no one right way to design
democratic innovations – much depends on the context, the task and the desired outcomes.
    A productive future research agenda for both CBNRM and democratic innovations would see
collaboration across these two communities of practice in working with indigenous and local communities
and public authorities. This would enable nuanced assessments of how different governance tasks are
currently realized and learning from those localities where endogenous forms of inclusive governance
are well established. Drawing on such learning, the principles and practices of democratic innovations
can be brought to bear (where necessary) to help improve the quality of governance in CBNRM and the
outcomes it generates. A better understanding of the relationship between context, design and outcomes
will thus emerge. Collaborations across CBNRM and democratic innovations communities of practice
and sensitive experimentation in the field can lead to the development and adoption of more inclusive
participatory designs to govern natural resources sustainably and the enhancement of more equitable
livelihoods and wellbeing for indigenous and local communities.




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9. Resources
Participedia https://participedia.net/ - a platform collating cases and methods of democratic innovations
and participatory governance.

LATINNO https://www.latinno.net/en/ - a platform collating innovations for democracy in Latin America.

Stephen Elstub and Oliver Escobar (eds) (2019) Handbook of Democratic Innovation and Governance – a
comprehensive selection of essays on different aspects of participatory governance.

John Gastil and Peter Levine (eds) The Deliberative Democracy Handbook: Strategies for Effective Civic
Engagement in the 21st Century – sets out the case for deliberative approaches to civic engagement and
provides a critical evaluation of different approaches around the world.

Graham Smith (2009) Democratic Innovations: Designing Institutions for Citizen Participation – sets out
the democratic characteristics of different forms of democratic innovation.


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