NO. 11 / May 2003 CONFLICT PREVENTION & RECONSTRUCTION Nigeria Strategic Conflict Assessment Methodology, Key Findings and Lessons Learnt The violence and unrest surrounding Nigeria's general elections this April highlighted the ongoing instability that threatens the country's development. Nigeria, with a Gross National Income of below $300 per capita, is a federation of 130 million people (close to 20% of Sub-Saharan Africa), living in 36 states and 774 local government areas. Out of the forty two years since independence, Nigeria has experienced thirty years of military dictatorship. During this period political and social values have been seriously undermined. Since 1999, when President Olusegun Obasanjo won democratic elections, conflict has resulted in over 10,000 deaths, and the internal displacement of over 300,000 people.1 Recognizing the need to analyze and address the sources of violent conflict in order to achieve development targets, the Post-Conflict Fund in the World Bank and other donors partnered with the Nigerian government and stakeholders to conduct a national Strategic Conflict Assessment in 2002/3. a vital structure for collective decision-making. This The Strategic Conflict Assessment approach was chosen over the more traditional The need to support a Strategic Conflict single-donor approach to draw upon a wide range Assessment (SCA) was agreed by donors in of international expertise and experience, to share December 2001, and supported by President resource costs and to mitigate political risk to Obasanjo. The central guiding principle was that donors. Donor cooperation and collaboration the SCA process should be led by the national meant that donors were able to cover areas where Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), partners may not have had the capacity or in the Presidency. Local ownership and capacity- mandate. This was the first time, globally, that a building were considered key to achieving national conflict assessment had ever been credibility and sustainability. supported by a group of donors. Conflict assessments by individual donors are often not Technical and financial support was provided to shared beyond the sponsoring donor. Where they IPCR and local stakeholders by some of Nigeria's are shared, they are often edited to remove major international donors: DFID; UNDP; USAID; "sensitive" parts, thus defeating the purpose of the and the World Bank, who formed an SCA Advisory analysis and making it difficult for stakeholders and Group to IPCR. The Advisory Group proved to be other donors to benefit. 1Global IDP Project, January 2002 Methodology report was launched at a second workshop with a The Strategic Conflict Assessment process was wide range of stakeholders in Abuja that month4. launched in May 2002, with a national stakeholder workshop with 150 participants, to generate Key Findings of the SCA awareness and buy-in from a wide range of The final SCA report is impressively bold in its Nigerian stakeholders.2 IPCR and partners would statements of the failures of governance in Nigeria. undertake the SCA in two main phases. Phase 1 After decades of military dictatorship, the country would involve a desk study by local consultants to turned toward democracy in 1999, but the map the causes, actors and dynamics of conflict immediate effect of democracy has been to based on existing literature. Information relating to generate more conflict. According to the SCA, at the country's different geo-political zones would be the heart of most violent conflict nationwide lies synthesized into a single report for the first phase of political corruption, and the lack of transparency in the SCA. For Phase 2, the findings of Phase 1 the use of the $15-18 billion annual revenues from would tested with fieldwork, and the focus would be oil and gas. This has led to a political crisis in more on responses and policy options. which political actions are often dominated by self- interest and money. It has also contributed to the Donors and IPCR had agreed to use DFID's politicization of ethnic and religious divisions, which published and tested `Strategic Conflict are mainly fault-lines along which violence erupts, Assessment' methodology, while adapting it to the often when manipulated by elites. The key actors Nigerian context. There are three stages in the in violent conflict are large numbers of unemployed assessment: (i) an analysis of causes, actors and and disillusioned youth, particularly in urban areas. dynamics; (ii) mapping of existing responses to conflict; and (iii) recommending policy options and The consolidation of democracy and even the strategies. Prior to the start of the SCA research survival of the Nigerian State have come to depend process, training on the DFID conflict assessment on the ability of the center to manage these methodology was carried out for local researchers centrifugal pressures. To date, the response has by a DFID consultant. been mainly the use of military force. Root causes have been allowed to persist. In order to preserve The fieldwork involved six teams consisting of IPCR democracy these root causes now need to be staff, consultants, civil society and donor addressed and a wider range of policy responses representatives, each traveling to one of the six- considered. According to the SCA, failure to resolve geopolitical zones. Interviews were held with a basic issues relating to resource competition will variety of stakeholders, including representatives of allow the current cycles of violent conflict to persist. federal, state and local governments; police and the national security service; donors; NGOs; In the past, civil society (with support from community-based organizations; academic international donors) has been active in research institutions; civil society;; traditional leaders; media; and local peacemaking initiatives, but it lacks and the private sector. Interviewers focused on capacity,strategic vision and engagement. The listening to stakeholders and impartially media have not yet played a constructive role, and documenting the variety of perspectives that they have sometimes served to heighten tension. were exposed to. Six zonal reports were written by Business leaders and investors have been ignored, the teams, based on the findings of the fieldwork. yet are major players in some of the conflicts. IPCR and local consultants then drew together the Closer collaboration between these parties, led by Phase 1 report and six zonal reports into a draft government's strategic vision, could unite consolidated report for Phase 2. The SCA significant forces to limit violent conflict and support consolidated report and the zonal reports were the development of democracy as the best long- published in one volume in March 2003.3 The term protection against the spread of violence in society. The SCA findings are valuable for informing and influencing future interventions. Producing reports 2 See Report of Stakeholders Workshop for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja 14-15 May 2002. 3 "Nigeria: Strategic Conflict Assessment, Consolidated 4The report of this workshop is currently being prepared and Zonal Reports", published by IPCR, March 2003. by UNDP Lagos. for each of Nigeria's six geo-political zones, as well Supporting an SCA requires significant human as a consolidated national report, has meant that resources input, is time-intensive, and inevitably the SCA brings out issues of concern at both macro takes longer than expected. In Nigeria, donor and meso levels. While certain issues such as agreement to support a conflict assessment led by political corruption can be generalized at the IPCR occurred in December 2001 and a draft final national level, others such as the politicization of report was ready by September 2002. shariah, and herder/farmer conflict, are more But the work does not stop there. The SCA report relevant to certain regions, which can be reflected is the basis and justification for follow-up work--it is in government and donor policies and programs. not a one-shot process, but must be ongoing. Lessons Learnt Next Steps Looking back on the process that led to the At the March 2003 workshop to launch the publication of the final Nigerian SCA report, it is published SCA report, representatives of Nigerian clear that it has been a great success. The Nigeria and donor governments, civil society, and the SCA represents the first ever multi-donor supported private sector, worked together to formulate a and country-led conflict analysis, and it is the first National Action Plan (NAP) for conflict reduction, national conflict assessment the World Bank has based upon the findings of the SCA.5 The NAP been associated with. focuses on six themes: (i) early warning and preventive action; (ii) addressing the economic and The main lesson learnt from the SCA process and social causes of conflict; (iii) mainstreaming conflict outcome relates to the rewards of donor prevention into government and donor programs; partnership in support of a national institution. A (iv) improving formal and informal/traditional multi-donor approach requires a high level of co- mediation mechanisms; (v) the political process; ordination and commitment to partnership. and (vi) security sector reform/ small arms and light Breaking the mould of more traditional approaches weapons reduction. also require high levels of trust. Physical presence on the ground is essential for a donor to be fully The donor Advisory Group has been widened to engaged in the process and to take the lead where encourage participation in follow-up by a larger other donors may lack capacity. Recruiting number of donors (`open architecture'). Donors are additional and shared donor human resources to offering support in areas where they have coordinate input and reduce the burden on core comparative advantage, and where plans fit with staff should be considered when embarking on a their mandates and country strategies. For multi-donor conflict assessment. This delicate example, DFID is likely to take the lead on security balancing act is further complicated by the need for sector reform, and USAID on mediation and donors to offer technical advice and support, while support to civil society. A number of donors have not compromising local ownership. Where local also made a commitment to use the SCA as the institutional capacity may be weak, this requires basis for improving the conflict-sensitivity of their particular care. strategies and development programs, and their responses to conflict in Nigeria. Producing a national SCA report for a country the size and complexity of Nigeria can be a challenging The Strategic Conflict Assessment and National process at times, but donors must stick to agreed Action Plan will inform future World Bank principles, such as local leadership and ownership. assistance to address economic and social sources This may include following a locally-driven of conflict through a focus on governance, private timetable, when local perceptions of time pressures sector-led growth and empowerment of may differ from perceptions of international communities. Specifically, together with DFID, the organizations. Local protocol must be respected, Bank is supporting IPCR's work with the Nigerian and donors need to take care to offer guidance PRSP team to integrate conflict sensitivity into the rather than impose externally-conceived structures Interim-PRSP. A project to address unemployment or processes. Conflict assessment methodologies among urban youth is being planned, as is support require flexible application including the for a peace-building television drama series development of local capacity as the process unfolds, and broad participation. 5IPCR is currently working on a draft of the National Action Plan as discussed by workshop participants. targeting urban youth. Training of editors and CPR Unit journalists on balance and tolerance in reporting is also ongoing. Conflict management is already This Dissemination Note was prepared by Sarah Lyons being integrated into the planned Fadama II project (Slyons@worldbank.org and Dirk Reinermann for wetlands development, using the SCA reports (Dreinermann @worldbank.org) in the Nigeria Country Team. It from the northern zones as background, and all was also published as Social Development Note No. 83. This note series is intended to disseminate good practice and relevant new projects in the Nigeria lending key findings on conflict prevention and reconstruction. The portfolio will undergo conflict risk screening as part series is edited by the CPR Unit in the Social Development of social analysis. Department of the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank. The views expressed in these notes are those of the authors and do not SCA Nigeria key partners necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank Group, its Partners in the SCA Nigeria process so far are too Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. CPR many to mention here, but include: the Nigerian Dissemination Notes are distributed widely to Bank staff and Federal Government, in particular IPCR staff; donor are also available on the CPR website (http://www.worldbank.org/conflict). staff in Nigeria and overseas; and representatives of Nigerian civil society. Special thanks and acknowledgement must go to the following people CPR Dissemination Notes for their hard work and dedication: Dr Sunday Ochoche (Director-General, IPCR) Dr Oshita Oshita and Lanre Obafemi (SCA No.1 (March 2002): Rebuilding the Civil Service in a Post- Coordinators, IPCR) Conflict Setting: Key Lessons of Experience, by Robert P. Beschel Jr.No.2 (April 2002): Aid, Policy and Growth in Post Claire Hickson (DFID) Conflict Countries, by Paul Collier. Bade Falade (UNDP) Minnie Wright (USAID) No. 3 (May 2002): Child Soldiers: Prevention, Demobilization Dirk Reinermann (World Bank) and Reintegration, Beth Verney. Sarah Lyons (World Bank) No.4 (June 2002): The Structure of Rebel Organizations: Implications for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, by Jeremy Weinstein. No. 5 (October 2002): The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF): Identifying Conflict-related Obstacles to Development, by Shonali Sardesai and Per Wam. No. 6 (November 2002): Colombia: Development and Peace in the Magdalena Medio Region, by Jairo Arboleda and Elsie Garfield. No. 7 (December 2002): Conflict and Labor Markets in Manufacturing: The Case of Eritrea, by Africa Private Sector Group. No. 8 (January 2003): The Social and Economic Costs of Armed Conflict in El Salvador, by Humberto Lopez. No. 9 (February 2003): Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict, by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. No. 10 (March 2003): `Mind the Gap': The World Bank, Humanitarian Action and Development--A Personal Account, by Colin Scott and Ian Bannon. No. 11 (May 2003) Nigeria Strategic Conflict Assessment Methodology, Key Findings, and Lessons Learned, by Dirk Reinermann