Report No: AUS2972 . Republic of Indonesia Indonesia Economic Quarterly FY13 Compilation of the July 2012, October 2012, December 2012 and March 2013 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Reports . May 2013 . EASPI EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC . . . Document of the World Bank Standard Disclaimer: . This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. . Copyright Statement: . The material in this publication is copyrighted. 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Both English language and Indonesian language versions are included. The IEQ is a product of the World Bank’s Indonesia country office. The reports were prepared by a team supervised by Shubham Chaudhuri (Lead Economist, EASPI) and subsequently by James A. Brumby (Sector Manager, EASPI), and Ndiame Diop (Lead Economist, EASPI), and led by Ashley Taylor (EASPI). The team worked under the overall guidance of Sudhir Shetty (Sector Director, EASPR) and Stefan G. Koeberle (Country Director, EACIF) and received valuable input from Bert Hofman (Director and Chief Economist, EAPCE) and from the cross-sectoral IEQ Editorial Board comprised of members from across the Indonesia country office. The production of the report was led by the Macro and Fiscal Policy Cluster, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network. The core project team, with responsibility for the economic and fiscal update sections, editing and production, was coordinated by Alex Sienaert, and comprised Arsianti, Magda Adriani, Andrew Blackman, Brendan Coates, Fitria Fitrani, Faya Hayati, Ahya Ihsan, Shakira Jones, Alex Sienaert and David Stephan (all EASPI). Additional contributions were received from Dwi Endah Abriningrum, Vivi Alatas, Erwin Ariadharma, Victor Duggan, Enda Ginting, Edgar Janz,, Yus Pakpahan, Cindy Paladines, Astrid Savitri, Staffan Synnerstrom, Kiyoshi Taniguchi, Gonzalo Varela and Matthew Wai-Poi (all EASPI), Neni Lestari, Djauhari Sitorus and The Fei Ming (all EASFP), Christopher Smith and Siwage Dharma Negara (EASHE), Jon Jellema (EASID), Fook Chuan Eng, Iwan Gunawan, Taimur Samad and Renata Simatupang (EASIS), Chandan Deuskar (EASIN), Jonathan Sariaatmadja (EACIF), David Lawrence (C3PDR), and Moez Miaoui and Stefan Handoyo (CEASB). Detailed comments and input were provided by Mark Ahern, Enrique Blanco Armas, Jim Brumby, Shubham Chaudhuri, Ndiame Diop, Anna Gueorguieva, Yue Man Lee, Hari Purnomo, Sjamsu Rahardja, Theo Thomas, Soekarno Wirokartono (all EASPI), Alexandra Drees-Gross (FFSAB), Samer Al-Samarrai (EASHE), Mustapha Benmaamar and Arlan Rahman (EASIS), Anita Kendrick, Shamima Khan, Bill Wallace (EACIF), Dini Sari Djalal (EAPXT), Tehmina Khan (EASPR), Chris Manning (Australian National University), Sudarno Sumarto (SMERU Research Institute) and Mark Vothknecht (DIW Berlin). Invaluable administrative support was provided by Titi Ananto, Nina Herawati, Sylvia Njotomihardjo, Ariza Nurana and Nayu Ramadhaningsih (all EASPI). Dissemination was organized by the Indonesia EXT team led by Dini Sari Djalal and including Farhana Asnap, Indra Irnawan, Jerry Kurniawan, Nugroho, Marcellinus Winata and Randy Salim (all EAPXT). The IEQ reports are a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, supported by funding from the Australian Government –– AusAID, under the Support for Enhanced Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy Analysis (SEMEFPA) program. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent, AusAID or the Australian Government. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Further editions of the Indonesia Economic Quarterly, along with links to press releases and launch presentations of the various reports can be found at the following website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/indonesia/publication/indonesia-economic-quarterly-reports . Compilation of the Indonesia Economic Quarterly (IEQ) FY 2013 Reports – Indonesian language versions • Rising to present and future challenges, July 2012 • Maintaining resilience, October 2012 • Policies in focus, December 2012 • Pressures mounting, March 2013 INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY Rising to present and future challenges July 2012 INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY Rising to present and future challenges July 2012 Preface The Indonesia Economic Quarterly reports on and synthesizes the past three months’ key developments in Indonesia’s economy. It places them in a longer-term and global context, and assesses the implications of these developments and other changes in policy for the outlook for Indonesia’s economic and social welfare. Its coverage ranges from the macroeconomy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Indonesia’s evolving economy. This Indonesia Economic Quarterly was prepared and compiled by the macro and fiscal policy cluster of the World Bank’s Jakarta office, under the guidance of Lead Economist Shubham Chaudhuri and Country Economist Ashley Taylor. The team included Magda Adriani (commodity prices), Andrew Blackman (international environment, external sector, financial markets and current account), Fitria Fitrani (labor market), Faya Hayati (prices and property market), Ahya Ihsan (fiscal, budget execution and roads) and David Stephan (real sector and risks). Additional contributions were received from Dwi Endah Abriningrum (fiscal and roads), Neni Lestari (banking), The Fei Ming (corporate sector), Gonzalo Varela and Victor Duggan (global linkages and economic performance) and Matthew Wai-Poi (poverty). Arsianti, Faya Hayati, Yus Medina Pakpahan and Ashley Taylor shared the editing and production. Enrique Blanco Armas, Mustapha Benmaamar, Shubham Chaudhuri, Dini Sari Djalal, Alex Drees-Gross, Anna Gueorguieva, Bert Hofman, Tehmina Khan, Sjamsu Rahardja and Samer Al-Samarrai provided detailed comments and input. Dini Sari Djalal, Farhana Asnap, Indra Irnawan, Jerry Kurniawan, Nugroho, Marcellinus Winata and Randy Salim organized the dissemination and Titi Ananto, Nayu Ramadhaningsih and Nina Herawati provided valuable administrative support. This report is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, supported by funding from the Australian Government - AusAID under the Support for Enhanced Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy Analysis (SEMEFPA) program. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent, AusAID or the Australian Government. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. For more World Bank analysis of Indonesia’s economy: For information about the World Bank and its activities in Indonesia, please visit www.worldbank.org/id In order to be included on an email distribution list for this Quarterly series and related publications, please contact madriani@worldbank.org. For questions and comments relating to this publication, please contact ataylor2@worldbank.org. Table of contents Preface iii Executive Summary: Rising to present and future challenges viii A. ECONOMIC AND FISCAL UPDATE 1 1. The global economic outlook remains weak and financial markets turbulent 1 2. Growth slowed in Q1 but remains solid against global headwinds 2 3. The balance of payments recorded a third consecutive deficit in Q1 2012 5 4. Spillovers from global financial market turbulence were seen again in May 8 5. Fuel subsidy spending remains high but a price hike in 2012 is now unlikely 10 6. The lower risk of a hike in subsidized fuel prices subdues the inflation outlook 14 7. Poverty continues to fall, but at a slowing rate 16 8. External uncertainty remains the greatest near-term risk to the economy 18 B. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA’S ECONOMY 21 1. Drivers and implications of recent trends in Indonesia’s current account 21 a. Recent dynamics in Indonesia’s current account ...................................................................... 21 b. Long-term sustainability and near-term financing ..................................................................... 23 c. Recent policy measures to mitigate external vulnerabilities ..................................................... 25 d. Concluding remarks ...................................................................................................................... 25 2. Identifying the constraints to budget execution in the infrastructure sector 26 a. Delays during budget preparation present the main bottlenecks, with procurement and implementation also affecting disbursements............................................................................ 27 b. Addressing budget execution challenges is critical for Indonesia ........................................... 29 C. INDONESIA 2014 AND BEYOND: A SELECTIVE LOOK 31 1. Investing in Indonesia’s roads 31 a. Under-investment, undersupply and deterioration in quality .................................................... 31 b. National roads are in good condition, but heavily congested ................................................... 33 c. Sub-national roads condition has deteriorated due to maintenance backlog ......................... 34 d. Towards improved roads infrastructure performance .............................................................. 35 2. The role of the global marketplace in enhancing domestic competitiveness 36 a. Some evidence on how greater integration can help improve productivity............................. 36 b. The importance of FDI for enhancing Indonesia’s productive capacity ................................... 37 c. Imports as instruments to facilitate innovation and promote competition .............................. 39 d. Exporting as a means to drive productivity and growth ............................................................ 41 APPENDIX: A SNAPSHOT OF INDONESIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 42 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Amidst equity market volatility, the Rupiah has continued to gradually depreciate ..... ix Figure 2: Capital spending, although up in nominal terms, continues to come in well below Budget allocations ......................................................................................................... x Figure 3: Equity market movements continue to be affected by developments in the Euro zone. 1 Figure 4: Global commodity prices have come down, but remain relatively high by historical levels ............................................................................................................................... 1 Figure 5: Indonesia’s major trading partner growth is set to remain weak in 2012, before picking up slightly in 2013 .......................................................................................................... 2 Figure 6: GDP growth slowed to 6.3 percent in the first quarter of 2012… ...................................... 3 Figure 7: …driven by a slowdown in the manufacturing and trade sectors .................................... 3 Figure 8: Higher frequency indicators are pointing to a slight moderation in activity ................... 4 Figure 9: A widening current account deficit contributed to overall balance of payments outflows in Q1 2012… .................................................................................................... 6 Figure 10: …as the non-oil & gas trade surplus has narrowed sharply ........................................... 6 Figure 11: The trade balance has moved into deficit as export growth has come down ............... 7 Figure 12: The latest bout of international financial market turmoil in May spilled over to Indonesian assets … ...................................................................................................... 8 Figure 13: …as foreign investors reduced their domestic debt and equity holdings in May and reserves declined ........................................................................................................... 8 Figure 14: Jakarta’s commercial property prices move up… ........................................................... 9 Figure 15: …but, nationwide, residential house price growth has eased in 2012 ........................... 9 Figure 16: The budget deficit in the first half of 2012 was less than a fifth of the full-year target under the revised Budget ............................................................................................ 10 Figure 17: Crude prices have fallen sharply and with them the likelihood of any subsidized fuel price hike in 2012 ......................................................................................................... 12 Figure 18: Headline inflation has eased up but core inflation remains relatively low................... 15 Figure 19: The gap between Indonesian and international rice prices once again moved towards record levels ................................................................................................................. 15 Figure 20: The national poverty rate continued to decline in 2012 but the fall was the lowest in the last decade ............................................................................................................. 16 Figure 21: Poverty rates are relative high in Eastern Indonesia ..................................................... 16 Figure 22: The remaining poor live increasingly far below the poverty line… .............................. 17 Figure 23: …while a large number of Indonesians just above the poverty line remain vulnerable to falls back into poverty ............................................................................................. 17 Figure 24: Unemployment continued decline in year to February 2012… ..................................... 18 Figure 25: China’s appetite for energy is a key driver of global consumption of liquid fuels ...... 20 Figure 26: China’s effect on commodity prices is considerable – yet it still trails the US ........... 20 Figure 27: The recent move into a current account deficit is part of a medium-term trend… ..... 23 Figure 28: …and is projected to remain at around 1 percent of GDP over the medium-term ...... 23 Figure 29: FDI has become a larger proportion of total financial account inflows since 2008-0924 Figure 30: Key infrastructure sectors received significant budget increases in 2011 .................. 26 Figure 31: But low 2010 and 2011 budget outcomes highlighted the ongoing challenges in budget execution .......................................................................................................... 26 Figure 32: Identified critical issues within each step of budget execution in 2010 and 2011 ...... 27 Figure 33: Physical progress on the Double Track (2010) project experienced significant delays relative to plans ............................................................................................................ 28 Figure 34: Actual physical progress of the Highway Construction and Maintenance West Java (2010) project was in line with the plan ...................................................................... 28 Figure 35: Financial disbursements on the Power Plant and Transmission Sulawesi-Maluku- Papua (2010) project were skewed towards the year end… ..................................... 29 Figure 36: …while disbursements for the Highway Agency of West Java Province (2010), a non- construction project, were more evenly spread through the year ........................... 29 Figure 37: After a steep fall, Indonesia’s investment in roads has only now returned to pre 1997/1998 crisis levels …............................................................................................. 31 Figure 38: … but no longer keeps pace with increasing traffic demand and growth.................... 32 Figure 39: …which led to a deterioration in road infrastructure and services .............................. 32 Figure 40: …and higher transport cost in term of trip time ............................................................. 32 Figure 41: Central government spending on national roads almost tripled in real terms between 2005 and 2011 ............................................................................................................... 34 Figure 42: The share of district roads in good condition has been supported by new construction.................................................................................................................. 34 Figure 43: Indonesian firms that are integrated into the world economy have performed better 36 Figure 44: Imports have been on the rise, driven by expansions in intermediate and capital goods imports .............................................................................................................. 39 Figure 45: The relationship between intermediate imports growth and export growth is very strong ............................................................................................................................ 39 Figure 46: Sectors that imported more of their inputs have generated more employment… ...... 40 Figure 47: …and have increased demand for domestic intermediates faster ............................... 40 LIST OF APPENDIX FIGURES Appendix Figure 1: Quarterly and annual GDP growth ................................................................... 42 Appendix Figure 2: Contributions to GDP expenditures ................................................................. 42 Appendix Figure 3: Contributions to GDP production..................................................................... 42 Appendix Figure 4: Motor cycle and motor vehicle sales ............................................................... 42 Appendix Figure 5: Consumer indicators ......................................................................................... 42 Appendix Figure 6: Industrial production indicators ....................................................................... 42 Appendix Figure 7: Real trade flows ................................................................................................. 43 Appendix Figure 8: Balance of Payments ......................................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 9: Trade balance ..................................................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 10: Reserves and capital inflows .......................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 11: Term of trade and export and import chained Fisher price indices ............ 43 Appendix Figure 12: Inflation and monetary policy ......................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 13: Monthly breakdown of CPI .............................................................................. 44 Appendix Figure 14: Inflation among neighboring countries ......................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 15: Domestic and international rice prices .......................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 16: Poverty and unemployment rate .................................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 17: Regional equity indices ................................................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 18: Dollar index and Rupiah exchange rate ......................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 19: 5 year local currency government bond yields ............................................. 45 Appendix Figure 20: Sovereign USD Bond EMBI spreads .............................................................. 45 Appendix Figure 21: International commercial bank lending ......................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 22: Banking sector indicators ............................................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 23: Government debt ............................................................................................. 45 Appendix Figure 24: External debt .................................................................................................... 45 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Some of Indonesia’s major export commodities have seen marked price falls in recent months ......................................................................................................................... viii Table 2: Under the baseline scenario growth is projected at of 6.0 percent in 2012...................... ix Table 3: The impact of a severe global downturn on economic growth in 2013 would be significant ....................................................................................................................... x Table 4: Under the baseline scenario GDP growth of 6.0 percent is projected for 2012, rising to 6.4 percent in 2013 ......................................................................................................... 5 Table 5: The current account is projected to move into a small deficit in 2012 and financial inflows to come down .................................................................................................... 7 Table 6: The projections for Indonesia’s external accounts are driven by a range of dynamics... 7 Table 7: Strong revenues outcome were seen in H1 2012 and disbursement rates, while improving overall, remain relatively low for capital expenditures ........................... 11 Table 8: The Government’s macro framework for 2013 projects growth to move up to around 7 percent .......................................................................................................................... 13 Table 9: Subsidy spending in 2012 is projected to significantly exceed the revised Budget allocation....................................................................................................................... 14 Table 10: The impact of a global downturn on economic growth would be significant ............... 19 Table 11: The current account surplus is projected to shift into a deficit in 2012 ........................ 22 Table 12: The state of Indonesia’s road network, 2009.................................................................... 33 LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES Appendix Table 1: Budget outcomes and estimates ....................................................................... 46 Appendix Table 2: Balance of Payments .......................................................................................... 46 LIST OF BOXES Box 1: Commercial property prices have been increasing strongly, while residential price growth has come down.................................................................................................. 9 Box 2: The “China effectâ€? on global commodity prices .................................................................. 20 Box 3: What is the current account balance? ................................................................................... 22 Box 4: Do local manufacturing firms benefit from greater integration? Some case studies from Jakarta and Surabaya .................................................................................................. 37 Box 5: The potential benefits of input quality and variety for manufacturing competitiveness .. 40 Executive summary: Rising to present and future challenges The global growth The near-term global economic outlook is fragile and emerging economies, including outlook remains weak Indonesia, again face the risk of a potential crisis that is not of their making. The growth and financial markets outlook for Indonesia’s major trading partners (MTP), at 3.3 percent in 2012, remains turbulent relatively weak as increased Euro zone uncertainty adds to the ongoing drags on global growth from budget cutting and deleveraging in developed economies, and capacity constraints in some developing economies. Recent international financial market turbulence looks set to continue in the near-term and, while this baseline scenario remains the most likely outcome, capital flows to emerging economies and sentiment are likely to remain volatile. Further enhancing crisis preparedness is therefore a policy priority for economies such as Indonesia but, at the same time, it is important to push ahead with reforms and investments which can support medium-term growth in what is likely to be a weaker global economic environment. However, to date Indonesia’s GDP growth remained a solid 6.3 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of Indonesia’s growth 2012, down slightly from an average of 6.5 percent in 2011. Seasonally-adjusted growth performance has overall came down off the highs of the final quarter of 2011 but consumption growth held remained solid up well. However, investment growth dipped and, reflecting the relative weakness of external demand, net exports again were a drag on growth. Inflation, although picking up somewhat, has remained relatively low and price expectations came down with the reduced likelihood of a subsidized fuel price increase in 2012, as oil prices declined. Indonesia is not, Non-oil commodity prices have Table 1: Some of Indonesia’s major export commodities however, immune to also seen sizeable drops in have seen marked price falls in recent months spillovers from recent months, including the Change in international Share of international prices of some of Indonesia’s commodity price Indonesia’s developments through key commodity exports such as total goods both trade channels… coal, rubber, palm oil and Three export value copper (Table 1). Falling months to Year to in 2011 June 2012 June 2012 (percent) international commodity prices, and weaker volumes, Coal -19.4 -29.0 13.4 contributed to a sharp slowdown Palm oil -13.4 -11.9 8.5 in export growth in recent Rubber -18.6 -35.2 5.8 months. With import growth still -12.4 -18.1 4.1 Copper relatively strong, the trade Note: International commodity prices in US dollar balance moved into deficit in Source: BPS and World Bank April and May. This trend has contributed to the current account balance turning into deficit which, while consistent with stronger domestic economic performance relative to the external environment, adds additional importance to the continuation of strong stable capital flows, such as FDI, to meet Indonesia’s external financing needs. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 vi i i …and financial channels, Figure 1: Amidst equity market volatility, the Heightened international risk aversion in particularly given the Rupiah has continued to gradually depreciate May was accompanied by outflows of sensitivity of portfolio (Indonesian equity index 1 Aug 2011=100; domestic asset holdings by non-resident capital flows to changes Rupiah per US dollar) portfolio investors in Indonesia (although in investor sentiment 1 Aug 2011=100 IDR per USD at USD 1.5 billion these were well below 105 10,500 those seen during previous bouts of JCI equity (LHS) market turbulence in September 2011 100 10,000 and May 2010). As in other emerging economies, equity markets declined 95 9,500 sharply before rebounding. The portfolio outflows, plus weaker trade balance, put 90 9,000 pressure on the Rupiah which has continued to depreciate against the US IDR per USD 85 8,500 dollar, down 9.8 percent since August (RHS) 2011 (Figure 1). There was also a 80 8,000 tightening of onshore US dollar liquidity, particularly in late May. With Bank 75 7,500 Indonesia intervening, foreign exchange Aug-11 Nov-11 Feb-12 May-12 reserves fell by roughly USD 5 billion in Source: CEIC both May and June to reach USD 106.5 billion at the end of June. Reflecting the relatively Under the baseline outlook in which there continues to be turbulence in international robust domestic financial markets, weak global growth and softening commodity prices, Indonesia’s growth performance seen to is expected to continue to be supported by domestic consumption and investment. These date, the baseline outlook are, however, expected to soften somewhat over the year, in line with high frequency is for Indonesia’s GDP to grow by 6.0 percent in indicators and, for investment in particular, reflecting global economic uncertainty. Growth 2012 and by 6.4 percent is expected to pick up in 2013 with some stabilization in the international situation, moving in 2013 to 6.4 percent from 6.0 percent in 2012 (Table 2). Table 2: Under the baseline scenario growth is projected at of 6.0 percent in 2012 2010 2011 2012 2013 Gross domestic product (Annual percent change) 6.2 6.5 6.0 6.4 Consumer price index* (Annual percent change) 6.3 4.1 5.0 5.1 Budget balance** (Percent of GDP) -0.6 -1.2 -2.2 n.a. Major trading partner growth (Annual percent change) 7.2 3.6 3.3 3.7 Note: * Q4 on Q4 inflation rate. ** Government figures for Budget deficit - 2011 is preliminary figure and 2012 is revised Budget Source: Ministry of Finance, BPS via CEIC, Consensus Forecasts Inc., and World Bank staff Risks in the international With the resolution of the Euro zone crisis still unclear, and the ongoing potential for other environment remain high, downside shocks to hit the global outlook, such as from developments in China or other are expected to persist… major emerging economies, there continues to be a risk of more adverse scenarios for Indonesia’s near-term external environment. The real impact of such scenarios, even if they occur in the second half of 2012, would probably be felt most strongly in 2013, although the financial impacts would be seen more immediately. Indeed, risks during 2013 are set to remain high given the likely continuation of problems in the Euro zone plus the ongoing fiscal challenges faced in other economies such as the US. …and, if realized in a In the event of a major freezing of international financial markets which contributes to a severe global slowdown, drop in trading partner growth, a fall in global commodity prices and reduced domestic could push Indonesia’s investor confidence, similar to in 2009, it is projected that growth could slow to 4.7 percent growth in 2013 down to in 2013 (Table 3). In a scenario in which such a crisis was accompanied, or indeed around 4 percent precipitated, a severe, prolonged global downturn encompassing the major emerging economies, growth in Indonesia could drop to 3.8 percent, with the impact of the slowdown felt more sharply in domestic activity as commodity price falls reduce incomes and investment. In the event of a severe crisis, it is possible that domestic consumer and business sentiment drops sharply which, combined with any potential stresses in the financial sector, could result in further downside to the growth scenarios. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 ix Table 3: The impact of a severe global downturn on economic growth in 2013 would be significant Scenarios: Outcomes Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Continuing 2009 again Severe global turmoil slowdown 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 Indonesian GDP growth (percent) 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.0 6.4 5.8 4.7 5.7 3.8 Scenario assumptions: Investment/GDP ratio (percent) 23.7 23.4 23.9 24.4 25.3 26.1 25.1 25.1 25.0 24.1 Major trading partner GDP growth (percent) 2.1 -0.7 7.2 3.6 3.3 3.7 2.3 0.1 1.9 -1.8 Terms of trade growth (percent) -18.1 -4.2 5.7 10.2 2.0 9.0 0.0 -15.0 0.0 -30.0 Note: 2012 and 2013 are projections. Terms of trade series is constructed by World Bank from monthly trade data Source: CEIC and World Bank staff projections Policymakers face the Emerging economies, including Indonesia, face the twin challenges of enhancing crisis twin challenges of preparedness to deal with near-term shocks while at the same time putting in place improving both crisis policies to support medium-term growth in a weaker global environment. These two preparedness and challenges should not be viewed in isolation. Backtracking or stalling on medium-term boosting medium-term growth reforms can adversely impact investor confidence now, increasing the susceptibility of the economy to changes in sentiment. Failing to adequately prepare for a near-term crisis can increase its impact, with long-term consequences for growth and welfare. Indonesia has made good Indonesia has made considerable recent progress in improving its crisis preparedness but progress on its crisis further work is necessary and, as in other economies, there is no room for complacency in preparation but further the current fragile market environment. The 2012 Budget Law provided flexibility for the work is required… government to adjust spending and financing in response to a crisis, subject to Parliamentary approval within 24 hours. Crisis Management Protocols have also been put in place to improve information-sharing, monitoring and crisis response mechanisms. However, there remain some gaps in the legal framework that need to be addressed, such as legal backing for decision-making and resolution of a failed bank or financial institution. In the long term, the authorities will need to design and put in place permanent arrangements for systemic monitoring and impact assessment, crisis preparedness, and crisis management (once the new Financial Services Authority, OJK, is fully operational). …such as to improve After strong issuance in the Figure 2: Capital spending, although up in nominal terms, budget execution in order year to date, the Government’s continues to come in well below Budget allocations to support the near-term financing position (central government capital spending relative to revised effectiveness of any Budget, percent; nominal annual growth, percent) looks relatively well placed to stimulus – should it be required… weather future market Spending relative to Nominal growth in capital tightness. The Government revised Budget spending (percent) has also arranged contingent allocation (percent) 110 50 financing of up to USD 5.5 Disbursement Nominal growth billion from development 100 rate (LHS) (RHS) 40 partners including the World Bank, the Asian Development 90 30 Bank, and Australia. 80 20 However, further work on preparing a fiscal stimulus plan 70 10 is required, in case domestic conditions deteriorate sharply. 60 0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Budget execution challenges remain, particularly for capital Source: Ministry of Finance and World Bank staff expenditures, limiting their calculations ability to be used to support near-term demand. Capital spending, although up in nominal terms, continues to come in well below budgeted levels (Figure 2). Disbursement rates in the first half of 2012, although still relatively low, were up slightly on 2011, perhaps reflecting efforts made by the newly established budget execution task force to monitor and speed up execution. However, some long-standing issues remain, such as land acquisition (where implementing regulations on the new law are still required), a complex budget revision process, and the need to improve the quality of project preparation. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 x … to ensure that social Although steps have been made to enhance the ability of the Government to target the programs can reach poor and vulnerable, further improvement in the social safety net, expanding programs those in need of support that work, and filling gaps in the existing coverage is required to protect the vulnerable during a crisis… from moving into poverty in the event of a crisis. In addition, social promotion programs are also required to help move out of poverty the remaining poor, many of whom are far below the poverty line (a feature which is likely to be one reason why, although poverty continues to decline, moving to 12.0 percent in March 2012, the rate of poverty reduction has fallen in recent years). … and to reduce the With the Indonesian Crude Price moving down to USD 99 per barrel in June, it looks opportunity costs and unlikely that its six month average will exceed the revised Budget threshold of USD 121 inefficiencies of fuel necessary to allow the Government to hike the subsidized fuel price. However, even with subsidies the fall in the oil price, in the absence of any price adjustment the fiscal burden, opportunity costs and inefficiencies of fuel subsidies will remain high. Recent Government forecasts project fuel subsidy spending in 2012 to come in almost 60 percent above their revised Budget allocation and to account for 20 percent of total central government spending excluding regional transfers. As highlighted in the April 2012 IEQ, the decision not to increase prices therefore represents a missed, or delayed, opportunity to redirect spending at a time when risks remain in the global environment. There is also a need to Indonesia, and other emerging economies, should prepare for a likely long period of focus in on policies and global economic volatility and weaker demand by re-emphasizing medium-term investments which can development strategies. These include productivity-enhancing reforms and stimulating boost medium-term increased investment, from domestic and foreign investors, as a pre-requisite for moving growth through improving productivity growth in Indonesia up to 7 percent or higher and to produce quality jobs for the roughly and addressing key two million workers joining the labor force each year. Coordination, clarity and consistency infrastructure constraints of regulatory policies are particularly important to support these investments, along with addressing Indonesia’s infrastructure weaknesses. To give a scale of the infrastructure challenges which are faced, while the total number of vehicles in Indonesia has increased threefold between 2001 and 2010, the national road network, that serves more than one third of vehicle traffic (in vehicle-km), only grew by a quarter. While the government has set ambitious targets for public private partnership (PPP) funding of infrastructure projects, much of the infrastructure investment will still need to come from the public sector given the limited performance on PPPs to date. Greater access to Facilitating international and domestic trade also has an important role to play in enabling domestic and Indonesia to harness the strength of its domestic market and to tap into the rising international markets has importance of the East Asia region within global demand. With further improvements in the potential to play an skills and infrastructure, for example, access to international trade and investment important role in improving domestic networks can also help to promote improvements in productivity and in the economic performance… competitiveness of domestic firms, as seen in the relative performance of those manufacturing firms more closely integrated with global markets. For example, in the same industry and province, those manufacturing firms which are exporters or that use imported materials are, on average, 19 percent more productive than non-integrated plants – while foreign-owned plants are 38 percent more productive than their domestic counterparts. …but recent Recent policy announcements have, however, raised some concerns on the direction of announcements in this trade and investment policy making. These measures include, for example, restrictions on area have raised some imported horticulture products and new divestment regulations and processing concerns both about the requirements in the mining sector. While the aims of these policies may originate in the direction of policy- making and the development objectives of promoting domestic productivity, jobs and growth, their difficulties in policy presentation, which has been often changing, highlights coordination and communication coordination and issues. As well as their uncertain effectiveness in meeting those development objectives communication and the risk of adverse long-term consequences, there is a concern that the expansion of such policies could weaken the confidence of investors in the domestic economic outlook at a time when it is needed most. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 xi T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 xii A. ECONOMIC AND FISCAL UPDATE 1. The global economic outlook remains weak and financial markets turbulent There has been renewed The outlook for Indonesia’s external environment continues to be dominated by concerns that the global developments in the Euro zone, along with renewed fears that the global economy may economic recovery is weaken further. The baseline near-term outlook remains a scenario of ongoing losing momentum international financial market turbulence, as outlined in the October 2011 IEQ. However, recent developments have again highlighted the risks of more adverse scenarios involving, for example, further tightening in global credit conditions and sharper declines in growth in developed and developing economies and in global commodity prices. Economic and political Concerns regarding the interlinked fiscal and banking problems of the Euro zone, and the developments in the Euro policy responses, have again been at the center of investor attention, with government zone have again held bond yields in Spain and Italy again rising, for example. Deleveraging by Euro area banks center stage, contributing has continued, contributing to drops in cross-border lending to emerging economies. to sharp swings in international financial International financial markets have been buffeted by changes in sentiment on the back of markets developments in Europe, although most market stress indicators have been considerably lower than their peaks of late 2008 or in May 2010 and September 2011. Nevertheless, developed and emerging market equities have, on average, given up much of their gains from early 2012 (Figure 3). For example, as of 4 July emerging markets equities (in US dollars) were 11.6 percent below their peaks of early March, but up 4.2 percent on end- 2011. Emerging market sovereign bond yields have also drifted higher as investors have retreated to safer assets, such as US, German and Japanese sovereign debt. Figure 3: Equity market movements continue to be Figure 4: Global commodity prices have come down, but affected by developments in the Euro zone remain relatively high by historical levels (USD equity index, 2 July 2008=100) (USD international commodity price indices Jan 2005=100) Index (2 July 2008=100) Index (2 July 2008=100) Index (Jan 2005=100) Index (Jan 2005=100) 125 125 350 350 Emerging market equity (USD) Energy Developed market equity (USD) 300 300 100 100 Metals and minerals 250 250 75 75 200 200 150 150 50 50 Euro area equity (USD) 100 Agriculture 100 25 25 50 50 Jul-08 Jul-09 Jul-10 Jul-11 Jul-12 Jun-06 Jun-08 Jun-10 Jun-12 Sources: MSCI and World Bank staff calculations Source: World Bank T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 1 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Leading indicators also Financial sector and policy developments in Europe have occurred against the backdrop point to a slowing in of contracting or flat leading and partial indicators in the Euro area, the US, Japan and global activity… China, which point to a slowing down in global activity. Global trade is also expected to remain subdued, with the World Bank projecting global trade volumes to grow by 5.3 percent in 2012, down from 6.1 percent in 2011, before recovering to 7.0 percent in 2013. … and international In line with the renewed concerns on the economic outlook, international commodity commodity prices – prices have retreated in recent months, but remain at relatively high levels by historical including oil – have come standards (Figure 4). Energy prices dropped 21.5 percent from March to June while non- down energy prices fell by 6.3 percent. Average crude oil prices (Brent) in June (USD 96 per barrel) were 23.5 percent below their March average, due to slowing global demand and improving production prospects. Metal and mineral prices fell 11.2 percent over the same period, on softening demand from Europe and China. The falls affected prices of some of Indonesia’s key commodity exports such as coal and rubber (down by almost 20 percent from March to June), palm oil (by 13 percent) and copper (by 12 percent). Although there have been The risk of a further weakening in the global economy and renewed financial market moves to ease policy to strains have prompted further monetary easing by, for example, the central banks in the support growth, this UK and Euro zone. Authorities in Asia, such as in China, have also cut rates or eased support is likely to be reserve requirements to support growth. However, as for developed economies, many more constrained this time round emerging economies have become more constrained in their ability to loosen monetary and fiscal policy further in the event of another major economic shock. Some emerging economies are also running up against capacity constraints. Added to this, ongoing processes of fiscal consolidation and deleveraging in developed economies will continue to hold back growth over the near and medium term. Overall, the baseline Combining these factors, the Figure 5: Indonesia’s major trading partner growth is set growth outlook in 2012 growth outlook for Indonesia’s to remain weak in 2012, before picking up slightly in 2013 and 2013 for Indonesia’s major trading partners (MTP) (Real GDP growth, percent) major trading partners remains weak, at 3.3 percent in Percent Percent remains relatively weak 2012 (Figure 5). Following the 12 12 devastating Thai floods in the Q4 2011, restocking of East 10 10 Asian supply chains 2010 2011 8 8 contributed to above-expected 2012f 2013f regional growth outturns in Q1 6 6 2012. However, renewed 4 4 weakness in the US, Europe and China has depressed the 2 2 baseline growth outlook for the remainder of 2012 to leave the 0 0 MTP projection for 2012 as a -2 -2 whole unchanged. The baseline projection for MTP growth in 2013 is 3.7 percent although, as highlighted in the Risks section below, more adverse scenarios for the Note: * India on fiscal year basis external environment would Source: World Bank Global Economic Prospects June 2012 push this down significantly. 2. Growth slowed in Q1 but remains solid against global headwinds The Indonesian economy Indonesia’s GDP increased by 6.3 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2012. grew by a solid 6.3 Although slowing slightly from 6.5 percent growth in the fourth quarter of 2011, this was percent in the first the sixth consecutive quarter of above 6 percent growth, (Figure 6). On a seasonally quarter of 2012, although adjusted basis the economy grew by 1.2 per cent in Q1, down from the very strong growth there were more signs of weakness in external of 2.1 percent in Q4 2011, reflecting the effects of weaker external demand but the demand offsetting strength of still buoyant private consumption. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 2 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Growth was supported by Private consumption growth was unchanged from the previous quarter (at 4.9 percent strong consumption, both year-on-year and 1 percent on quarterly seasonally adjusted basis). Government private and public, but consumption growth also came in stronger than expected, at almost 6 percent year-on- trade volumes were year, perhaps reflecting improved disbursements. However, following a very strong weaker performance in the final quarter of 2011, investment growth slowed, with seasonally adjusted quarterly growth of only 0.3 percent, the lowest rate since Q1 2009. The weakness of real exports continued, registering zero growth in seasonally adjusted terms. However, imports were also weaker than expected, with seasonally adjusted growth dropping from 5.2 percent in Q4 2011 to 0.5 percent, likely reflecting the weak investment demand. As a result, net exports subtracted 0.2 percentage points from seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP growth, less than the 1.6 percentage points subtracted in the final quarter of 2011. Figure 6: GDP growth slowed to 6.3 percent in the first Figure 7: …driven by a slowdown in the manufacturing and quarter of 2012… trade sectors (real GDP growth, percent) (contribution to real GDP growth year-on-year, percentage point) Percent Percent Percentage points Percentage points 4 8 2.0 2.0 Year on year (RHS) Manufacturing 1.5 1.5 3 6 1.0 1.0 QoQ seas. adjust (LHS) Average (LHS)* 2 4 0.5 0.5 1 2 0.0 0.0 Trade, hotel and restaurant 0 0 -0.5 -0.5 Mar-05 Mar-07 Mar-09 Mar-11 Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-10 Mar-12 Note: * Average QoQ (quarter-on-quarter) growth since Q1 Source: CEIC and World Bank staff calculations 2002 Source: BPS and World Bank staff seasonal adjustment Production growth was On the production side, the major drivers of growth were the primary sectors while the driven by agriculture, contribution to growth from the manufacturing and trade sectors weakened (Figure 7). mining, and transport and Mining recorded its strongest quarterly growth since late 2006 while agriculture remained communications, strong. Manufacturing growth continued to decline, moving down to 5.7 percent year-on- offsetting weakness in the manufacturing and year in Q1 after peaking at 6.9 percent in Q3 2011. The first quarter performance was trade sectors driven by the sharp deceleration in growth in the food, beverage and tobacco sector while trade-exposed sectors, such as textiles, clothing and footwear, also slowed. At the same time, service sector growth weakened, with the largest category, trade, hotels and restaurants, growing at less than 1 percent in quarterly seasonally adjusted terms for the first time since early 2009, although the transport and communication sector grew strongly. Comparing the strength of the production sectors in mid-2012 with the situation in mid- 2008, overall industry activity, particularly in manufacturing, remains relatively robust. In contrast, services sector year-on-year growth, which has been moderating after peaking at 9 percent in Q4 2010, is lower than in early 2008. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 3 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Recent partial indicators Recent data points to a slight Figure 8: Higher frequency indicators are pointing to a have pointed to a slight slowing in domestic economic slight moderation in activity moderation in economic indicators (Figure 8). Cement (year on year growth, percent) activity sales and motorcycle sales Percent Percent have been trending down in 8 8 recent months. Motorcycle Gross Domestic Product sales were down 14 percent year-on-year in May, 6 6 reflecting weak sales in rural areas as rural incomes declined with recent 4 4 commodity price falls. However, sales of motor Coincident Index vehicles remained robust, 2 2 although demand is expected to soften as new minimum down payment requirements came into effect on June 15. 0 0 Apr-04 Apr-06 Apr-08 Apr-10 Apr-12 After declining in early 2012, reflecting uncertainty over Note: The coincident index is a weighted average of fuel prices, consumer production, trade, financial and international variables. The index is scaled to have the same mean and standard sentiment rebounded in May deviation as year-on-year GDP growth and June but remains around Source: CEIC and World Bank staff calculations 4 percent below January levels. In the baseline scenario While domestic economic performance has been largely in line with the April 2012 IEQ Indonesia’s GDP growth forecasts, the recent weakness in trade data and other partial indicators, plus the slight is projected at 6.0 percent downgrade to major trading partner growth for the remainder of 2012 (within an in 2012 and 6.4 percent in unchanged projection for growth in the year as a whole), point to a slight moderation in the 2013, although risks to the outlook remain baseline outlook for 2012. As a result, GDP growth in 2012 is now forecast at 6.0 percent. heavily skewed to the downside The baseline outlook for 2013 remains for a rebound in growth to 6.4 percent as the external environment improves somewhat. However, as discussed further below, the risks to the outlook remain heavily skewed to the downside and, in the event of more severe adverse shocks to international financial markets, commodity prices or external demand, domestic growth could come in considerably below these baseline projections. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 4 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Table 4: Under the baseline scenario GDP growth of 6.0 percent is projected for 2012, rising to 6.4 percent in 2013 (percentage change, unless otherwise indicated) Revisions to Annual Year to December quarter annual 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 1. Main economic indicators Total Consumption expenditure 4.5 4.8 5.0 4.6 4.8 5.0 -0.1 0.0 Private consumption expenditure 4.7 4.5 4.8 4.9 4.3 4.9 -0.1 0.0 Government consumption 3.2 6.8 6.0 2.8 6.9 5.9 0.0 0.0 Gross fixed capital formation 8.8 9.6 10.0 11.5 9.5 10.1 -0.1 0.0 Exports of goods and services 13.6 6.3 7.6 7.9 6.8 6.9 -1.1 -1.9 Imports of goods and services 13.3 7.7 8.1 10.1 6.1 8.2 -1.5 -1.5 Gross Domestic Product 6.5 6.0 6.4 6.5 5.8 6.5 -0.1 0.0 Agriculture 3.0 3.4 3.4 4.1 2.8 3.6 0.0 0.0 Industry 5.3 4.9 5.3 5.3 4.7 5.4 0.0 0.0 Services 8.5 7.8 8.2 9.0 7.9 7.7 -0.2 0.0 2. External indicators Balance of payments (USD bn) 11.9 3.0 10.8 n/a n/a n/a -4.8 -1.8 Current account balance (USD bn) 1.7 -7.9 -4.6 n/a n/a n/a -3.8 -2.9 Trade balance (USD bn) 23.3 11.3 15.7 n/a n/a n/a -4.2 -2.9 Financial account balance (USD bn) 14.0 11.3 15.4 n/a n/a n/a -0.7 1.1 3. Other economic measures Consumer price index 5.4 4.4 5.1 4.1 5.0 5.1 -0.3 -0.1 Poverty basket Index 8.2 7.0 7.5 6.3 7.0 7.6 -0.1 -0.5 GDP Deflator 8.4 7.2 8.1 7.5 8.1 8.1 -1.5 -1.5 Nominal GDP 15.4 13.7 15.1 14.5 14.4 15.1 -1.6 -1.6 4. Economic assumptions Exchange rate (IDR/USD) 8773 9300 9100 9024 9400 9100 300 100 Indonesian crude price (USD/bl) 112 110 100 111 100 100 -10 -15 Major trading partner growth 3.6 3.3 3.7 2.5 3.5 3.9 0.0 -0.2 Note: Projected trade flows relate to the national accounts, which may overstate the true movement in trade volumes and understate the movement in prices due to differences in price series. Revisions are relative to projections in April 2012 IEQ. The annual revisions under ‘3. Other economic measures’ are based on the no-fuel subsidy reform projections of the World Bank in April 2012 and not the published April 2012 IEQ projections which were based on fuel-subsidy reform Source: MoF, BPS, BI, CEIC and World Bank projections 3. The balance of payments recorded a third consecutive deficit in Q1 2012 Indonesia’s overall Indonesia experienced further overall balance of payment outflows in the first quarter of balance of payments 2011, for the third consecutive quarter (Figure 9). However, at USD 1.0 billion the outflows recorded a third were less than those seen in the third and fourth quarter of 2011 (USD 4.0 billion and consecutive quarter of USD 3.7 billion respectively). Furthermore, while capital outflows were the primary drivers outflows in Q1 2012 as the current account of the deficits in the second half of 2011, the notable feature in the first quarter of 2012 widened was the widening in the current account deficit, as slowing external demand and continued strong domestic demand further narrowed the trade surplus (Figure 10). The recent trends in the current account balance and their implications are discussed in greater detail in Part B. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 5 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Modest capital inflows With global financial market strains having subsided somewhat in the first quarter of 2012, were seen and FDI Indonesia recorded net inflows of USD 2.2 billion on the capital and financial accounts. remained firm Although “otherâ€? banking flows continued to be negative, net portfolio capital inflows resumed with the USD 2.8 billion of inflows supported by net purchases of government securities (including January’s USD 1.75 billion issuance of US dollar global bonds). These inflows were complemented by continued solid foreign direct investment (USD 4.6 billion, up slightly on the preceding quarter). According to the Investment Coordination Board (BKPM), FDI inflows in the first quarter were primarily directed towards the mining sector; transportation, storage and telecommunications, food crops and plantation; and metals, machinery and electronics. FDI inflows are also becoming more evenly distributed throughout Indonesia, with realized investment outside Java increasing to 47.2 percent of total investment, up from 44.2 percent in the same period in 2011. Figure 9: A widening current account deficit contributed to Figure 10: …as the non-oil & gas trade surplus has narrowed overall balance of payments outflows in Q1 2012… sharply (USD billion) (monthly value of goods trade, USD billion) Net direct investment Net portfolio USD billion USD billion Net other capital Current account 5 5 Overall balance USD billion USD billion Trade balance 16 16 4 4 Non-Oil & Gas 12 12 trade balance 3 3 8 8 2 2 4 4 0 0 1 1 -4 -4 0 0 -8 -8 Oil & Gas trade balance Mar-07 Mar-08 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 -1 -1 May-07 May-08 May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12 Source: BI Source: BPS More recently, however, Export values have come down markedly in recent months, contracting by 8.5 percent further weakness in the year-on-year in May 2012. These falls have been driven primarily by lower bulk global economy and commodity exports as both prices and volumes have moved down due to the weaker commodity prices has global economic environment. Meanwhile imports growth has remained strong, at 16.1 seen export growth decline and the trade percent year-on-year in May, with a pick-up in intermediate goods, particularly machinery, balance move into electrical appliances and transport goods. These trends have pushed the non-oil & gas deficit goods balance into a deficit for only the second time in the past decade while oil and gas trade remains broadly in balance. As a result the trade surplus has narrowed and moved into a deficit in April and May (Figure 11). The past quarter has Amidst this period of slowing external demand and heightened financial market volatility, seen further there has been a number of announcements of changes to domestic trade and announcements of investment policy. For example, in May the Government issued a new regulation to proposed changes to restrict certain categories of imports, including finished goods, and the Government has domestic trade and investment policy moved to introduce a 20 percent export tax on raw commodities and base metals by holders of certain license types (see fiscal section below) and measures to promote domestic processing. On the investment-side, the Government has indicated that it is preparing to revise the negative-investment list to allow increased FDI into several key industries including pharmaceuticals, health care, telecommunication and education. However, there have also been recent announcements moving to limit foreign ownership and forced divestment in the banking and mining sectors. While many of these different policies are aimed at developing local industries and supporting domestic investors, they may also create uncertainty for businesses and investors, which could impact on future investment. In addition, for some of the proposed policies it is unclear whether their implementation will be able to meet the desired objectives. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 6 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Figure 11: The trade balance has moved into deficit as Table 5: The current account is projected to move into a export growth has come down small deficit in 2012 and financial inflows to come down (value of goods trade, USD billion; year-on-year growth of 3- (USD billion) month moving average goods value, percent) Export value (LHS) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Import value (LHS) Trade balance (LHS) Overall Balance USD Export growth 3mma yoy (RHS) Percent of Payments 12.5 30.3 11.9 3.0 10.8 billion 20 Import growth 3mma yoy (RHS) 80 Current Account 10.6 5.1 1.7 -7.9 -4.6 10 40 Trade 21.2 21.3 23.3 11.1 15.6 Income -15.1 -20.8 -25.8 -23.8 -25.2 0 0 Transfers 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.8 Capital & Financial -10 -40 Accounts 4.9 26.6 14.0 11.3 15.4 Direct Inv. 2.6 11.1 11.1 10.4 10.8 -20 -80 Portfolio 10.3 13.2 4.5 6.9 8.7 May-08 May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12 Other -8.2 2.3 -1.6 -6.1 -4.1 Reserves(a) 66.1 96.2 110.1 106.5 Note: 3mma is three month moving average. Data on growth Note: Errors and omissions not shown. (a) 2012 reserves as of imports, including imports to Special Economic Zones, of end-June only available from January 2009 Source: BI and World Bank staff projections Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations Table 6: The projections for Indonesia’s external accounts are driven by a range of dynamics MTP growth Commodity prices Real export and Trade Surplus Current Account index** import growth*** 2008 Low and moderating Peak mid-year, before Solid growth Moderate and Moderate quarterly falling rapidly narrowing surplus then deficits 2.1 percent Energy = 156.0 X = 9.5 percent USD 9.9 billion USD 0.1 billion Non-Energy = 155.5 M = 10.0 percent 2009 Recession then Gradual recovery Big contractions. Expanding to large Quarterly deficit rebound Imports fall more surplus then large surpluses than exports -0.7 percent Energy = 104.8 X = -9.7 percent USD 21.2 billion USD 10.6 billion Non-Energy = 129.9 M = -15.0 percent 2010 Strong rebound Continued gradual Strong recovery. Stable large surplus Moderate but recovery Imports recover narrowing surplus faster than exports 7.2 percent Energy = 128.2 X = 15.3 percent USD 21.3 billion USD 5.1 billion Non-Energy = 154.0 M = 17.3 percent 2011 Moderate and stable Increasing followed by Recovery continues Stable large surplus Low and narrowing renewed moderation surplus 3.6 percent Energy = 153.0 X = 13.6 percent USD 23.3 billion USD 1.7 billion Non-Energy = 170.8 M = 13.3 percent 2012* Moderate but easing Relatively high but Moderate but Moderate and Moderate and easing easing. Exports narrowing widening deficit weaker than imports 3.3 percent Energy = 152.7 X = 6.3 percent USD 11.1 billion USD -8.1 billion Non-Energy = 162.2 M = 7.7 percent 2013* Slowly recovering Stable but slightly Slowly recovering Widening slightly Low and narrowing lower deficit 3.7 percent Energy = 149.3 X = 7.6 percent USD 15.6 billion USD -4.8 billion Non-Energy = 155.5 M = 8.1 percent Note: * forecasts under the baseline scenario. ** World Bank commodity price index in constant 2005 US dollars (2005=100). *** goods and services real trade growth. Source: World Bank THE WORLD BANK | BANK DUNIA July 2012 7 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Baseline projections for The near-term outlook for Indonesia’s external accounts will depend critically on the overall balance of developments in Indonesia’s export markets and international commodity prices, and on payments inflows have investor sentiment. In the baseline scenario the trade surplus is projected to narrow in come down reflecting the 2012 to roughly half its 2011 value but to improve in 2013, in line with the international weaker global outlook, while financial flows will environment, reducing the current account deficit slightly (Table 5 and Table 6). On the continue to be sensitive financial account side, net direct investment is expected to remain firm. Portfolio and other to global market capital flows for 2012 have been downgraded in light of the outflows in the year-to-date conditions but should gradually improve through 2013 in the baseline scenario as volatility in international financial markets recedes. Should global conditions deteriorate further, the set of dynamics driving the balance of payment would clearly play out differently for both trade and, in particular, financial flows. 4. Spillovers from global financial market turbulence were seen again in May Indonesia’s financial The rise in global risk aversion and financial market turbulence in the second quarter of markets were again 2012 was transmitted to Indonesia’s asset markets, with equities declining by 8.3 percent affected by a over May before rebounding strongly. Some domestic sectors, such as mining and deterioration in banking stocks, were also affected by the trade and investment policy announcements international investor sentiment in the second mentioned above. Domestic currency government bond yields also widened, as non- quarter of 2012 resident investors reduced their positions over May, but have since come down (Figure 12). Portfolio capital outflows, April saw modest capital inflows to domestic equity and debt markets, but the inflows and the deteriorating reversed with the renewed intensity of the Euro zone crisis in early-May. Portfolio capital trade surplus, put upward outflows of USD 1.5 billion in May were followed by much lower outflows in June (Figure pressure on the Rupiah 13). These outflows, plus the move to a goods trade deficit, put the Rupiah under pressure and resulted in a tightening in onshore US dollar liquidity, particularly in late May. With Bank Indonesia intervening, foreign exchange reserves fell by roughly USD 5 billion over May and June to reach USD 106.5 billion at the end of June. To support dollar availability and encourage foreign currency deposits to move onshore, in mid-June Bank Indonesia began offering short-term US dollar term deposits to local banks with flexible maturities and at favorable interest rates compared to offshore markets. Figure 12: The latest bout of international financial market Figure 13: …as foreign investors reduced their domestic turmoil in May spilled over to Indonesian assets … debt and equity holdings in May and reserves declined (equity index, 1 August 2011=100; IDR per USD; yield, (USD billion) percent) 1 Aug 2011=100 Percent; 000 IDR per USD USD billion USD billion 105 10 150 5.0 IDR 000 per USD (RHS) Reserves 100 9 (LHS) 125 2.5 95 8 90 100 0.0 JCI equity (LHS) 7 85 75 -2.5 6 80 5-yr IDR government 5 50 -5.0 75 bond yield (RHS) Non-resident portfolio inflows, (RHS): Equities SUN SBI 70 4 25 -7.5 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Source: CEIC World Bank staff calculations Note: “Flowsâ€? for SUN (IDR government securities) and SBI (BI certificates) indicate changes in holdings. Source: BI, CEIC and World Bank staff calculations T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 8 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges With inflation concerns With inflation set to remain within its target of 4.5 percent +/- 1 percent for 2012, Bank receding, Bank Indonesia Indonesia has turned its focus to providing “support for Rupiah stabilizationâ€? and is focusing on exchange managing inflation expectations through monetary operations and macro-prudential rate stabilization and policies. The latter include the maximum loan-to-value regulations for housing and vehicle managing inflation expectations loans that were outlined in the April 2012 IEQ. The challenge for the central bank is to continue to utilize its various policy instruments to support growth during this next period of softening global conditions, whilst ensuring that short-term inflation pressures – such as the upcoming Ramadan price spikes – do not translate into sustained rises in inflation and inflation expectations. Box 1: Commercial property prices have been increasing strongly, while residential price growth has come down The property sector in Indonesia, particularly commercial property, has witnessed strong growth over the past year following the large declines in construction output and prices in the years following the global financial crisis. Amongst domestic equities, the property sector has seen the second highest increases, rising by 22 percent in the first quarter of 2012 and by 43 percent over the year, compared to gains of 8 percent and 12 percent, respectively, for the overall equity index over those periods. Commercial property sales and rental rates in Jakarta have also seen sizeable increases. According to the BI Commercial Property Survey of 706 property companies in Greater Jakarta, the selling price of offices in Jakarta rose by 27 percent over the year to Q1 2012, close to double the fastest pace seen in the previous four years (Figure 14). Demand for office space has increased, and with the stock of office space for sale or lease largely 2 unchanged in Jakarta, the occupancy rate has risen to 96 percent. However, by the end of 2012 a further 429,220 m is expected to come online (an increase of approximately 40 percent on current stock available for sale) which is likely to dampen the strong growth in prices witnessed over the past year. Higher rental demand has also led to a six percent increase over the year for the rental rate. The rate of increases in nationwide residential property prices has been significantly lower, below the rate of inflation for most of the previous decade (Figure 15). Despite strong investment growth in the sector, residential prices growth has been subdued. According to BI’s Residential Property Survey of 260 property developers across 14 major cities in Indonesia, residential property prices continue to ease from their recent peak of 5 percent year-on-year in December 2011 to a projected 2.8 percent year-on-year in June 2012. Some of the reasons for this trend include a surge in supply following a construction boom in 2007 and 2008. Respondents to BI’s survey also pointed to the impact of higher prices of building materials, relatively high mortgage rates as well as bureaucratic red tape. Several respondents also cited the new regulations in Housing Law No. 1/2011 that came into effect in 2012 as affecting demand of new home- owners because it prevents developers from constructing properties smaller than 36m2. In addition, the above-mentioned new higher minimum down-payments on larger properties may also affect the price outlook going forward. However, the medium-term outlook is supported by projections for rising incomes and the emergence of the middle class, along with the continued trends in urbanization and improved access to finance. Figure 14: Jakarta’s commercial property prices move up… Figure 15: …but, nationwide, residential house price growth (office stock available for sale , 000 m2; office space has eased in 2012 monthly rental rate, IDR per m2 per month; office average (year-on-year growth in residential property price, percent) selling price, million IDR per m2) Million IDR/m2 Percent Percent 20 1.00 10 10 Office "Large "Small 18 (selling house" house 16 price) prices prices" 5 5 14 (IDR/m2/month) 12 0.67 170,000 0 "Medium 0 Office 155,000 house" space prices Stock (000 monthly 140,000 -5 -5 m2) rental rate 1200 0.33 125,000 1000 Office space for -10 -10 800 sale Real average house prices 600 (stock) (ex-post, deflated by CPI) 400 0.00 -15 -15 Mar-07 Nov-08 Jul-10 Mar-12 Jun-03 Jun-06 Jun-09 Jun-12 Note: Based on greater Jakarta area only Note: Small houses are less than 36m2, medium houses are Source: BI Commercial Property Survey between 36m2 and 70m2, large houses are above 70m2 Source: BI residential property survey and World Bank staff calculations T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 9 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Overall banking sector As of April 2012, overall banking sector indicators remained solid. The capital adequacy performance continues to ratio, while down slightly, remains at 18 percent. Non-performing loans were down half a be robust percentage point over the year to 2.3 percent. With lending rates coming down close to 1 percentage point in the first quarter, net-interest margins also came down to 5.4 percent. Credit growth accelerated to 25.7 percent year-on-year in April 2012 led by investment credit (up by 28.8 percent), capital credit (up by 27.7 percent), and then consumer credit (up by 20.5 percent). The new regulations on housing and vehicle loans may dampen credit growth directed to these sectors. As discussed in Box 1 residential property prices has eased recently, although commercial property sales and rental prices have seen strong growth. Loan growth has contributed to the gradual rise in the loan-to-deposit ratio to 81.6 percent at April 2012. There are, however, reports that banks are lending more cautiously to industries which are most sensitive to current global economic and commodity price volatility such as natural resources, minerals, plantations and shipping firms. At the same time, the US dollar liquidity tightness mentioned above is reportedly affecting the ability of some local corporates to obtain dollars and dollar credit facilities. There has been progress In a welcome development to enhance crisis preparedness, the Ministry of Finance, the on some important Indonesian Deposit Insurance Corporation, and BI have signed a Memorandum of financial sector Understanding (MoU) to coordinate efforts in order to prevent and address issues of institutional financial system stability. The MoU provides guidelines for coordination in the event of a developments financial crisis and identifies mechanisms for sharing data and information. It also supports the creation of an integrated crisis management protocol (CMP) based on the agencies’ authority under existing laws and regulations. While the National CMP helps improve crisis prevention and the handling of a potential financial crisis in the short-term, it does not fully address the gaps in the current legal framework and, in the long term, the authorities will need to design and put in place permanent arrangements for systemic monitoring and impact assessment, crisis preparedness, and crisis management, once the Financial Services Authority (OJK) is fully operational. As discussed in the December 2011 IEQ, the OJK is due to take over supervision and regulation of non bank financial institutions and capital markets by January 1, 2013 and of the banking industry by January 1, 2014, while Commission XI of the House of Representatives recently voted to select seven Commissioners of the OJK. Finally, in another regulatory development, Bank Indonesia signed two MoUs on cross border banking supervision with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Services Commission of Korea. 5. Fuel subsidy spending remains high but a price hike in 2012 is now unlikely Indonesia’s fiscal The central government Figure 16: The budget deficit in the first half of 2012 was less position in the first half of budget balance recorded than a fifth of the full-year target under the revised Budget 2012 remained solid with a deficit of IDR 36.1 (percent of GDP by in the first half of year) revenue performance trillion in the first half of Percent of GDP (+) indicates deficit Percent of GDP strong against relatively weak expenditures the year, well below the (-) indicates surplus full-year government 3.0 3.0 Overall deficit Primary deficit Net financing target of IDR 190.1 trillion 2.0 2.0 deficit or 2.1 percent of GDP (Figure 16). The 1.0 1.0 primary balance was also in a surplus, reflecting 0.0 0.0 strong revenue collection -1.0 -1.0 along with relatively weak expenditure performance, -2.0 -2.0 particularly for capital and Revised Realization Realization Revised Realization material expenditures. Budget full-year 1st half Budget 1st half However, it is worth 2011 2012 noting that the deficit Source: MoF and World Bank staff calculations tends to be back loaded with expenditures towards the end of the year – in both 2010 and 2011, despite full-year deficits, the central government balance was in surplus from February to November. The government’s financing plans were well on-track. By end of June, 61.8 percent of the government’s total gross securities issuance target of IDR 270.7 trillion had been realized. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 10 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Solid economic growth in Revenues in first half of 2012 reached 44 percent of the full-year revised Budget target has supported strong and were up 19 percent on the first half of 2011 (Table 7). Non-oil and gas income taxes, revenue collection in the sales taxes, as well as excise taxes performed well but revenues from export duties first half of the year declined by 34 percent on the first half of 2011 as weaker global demand depressed despite lower receipts relating to exports and commodity prices, such as crude palm oil. Non-tax revenues, which made up a quarter of commodities total revenues, were boosted by the relative high crude oil price in the first half of the year and strong dividends from State-Owned Enterprises. Table 7: Strong revenues outcome were seen in H1 2012 and disbursement rates, while improving overall, remain relatively low for capital expenditures (value in the first half 2012, IDR trillion; share of revised Budget level, percent) Nominal value in the first As share of full-year revised half of the year (IDR trillion) Budget level 2010 2011 2012 2010 2011 2012 Total revenue 444 497 593 44.7 42.5 43.7 Tax revenue, of which 338 388 457 45.4 44.1 44.9 Non-oil & gas income tax 148 174 199 48.2 47.3 44.6 Sales tax (VAT) 99 112 150 37.8 37.7 44.5 Non-tax revenues 106 109 136 42.8 38.2 39.8 Total expenditures 396 442 629 35.1 33.5 40.7 Central gov. expenditures, of which 234 260 394 30.0 28.6 36.8 Personnel 73 81 104 45.2 44.0 49.0 Material 29 35 42 26.0 24.4 22.4 Capital 16 23 31 17.3 16.2 18.2 Energy subsidy 52 54 124 35.9 27.8 61.5 Social 19 12 30 26.8 14.8 54.4 Transfers to regions 162 183 236 46.9 44.3 49.2 Source: MoF and World Bank staff calculations The government recently As mentioned above, the Government recently issued a new regulation (PMK No. issued a regulation 75/PMK.011/2012), effective mid-June 2012, imposing a 20 percent export tariff on imposing a 20 percent unprocessed mining exports of a list of raw minerals and ores, such as gold, copper and export tariff on a range of iron ore, for holders of mining business licenses ("IUPs") and Special Business Mining raw minerals and ores (excluding coal) Licenses ("IUPKs"). The stated objective was to increase domestic value added through promoting investment in the mineral processing sector, as well as to promote sustainable use of resources. There has been some lack of clarity on the details of the policy and its implementation, adding to policy uncertainty in the sector, with the potential to impact on future investment. Expenditure Expenditures in the first half of 2012 reached 41 percent of the full-year revised Budget disbursements are on allocation (Table 7) and were up by 42 percent compared to the first half of 2011. track but this is to a large However, the improved disbursement was partly driven by strong fuel subsidy spending, part driven by energy led by the high oil price at the start of the year and the weakening Rupiah. By the end of subsidies… June, 65 percent of the allocated fuel subsidy spending had been realized (IDR 89 trillion out of IDR 137 trillion). Fuel subsidies accounted for 23 percent of central government spending (excluding transfers), while the share for energy subsidies reached 32 percent. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 11 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges …but the price The opportunity to adjust Figure 17: Crude prices have fallen sharply and with them adjustment for subsidized subsidized fuel prices in 2012 the likelihood of any subsidized fuel price hike in 2012 fuel is unlikely to occur in is unlikely to be realized. The (USD per barrel) 2012… six-month average ICP USD per Budget assumption USD per peaked in May at just under barrel barrel revised Budget assumption the USD 121 per barrel threshold required to allow 160 160 the Government to hike the Brent futures as of 4 140 140 subsidized fuel price. With July 2012 international oil prices moving 120 120 Brent oil down sharply from May to 100 price 100 USD 99 per barrel in June 80 80 (Figure 17), this threshold is 60 60 unlikely to be breached. The Indonesia crude absence of fuel subsidy 40 oil price 40 reform is likely to lead to an 20 20 overspending on fuel subsidies and a continuation of their considerable opportunity cost (see April 2012 IEQ for further Source: EIA, ESDM, ICE, Ministry of Finance discussion). ..prompting the In an effort to improve broader energy efficiency and to control subsidized fuel Government to announce consumption, the President announced five policies, effective from June 2012, aimed at policies to improve improving energy efficiency. These include, for example, banning official government and energy efficiency SOE vehicles, as well as vehicles of mining and plantation firms, from consuming subsidized fuel and encouraging conversion from gasoline to liquefied petroleum gas. However, the saving of these efforts for 2012 are projected by the Government to be relatively small at 0.568 million KL of the allocated volume of 40 million KL.1 As discussed further in Disbursement of capital and material expenditures in the first half of the year, while Part B, disbursement showing strong nominal growth, remain relatively low compared to the full-year revised rates of capital Budget allocations. The disbursement rate on capital expenditures reached 18 percent, up expenditures, while on the 2011 level of 16 percent, on the back of nominal growth in spending of 35 percent. improving remain relatively low Spending on materials rose by 20 percent in nominal terms although the first-half disbursement rate dipped slightly on the performance in 2011. The improvements seen in spending, such as for capital expenditures, may in part reflect the efforts being made by the Government’s budget execution task force (TEPPA) in monitoring and speeding up budget execution. The World Bank’s For 2012 as whole, expenditures are projected to be in line with the revised Budget, projection for the budget largely due to over-spending relative to budget on energy subsidies and under-spending deficit in 2012 is 2.1 on core programs than budgeted. On the other hand, revenues collection is likely to be percent of GDP lower than targeted with lower oil production, moderation in commodity prices, and weaknesses in the global outlook. Combined, these factor result in a World Bank deficit projection of IDR 177 trillion, or 2.1 percent of GDP, slightly lower than the Government’s latest Semester I forecast. 1 http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2012/05/30/2052179/Target.Penghematan.BBM.Bersubsidi.568.000. Kiloliter T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 12 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges The Government has The 2012 revised budget deficit will be financed largely by net government securities made solid progress on issuance of IDR 159.6 trillion and the Government’s accumulated cash balance of IDR its financing position for 56.2 trillion. In the first half 2012, Government net securities issuance had already 73.7 2012, despite continued percent of its target (with gross securities issuance above 60 percent of its target). The uncertainty in the global outlook Government’s front loading of issuance included the placement of USD 2.5 billion in global bonds in April. However, with the international financial market outlook remaining uncertain, the Government has taken the precautionary step of arranging contingent financing of up to USD 5.5 billion from development partners, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and Australia, so as to support critical spending in the event of a sharp rise in financing costs. The Government has In mid-May, the Table 8: The Government’s macro framework for 2013 projects submitted to the Government submitted its growth to move up to around 7 percent Parliament the 2013 macro and fiscal 2011 2012 2013 macro economic and Budget framework for 2013 to Revised fiscal framework macro and Parliament. The macro Actual Budget fiscal assumptions project a (APBN-P) framework continuation of strong Real GDP growth growth and improved oil 6.5 6.5 6.8–7.2 (percent) lifting (Table 8). The Inflation (percent) 5.4 6.8 4.5–5.5 framework also set out the Exchange rate (IDR Government’s policies and 8,742 9,000 8,700–9,300 per USD) strategies which are to aim SPN interest rate 6.6 5.0 4.5–5.5 at “strengthening the (percent) domestic economy to Indonesia Crude Price 111 105 100-120 improve people’s welfareâ€?. (USD/Barrel) Oil lifting (000 bpd) 898 930 910–940 A number of specific policies on revenue and Gas lifting (000 n.a. n.a. 1,290–1,360 expenditure were also boepd) outlined. For example, the Note: mbpd is million barrels per day. mboepd is million barrel of oil equivalent per day Government is proposing Source: MoF to increase the value added tax on luxury goods (non-vehicle) and the excise tax on cigarettes. The minimum 2 annual income tax threshold is also to be increased from IDR 15 million to IDR 24 million. Investments will continue in infrastructure projects related to the targets of the Master Plan (MP3EI) MP3EI), as well in social and poverty reduction programs, while salaries are proposed to be increased by 7 percent. The draft budget and financial note 2013 are expected to be officially submitted by the Government to Parliament in mid-August 2012. 2 http://www.pajak.go.id/content/news/ditjen-pajak-dukung-kenaikan-ptkp T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 13 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Table 9: Subsidy spending in 2012 is projected to significantly exceed the revised Budget allocation (IDR trillion, unless otherwise indicated) WB July 2012 forecast 2011* 2012 2012 (p) 2012 (p) Difference relative to: Revised MoF WB July Revised MoF Budget Semester I 2012** Budget Semester I report report projection Assumption on subsidized fuel price No Potential for No No Change IDR 1,500 Change Change hike if oil price high enough*** A. State revenues and grants 1,200 1,358 1,362 1,334 -24.0 -28.2 1. Tax revenue 873 1,016 1,017 1,003 -12.9 -13.6 2. Non-tax revenue 324 341 345 331 -10.3 -13.8 B. Expenditure 1,290 1,548 1,553 1,512 -36.7 -41.5 1. Central government, o/w 878 1,070 1,071 1,032 -37.6 -38.8 Personnel 176 212 206 204 -8.5 -2.5 Materials 121 187 170 162 -24.8 -8.3 Capital 116 169 153 145 -23.2 -7.9 Subsidies, o/w 295 245 347 328 82.7 -19.1 Fuel subsidy 165 137 217 198 60.4 -19.0 Social 71 55 48 53 -2.8 4.8 2. Transfers to the regions 411 479 482 480 0.9 -2.6 C. Primary balance 3 -72 -79 -59 13.3 19.9 D. SURPLUS / DEFICIT -90 -190 -191 -177 12.6 13.3 As percent of GDP -1.2 -2.2 -2.3 -2.1 0.1 0.2 Key economic assumptions/outcomes Economic growth (percent) 6.5 6.5 6.3-6.5 6.0 -0.5 n.a. CPI inflation (percent) 5.4 6.8 4.8 4.4 -2.4 -0.4 Exchange rate (IDR/USD) 8,742 9,000 9250 9,300 300.0 50.0 Crude oil price (USD/barrel) 111 105 110 110 5.0 0.0 Oil production ('000 barrels/day) 898 930 900 900 -30.0 0.0 Note: * 2011 is unaudited outcome. ** World Bank revenue estimates are based on a different methodology than the Government to derive projections for nominal GDP (see Part C of the June 2010 IEQ for a full discussion). *** the revised Budget includes the option of a IDR 1,500 fuel price increase provided the ICP price is on average, over a six month period, 15 percent above the revised Budget assumption of USD 105 per barrel Source: MoF and World Bank staff calculations 6. The lower risk of a hike in subsidized fuel prices subdues the inflation outlook After reaching a two-year Headline CPI inflation was 4.5 percent year-on-year in June 2012, close to one low in February 2012, percentage point up on the two-year low seen in February (Figure 18). However, inflation headline year-on-year remains below five percent, close to half the average in the previous decade, despite inflation has moved up by above average growth. This reflects the absence of large administered price shocks, close to 1 percentage point to 4.5 percent in subdued commodity price shocks and improved macro-prudential policy management. June 2012… Monthly inflation outturns have also been relatively subdued as good harvests increased food supplies. Core inflation, a better measure of underlying consumer price pressures, edged down to a 21-month low in May of 4.1 percent, before ticking up slightly in June. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 14 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Figure 18: Headline inflation has eased up but core inflation Figure 19: The gap between Indonesian and international remains relatively low rice prices once again moved towards record levels (price inflation, percent) (price difference, percent; wholesale rice price, IDR per kg) Percent Percent Percent IDR per kg 3 24 160 10,000 Vietnam 15 percent Domestic medium Food inflation yoy (RHS) broken (RHS) quality (RHS) 120 8,000 2 16 Core inflation Headline yoy (RHS) inflation yoy (RHS) 80 6,000 1 8 40 4,000 0 0 0 2,000 Headline inflation mom (LHS) Difference between domestic and -1 -8 international price (LHS) -40 0 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Note: yoy is year-on-year and mom is month-on-month Source: Cipinang Wholesale Rice Principal Market, Food and Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations Agriculture Organization and World Bank …as food price inflation The year-on-year rise in headline inflation was mainly due to an uptick in food price has picked up inflation to 7.2 percent in June. This followed the declines in food price inflation through 2011 and early 2012, as the food price highs of 2011 unwound, which resulted in an 8- year low of 2.9 percent in February 2012. The rise in food prices pushed the poverty basket inflation rate up from 6.3 percent in February to 7.7 percent in June. Looking across the consumer price index, the rate of price increases has been relatively even, with the dispersion of inflation rates across sub-components the lowest in eight years. Retreating gold prices have pushed down inflation for personal effects, a subcomponent of clothing and, while, with no changes in subsidized energy prices in more than a year, transport and household energy cost inflation remain moderate. The gap between The gap between domestic and international prices of rice eased during the harvest Indonesian and season before rising again in June (Figure 19). In June 2012, domestic wholesale rice international rice prices, prices were 86-95 percent higher (depending on quality) than comparable rice from which had fallen through international markets (from Thailand and Vietnam respectively), slightly down from the to May, moved back towards record highs in record gap of 72-100 percent in February 2012. The reduction in the price gap over the June harvest period was driven by three factors: a small increase in international rice prices; the depreciation of the Rupiah against the US dollar; and falling domestic rice prices due to improved production. In June, however monthly international rice prices declined by 5 percent and, coupled with the pick-up in domestic prices following the end of the harvest season, the gap increased back towards record highs. Near-term price The large near-term upside risks to the CPI inflation outlook from administered price expectations fell as a fuel reforms have largely subsided, with both electricity and fuel subsidized price hikes most price increase in 2012 likely off the agenda for 2012. As discussed further below, with oil prices falling, the became unlikely threshold condition to allow for a rise in the subsidized fuel price is unlikely to be met in 2012. Consumer price expectations came down following their previous increases related to the initial plans to hike fuel prices but, with Ramadan and Idul Fitri in August, near-term price expectations, as they usually do at this point, have begun to increase. CPI inflation is projected Under the baseline outlook, CPI inflation is project to rise to 5.0 percent year-on-year in to rise to 5.0 percent the final quarter of 2012 reflecting strong credit growth, still solid domestic demand and year-on-year in the final some pass-through to higher import prices of the depreciation of the Rupiah against the quarter of 2012, towards US dollar. This is towards the upper end of Bank Indonesia’s target range of 4.5% ± 1%. the upper end of BI’s target range of 4.5 Annual CPI inflation for 2012 as a whole is projected to be 4.4 percent. percent ± 1percent In 2013, inflation is projected to move up to 5.1 percent for the year as a whole, although downside risks persist should the external environment deteriorate further. The path for T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 15 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges administered prices is key to the outlook, with the baseline forecasts assuming no energy price rises. In terms of the likelihood of reform, electricity prices are more likely to be increased than any reforms to fuel prices. Domestic food price developments through Ramadan and Idul Fitri will also be particularly important for poverty basket inflation which, in the baseline scenario, is expected to ease to 7.0 percent in Q4 2012 and end 2013 at 7.6 percent. GDP deflator growth is The broad level of prices in the economy, as measured by the GDP deflator, rose by 6.0 also expected to pick up percent year-on-year in Q1 2012, the lowest rate since 2009. GDP deflator inflation is from its current lows projected to rise through the rest of 2012 to reach 7.2 percent for the year as a whole (with the low first quarter outcome contributing to the downward revision in the forecast). In 2013, annual GDP deflator growth is expected to continue rising, reaching 8.1 percent on the back of strengthening economic growth and credit conditions, but remaining well below the 14.5 percent average seen in the 4 years prior to the global financial crisis. 7. Poverty continues to fall, but at a slowing rate The poverty rate The official poverty rate fell from 12.5 percent in March 2011 to 12.0 percent in March continued to fall in the 2012. Both urban and rural areas experienced a decline, with urban poverty falling from year to March 2012, but 9.2 to 8.8 percent, and rural poverty from 15.7 to 15.1 percent. The highest rates of the rate of decline was poverty are in Eastern Indonesia, while the lowest are in Kalimantan (Figure 20). Poverty the lowest in a decade lines across the country increased on average by 6.4 percent to a consumption level of IDR 249,000 per person per month. While the poverty rate continued to fall, the 0.5 percentage point decline is the lowest drop in ten years, excluding the 2 percentage point increase in 2006. This reflects the slowing rate of poverty reduction evident in the last four years (Figure 21). Figure 20: The national poverty rate continued to decline in Figure 21: Poverty rates are relative high in Eastern 2012 but the fall was the lowest in the last decade Indonesia (change in poverty rate, percentage points; poverty rate, (poverty rate, percent) percent) Percent Percentage points 30 30 20 4 National poverty rate (LHS) 25 25 20 20 15 2 15 15 10 10 10 0 5 5 0 0 5 -2 Annual change in poverty rate (RHS) 0 -4 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations Note: NT is Nusa Tenggara Source: BPS There are a number of There are a number of possibilities for the relatively small fall in the poverty rate in 2012. possibilities for the One contributing factor apparent now is that that the prices for the goods and services relatively small fall in consumed by the poor have experienced a larger increase than those for the average poverty in 2012 household or the economy in general - the 6.4 percent increase in the poverty line in the year to March 2012 is higher than the corresponding increase in the GDP deflator (6.0 percent) or the rates of headline inflation (4.0 percent) and core inflation (4.3 percent). Evaluation of three other possibilities can also be conducted after the March 2012 Susenas household microdata become available. First, there could be a greater rate of new entry of individuals into poverty than in previous years. Second, the growth in nominal consumption for the poor could be less than that of the average household. Third, the year-on-year growth in GDP to March 2012 of 6.3 percent may be higher than the average growth in household consumption reported in the Susenas. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 16 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Slower poverty reduction The changing nature of the poor is also a factor. As the poverty rate nears 10 percent, may also reflect the poverty reduction is becoming more difficult. When poverty was 20 or 30 percent of the entrenched nature of the population, there were many people living just under the poverty line, so moderate remaining poor, as well increases in income brought a large number out of poverty. However, in recent times, as the large number of households vulnerable to there are fewer people just below the poverty line, with many of the remaining poor being falling into poverty much further below (Figure 22). As a consequence, greater increases in their income are required to achieve the same rate of poverty reduction as in previous years. At the same time as the remaining poor are increasingly far below the poverty line, the many people who have moved out of poverty in the last three decades still live close to the poverty line and remain vulnerable to falling back into poverty (Figure 23); over half of the poor in each year were not poor the year before. Figure 22: The remaining poor live increasingly far below the Figure 23: …while a large number of Indonesians just above poverty line… the poverty line remain vulnerable to falls back into poverty (average per capita consumption by percentile for bottom 20 (2011 monthly per capita consumption, 000 Rupiah) percent of population, as percentage of poverty line) Percent Percent Million of individuals Poverty Line (PL) (12.5 120 120 percent below) 10 Poverty line 1.2 X PL (24 percent 100 100 below) 8 1.5 X PL (38 percent 80 80 below) 6 60 60 Consumption relative to poverty line 4 40 40 2 20 20 0 0 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 Per capita consumption percentile Monthly Household Per Capita Consumption (IDR 000) Source: Susenas 2011 and World Bank staff calculations Source: Susenas 2011 and World Bank staff calculations Addressing these These two related phenomena of chronic poverty and widespread vulnerability mean problems of poverty and poverty reduction policies in Indonesia should focus on two objectives. First, social vulnerability requires promotion programs are required to help the remaining poor out of poverty through more effective income support and investment in their human capital. This includes programs in government programs Indonesia such as Scholarships for Poor Children (Beasiswa Siswa Miskin, or BSM) which allows poor families to meet the cost of education, and the conditional cash transfer program (Program Keluarga Harapan, or PKH) which provides cash transfers to the mothers of very poor households while promoting maternal and child health and school enrolment. However, coverage of these programs remains very low and needs to be increased to include the many poor who currently miss out. Second, social protection programs are required to protect the many more vulnerable households in Indonesia from falling into poverty.3 Some such programs exist, such as Rice for the Poor (Raskin) and Health Insurance for the Poor (Jamkesmas), but they experience problems of implementation and do not reach all of the poor and vulnerable. These programs need to be improved and expanded to cover all vulnerable households. At the same time, new programs are needed protect especially vulnerable groups, such as the destitute elderly and the disabled, or to provide work for the temporary unemployed. 3 For more details see the Part C of the April 2012 IEQ and the recently released World Bank (2012) report on Protecting Poor and Vulnerable Households in Indonesia, available at http://go.worldbank.org/5BWH4ZCQM0. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 17 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Employment growth in Turning to labor market Figure 24: Unemployment continued decline in year the year to February 2012 developments, total employment in to February 2012… was led by the industrial February 2012 rose by 1.4 percent (year-on-year growth, percent; unemployment rate, and services sectors… percent) year-on-year, pushing the open unemployment rate down by 0.5 Unemployment rate (LHS) percentage points to 6.3 percent Real GDP growth (LHS) (Figure 24). Based on GDP data for Non-agri employment rate (RHS) Q1 2012, each 1 percentage point Formal employment rate* (RHS) Percent Percent of GDP growth was associated with 12 65 an increase in employment of around 216,000, somewhat lower 9 55 than the average of around 400,000 in the past six years (although further analysis is 6 45 required to look into these trends in more detail). 3 35 The services and industrial sectors 0 25 were broadly equal drivers of this 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 employment growth with the former increasing by 3 percent, boosted by Note: Data for February. BPS changed the labor force the financial sector. Employment in survey weighting in February 2011. *Formal employment includes employers with, permanent industry increased by 6.4 percent workers and salaried workers and had the highest elasticity to Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculation GDP growth amongst the various sectors. …as jobs continue to The decline in agricultural employment in the year to February 2012 is consistent with the move away from longer-term trends. Over the past six years the share of total employees in non- agriculture and towards agricultural sectors increased from 56 percent to 63 percent. This transition to the non- more formal employment agriculture sector is one major factor why formal employment has picked up in recent years, although even within the formal sector the vast majority of workers do not have a contract. Interestingly, in line with increased demand for skilled labor, it was higher educated employees who contributed the most to employment growth over the past year and who also achieved the largest falls in unemployment rates. 8. External uncertainty remains the greatest near-term risk to the economy Risks in the international With the resolution of the Euro zone crisis still unclear, and the ongoing potential for other environment remain high downside shocks to hit the global outlook, such as from developments in China or other and are expected to major emerging economies, there continues to be a risk of more adverse scenarios for persist… Indonesia’s near-term external environment. The domestic real impact of such scenarios, even if they occur in the second half of 2012, would probably be felt most strongly in 2013 (although the financial market impacts would be more immediate). Indeed, it is likely that risks during 2013 will remain high given the likely continuation of problems in the Euro zone plus the ongoing fiscal challenges also faced in economies such as the US. …and, if realized in a The October 2011 IEQ outlined a number of alternative scenarios for the international severe global slowdown, environment. Assumptions were made for the likely path of trading partner growth, terms could push Indonesia’s of trade (primarily commodity prices) and domestic investment in each scenario which growth in 2013 below 4 then flow through to projected growth to provide some guide to the downside risks that the percent Indonesian economy might face. In the baseline scenario of continued financial market turbulence, as outlined above, growth is expected to moderate to 6.0 percent in 2012 before recovering slightly to 6.4 percent in 2013. In the event of a major freezing of international financial markets which contributes to a drop in trading partner growth, a fall in global commodity prices and reduced domestic investor confidence leading to a scenario similar to in 2009, it is projected that growth could slow to 4.7 percent in 2013 (Scenario 2 in Table 10). In a third scenario in which such a crisis was accompanied by, or indeed precipitated, a severe, prolonged global downturn encompassing the major emerging economies, growth in Indonesia could drop to 3.8 percent, with the impact of the slowdown felt more sharply in domestic activity as commodity price falls reduce incomes and investment. Developments T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 18 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges in China, for example, are of particular interest not just for commodity demand but also for the outlook for global commodity prices (see Box 4). It is also possible that if consumer and business sentiment drop particularly sharply, perhaps in conjunction with stresses in the domestic financial sector, this could push growth down further, below these scenario projections. Table 10: The impact of a global downturn on economic growth would be significant Scenarios: Outcomes Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Continuing Return to Severe global turmoil 2009 slowdown 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 Indonesian GDP growth (percent) 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.5 6.0 6.4 5.8 4.7 5.7 3.8 Scenario assumptions: Investment/GDP ratio (percent) 23.7 23.4 23.9 24.4 25.3 26.1 25.1 25.1 25.0 24.1 Major trading partner GDP growth (percent) 2.1 -0.7 7.2 3.6 3.3 3.7 2.3 0.1 1.9 -1.8 Terms of trade growth (percent) -18.1 -4.2 5.7 10.2 2.0 9.0 0.0 -15.0 0.0 -30.0 Note: 2012 and 2013 are projections. Terms of trade series is constructed by World Bank from monthly trade data Source: CEIC and World Bank staff projections The balance of payment Under the baseline scenario, Indonesia’s overall balance of payment is expected to outlook also remains register a small surplus in 2012, expanding slightly in 2013. Should the international uncertain and more environment move into either of the more negative scenarios, there could be significant adverse global scenarios implications for Indonesia’s balance of payments inflows, particularly in the third scenario. would put pressure on trade and capital flows Lower external demand and commodity prices would bring down the trade surplus and widen the current account further. Increased international market turbulence, and investor flight to quality, would likely lead to capital outflows, putting pressure on the Rupiah and domestic asset prices. Risks to the inflation The reduced likelihood of a fuel price increase in 2012 has reduced the near-term inflation outlook, while reduced, risks. However, inflation risks to the upside and downside remain sizeable. If growth remain sizeable… continues to be robust then inflation could surprise on the upside as capacity constraints tighten. Further the depreciation of the exchange rate could also feed into higher domestic prices (a 10 percent depreciation in the Rupiah against the USD is associated with roughly a 0.5-1 percentage point rise in headline inflation). However, greater-than- expected falls in external demand and global commodity prices would tend to dampen domestic inflation, both directly through import prices, and through their impact on income and demand in the economy. Finally, any changes in policy on administered prices, such as for electricity and fuel, would result in a significantly different outlook. …while subsidy spending Recent falls in crude oil prices have dampened the cost per liter of fuel subsidies. and disbursement However, spending in the first half of the year indicates the high risks of overspending challenges pose risks to relative to the revised Budget allocation (with the Government projecting total subsidy the Budget outlook spending IDR 100 trillion above the revised Budget level of IDR 245 trillion). The reforms measures to limit consumption are unlikely to have a sizeable impact on the level of spending, which continues to present a significant cost in terms of spending which could be better used on other development objectives and to more effectively support poor households. Set against this is lower spending due to the execution challenges mentioned above and discussed further in Part B. These two factors, along with the path of commodity prices, and hence revenues, are some of the main risks to the deficit outcome in 2012. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 19 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Box 2: The “China effectâ€? on global commodity prices Fluctuations in global commodity demand and prices are a key driver of the economic outlook for Indonesia, affecting the fiscal position, the trade balance and also domestic consumption and investment. Much of the recent rise in the volume of Indonesian commodity exports has been due to rising demand from China, but how important is Chinese demand as a driver of global commodity prices? As a global center of production, China has become an increasingly important source of commodity demand. In 2000, most of its exports were consumption goods, yet by 2009 capital goods accounted for about half of its exports (IMF, 2011). These goods tend to require larger quantities of natural resources as production inputs, explaining part of the surge in its appetite for commodities. Another source of Chinese commodity demand is investment in infrastructure and housing as the country moves up the income ladder. Demand is particularly strong for energy and metals. Chinese consumption of liquid fuels is a major driver of global energy demand (Figure 25). While in the year 2000, China accounted for 6.4 percent of global demand, it almost doubled by 2011 to 11.2 percent. The IMF anticipates that Chinese energy consumption is going to double by 2017 and triple by 2025 from its 2008 level. Figure 25: China’s appetite for energy is a key driver of Figure 26: China’s effect on commodity prices is global consumption of liquid fuels considerable – yet it still trails the US (contributions to year-on-year growth, percent) (contribution of variation in China’s demand to variation in commodity prices, percent) China Percent Percent USA Other OECD 16 16 Other Asia & Oceania Percent Rest of World 14 14 Percent China USA Total 4 4 12 12 10 10 2 2 8 8 6 6 0 0 4 4 2 2 -2 -2 0 0 -4 -4 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013f Source: Energy Information Administration Note: 4-quarter variance decomposition shock of one standard deviation in industrial output, showing the contribution of variation in China’s demand to variation in commodity prices. Data for 2000-2010 Source: IMF Given its weight as a major global consumer of raw materials, it is not surprising that China has a considerable effect on commodity prices. Jenkins (2011) estimates for the period 2002 to 2007 that China’s growth in demand for oil at 42.1 percentage points above global demand growth translated into an increase in global oil prices in the range of 10.8 to 27.1 percent. Between 2001 and 2011, China’s consumption of metals increased by 350 percent (World Metal Statistics). Its effect on global prices is particularly pronounced in copper, tin, aluminum, and nickel (Figure 26). However, although pressure on commodity prices from China has intensified significantly, it does not yet reach the same levels as pressures from the US (which remains the world’s largest economy). As China’s growth outlook dims, global commodity prices will ease. The persistent fragility of the global economy still dampens demand for Chinese exports. Domestic investment is likely to slow as tighter credit conditions curb activity in residential real estate and manufacturing. Moreover, restocking in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2009 is coming to an end as Chinese companies have rebuilt their inventories. Jointly, these factors are likely to reduce demand for many commodities – and indeed, as discussed earlier, recent months have seen declines in international commodity prices. It is however worth noting that a rebalancing in Chinese demand towards private consumption would add support to prices of products such as palm oil, vegetables, fish and meat, rubber for the production of tires, and other consumer-related commodities – many of which Indonesia also exports. Notes: This box is reproduced from the World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update (2012) and refers to Jenkins, R. (2011) “The ‘China effect’ on commodity prices and Latin American export earningsâ€?, CEPAL Review 103, and IMF(2011), “China: 2011 Article IV Consultationâ€?, IMF Country Report No. 11/192 T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 20 B. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA’S ECONOMY 1. Drivers and implications of recent trends in Indonesia’s current account Indonesia’s current Rapid domestic growth and weak external demand have seen Indonesia’s current account account balance has surplus (CAS) narrow substantially in recent years. The World Bank projects that been narrowing and is Indonesia will record an annual current account deficit (CAD) in 2012 for the first time projected to move into an since before the Asian financial crisis. While the recent weakening of the trade balance, annual deficit in 2012 for the first time since the as described in Part A, has accelerated the movement of the current account into deficit, Asian financial crisis this is also a medium-term trend. This section analyzes the drivers that underlie these recent dynamics in Indonesia’s current account, and discusses related issues of the sustainability of the deficit and its implications for Indonesia’s external financing position. a. Recent dynamics in Indonesia’s current account After maintaining a Prior to the Asian crisis, Indonesia experienced almost three decades of strong economic current account deficit expansion, driven by industrialization, urbanization and the reduction of trade barriers, through the 1980s and which saw the economy became more globally integrated.4 As in many other countries, 1990s, the fundamentals this rapid ‘catch-up’ phase of economic development required a significant increase in the of Indonesia’s external accounts changed during investment rate, with investment-to-GDP rising from 28.5 percent in 1980 to 37.2 percent the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Given low domestic savings, this investment was financed by borrowing from overseas with the current account deficit averaging around 3 percent of GDP annually (see Box 3 for a description of the current account). Current account outflows were financed by short-term loans and portfolio capital inflows. The sudden withdrawal of external financing during the Asian financial crisis saw Indonesia’s current account swing to a surplus as the currency depreciated heavily, followed by policy reforms aimed at reducing external debt and building domestic buffers against sudden stops in foreign capital flows. In recent years, Indonesia Since 1998 Indonesia’s current account has generally remained in surplus, with export has maintained a current earnings more than offsetting imports and income payments to foreign investors. This account surplus, reflects an increase in savings relative to investment compared to before the Asian contributing to the build- financial crisis, reflecting more conservative investment practices and lending regulations. up of foreign reserves The persistent current account surplus has also helped to provide a source of external financing in recent years, lowering vulnerabilities to sudden capital stops, and has contributed to the four-fold increase in foreign reserves over the past decade. Yet, the current account However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, strong domestic conditions combined with has been trending down ongoing weakness in the global economy have resulted in a narrowing of the current since the 2008 global account surplus, as imports and income outflows related to increasing FDI (particularly in financial crisis… the mining & minerals sector) have grown faster than exports earnings. 4 Elias & Noone (2011), “The Growth and Development of the Indonesian Economyâ€?, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, December. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 21 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Table 11: The current account surplus is projected to shift into a deficit in 2012 (USD billions, unless otherwise stated) 20-year 5-year average average 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Current Account 2.7 6.4 13.6 5.6 1.7 -7.9 -4.6 -7.4 percent of GDP 0.9 1.2 2.5 0.8 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 -0.6 Trade Balance 8.1 19.3 21.2 21.3 23.3 11.3 15.7 15.2 Goods 20.6 30.2 30.9 30.6 33.9 Services -12.5 -10.9 -9.7 -9.3 -10.6 Income balance -10.2 -18.5 -15.1 -20.8 -25.8 -23.8 -25.2 -27.4 Transfers balance 2.3 4.8 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.6 4.8 4.7 Source: BI and World Bank Box 3: What is the current account balance? A country’s current account balance records all transactions with the rest of the world related to the exchange of goods and services (trade balance), an income balance, and current transfers. The income balance records net interest and dividend payments and earnings of domestically owned firms operating abroad, while the last component reflects net payments (that do not 5 correspond to purchases of any good, service, or asset) received from the rest of the world. Current Account = Trade Balance + Income Balance + Current Transfers Balance Taken another way, the current account reflects the difference between savings and investment in an economy. If an economy consumes and invests more than it produces or receives in income or transfers, i.e. it runs a current account deficit, it must be borrowing from foreigners to finance this deficit or equivalently its national savings are lower than investment. Thus a current account deficit allows a country to borrow now to fund investment which cannot be financed from national savings, and repay later out of higher national income. There are also important economic linkages between the current account and a country’s net international investment position (NIIP). A country’s NIIP reflects the build-up – or stock – of an economy’s financial transactions with the rest of the world. In the absence of valuation changes, the level of the current account, i.e. an economy’s net saving, will equal the change in the NIIP in a period. This is, however, rarely the case: valuation changes reflecting asset price and currency movements also impact the stock of foreign assets and liabilities during a period. The sum of current account transactions and valuation changes therefore give the change in a country’s NIIP. A CAD also has implications for short-term financing, as it will add to a country’s gross external financing needs. Although borrowing and investing now against future income can provide an effective means to accelerate economic development, a CAD also increases a nation’s dependence on foreign capital inflows. An economy’s external financing needs in a given year comprise all medium- and long-term debt which will amortize, plus any short-term debt falling due, plus any current deficit that needs financing. On the other hand a current account surplus would provide additional external financing sources. …recording a deficit in Recent falls in commodity prices and weak external demand have accelerated the trend the past two quarters, as towards a CAD, with Indonesia recording a deficit in Q4 2011 and Q1 2012 (Figure 27). imports growth has Q1 2012 saw the CAD widen to USD 2.9 billion (1.3 percent of GDP) from USD 1.6 billion continued to outpace (0.7 percent of GDP) in Q4 2011. As a ratio to GDP the current account deficit is only sluggish exports growth around half the average deficit prior to the Asian financial crisis. The widening in the CAD was driven by a sharp fall in the goods trade surplus to USD 3.5 billion, down from USD 6.4 billion in Q4 2011 and USD 9.4 billion in Q3 2011. The narrowing has primarily been driven by weak non-oil and gas export volumes, consistent with slowing industrial production in major trading partners. By sector, mining and manufacturing exports have fallen, particularly to China. On the imports side, non-oil and gas imports have been rising due to increased demand for capital and intermediate goods as inputs to domestic investment. Imports of oil and gas have also been rising, reflecting strong consumption and industrial activity. Meanwhile the services deficit has been trending wider in recent years as demand for freight services has 5 Previously referred to as Workers’ Remittances, this category was amended in the IMF Balance of th Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6 edition (2007) to reflect all transfers between residents and non-residents, regardless of the source of income or the relationship between the households. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 22 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges increased with higher bulk commodity export volumes, combined with an increase in Indonesian residents travelling abroad. The income deficit has also increased, due to increased profit repatriation in line with rising FDI inflows in recent years. Figure 27: The recent move into a current account deficit is Figure 28: …and is projected to remain at around 1 percent part of a medium-term trend… of GDP over the medium-term (USD billion) (USD billion; percent of GDP) Goods trade balance Services trade balance USD billion Percent of GDP Income balance Current transfers 15 6 USD billion USD billion 10 4 15 15 5 2 10 10 USD value 0 0 5 5 -5 -2 0 0 -10 -4 Relative to GDP (RHS) -5 -5 -15 -6 -10 -10 -20 -8 -25 -10 -15 -15 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Mar-06 Sep-07 Mar-09 Sep-10 Mar-12 Source: Bank Indonesia Sources: historical IMF data, World Bank projections Robust domestic Looking ahead, the current account is expected to record an annual deficit for 2012, and demand, combined with continue to widen in dollar terms over the medium-term (although remaining below 1 ongoing global economic percent of GDP, Figure 28). The move towards a CAD is not unexpected. Rather, it weakness, is projected to reflects the relative strength of the domestic economy and is consistent with Indonesia’s push the current account into deficit growing demand for foreign savings to finance strong domestic investment and economic expansion. Current account deficits There is no strict causality between a current account deficit and poor economic and surpluses may arise performance. As mentioned, a CAD can allow an economy to front-load investment, for a variety of reasons supporting economic growth and improvements in social outcomes. As discussed in Part C, financing the deficit through increased FDI, and the imports of capital goods which may contribute to the current account position, can also have potential positive spillovers to productivity, wages, and the transfer of management skills and technology. A current account deficit can also reflect a relative abundance of investment opportunities, which can attract greater foreign capital inflows, particularly stable FDI funding. However, there may be concerns if a CAD reflects funding of speculative investment opportunities that do not increase the productive capacity of an economy and which are financed by short-term capital flows that are vulnerable to sudden stops. Conversely, a CAS could imply there are insufficient domestic opportunities for high quality investment, leading residents to channel their savings overseas. This deprives the domestic economy of capital to finance infrastructure and private sector development. It is also worth noting that the world economy cannot operate with all countries running a CAS. b. Long-term sustainability and near-term financing Current account CAD sustainability – the ability of a country to run a CAD over an extended period of time sustainability refers to – is linked to its capacity to repay the related accumulated stock of foreign debts through the willingness and ability future trade surpluses, and whether foreign investors are both willing and able to lend to of an economy to repay the country to finance the CAD in the short-term. Part and parcel of this are foreign current borrowings and foreign investors’ investors’ perceptions regarding the economy’s willingness and ability to meet its debt willingness to lend to an obligations and ability to do so. This perception improves with the quality of investment economy projects and the macroeconomic policy environment of the country. Sustainability can also refer to an assessment of whether a continuation of the current stance is vulnerable to shifts in policy or external shocks which will require a sharp rebalancing of the economy, such as a tightening of monetary or fiscal policy to reduce imports. If the answer is yes, the imbalance is unsustainable. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 23 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Indonesia’s external debt As of end-2010 Indonesia’s recorded net international investment position showed USD position is viewed as 422 billion in liabilities, of which USD 154 billion were the stock of FDI liabilities, set sustainable against USD 133 billion in assets. The move towards a CAD is expected to add to Indonesia’s net liability position. Focusing on external debt liabilities (which were equivalent to 27 percent of GDP at end-2011), the sustainability assessment of the 2011 IMF Article IV report concluded that Indonesia’s external debt position is sustainable over the medium-term. The relatively modest current account deficit is expected to be more than offset by relatively high growth, increasing non-debt creating (i.e., FDI and equity) flows and some further real appreciation. The IMF’s shock analysis also suggests that external sustainability is robust to most shocks, with the external debt ratio expected to trend down and remain at manageable levels under all standardized shock scenarios. Yet it remains important As mentioned above, the move to a current account deficit will add to Indonesia’s external to ensure the economy financing needs. However, it is likely to remain a relatively low share of the overall can meet its short-term financing requirements. For example, over the past two quarters in which Indonesia financing needs, recorded a CAD, the country’s servicing of the principle due on external debt was USD particularly during periods of acute financial 32.9 billion and USD 39.8 billion, respectively. The CAD in each of these quarters (USD market stress 1.6 billion and USD 2.9 billion, respectively) was only a small fraction of this value and were fully covered by net non-debt creating inflows (net direct investment and net equity inflows of USD 2.6 billion and USD 3.0 billion, respectively). In a baseline scenario of continued solid FDI performance this situation would be expected to continue, although a sharp weakening in external demand and commodity prices and rise in financial market volatility could clearly affect this outlook. The composition of The changing composition of Figure 29: FDI has become a larger proportion of total Indonesia’s net capital Indonesia’s capital inflows is financial account inflows since 2008-09 inflows have changed in also important when looking (USD billion) recent years, with direct at foreign investors’ Direct Investment Portfolio Investment investment now a larger perceptions of the Other Investment Current Account share of net inflows sustainability of the emerging USD billion USD billion CAD. Prior to the global 30 30 Forecast financial crisis, FDI 25 25 represented around 50 20 20 percent of gross financial 15 15 account inflows. This ratio fell 10 10 to around 25 percent in 2009. 5 5 However, a strong recovery in 0 0 FDI inflows in recent years saw the ratio rise to 65 -5 -5 percent in 2011. World Bank -10 -10 projections are for FDI to -15 -15 remain at around 60 percent 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 of total financial account Source: BI historical data and World Bank projections inflows over the forecast horizon. The outlook for FDI is key High long-term FDI flows, as opposed to short-term portfolio flows, are an important factor to current account in reducing the external financing risks of an economy. For example, recent work by sustainability and Levchenko and Mauro (2006) concludes that FDI helps protect countries from sudden stability of financing stops in capital flows.6 As outlined in the June 2011 IEQ, the underlying drivers of FDI inflows to Indonesia appear positive, with average quarterly FDI during Q1 2010 – Q1 2012 more than three times higher than the five-year average before the 2008/09 global downturn. These FDI inflows are also broad based, and becoming more geographically disbursed across the archipelago, as foreign companies seek access to Indonesia’s large consumer base, natural resources and to take advantage of lower production costs to service export markets. However, they are sensitive to the regulatory and investment climate. 6 Levchenko, A. and Mauro, P. (2006) “Do Some Forms of Financial Flows Help Protect from Sudden Stops?â€? Working paper WP/06/202. International Monetary Fund. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 24 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges c. Recent policy measures to mitigate external vulnerabilities The authorities in Aside from prudent macro policy management and building foreign reserves, authorities Indonesia have taken have undertaken a range of regulatory reforms to help mitigate Indonesia’s external steps to reduce the vulnerabilities and to reduce the potential for short-term capital flows to destabilize the economy’s exposure to domestic economy and financial markets. BI has gradually reduced the stock of central both foreign capital withdrawals and bank bills (SBI) on issuance, replaced short-term 1, 3 and 6 month bills with term deposit domestic capital flight facilities, and introduced a 6-month holding period on SBI. These measures have seen the share of SBI owned by foreigners drop from 39 percent in May 2011 to less than 2 percent at the end of May 2012. BI has also combined regulatory reform and incentives to encourage domestic firms and investors to hold capital onshore, to mitigate a possible sudden flight of domestic savings. These policies include requiring companies to repatriate all foreign-currency export earnings to domestic banks, capping the value of forex purchases by residents for savings purposes, and introducing a range of USD term deposit products. As mentioned in Part A, the Government has also advanced crisis preparedness through improved coordination of a Crisis Management Protocol, as well as adding significant fiscal buffers to the 2012 Budget, including: a framework to support domestic bonds prices; and contingency plans to support a rapid government response to crisis or emergency situations.7 Sustainable financing of Policies to reduce the economy’s reliance on volatile capital flows and increase stable the CAD requires stable long-term foreign investment are vital to improving the nation’s capacity to meet both its long-term investment short and medium-term external financing needs. While Indonesian policymakers cannot inflows, which can be control the international “push factorsâ€?, such as a high-income economy interest rates or supported by policies to improve the investment growth, behind foreign capital flows, the authorities can help to provide a conducive climate and domestic environment for business and investment by putting in place policies to promote competiveness a stable and open investment climate and increased private-sector competitiveness. Policy consistency and communication are also critical for attracting long-term investment and mitigating volatile short-term capital flows. Managing policy changes to avoid uncertainty or confusion in the policy environment, and to consider the long-term, as well as the short-term, implications of policy can help to support longer-term investments. In this regard, recent policy announcements regarding trade restrictions and ownership limits in the banking and mining sectors appear to have already increased investor uncertainty. d. Concluding remarks Indonesia’s move Overall, as outlined in Part A, the baseline outlook for Indonesia’s economy remains solid, towards a current although downside risks remain high. Strong domestic growth and a relatively weak account deficit reflects its external environment are gradually pushing Indonesia towards a CAD – a development relatively strong domestic which is common for a rapidly-growing emerging economy with high investment needs economic conditions but, in the current fragile and low domestic savings. Baseline projections are for Indonesia to attract sufficient long- international term non-interest bearing capital inflows, such as FDI, to service the CAD over the coming environment, it will be years. important to monitor developments closely, However, investor sentiment remains sensitive to adverse commodity price shocks that particularly related to could widen the current account deficit and to further global market volatility which could short-term external intensify financing pressures. In this regard, recent policy changes to reduce Indonesia’s financing exposure to volatile capital outflows are welcome, as is the emphasis on improving areas such as infrastructure. A lack of clarity or consistency on trade and investment policies, however, could undermine foreign investor confidence with potential implications for both short-term portfolio and longer-term FDI flows. In the current fragile international environment monitoring the drivers of the CAD and the sources of Indonesia’s short-term external financing can also play an important role in the early identification of dynamics which may give rise to any concerns over both long-term trends and near-term financing pressures. 7 For example, the Budget Law 2012 provides the legal basis for the Government to seek parliamentary approval, within 24 hours of submission, to respond to an emergency event, as outlined in the law. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 25 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges 2. Identifying the constraints to budget execution in the infrastructure sector Timely budget execution Timely budget execution and sound public financial and management (PFM) institutions and sound public are key to achieving development targets and outcomes. In Indonesia’s case improving financial management budget execution is all the more important given the recent steep increase in the budget institutions are critical in allocation for key infrastructure sectors to address infrastructure shortfalls. Timely budget delivering public services and achieving execution is even more critical during an economic slowdown as expenditure policy is a development outcomes key countercyclical tool with can be used to inject demand into the economy. Indeed, understanding the challenges and constraints facing budget execution can help policy makers better prepare and respond to any potential shocks, for example emanating from a deteriorating external environment. Drawing on recent analysis, this section discusses key issues in the execution of the central government budget and policy options to address those challenges.8 The study was conducted by analyzing 36 samples of DIPA (Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggara, Budget Warrant) in the infrastructure sector at each stage of budget execution (budget preparation, procurement, and implementation) and by identifying gaps between plans and actual implementation. It was carried out in four locations through data analysis, focus group discussions, and in-depth interviews with stakeholders including officials of the project implementing unit (Satker), officials at the local treasury offices (KPPN), and selected contractors. The objective of the study was to identify constraints in budget execution in 2010 and to assess the effectiveness of reforms that have since been introduced to address these constraints. Budget execution in the Weak disbursements of the budget in 2010 and 2011 highlight ongoing challenges with infrastructure sector budget execution. In 2010, all key infrastructure sectors saw actual spending come in continues to be a below the budgeted amount. In both 2010 and 2011, less than 85 percent of the revised challenge in Indonesia capital expenditure budget was disbursed, notwithstanding an increase in nominal terms of 44 percent in actual capital expenditure between 2010 and 2011. Most budget increases were allocated to key infrastructure sectors (Figure 30 and Figure 31). In addition, more than 50 percent of total disbursements occurred in the last quarter of those two years. These slow and low disbursement patterns are likely to reoccur in 2012. In the first half 2012, disbursement of capital expenditure improved slightly but remained low at 18 percent of the full year budget allocation (see Part A). (For cross country analysis of government spending disbursement profiles please see Dec 2010 IEQ). Figure 30: Key infrastructure sectors received significant Figure 31: But low 2010 and 2011 budget outcomes budget increases in 2011 highlighted the ongoing challenges in budget execution (IDR trillion, nominal) (IDR trillion, nominal) IDR trillion IDR Trillion 2009 Revised Budget 2009 Actual 50 50 2010 Revised Budget 2010 Actual Irrigation Energy 2011 Budget 2011 Actual Transport. IDR trillion IDR trillion 40 40 50 50 40 40 30 30 30 30 20 20 20 20 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Irrigation Energy Transport Telecom. WSS Source: Ministry of Finance & World Bank staff calculations Note: WSS is water supply and sanitation Source: Ministry of Finance & World Bank staff calculations 8 This section draws upon a recent joint publication, DIPA Tracking Study: Identifying the constraints to budget execution in the infrastructure sector (2012), between the Fiscal Policy Office of the Ministry of Finance, Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat Universitas Indonesia (LPEM-UI), and the World Bank. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 26 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges The Government has The Government has recently established a budget execution task force (TEPPA or Tim introduced a number of Evaluasi dan Pengawasan Penyerapan Anggaran) to closely monitor and to eliminate measures to accelerate bottlenecks constraining budget execution. TEPPA is led by the Presidential Work Unit for budget execution Supervising and Controlling Development (UKP4 or Unit Kerja Presiden Bidang performance Pengawasan dan Pengendalian Pembangunan) and co-led by the Ministry of Finance and the State Development Audit Agency (BPKP). Other measures that have been introduced include: streamlining budget preparation and payment processes; implementation of a new regulation on procurement (Perpres No. 54/2010), and; the implementation of guidance on budget execution (Perpres No. 53/2010, a second revision of Keppres No. 42/2002), which provides flexibility on Satker (work unit) personnel appointments. a. Delays during budget preparation present the main bottlenecks, with procurement and implementation also affecting disbursements Critical constraints can The assessment of budget execution was divided into three stages: budget preparation, be identified in each step procurement, and implementation. The performance of budget execution is influenced by of budget execution many factors such as the nature of the project (maintenance and operation, or construction), the length of a project, and the source of funding. The implementation is not only influenced by internal factors within Satker or the respective line ministry, but also by external factors such as other line ministries, lower-level governments, parliament, and other institutions. Thus, issues identified in budget implementation vary widely from technical, capacity, policy and regulation, and institutional. Nonetheless, some critical issues commonly emerge as constraints during budget execution (Figure 32). Figure 32: Identified critical issues within each step of budget execution in 2010 and 2011 I. Budget Preparation II. Procurement III. Implementation Others • Appointment of Satker • Lengthy objection and • Complex and lengthy land • Lack of socialization and personnel still experience appeal process acquisition process insufficient time for delays and remain single year • Lack of utilization of early • Skewed disbursement preparation prior to • Bintang (blocked DIPA) procurement flexibility toward end of fiscal year implementation of new practice policies that affect budget • Lengthy DIPA revision process execution Source: DIPA Tracking Study: Identifying the constraints to budget execution in the infrastructure sector (2012) Delays and complexities Although the procurement and implementation stages also face some challenges, delays during budget during budget preparation are the most critical and significantly affect subsequent preparation appear to be activities (Figure 32). Long-standing issues remain the primary reasons for delays during the most critical issue budget preparation. Those include: administrative delays in the Satker receiving the DIPA constraining budget execution (although the DIPA are approved before the fiscal year) and delays in appointing Satker personnel; the lengthy process of DIPA revision and unblocking blocked (bintang) DIPA; poor planning and budgeting due to weak capacity of the Satker; and the budget details of the appropriation process (approval by Parliament) being at a highly disaggregated level - i.e. not only at the ministry or project level, but also at the activity level as well as by type of expenditure. The procurement process The procurement process is regulated by a new procurement regulation (Perpres No. also faces challenges and 54/2010, a revision of Keppres No. 80/2003) which became effective in 2011. This has delays brought with it some new challenges on account of a number of structural changes introduced by the new regulation. For instance a lack of familiarity with the new system has resulted in multiple interpretations and has caused procurement committees to adopt an overly cautious approach during the procurement process. The objection-and-appeal procedures, which aim to improve transparency, were introduced with no clear time limits, significantly affecting the procurement process. The lack of human resources (certified procurement specialists as required by the law) and inadequate infrastructure to support e-procurement (e.g., limited bandwidth) were also often identified as constraints by Satker personnel. A weak incentive structure for Satker personnel, coupled with growing concerns over the heightened level of fiduciary (audit) control, also discourages Satker personnel performance in project implementation. The flexibility to conduct early procurement before the fiscal year, to accelerate procurement process as allowed by the new regulation, has also not been effective. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 27 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges The lengthy and complex Although project implementation depends on the nature of the project, large-scale land acquisition process construction projects that have a land acquisition component often experienced delays is the main constraint due to the lengthy and complex processes, coupled with coordination issues. About two during the thirds of the Satker in the sample indicated that they faced problems in land acquisition. implementation stage For example, Satker development of the Double Track Railway 2010 experienced significant gaps between the planned and actual implementation progress due to delays in land acquisition process (Figure 33). Meanwhile, non-construction projects (maintenance and operation) were mostly implemented as expected. For example, a road maintenance activity (carried out by Highway Construction and Maintenance West Java 2010) was implemented as planned as it did not require land acquisition (Figure 34). Figure 33: Physical progress on the Double Track (2010) Figure 34: Actual physical progress of the Highway project experienced significant delays relative to plans Construction and Maintenance West Java (2010) project (plan and actual cumulative physical progress, percent) was in line with the plan (plan and actual cumulative physical progress, percent) Percent Percent Percent Percent 100 100 100 100 Plan Plan Actual Actual 80 80 80 80 60 60 60 60 40 40 40 40 20 20 20 20 0 0 0 0 Jan Jun Aug Sep Mar May Jul Nov Dec Apr Feb Oct May Jan Jun Jul Nov Dec Mar Apr Feb Aug Sep Oct Source: Satkers and KPPN Office Source: Satkers and KPPN Office Financial disbursement is The first disbursements of capital expenditure generally occur at the end of the first skewed towards the end quarter and vary by the nature of the project. There are inconsistencies when comparing of the fiscal year disbursement plans against actual spending caused by delays in starting implementation of projects, delays at the Satker in processing payments, and contractors’ preference for submitting invoices for payment at the end of the fiscal year as many contractors feel that the payment procedures are cumbersome (see example in Figure 35). There is still no clear monitoring system and a lack of enforcement to monitor the process by which the Satker issue payment orders to local treasury offices (KPPNs). However, similar to project implementation, the financial disbursement of non-construction activity (maintenance and operational) remained in accordance with the plan (Figure 36). The implementation of While new policies on budget efficiency and optimization are expected to enhance the some policies in 2011 quality of spending, insufficient experience and time for preparation prior to (e.g., budget efficiency implementation has negatively affected budget execution (e.g., through multiple DIPA and budget optimization) revisions). Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 7/2011 on Budget Efficiency required all had an adverse impact on budget execution line ministries to cut/reduce their budgets by a minimum of 10 percent. Ministry of Finance Regulation PMK No. 38/2011 regarding budget optimization aimed to provide rewards and punishments to line ministries based on efficiencies in procurement in 2010. Most Satker consequently had to revise their DIPA and budget details (POK). The utilization of budget optimization and reallocation of the 10 percent savings were decided in March, which slowed down Satker’s performance and left insufficient time for proper planning. As a result, new initiatives/activities for budget optimization were blocked and were not fully spent. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 28 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Figure 35: Financial disbursements on the Power Plant Figure 36: …while disbursements for the Highway Agency and Transmission Sulawesi-Maluku-Papua (2010) project of West Java Province (2010), a non-construction project, were skewed towards the year end… were more evenly spread through the year (cumulative financial progress of plan and actual, percent (cumulative financial progress of plan and actual, percent of total; monthly financial disbursements, IDR billion) of total; monthly financial disbursements, IDR billion) Monthly plan (RHS) Monthly plan (RHS) Monthly disbursement (RHS) Monthly disbursement (RHS) Cumulative plan (LHS) Cumulative plan (LHS) Cumulative actual disbursement (LHS) Cumulative actual disbursement (LHS) Percent IDR billion Percent IDR billion 100 125 100 20 80 100 80 16 60 75 60 12 40 50 40 8 20 25 20 4 0 0 0 0 July May Apr Jan Oct June Aug Sept Mar Nov Dec Feb July Mar May Apr Jan Feb June Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Source: Satkers and KPPN Office Source: Satkers and KPPN Office b. Addressing budget execution challenges is critical for Indonesia Intensive monitoring and Budget implementation for 2012 is currently entering the second half of the fiscal year. providing coordinated Accordingly, efforts to accelerate budget execution can be focused on high-risk projects and targeted assistance that are likely to experience delays - such as large capital and priority projects and those to identified high-risk that have previously experienced problems during the preparation phase. This can be projects may be warranted to assist in the done through close monitoring and by providing targeted support to selected line implementation of the ministries and Satkers. To this end, TEPPA has been very active in monitoring and 2012 budget coordinating with line ministries to accelerate budget execution. In addition, the introduction of any new policies should take into account potential adverse impacts on budget execution and allow enough time for understanding the new regulations and preparing accordingly prior to implementation. Otherwise this could exacerbate an already complex budget execution process and delay implementation. Streamlining some Accelerating the issuance of the new government regulation (PP) on budget execution procedures and which is currently under preparation, can address some of the constraints and regulatory regulation relating to inconsistencies in budget preparation and execution in 2013 and in the medium term. The budget preparation, recurring administrative delays can be reduced by minimizing the application of procurement, and implementation can conditional budget approval or blocked (bintang) DIPA and further streamlining budget accelerate the revision procedures. implementation of the 2013 budget The procurement process can also be improved in 2013, particularly by optimizing the flexibility to conduct early procurement before the fiscal year, allocating the necessary resource for e-procurement implementation, and improving understanding of the regulation across line ministries and Satkers. Streamlining the objection-and-appeal procedure (e.g., increasing the deposit for submitting an objection and introducing clear limits on the number and duration of appeals and objections) can also help. Finally, linking performance of the procurement committee members to Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) can provide incentive for the committee to improve their performance. In addition, expediting the finalization of government regulation on land acquisition in order for the newly approved law (Law 2/2012) to be effective is critical in enhancing land acquisition process which has been the main bottleneck in infrastructure project implementation. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 29 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges In the medium term, In the medium term, efforts to improve budget execution should be closely aligned with the efforts to accelerate ongoing broader PFM reforms including the implementation of Performance Based Budget budget execution should (PBB) and Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). To this end, one of the be part of broader Public important elements is providing increasing authority to line ministries (Echelon 1 officials) Financial Management (PFM) reforms to deal with DIPA revisions within the activity level. This can speed up budget preparation and implementation through strengthened ex-post control and audit. Therefore, current detailed input-based budget appropriation by Parliament is no longer in line with the current reforms towards performance-based budgeting, suggesting that budget appropriation (approval by parliament) should be at a more aggregated level. In addition, efforts should be made to gradually discontinue the practice of using blocked DIPA (bintang) or conditional budget approval. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 30 C. INDONESIA 2014 AND BEYOND: A SELECTIVE LOOK 1. Investing in Indonesia’s roads Reliable and accessible Road vehicles are the predominant mode of transport in Indonesia, accounting for 70 road infrastructure are percent of freight ton-km and 82 percent of passenger-km. Roads play a critical role in important for economic facilitating inter-urban passenger movements, in linking communities and markets, and in growth and poverty sustaining the country’s international competitiveness. Roads, and other transport modes, reduction, as the Government of Indonesia can also help poverty reduction progress and provide access to education and health strongly recognizes services, particularly in rural areas. The Government recognizes this importance and improved road infrastructure is one of the focuses of the Master Plan for Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia Economic Development (MP3EI), which provides the basis for supporting the connectivity agenda. This section outlines the current state of Indonesia’s road network, the levels of investment and potential ways to support improved performance of the sector going forward.9 a. Under-investment, undersupply and deterioration in quality Indonesia’s investment in After a steep decline in the Figure 37: After a steep fall, Indonesia’s investment in roads roads has returned to the late 1990s road investment has only now returned to pre 1997/1998 crisis levels … pre-1997/1998 financial returned to the pre- (IDR trillion 2007 prices; total as percent of GDP) crisis level after a sharp 1997/1998 financial crisis decline in late 1990s… Central Province LGs SOEs Private level of 1.6 percent of GDP (Figure 37), although overall IDR trillion (2007 Prices) Percent of GDP infrastructure investment 80 2.00 has only partially returned to 70 1.75 pre-crisis levels. The public Relative to GDP (RHS) 60 1.50 sector has historically been 50 1.25 the major player in road sector investment and the 40 1.00 recovery in road investment 30 0.75 has been largely dominated 20 0.50 by district governments, following the implementation 10 0.25 of decentralization in 2001. 0 0.00 Private sector and state 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 owned enterprises (SOEs) Note: SOE: state-owned enterprise; LG: local government contributions have Source: Ministry of Finance (processed) for central and sub- historically been small and national governments; annual reports for state-owned only concentrated on a few enterprises; World Bank PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure toll road developments. Advisory Facility) database for private investment 9 This section draws upon the forthcoming World Bank publication Investing in Indonesia’s Roads: Improving Efficiency and Closing the Financing Gaps. For an overview of overall infrastructure investment in Indonesia, please see June 2011 IEQ. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 31 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges ….but this level of The current level of road Figure 38: … but no longer keeps pace with increasing investment no longer investment no longer keeps traffic demand and growth keeps pace with pace with rapid increases in (number of vehicles, million) increasing traffic demand traffic demand and is and growth Passenger car Bus Truck Motor cycle inadequate to address a decade of maintenance Millions Millions backlogs. The total vehicle 80 80 fleet has increased threefold 70 70 between 2001 and 2010 and 60 60 is projected to continue increasing for the 50 50 foreseeable future. The 40 40 number of passenger cars, 30 30 buses, and trucks registered 20 20 rapid growth of above 20 percent annually between 10 10 2005 and 2010 (Figure 38). 0 0 However, the national road 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 network that serves more Source: BPS than one third of vehicle traffic (in vehicle-km) only grew by a quarter during the same period. Furthermore, the availability and quality of Indonesia’s road infrastructure lags those of some regional peers, and trip times are longer (Figure 39 and Figure 40). The demographic road density (2.0 km per 1,000 people) and spatial road density (200 km per 1,000 km2) are below average when compared with regional and international benchmarks. Figure 39: …which led to a deterioration in road Figure 40: …and higher transport cost in term of trip time infrastructure and services (average trip time, hour per 100 km, 2010-2011) (Quality of road infrastructure index, 2010-2011) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 hr/100km 3 Developing Asia Vietnam ASEAN Indonesia Indonesia China China Thailand Thailand Malaysia Singapore Malaysia 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 hr/100km 3 Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 Report 2010-2011 The condition of the road In 2009, the total length of the classified road network in Indonesia was reported to be network is particularly 477,079 km (Table 12). This excludes non-engineered village roads (jalan poor at the district and desa/lingkungan) in the order of 244,000 km. It is important to note that national roads city level and needs to be have the highest network utilization (vehicle-km/year) of 34 percent, although they properly maintained and expanded represent only 8.8 percent of total road network. The utilization of district/city roads is at 33 percent even though they account for nearly 80 percent of the network. On quality, the national roads are classified as mostly in good condition, while sub-national roads are largely in bad and poor condition. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 32 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Table 12: The state of Indonesia’s road network, 2009 Length 2 lane equivalent Paved Good & Fair Bad & Poor Asset value Network Utilization (km) (percent of total) (percent of Condition Condition (percent of (percent of total total) (percent of (percent of GDP vehicle km per total) total) year) National 38,570 8.8 91 86 14 2.8 34 Provincial 48,691 9.7 81 63 27 2.3 19 District/city 384,810 79.9 55 43 57 10.1 33 Jakarta 6,266 1.3 79 64 36 0.3 10 Toll 742 0.3 100 96 4 0.1 4 Total 477,079 100 61 54 46 15.6 100 Sources: DGH-Ministry of Public Work, BPS, and World Bank staff estimates using RONET b. National roads are in good condition, but heavily congested National roads, including National road condition has improved in recent years. About 86 percent of national roads tolled expressways, are are currently in good condition, which is well above the developing country average of 70 mostly well maintained, percent. This improvement in national road condition reflects a recent emphasis on but traffic congestion is national road maintenance. However, there has been only a marginal increase in new prevalent road construction. As a result, there is a strong concentration of traffic in the urban centers and on the regional roads and road travel speeds are consequently relatively low, in the order of 40 to 45 km/hr on many national routes. Overloaded vehicles on regional main roads are prevalent due to the low level of enforcement, while the extent of damage is exacerbated by ineffectual vehicle inspections, and poor vehicle maintenance. Progress with expressway and toll road development has been exceedingly slow. By 2010, only 742 km of toll roads had been constructed and become operational even though the first toll road development was back in 1978. This is less than a third of the estimated needs of 2,400 km according to the Ministry of Public Works’ Strategic Plan and lags well behind several countries in the region in terms of expressway density (km/1,000 population). The implementation of toll road development under PPP (Public Private Partnership) has continued to be constrained by a complex land acquisition process, weak project preparation and selection, as well as the absence of an efficient toll roads viability gap funding mechanism. Central government Central government spending on national roads has almost tripled in real terms between spending on national 2005 and 2011 (Figure 41). Spending on national roads represents about 60 percent of roads has sharply the central government’s transport spending (on all modes). In 2009, the significant increased recently increase reflected the additional spending for fiscal stimulus in an effort to contain the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis. Further, a sharp decline in 2010 was partly due to ongoing budget execution challenges (see Part B for further discussions). In 2011, budget allocation increased significantly reflecting the Government’s priority to address the infrastructure development gap which is in line with the RPJMN 2010-2014. Despite the recent sharp Given the growth in traffic demand and medium term development targets, increased increase, spending on investment in new national road construction with appropriate standards is required. new national road During the period 2005-11, the national road network was mostly extended through the re- construction is still classification of 8,000 km of main roads, especially through betterment10 (minor widening) critically needed interventions to improve sub-standard roads considered strategically important. On the other hand, the current level of spending on national road maintenance is sufficient if spent efficiently and close to the estimated needs of IDR 6.9 trillion. Both new construction and maintenance could be done more efficiently. First, expanding the national current network through reclassifying roads as national or special roads and devoting most of the budget to limited betterment and incremental widening of existing 10 In Indonesia, “bettermentâ€? typically involves the base course strengthening, minor widening, providing a new asphalt wearing course, and improving drainage. In most cases, the road already has an asphalt pavement. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 33 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges roads will not accomplish the development of a high standard arterial network that best meets the needs of the economy. Second, unit costs for national road maintenance in Indonesia are relatively high when benchmarked against international norms. While many countries have now contracted out most of their routine maintenance works, Indonesia still uses the force account (in-house) approach. The fragmented (small size) procurement packages also contribute to higher administrative costs and inefficiency, and create disincentive for the private sector to participate. Figure 41: Central government spending on national roads Figure 42: The share of district roads in good condition has almost tripled in real terms between 2005 and 2011 been supported by new construction (IDR trillion 2007 prices) (district road condition, percent of total roads; total length of road, kilometer) Investment Betterment Maintenance Good Fair Poor Damaged Non-physical Bridge length of road (RHS) IDR trillion (2007 prices) Percent km (000) 25 25 100 400 20 20 80 370 15 15 60 340 10 10 40 310 5 5 20 280 0 0 0 250 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 Source: Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Public Work, World Source: BPS Bank staff estimates Note: * 2011 figures are for budget allocations c. Sub-national roads condition has deteriorated due to maintenance backlog Lack of maintenance of Following the transfer of responsibility to manage sub-national roads with decentralization sub-national roads is a in 2001, provincial and district/city spending on sub-national roads has more than tripled in serious concern as new real terms from IDR 18 trillion in 2001 to IDR 53 trillion in 2009. This rise in spending has development takes mostly translated into significant increases in district road networks. However, district road priority over maintenance conditions have deteriorated, with slightly declining percent of roads in good condition being supported by the new construction (Figure 42). These significant increases in the length of district/city roads are partly driven by local political preference for new construction over maintenance and a proliferation of new districts after decentralization, which has led to fragmented and weak institutions managing sub-national roads. Closing the financing Provincial and district/city governments currently allocate about IDR 14.9 trillion, less than gaps to address sub- half of their estimated needs for road preservation of around IDR 32.5 trillion, hence the national road annual funding gap is IDR17.6 trillion. To improve the percent of sub-national roads in fair maintenance backlogs and good condition from 63 percent to 86 percent would require doubling the current would require doubling the current spending spending level which includes overall road network integrity, including rehabilitation works 11 levels to bring damaged roads to a maintainable condition during the first five years. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of neglecting road maintenance is high. It is estimated that for every IDR 10,000 spend on road maintenance, IDR 46,000 in road user cost savings are generated. Therefore it is important to close the funding gap that has opened up and to eliminate the backlog of sub-national road maintenance. 11 These preservation needs are generated from the World Bank’s Road Network Evaluation Tool (RONET), see Investing in Indonesia’s Roads: Improving Efficiency and Closing the Financing Gaps. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 34 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges d. Towards improved roads infrastructure performance The capacity of the The current policy of expanding the national network through reclassifying provincial roads national road network as national or special roads and devoting most of the budget to limited betterment and should be expanded only incremental widening of existing roads is not optimal and will not accomplish the by following appropriate development of a high standard arterial network that will best meet the needs of the road capacity standards economy. The long term need for national road development is road expansion to 4-lane divided standard and a separate integral expressway network where appropriate. The efficiency of national Phasing out force account and moving towards performance-based contracts (PBC), road maintenance can be 12 could further improve efficiency through competition. A successful approach in other improved by phasing out countries has been to encourage force account units to become small contracting firms. force accounts and Initially such firms are given special support and are guaranteed work for the first few gradually moving towards performance based years, but eventually they have to become fully competitive contractors. Some of these contacts, and increasing firms continue to expand and eventually can handle large-scale projects. Extending road the average size of preservation activities from annual to multi-year programs and increasing the average size procurement packages, of road maintenance procurement packages could reduce administrative cost and improve efficiency as well as create incentives for the private sector to participate. Given the urgency to To accelerate highways development as outlined in the Ministry of Public Works’ strategic address congestion and plan, the Government may need to step in and increase public investment in highways, the slow progress with particularly in low traffic volume sections and outside Java routes. At the same time, Public Private addressing factors that constrain PPP implementation is also critical. Improving PPP Partnerships (PPPs) implementation, the project selection and preparation by involving key related institutions (such as the Ministry Government may need to of Finance) and providing adequate fiscal support through a viability gap assessment is step up public investment critical for successful implementation. Focusing on the most strategic and viable PPP while addressing projects and getting them transacted can be a powerful way to demonstrate government constraints to PPPs commitment to PPP implementation (for a further discussion on PPPs please see the October 2011 IEQ). To address district/city Higher priority should be given to resolving the district/city roads maintenance backlog road maintenance and fragmented and weak institutional capacity. One possible option is to integrate backlogs, a new district/city road planning and management at the provincial level to increase regional institutional and funding coordination and benefits from economies of scale, and to address the technical and mechanism is proposed managerial capacity issue without undermining local decision-making authority. Districts could delegate the management of all or part of their road networks using a contract management approach. The funding for this maintenance could potentially be secured through earmarking of the road-related user charges (RUCs), which include the annual vehicle license fees (PKB), vehicle transaction/transfer fees (BBNKB) and the fuel levy (PBBKB). Should these RUCs be allocated entirely to maintenance, it is estimated that about 90 percent of the maintenance needs can be met. Earmarking may have its own challenges such as reducing budget flexibility, but in this case, there is an argument to be made that the benefit incidence principle applies more and those who benefit from the roads should pay more for its maintenance. 12 In a traditional contract, the contractors are paid for the amount of work completed. Under a performance-based contract, the contractor works on a lump sum basis, usually receiving annual payments for meeting contractually binding performance requirements. International experience shows that PBCs can deliver higher quality results, often for a lower price. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 35 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges 2. The role of the global marketplace in enhancing domestic competitiveness How can the global Indonesia has the potential to move to a higher level of growth through leveraging its marketplace for goods natural resource endowments, growing domestic market size and enhancing the skills of and investment play a its growing workforce. To turn potential into reality the Indonesian private sector needs to role in enhancing the ramp up investment, to improve competitiveness, and to become more efficient. To what performance of Indonesia’s private extent can global inter-linkages be harnessed to help achieve these objectives? Using sector? firm- and sector-level data from the Indonesian manufacturing sector, this section analyzes the linkages between domestic economic performance and three aspects of international linkages - foreign direct investment, access to imports, and access to export markets. a. Some evidence on how greater integration can help improve productivity Using firm-level data of Given the diverse nature of Figure 43: Indonesian firms that are integrated into the Indonesian medium and firms, detailed information world economy have performed better large manufacturers, about their characteristics is (productivity level and growth premia, percent) evidence suggests that crucial to identify how one Productivity Level Premia Productivity Growth Premia greater integration is associated with better particular element, such as, in -40 -20 0 20 40 performance… this case, their degree of integration in the global SME (below 100 employees)/Large marketplace, can affect their performance.13 The Foreign (threshold comparison of performance 10%)/Domestic indicators between firms that Importer (threshold are more globally integrated 10%)/Non importer and those that are not, but operate in the same industry, New Plant/Continuing and are located in the same Plants that will province, can provide exit/Continuing preliminary information on the potential benefits of integration. Exporter (threshold 10%)/Non exporter In this analysis the focus is on a firm’s total factor productivity -40 -20 0 20 40 (TFP), a measure of the Percent efficiency with which inputs are transformed into output, and its Note: The premia is the percentage difference between rate of growth. productivity levels and growth for plants with the listed characteristic relative to those without that characteristic, In Indonesia, firms that are after controlling for a firm’s industry and province and the either exporters, users of year. Foreign plants are those that have at least 10 imported inputs or foreign- percent of foreign ownership; importer/exporter are plants that respectively import/export at least 10 percent owned tend to perform better of their output; exiting plants are those that will stop than those firms which are less producing during the coming 2 years; and new plants are integrated. For example, those that have been created in the past 3 years exporters and firms that use imported materials are, on average, 19 percent more productive than non-integrated plants – while foreign-owned plants are 38 percent more productive than their domestic counterparts (Figure 43). 13 The analysis in this section relies on data from the annual BPS Indonesian Census of Manufacturing conducted. The Census surveys all registered manufacturing plants with more than 20 employees, and contains detailed information on plants in the formal manufacturing sector including output, inputs, labor, capital, imports, exports, and foreign ownership. While the unit of analysis in the Census is the ‘plant’, in this piece, however, ‘plant’ and ‘firm’ are used interchangeably. The data available are for the period 1990–2009 and contain more than 420,000 plant observations. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 36 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges …and improving The relative out-performance of more integrated firms is also seen in their performance performance over time over time. For example, productivity growth for exporters has been on average 3 percentage points faster than for non-exporters over 1990 to 2009; for firms with foreign owners it has been about 6 percentage points higher than for domestic firms; and for users of imported inputs it has been 2 percentage points higher than for those that rely only on domestic inputs. These premia suggest an association between integration and performance, but they cannot determine the direction of causality. It is likely that firms that performed better in the first place were the ones that succeed in entering export markets, that ventured into using imported inputs, or that attracted foreign investors. However, as outlined below, there is substantial evidence pointing to greater integration as an important force affecting productivity in Indonesia (see Box 4 for some case study evidence). Box 4: Do local manufacturing firms benefit from greater integration? Some case studies from Jakarta and Surabaya Local firms can benefit from the presence of foreign-owned firms through business interactions which transfer knowledge, skills and practices. Indeed, anecdotal evidence provides examples of such interactions which have contributed to increased knowledge capacity, improvement in product quality, and increase in sales volume. For example, a domestic producer of metal components for Japanese automotive firms highlighted the substantial benefits received from the interaction with its foreign-owned clients. The Japanese firms operating in Indonesia provided support during several free consultations, as well as auditing activities, which were conducive to improvements in product design and quality. More importantly, the producer claimed that the new knowledge acquired by the local firm improved the quality of inputs sold to other customers (both local and foreign). In addition, the new knowledge gained by the local firm helped it to gain market shares and enter new markets. Other examples point to improvements in product quality and standards by some Indonesian manufacturing firms due to their interaction with foreign clients as well as with suppliers of imported inputs. For example, two resource-based manufacturers (one in the coffee processing sector, another in the fish industry) claim that their interactions with foreign clients involved in exporting helped them to introduce better quality and sanitary standards. The fish producers, for example, pushed by strict sanitary standards abroad, and encouraged by free training provided by their foreign clients improved the standards in all their production processes. For the coffee producer, suppliers provided training on how to operate a sophisticated imported coffee processor, which led to an improvement in the quality of the final product. Meanwhile, increased competition from foreign products can also motivate local firms to innovate to produce better products for customers. For example, a large local household and electrical appliances producer based in Surabaya reported that competition with Chinese producers encouraged them to be more creative, which led to the development of a customer service unit, providing quality after-sales services. This proved to be effective in maintaining market share, by differentiating their product from competitors. b. The importance of FDI for enhancing Indonesia’s productive capacity The importance of FDI in Foreign-owned plants accounted for 41 percent of total output in 2005-9, up from 23 the Indonesian economy percent in 1990-94. Over the same period, their share of exports rose from just above 25 has increased over the percent to 50 percent. In some industries it is even higher. For example, in 2009, plants past two decades,.. with foreign equity accounted for over 75 percent of exports in 8 of 21 manufacturing industries and over 50 percent of exports in a further 5 industries. …is likely continue to Recent BKPM data suggest that in the first quarter of 2012, foreign investment realization rise… in manufacturing reached USD 5.7 billion, a 30 percent increase year on year. As outlined in the June 2011 IEQ, these increased FDI inflows have been driven by relatively low labor costs, the availability of key natural resources and a large and growing domestic market, reflecting favorable demographics, high GDP per capita growth, and a rapidly growing middle class. However, the attractiveness of Indonesia for FDI inflows could be further enhanced by addressing weaknesses in terms of infrastructure and skills, and by improvements in the business environment, which are also necessary, if the full benefits of the FDI are to be gained. …and can potentially FDI can play three crucial roles in supporting Indonesia’s development in terms of bring a number of financing of investment, facilitating the opening up of export markets, and boosting important benefits to the productivity, helping the country move up the value chain. Foreign sources of financing domestic economy are likely to be crucial to help meet the targeted increases in physical capital investment that Indonesia needs. Although it is possible to design policies to stimulate higher saving rates domestically, these could have the unintended consequence of choking off domestic demand. Within foreign financing, FDI is regarded as the most attractive source of longer- term funding given its relative stability and the other potential benefits it may bring. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 37 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Foreign-owned plants As mentioned above, foreign-owned plants in Indonesia’s manufacturing sector tend to be tend to exhibit higher more efficient than domestically-owned plants. On average, they have a 39 percent higher efficiency and can play an TFP, and 122 percent higher labor productivity, than domestic plants in the same industry. important role in One reason for this is that, due to their larger size, they are better positioned to reap the improving domestic competitiveness benefits of scale economies. Their use of imported inputs and a more capital intensive production process also tends to make them more export-oriented than their domestic counterparts and they tend to have a larger volume of exports per product. Although they do not seem to employ a much higher proportion of skilled labor, they do spend more on training and R&D both in absolute and per worker terms – important factors for improving competitiveness. Moreover, foreign producers are less likely than Indonesian producers to report problems such as access to finance and raw materials and with marketing. Foreign-ownership can Research also shows that foreign ownership leads to significant productivity help generate improvements in the acquired plants. For Indonesia, a recent study of foreign acquisitions productivity gains within during 1985-99 established a causal effect of foreign ownership on productivity. The the firm… increases in productivity became visible in the acquisition year and continued in subsequent periods. After three years, the acquired plants had productivity levels 13.5 percent higher than a comparable “controlâ€? group of domestic firms. The rise in productivity was a result of restructuring, as acquired plants increased investment outlays, 14 employment and wages. …and for other firms Furthermore FDI is a potentially important channel for international technology diffusion. In through technology this way productivity gains are not restricted to the multinational itself, but may spillover to spillovers other firms that directly or indirectly interact with it. This may occur in a number of ways. For example, firm-specific technology is likely to be transferred from multinational parents to domestic subsidiaries and there is also likely to be beneficial technological knowledge transfer to domestic firms that interact with multinationals either by supplying or buying inputs (vertical spillovers), or by competing with them (horizontal spillovers). Firms with skilled labor Indeed, in Indonesia, FDI has been found to improve the productivity of manufacturing and R&D capacity benefit establishments supplying inputs to multinationals (by over 2 percentage points in a the most from these number of industries) although the gains do not accrue to all suppliers equally. Firms that spillovers… have the necessary learning capacities, such as a skilled labor force and active R&D programs, benefit the most. In addition, the productivity gains achieved by suppliers to multinationals can also lead to reduced input prices, which are of benefit to other uses of these inputs beyond the multinational firm.15 … and facilitating Furthermore, becoming a supplier to multinational can be a challenging process. For interactions between example, many foreign firms often require their prospective suppliers to improve their local and foreign-owned products or processes prior to signing contracts. This is why firms that become suppliers firms is key to achieving to multinationals are generally already high-performers. Facilitating the interactions effective knowledge transfers between foreign-owned and locally-owned firms can therefore play an important role in helping to promote the beneficial knowledge transfers highlighted above. 14 The study established the causal link between foreign ownership and productivity by pairing up each Indonesian plant that was going to receive FDI in the subsequent period with a domestic plant with very similar observable characteristics operating in the same sector and year and then comparing their productivity performance. For more details, see Arnold and Javorcik (2009), “Gifted kids or pushy parents? Foreign direct investment and plant productivity in Indonesiaâ€?, Journal of International Economics, 79(1), pp. 42-53. 15 Blalock, G. and P. Gertler (2008), “Welfare gains from Foreign Direct Investment through technology transfers to local suppliersâ€?, Journal of International Economics, 74(2), pp. 402-421, and Blalock, G. and P. Gertler (2009), “How firm capabilities affect who benefits from foreign technologyâ€?, Journal of Development Economics, 90 (2), pp. 192-199. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 38 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges c. Imports as instruments to facilitate innovation and promote competition Indonesia’s imports of As with many other countries, Indonesia’s imports, and exports, have seen strong growth intermediates and capital over the past two decades. For the period 1990-2011, annual growth rates for imports (in goods, and exports, have constant US dollars) have averaged 11 percent, increasing to 19 percent over 2000-2011. accelerated in recent A closer look at the composition of imports indicates that intermediates and capital goods, years some of which will be used as inputs in the production of exports, account for the largest (and growing) share of Indonesia’s imports (Figure 44). In 2010, for example, these two components amounted to 70 percent of total imports (and roughly explained the same proportion of its growth), compared with only 6 percent for consumer goods. The remaining 24 percent was accounted for by imports of transport equipment and other goods. Figure 44: Imports have been on the rise, driven by Figure 45: The relationship between intermediate imports expansions in intermediate and capital goods imports growth and export growth is very strong (Indonesian imports of goods, broad economic classification, (year-on-year growth of USD value of manufacturing exports USD billion 2000 prices) and growth of intermediates imports, percent) 40 40 Final Goods Intermediates Capital Goods Fuels & Lubricants Mar-2010 Growth of Manufacturing Exports (%) Dec-2010 Transport Equipment Others Exports 20 Jun-2010 20 USD billion (2000 prices) Mar-2008 200 200 Dec-2009 0 Dec-2008 0 150 150 Jun-2009 100 100 -20 Mar-2009 Sep-2009 -20 50 50 -40 -40 0 0 -80 -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Growth of Imports of Intermediates (%) Sources: Comtrade, WITS Sources: Comtrade, WITS The increasing Firms may import intermediates or capital goods because they are cheaper, of better importance of global quality or simply because there are no domestically-produced versions of the same input production networks, available. However, global value chains, in which multinational firms “sliceâ€? production combined with price, processes and carry out each part wherever the necessary skills and materials are quality or variety advantages, partly available at competitive costs, also seem to play an important role in the rise of explain why firms in intermediate and capital imports. First, it is among multinational firms where the use of Indonesia opt for foreign foreign inputs is the highest, with its share of total inputs reaching 37 percent, compared intermediates and capital to only 6 percent among local firms (2009 data from BPS). Second, if global value chains goods do account for an important part of intermediate inputs, one would expect to see a strong link between the growth in imports of intermediates and export growth. This is indeed apparent (Figure 45 illustrates this relationship by focusing on 2008-2010, a period of sharp changes in trade flows). The sharp deceleration of imports of intermediates was accompanied by a sharp deceleration of export growth, reflecting the heavy reliance of many exporters on imported components. These linkages between exports and intermediate imports highlight the potential for restrictions on imports to affect export competitiveness, given that for each dollar exported by Indonesians, 20 cents correspond to imported components. Sectors that use a larger Figure 46 and Figure 47 look at the relationship between the relative intermediate imports portion of imported of a sector against its growth in employment and in demand for domestic intermediate intermediate goods are goods. While some firms or domestic sectors may face pressures from import competition, also those in which it is notable that these relationships suggest that sectors relatively reliant on imported demand for domestic intermediate goods intermediaries have been the ones providing greater employment growth and demand for increased the most domestic producers of intermediate goods. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 39 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Figure 46: Sectors that imported more of their inputs have Figure 47: …and have increased demand for domestic generated more employment… intermediates faster (employment growth across sectors in manufacturing, percent (growth of demand for domestic intermediates growth, percent per annum; share of imported inputs in total input bill in per annum; share of imported inputs in total input bill in manufacturing, percent) manufacturing, percent) 100 100 12 12 Intermediates , percent per annum) Growth in Employment, percnt per Growth in Demand for Domestic 80 80 10 10 60 60 8 8 40 40 annum 20 20 6 6 0 0 4 4 -20 -20 2 2 -40 -40 -60 -60 0 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 20 40 60 80 100 Imported Inputs/Inputs, percent Imported Inputs/Inputs, percent Note: Shares of imported inputs to total inputs are sectoral Note: Shares of imported inputs to total inputs are sectoral averages in 2005 for the manufacturing sector. Sectoral averages in 2005 for the manufacturing sector. Sectoral growth in employment is for the period 2000-2005 growth in demand for domestic intermediates is for the Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations period 1995-2005 Sources: BPS and staff calculation Increased import Increased competition from foreign products can also stimulate improvements in the competition can also allocation of resources, improvements in productivity levels and incentives to invest and encourage better innovate (Box 5 provides anecdotal evidence). For example, goods that were successfully performance of domestic produced and exported by Indonesian firms and at the same time faced import producers competition domestically were 15 percentage points more likely to survive in export markets than those that were not subject to import competition. Box 5: The potential benefits of input quality and variety for manufacturing competitiveness Research suggests that imported inputs have played a key role in improving performance in the Indonesian manufacturing sector. A study based on Indonesian manufacturing census data from 1990-2001 by Amiti and Konings (2007) found that a 10-percentage point fall in input tariffs led to a productivity gain of 12 percent via learning, quality and variety effects. This gain was at least twice as high as the gains from reducing output tariffs that may arise via tougher competition effects. Affordable imported inputs can also raise productivity via quality and variety effects. For example, although a fall in a tariff on inputs such as compressors may force the domestic compressor industry to become more competitive, it has quite different effects on users of these inputs, such as producers of refrigerators. Their productivity can increase as they can access the latest foreign technology embodied in imported inputs. Higher quality compressors facilitate production of higher quality refrigerators. Moreover, access to a wider range of compressors may allow producers to lower their costs by choosing the most appropriate and potentially cheaper type of compressor, which was previously not available. Recent research on India shows similar important roles for imported inputs. According to Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova (2008), the expansion in the number of products produced by Indian manufacturing firms during the 1990s was in part a direct consequence of cheaper, more varied, and better quality imported inputs. Tariff reductions lowered prices and increased volumes of existing imports, but they also meant access to new types of intermediate inputs from the rest of the world. These new inputs, in turn, resulted in an increase in the number of products manufactured by firms, which explained nearly a quarter of manufacturing output growth. Firms then could use the input cost savings due to trade liberalization to cover the fixed costs of entering new product lines. In addition, access to higher quality intermediate inputs and capital goods relaxed technological constraints. Note: See Amiti, M. and J. Konings (2007), “Trade liberalization, intermediate inputs, and productivity: evidence from Indonesiaâ€?, American Economic Review, 97(5), pp 1611-1638, and Goldberg, P. Khandelwal, A. Pavcnik and P. Topalova (2008), “Imported Intermediate Inputs and Domestic Product Growth: Evidence from Indiaâ€?, NBER Working Paper 14416, National Bureau of Economic Research T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 40 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges d. Exporting as a means to drive productivity and growth Exporting allows Export markets can generate dynamic gains associated with faster productivity growth Indonesian firms to learn and innovation capacity. For example, tougher competition in export markets increases and innovate the costs of not innovating. Local firms tend to find foreign customers more sophisticated and discriminating, and to satisfy them, exporters may need to improve production processes, upgrade capital and standards, as well as train their workers. In addition, export markets can be a powerful force for product diversification. The more trade there is Firms in developing countries face considerable fixed costs in order to enter export with a particular market, 16 markets. Firms need to search for market information, comply with foreign standards, the more information is and understand foreign clients. Recent research shows that the overall level of trade available for new between two countries is important in allowing new entrants to enter and survive in the exporters, and therefore the easier it is to enter export market. The expansion of exports of existing products is therefore helpful for future that market export growth and diversification, including for new firms to enter the existing export market. This is because the higher the export flows with a particular destination, the larger the stock of available information there is about that market, lowering the information related costs a firm faces when entering a new export market.17 As well as the potential As well as providing an engine for learning and innovation, export markets have of course supply-side productivity played a key role in increasing demand for the goods and services produced by benefits of exports, they Indonesian firms. For example, over the period 1990-2010, export growth was equivalent can of course support to 52 percent of the total growth in demand for Indonesia’s goods and services (although demand for domestic production import growth must subtracted from this to get the contribution of net external demand to growth). As seen in the growth performance of many of Indonesia’s regional peers during the global financial crisis of 2008 to 2009, greater trade openness can also bring with it the potential for growth volatility. However, recent work suggests that greater trade openness tends to reduce volatility in economies that show relatively high levels of export diversification, while the opposite happens in poorly diversified economies. In particular, it is product diversification that plays the most important role in shielding an economy from the detrimental impact of foreign shocks.18 16 Brenton, P., Newfarmer, R. and P. Walkenhorst (2007), “Avenues for Export Diversification: Issues for Low-Income Countriesâ€?, MPRA Paper 22758, University Library of Munich, Germany. 17 Ibid. 18 Haddad, M., Lim, J., Munro, L., Saborowski, C. and B. Shepherd (2011), “Volatility, Export Diversification and Policyâ€?, Chapter 11 in Managing Openness, Ed. Haddad, M. and B. Shepherd, The World Bank. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 41 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges APPENDIX: A SNAPSHOT OF INDONESIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS Appendix Figure 1: Quarterly and annual GDP growth Appendix Figure 2: Contributions to GDP expenditures (percent growth) (quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted) Percent Percent Percent Percent 4 8 4 4 Year on year (RHS) 3 3 3 6 2 2 QoQ seas. adjust (LHS) 1 1 2 Average (LHS)* 4 0 0 -1 -1 1 2 -2 -2 Mar-09 Dec-09 Sep-10 Jun-11 Mar-12 Discrepancy Net Exports Investment 0 0 Mar-05 Dec-06 Sep-08 Jun-10 Mar-12 Gov cons. Private cons. GDP Note: *Average QoQ growth between Q4 2005 – Q1 2012 Source: BPS via CEIC and World Bank Sources: BPS, World Bank seasonal adjustment Appendix Figure 3: Contributions to GDP production Appendix Figure 4: Motor cycle and motor vehicle sales (quarter-on-quarter, seasonally adjusted) (monthly sales) Percent Percent '000 '000 3 3 900 110 Motor cycles (LHS) 2 2 700 90 1 1 500 70 0 0 Motor vehicles (RHS) -1 -1 300 50 Mar-09 Dec-09 Sep-10 Jun-11 Mar-12 Other (incl services) Trade, Hotel& Rest. Comm and transport Manufacturing Mining and Const Agriculture 100 30 Overall GDP May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12 Source: BPS via CEIC Source: CEIC Appendix Figure 5: Consumer indicators Appendix Figure 6: Industrial production indicators (index levels) (year-on-year growth) Index Index Percent Percent 150 150 15 60 BI Retail sales index Manufacturing production index (LHS) 125 125 10 40 BI Consumer Survey Index 100 100 5 20 75 75 0 0 Cement sales (RHS) 50 50 -5 -20 May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12 May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12 Source: BI via CEIC Source: CEIC T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 42 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Appendix Figure 7: Real trade flows Appendix Figure 8: Balance of Payments (quarter-on-quarter real growth, nsa) (USD billion) Percent Percent USD billion USD billion 20 20 16 16 Overall Balance 12 12 10 10 Imports Current account 8 8 0 0 4 4 0 0 -10 -10 Errors and omissions Exports -4 -4 Capital and financial account -20 -20 -8 -8 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Mar-09 Mar-10 Mar-11 Mar-12 Source: BPS (National Accounts) and World Bank Source: BI and World Bank Appendix Figure 9: Trade balance Appendix Figure 10: Reserves and capital inflows (USD billion) (USD billion) USD billion USD billion USD billion USD billion 20 5.0 150 5.0 Trade balance International Exports (RHS) Reserves (LHS) (LHS) 125 2.5 10 2.5 100 0.0 0 0.0 75 -2.5 -10 -2.5 50 -5.0 Imports (LHS) Non-resident portfolio inflows (RHS) -20 -5.0 May-09 May-10 May-11 25 May-12 -7.5 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Source: BPS and World Bank Source: BI and World Bank Appendix Figure 11: Term of trade and export and import Appendix Figure 12: Inflation and monetary policy chained Fisher price indices (month-on-month and year-on-year growth, percent) (index 2006=100) Index (2006=100) Index (2006=100) Percent Percent 250 250 3 12 Headline inflation, YoY (RHS) Chained export price Core inflation, YoY (RHS) 200 200 2 8 BI policy rate (RHS) Terms of trade 1 4 150 150 0 0 100 100 Chained import price Headline inflation MoM (LHS) -1 -4 50 50 Jun-08 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 Mar-06 Mar-08 Mar-10 Mar-12 Source: BPS and World Bank Source: BPS and World Bank T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 43 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Appendix Figure 13: Monthly breakdown of CPI Appendix Figure 14: Inflation among neighboring countries (percentage point contributions to monthly growth) (year-on-year, June 2012) Percent Percent Percent 1.8 1.8 Volatile Administered -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Core Headline Singapore * 1.2 1.2 Indonesia China* Philippines * 0.6 0.6 Thailand USA * 0.0 0.0 Korea* Malaysia* Japan * -0.6 -0.6 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Percent Sources: BPS and World Bank *May is latest available month Sources: National statistical agencies via CEIC, and BPS Appendix Figure 15: Domestic and international rice prices Appendix Figure 16: Poverty and unemployment rate (Wholesale price, in IDR per kg) (percent) IDR/Kg IDR/Kg Percent Percent 11,000 11,000 25 25 9,000 Medium quality: 9,000 20 20 Muncul I (domestic) Thai 100% B 2nd grade (international) Poverty rate 7,000 7,000 15 15 5,000 5,000 10 10 Unemployment rate 3,000 3,000 5 5 Low quality: IR 64 III (domestic); Thai A1 Super (international) 1,000 1,000 0 0 Jun-09 Jun-10 Jun-11 Jun-12 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Note: Dashed: international Thai rice (cif) prices. Note: Labor data from February Sakernas Solid: domestic wholesale rice Sources: BPS, and World Bank Sources: PIBC, FAO and World Bank Appendix Figure 17: Regional equity indices Appendix Figure 18: Dollar index and Rupiah exchange rate (daily, index January 2009=100) (daily, index and levels) Index (Jan 2009=100) Index (Jan 2009=100) Index (5 Jan 2009=100) IDR per USD 300 300 120 8,000 JCI IDR/USD (RHS) 250 250 110 9,000 SET 200 200 BSE IDR Appreciation 100 10,000 150 150 Shanghai 90 11,000 100 100 SGX Dollar Index (LHS) 50 50 80 12,000 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Sources: World Bank and CEIC Sources: World Bank and CEIC T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 44 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Appendix Figure 19: 5 year local currency government bond Appendix Figure 20: Sovereign USD Bond EMBI spreads yields (daily, basis points) (daily, percent) Percent Percent Basis points Basis points 15 15 1000 250 Indonesia 750 125 10 10 Indonesia spreads less overall EMBIG Index spreads (RHS) Philippines 500 0 5 5 Malaysia 250 -125 Thailand United States Indonesia EMBIG bond spreads (LHS) 0 0 0 -250 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Sources: World Bank Sources: World Bank and CEIC Appendix Figure 21: International commercial bank lending Appendix Figure 22: Banking sector indicators (monthly, index January 2009=100) (monthly, percent) Index (Jan 2009=100) Index (Jan 2009=100) Percent Percent 200 200 100 10 Indonesia Loan to Deposit Ratio 180 180 (LHS) 80 8 India 160 160 Singapore 60 6 140 140 Non-Performing Loans (RHS) Return on Assets Ratio Malaysia 40 4 120 120 (RHS) Thailand 20 2 100 100 USA Capital Adequacy Ratio (LHS) 80 80 0 0 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Sources: CEIC and World Bank Sources: BI and World Bank Appendix Figure 23: Government debt Appendix Figure 24: External debt (percent of GDP; USD billion) (percent of GDP; USD billion) Percent USD billion Percent USD billion 50 250 50 250 Government debt ratio to GDP (LHS) External debt ratio to GDP (LHS) 40 200 40 200 30 150 30 150 20 100 20 100 10 50 10 50 0 0 0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 2011 2012* Domestic debt, RHS Public external debt, RHS *April *April External debt, RHS Private external debt, RHS Sources: BI and World Bank Sources: BI and World Bank T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 45 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Rising to present and future challenges Appendix Table 1: Budget outcomes and estimates (IDR trillion) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 Outcome MoF Semester I Outcome Outcome Revised Budget (Unaudited) projections A. State revenue and grants 848.8 995.3 1,199.5 1,358.2 1,362.4 1. Tax revenue 619.9 723.3 872.6 1,016.2 1,017.0 2. Non-tax revenue 227.2 268.9 324.3 341.1 344.6 B. Expenditure 937.4 1,042.1 1,289.7 1,548.3 1,553.1 1. Central government 628.8 697.4 878.3 1,069.5 1,070.8 2. Transfers to the regions 308.6 344.7 411.4 478.8 482.3 C. Primary balance 5.2 41.5 3.1 -72.3 -78.9 D. SURPLUS / DEFICIT -88.6 -46.9 -90.2 -190.1 -190.8 (percent of GDP) -1.6 -0.7 -1.2 -2.2 -2.3 Note: * MoF estimates based on MoF Semester I 2012 report Source: MoF Appendix Table 2: Balance of Payments (USD billion) 2009 2010 2011 2010 2011 2012 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Overall Balance of Payments 12.5 30.3 11.9 7.0 11.3 7.7 11.9 -4.0 -3.7 -1.0 As percent of GDP 2.3 4.3 1.4 3.7 6.0 3.9 5.6 -1.8 -1.7 -0.5 Current Account 10.6 5.1 1.7 1.0 0.9 2.7 0.1 0.5 -1.6 -2.9 As percent of GDP 2.0 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.5 1.3 0.1 0.2 -0.7 -1.3 Trade balance 21.2 21.3 23.3 5.4 6.4 7.2 6.0 6.9 3.3 1.5 Net income & transfers -10.6 -16.2 -21.6 -4.4 -5.6 -4.5 -5.8 -6.4 -4.9 -4.3 Capital & Financial Account 4.9 26.6 14.0 7.5 9.7 5.0 13.5 -3.5 -1.0 2.2 As percent of GDP 0.9 3.8 1.7 4.0 5.2 2.5 6.4 -1.5 -0.5 1.0 Direct investment 2.6 11.1 11.1 1.8 4.4 3.5 3.8 2.0 1.9 2.0 Portfolio 10.3 13.2 4.5 4.5 1.4 3.8 5.5 -4.7 -0.2 2.8 Other -8.2 2.3 -1.6 1.2 3.8 -2.3 4.2 -0.8 -2.8 -2.6 Errors & omissions -3.0 -1.5 -3.9 -1.6 0.7 0.0 -1.8 -1.0 -1.2 -0.3 (a) Reserves 66.1 96.2 110.1 86.6 96.2 105.7 119.7 114.5 110.1 110.5 Note: * Reserves at end-period Source: BI and BPS T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A July 2012 46 Investing in Indonesia’s Institutions for Inclusive and Sustainable Development INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY Maintaining resilience October 2012 INDONESI A ECONOMIC QUAR TERLY 0DLQWDLQLQJ UHVLOLHQFH October 2012 Preface 7KH ,QGRQHVLD (FRQRPLF 4XDUWHUO\ UHSRUWV RQ DQG V\QWKHVL]HV WKH SDVW WKUHH PRQWKVµ NH\ GHYHORSPHQWV LQ ,QGRQHVLDµV HFRQRP\ ,W SODFHV WKHP LQ D ORQJHUWHUP DQG JOREDO FRQWH[W DQG DVVHVVHV WKH LPSOLFDWLRQV RI WKHVH GHYHORSPHQWV DQG RWKHU FKDQJHV LQ SROLF\ IRU WKH RXWORRN IRU ,QGRQHVLDµV HFRQRPLF DQG VRFLDO ZHOIDUH ,WV FRYHUDJH UDQJHV IURP WKH PDFURHFRQRP\ WR ILQDQFLDO PDUNHWV WR LQGLFDWRUV RI KXPDQ ZHOIDUH DQG GHYHORSPHQW ,W LV LQWHQGHG IRU D ZLGH DXGLHQFH LQFOXGLQJ SROLF\ PDNHUV EXVLQHVV OHDGHUV ILQDQFLDO PDUNHW SDUWLFLSDQWV DQG WKH FRPPXQLW\ RI DQDO\VWV DQG SURIHVVLRQDOV HQJDJHG LQ ,QGRQHVLDµV HYROYLQJ HFRQRP\ 7KLV ,QGRQHVLD (FRQRPLF 4XDUWHUO\ ZDV SUHSDUHG DQG FRPSLOHG E\ WKH PDFUR DQG ILVFDO SROLF\ FOXVWHU RI WKH :RUOG %DQNµ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â€? $OWKRXJK PRVW RI WKH DYDLODEOH HPSLULFDO VWXGLHV DUH IURP 2(&' FRXQWULHV WKH FRPPRQ ILQGLQJ LV WKDW ÊŠ >,@Q FRXQWULHV ZKHUH PRUH IUHHGRPV KDYH EHHQ JUDQWHG LQVWLWXWLRQV RI KLJKHU HGXFDWLRQ KDYH EHJXQ WR DFW LQ D PRUH HQWUHSUHQHXULDO IDVKLRQ DOLJQ WKHLU SURJUDPV WR D JUHDWHU GHJUHH ZLWK WKH GHPDQGV RI  VWXGHQWV DQG WKH ODERU PDUNHW DQG UHVSRQG HIILFLHQWO\ WR JRYHUQPHQW LQFHQWLYHV.â€? *LYHQ WKH LQWHQVH LQWHUHVW WKDW WKH GHEDWH RQ DXWRQRP\ KDV JHQHUDWHG WKH IROORZLQJ VHFWLRQV ILUVW SURYLGH DQ RYHUYLHZ RI HYLGHQFH RQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO DXWRQRP\ DQG DFFRXQWDELOLW\ LQ RWKHU FRXQWULHV DV EDFNJURXQG DQG FRQWH[W WR WKHVH GHYHORSPHQWV LQ ,QGRQHVLD $ EULHI VXPPDU\ RI RWKHU NH\ IHDWXUHV LQQRYDWLRQV DQG FKDQJHV WKH QHZ /DZ SODQV WR LQWURGXFH LV WKHQ SURYLGHG IROORZHG E\ EULHI FRQFOXGLQJ FRPPHQWV RQ OLNHO\ QH[W VWHSV DQG LVVXHV a. 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T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 24 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus …which tends to affect Poor households benefit less from minimum wage increases. First, many of the poor do low-wage workers more not work in the formal sector and do not earn regular wages. Second, the majority (55 percent in 2006) of poor workers with salaried jobs report that they earn less than the 15 minimum wage. This is mostly likely because they tend to work in micro-firms that are more likely to be non-compliant in paying minimum wages. c. Changes in the process for setting minimum wages Indonesia revised the The current process for setting minimum wages was first laid out in the 2003 Manpower process for setting Law in which local tripartite wage councils prepared a proposed level that was based on a minimum wages in decent standard of living for workers. Governors (for provinces) and heads of districts and 2006… mayors (for district and municipalities) finalize the level and set the new minimum wage. In 2005, the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration decreed that local wage councils were required to use a new standard for calculating the cost of living for workers (Kebutuhan Hidup Minimal, KHL), which was to be used as an input for determining minimum wages. The KHL, calculated from a basket of 47 basic commodities and services, was on average 38 percent higher than the previous living standards measure.16 … but the process needs In 2007, the authority for calculating the KHL shifted from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) to the to become less political tripartite local wage councils (Dewan Pengupahan). Unions and employer groups conduct and more technically separate surveys to calculate the KHL, which is then negotiated and a compromise figure driven is agreed upon. Recent research indicates that this method overstates the real increase in prices; during 2007-2011 KHL increases were almost double the estimated increase in the rate of inflation.17 Nevertheless, the influence of the KHL on minimum wages – although positive – is relatively small. The other factors considered by the wage councils are not publicly released. The shift from a technical to negotiated approach partly explains the large variation in minimum wage increases across regions. Revisions to the Since the process of determining minimum wages is mostly based on negotiations, and minimum wage setting only weakly linked to technical assessments of cost of living increases, the process has process are needed to become highly contentious. A more technical approach to setting minimum wages can reduce the risk of future improve the transparency and perceived fairness of the process while, at the same time, labor unrest minimizing business uncertainty and output losses. The appropriateness of the KHL bundle should be re-assessed, and a single transparent process to re-calculate the annual KHL should be agreed to in advance. This revised KHL should become the primary determinant for proposing minimum wage increases; other factors that contribute to the calculation should be standardized and made available for public scrutiny. Shifting towards such a transparent, technically-driven approach will help to ensure that the minimum wage setting process will not be subject to interference by local politics or the interests of employers or unions. This will also improve the transparency and predictability of future minimum wages, which will help boost investor confidence in Indonesia by facilitating business planning and potentially reducing the risk of labor unrest. d. Adopting a long-term view on job creation and worker protection Broader dialogue is also Minimum wage policies are closely linked to other employment protection measures: needed on a long-term severance pay, restrictions on fixed-term contracts and outsourcing, and the introduction reform strategy that of social security benefits such as pensions and accident insurance. There has been works for all workers… strong and vigorous debate on each of these issues, but workers and employers remain trapped in a “lose-loseâ€? situation. Little effort has been made to consider how the policies and regulations work in tandem to protect workers, or their effect on job creation. There is a need for the Government, workers (represented not only by unions but also considering the interests of the large population of informal workers) and employers to shift towards a long-term view of labor policy reform in Indonesia and find “win-winâ€? solutions that work for all. Together, these stakeholders should consider what blend of policies and instruments can be applied to provide real protection for workers without compromising investment in labor-intensive industries and the pace of quality job creation in Indonesia. Such a discussion will also require addressing and resolving some of the issues related to establishing the national social security systems. This will include how to expand 15 Ibid. 16 Chris Manning and Raden Muhamad Purnagunawan, 2012. 17 Ibid. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 25 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus coverage, designing the right benefit package, ensuring that the future system will be financially sustainable in the long-run, transforming the institutions responsible for the delivery and oversight of the social security system, and synergizing the labor law with the introduction of the social security employment programs. …and is driven more by This section has briefly reviewed the evidence to inform the discussion on minimum research-based evidence wages, drawing on the findings of the 2010 World Bank Jobs Report, which reviewed than short-term politics Indonesia’s labor market over the last two decades. However, further work is required by all stakeholders to build the body of knowledge needed for evidence-based policy making. To this end, in early 2013 the World Bank will release an update of the report, which will expand on some of the most pressing issues, notably social security benefits for workers and skills development. At the same time, the World Bank’s 2013 World Development Report is focusing on the issue of jobs and will provide global learning on how to provide more jobs and improve effective protection for all workers. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 26 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus 2. Building Jakarta’s resilience to frequent flooding Jakarta is Indonesia’s As the main commercial hub of Indonesia, the capital city of Jakarta contributes about 13 preeminent urban center, 18 percent, or USD 112 billion, of the country’s total GDP. As the economic and political one of the largest center of Indonesia, regional urbanization has also contributed to making Jakarta one of metropolitan areas in the the largest metropolitan areas in the world. The Special Capital District of Jakarta (DKI) world, and the source of almost one sixth of the covers an area of approximately 650 km2 with a population of about 10 million (2010). The 2 country’s GDP… population of Greater Jakarta (covering about 7,300 km ) stands at just under 30 million. Population growth rates are far above the national average and the population is projected to exceed 35 million people by 2020. Up to 250,000 rural-urban migrants are estimated to move to Jakarta every year, contributing to the increase in informal settlements where people live without the benefit of public services (e.g., transportation, water supply, sanitation and waste management). …but it suffers from a Due to its location and rapid population growth, coupled with under-development of public perennial flood problem services, the city has become known for a range of problems, the most severe of which are manifested in disastrous perennial flooding. Jakarta was built on a low lying coastal area. It sits on fluvial sediments on the lowest lying areas of a basin that is surrounded by several dormant volcanoes whose slopes form the upstream catchment areas of the 13 major rivers that flow through the basin on their way to the Java Sea. Today, about 40 percent of the city (including most of north Jakarta) lies at, or below, sea level. Perennial floods have been a fact of life in Jakarta since its foundation. Major and destructive incidences have been recorded as far back as 1621, 1654, and 1918.19 As the current rainy season has brought localized flooding to parts of the city, this section provide a timely overview of the severe economic and human impact of such flooding and its determinants. While recognizing the policy challenges, it then outlines some immediate actions that can help to alleviate flood impacts and improve the city’s resilience in the near and medium term. a. The severity of flooding has increased, imposing significant costs Flood incidences have Flood incidences have been increasing in severity during the past decades, with been increasing in especially devastating floods recorded in January 1996, February 2002, and February severity in recent times… 2007. The 2007 event alone inundated 235 km2 (about 36 percent) of the city, by up to seven meters in some areas. It affected more than 2.6 million people and forced 340,000 people to flee their homes. Over 70 people died and outbreaks of disease affected over 200,000 people. In 2008 a flood event closed the airport toll road, cancelling over 1,000 flights and causing serious disruptions for the city. Floods in 2009 also occurred at high intensity and continued into 2010. The actual and perceived risk of flooding results in human suffering, direct financial and economic damage, and affects the incentives of businesses and investors to make investments in affected areas. …inflicting a severe The estimated financial and economic losses from a 10-day flood event in 2002 were over economic, financial and USD 1 billion, whereas the 6-day 2007 flood cost about USD 900 million. The human toll… consequences of severe flooding to Jakarta are even more alarming if assessed by their sectoral impacts. Unlike rapid onset disasters, like earthquakes or tsunamis (the impact and reconstruction from which are discussed in the following section), the direct damage caused by inundation is relatively small compared to the economic losses caused by interruptions in city services and mobility, and hence productive economic activities (see Box 5 on the 2007 flood). 18 Calculations based on 2011 GDP and regional GDP figures from CEIC. 19 Laporan Perkiraan Kerusakan dan Kerugian Pasca Bencana Banjir Awal Februari 2007 di Wilayah JABODETABEK (Damage and Losses Estimate of February 2007 Flood), http://www.bappenas.go.id/node/111/995/laporan-perkiraan-kerusakan-dan-kerugian-pasca- bencana-banjir-awal-februari-2007-di-jabodetabek/ T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 27 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Box 5: The impact of the major 2007 flood on Jakarta The 2007 flood, which inundated nearly 36 percent of the city, blocked many major access roads, disrupting supplies of goods and production materials from, into or through the city. The same flood inundated 2,465 electricity distribution transformers which had to be shut down. Similarly five water treatment plants were affected, while damages to mains distribution from upstream sources in Bogor reduced clean water supply of 400 liters/second for more than one week.The Indonesian Association of General Insurance estimated that the claims that had to be paid to private individuals amounted to USD 400 million. The impact of the flood was relatively well documented. A damage and loss assessment was immediately carried out by BAPPENAS. This provided a breakdown of the sectoral effects of the disaster in the form of direct damage to assets and economic losses from disruption to economic activities. While direct damage to private homes and public infrastructure reached more than USD 160 million, the economic impact caused by loss of opportunity for trade and commerce was much larger at USD 680 million. Figure 29: The 2007 flood caused sizeable financial Figure 30: …and these economic losses were focused on damage but much greater economic losses… larger industrial firms Million Million Large Industry SMEs USD Damage Losses USD Informal Sector Trade (traditional markets) 1,000 1,000 Agriculture/Fishery 6.45 3.28 4.84 100 100 76.74 10 10 210.53 1 1 Source: Bappenas 2007 Source: Bappenas 2007 A closer look at the economic losses also reveals that large industry, such as major factories, was impacted the most, since supplies for their production were disrupted and factories had to be shut down as workers could not come to work. The second largest impact was for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs), which typically employ more people. With major industrial cities like Jakarta increasingly playing an important role as regional production bases for ASEAN, flood occurrences such as these raise major concerns of supply disruptions for regional economic players such as car and part manufacturers (with similar concerns raised following the major floods in Thailand in 2011). …affecting the poor While major flood events such as in 2007 impact both the richer and the poorer disproportionately populations of Jakarta, the poor, who tend to live in low lying areas or along waterways, are disproportionately impacted (Figure 30). As a large metropolitan area, Jakarta offers many economic opportunities and attracts in-migration from surrounding areas. In the absence of adequate affordable housing for day laborers and people working in the informal sectors which help provide the city with much needed workers, informal settlements typically occupying public spaces in hazard-prone areas have grown. This trend not only increases the vulnerability of the community, but also creates the burden on already aging and often not properly maintained infrastructure such as canal and river embankments. b. Weather patterns, urbanization, subsidence and climate change all play a role… Climate and weather The Jakarta region experiences high annual average rainfall. The climate and weather in patterns contribute to Indonesia is influenced by the convergence of tropical and continental influences, and the make Jakarta prone to monsoon seasons, that determine distinct weather patterns such as the rainy and dry floods... seasons. Around Jakarta, the complex land and mountain range formation creates an ascent of humid air masses that result in powerful cloudbursts affecting regional weather systems. Annual rainfall typically ranges between 1,500 to 2,500 mm per year, but reaches up to 4,000 mm per year in the higher elevation upstream areas, leading to high intensity, high volume water runoff flows through the Jakarta basin area. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 28 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus …but this is exacerbated Overall urbanization trends are central to the causes of Jakarta flooding. The population of by massive urbanization Greater Jakarta has more than tripled over the last four decades, recording the levels of and the inability of 8.4 m in 1971, 11.5 million in 1980, 17.1 million in 1990, 20.4 million in 2000, and 27.9 infrastructure to cope million in 2010. The net population density of Jakarta city is about 140 persons per hectare, with central Jakarta by far the most densely populated area in Indonesia. (Figure 31) Figure 31: Densely-populated slum areas were heavily affected by the 2007 flood Source: Jakarta Urban Challenges in a Changing Climate. Mayors’ Task Force On Climate Change, Disaster Risk and The Urban Poor (2010) Urbanization has led to a The intensification of urbanization is linked to the increasing severity of flooding events. reduced capacity for There has been encroachment and development on critical catchment areas and rainfall absorption and increased solid waste generation and sedimentation. As urbanization spreads upstream, retention, overwhelming land-use patterns change and competition for water resources increases, which severely the flood control system design affect downstream areas. Peak water flows have increased (increased flow volumes and flow velocity), an outcome of the reduced rainfall absorption and retention capacity, overwhelming flood control system design. The flow capacities of flood control designs have also decreased due to the lack of adequate operations and maintenance and the existence of bottlenecks (e.g., low-clearance bridges, pipes, and other obstacles) resulting in sedimentation. About 17.9 percent of all solid waste ends up in the drainage system, amounting to about 1,067 m3/day, of which about 921 m3/day is generated from within DKI 3 Jakarta, while the remaining 146 m /day travels from upstream areas. Land subsidence and In the meantime, continuing land subsidence threatens the overall functioning of the flood climate change control system and increases risks of tidal floods, and climate change is expected to compound the problem, cause higher intensity rainfall conditions and rising sea-levels. Recent studies of land with some parts of subsidence have found typical subsidence rates of 7.5 to 10 cm per year particularly Jakarta are sinking by up to 25 cm per year… affecting areas of north Jakarta. However, in localized areas of north Jakarta subsidence in the range of 15 to 25 cm per year have been observed, which if sustained, would result in them sinking to 4 to 5 m below sea level by 2025. Land subsidence results in increased vulnerability to flooding due to the reduced gravitational capacity to channel storm flows to the sea, and the increased risk of tidal flooding. Land subsidence also increases the necessity for pumping, dikes and sea defenses. The most prominent cause of land subsidence in Jakarta is intensive deep groundwater abstraction – a common source of water supply for individual households and businesses in the city. The deep wells drill into the aquifer and extract high volumes of water, collapsing the aquifer structure and allowing sea water intrusion. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 29 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus …while climate models Region-based climate models released as part of a climate change vulnerability mapping predict both rising sea study for Southeast Asia (2009) have identified Jakarta as the most vulnerable region in levels and increasing 20 Southeast Asia to the risks of climate change . Climate change could impact Jakarta's frequency and intensity floods in two ways - through a rise in sea levels and an increase in both the frequency and of rainfall intensity of rainfall. An increase in sea-level, combined with drastic land subsidence, will greatly affect populations living in low lying coastal areas in north Jakarta. An increase in rainfall is also a source of concern. The Inter-governmental Panel for Climate Change (2008) report stated that Jakarta will be vulnerable to both an increase in the number of wet days in the new century, indicating an increase in the frequency of rainfall, and an increase in the intensity of precipitation events, particularly in tropical and high latitude areas that already have high mean precipitation. The most devastating flooding scenario for Jakarta would be an event whereby high tide conditions concurrently occurred with high rainfall upstream – a flood event risk that is increasingly worrisome with the additional factors of climate change in the region. c. …but actions can be taken to improve Jakarta’s resilience to floods Comprehensive flood Regional spatial planning regulations stipulate flood management implementation and mitigation is complicated coordination across local governments, but, as in other countries, such cross-coordination and hampered by the will continue to pose difficulties, especially when requiring upstream regions to make difficulties of investments (such as upland retention facilities and management) to protect downstream coordination across the Jakarta basin area… areas. Without ensuring the protection of remaining green spaces and retention functions in the Greater Jakarta basin (known as the Jabodetabekpunjur), future flood risks remain significant for the city of Jakarta. … but there are practical Nevertheless, a sequence of staged interventions could enable authorities to address the immediate actions that issues in a practical manner. The first priority would be rehabilitating existing can help alleviate flood infrastructure, addressing flow and retention capacities. The second phase would include impacts in the short to the improvement of infrastructure, especially realigning the flood control systems affected medium term by subsidence and inter-connecting the existing major East and West flood canals. In parallel, there should be efforts to build consensus and multi-stakeholder action on the issue of upstream management and coastal protection, which will require long-term preparation and implementation. Restoring flood systems Hydraulic modeling studies have unanimously suggested that the most immediate to their original design beneficial response for flood mitigation is to take steps to return the system to its original and capacity will have the design. Comprehensive simulations of the 2007 flood event predict that the disruption to most immediate impact… more than one million people, or 40 percent of the flood impact, could have been avoided if the existing system was operating at original intended capacity (Figure 32). Returning the systems to their original design should also be complemented by a strong focus on routine future maintenance and the mobilization of the community at large to provide additional household and community level assistance to mitigate floods. Figure 32: The 2007 flood would have been less severe if existing facilities were fully functioning (left panel: actual extent of flooding; right panel: simulated extent of flooding with fully-functioning flood systems) Source: Indonesia Ministry of Public Works (2012) Source: Indonesia Ministry of Public Works (2012) 20 “Climate Change Vulnerability Mapping for Southeast Asia". Yusuf, A.A. and H. Francisco, 2009. Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA). See: http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/12324196651Mapping_Report.pdf T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 30 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus …while reconfiguring key The recently completed East flood canal offers the possibility to divert excess flows of the canal networks at main Ciliwung river. The building of a diversion system for the Ciliwung river at the strategic locations existing main control gate in south Jakarta or further upstream, connecting both the East strengthens the system and West flood canals, and improvements to adjoining canals, would provide further to cope with recent urban and physical changes safeguards to the heavily populated city center. Coupled with the normalization of the existing system to original design, an additional 600,000 people could have escaped the direct effects of the 2007 flood event. In the meantime, better Despite the various ongoing and planned efforts to mitigate flood risks in Jakarta, these preparation and risks will continue to threaten the city for the foreseeable future. Contingency planning and systematic contingency investing in flood preparedness are critical to increase the resilience of the city and its planning can help population to cope with, adapt to and prepare for the recurring flood events, thereby improve resilience reducing their vulnerability to these risks. Sophisticated In recent months, a more sophisticated contingency planning tool has been introduced contingency planning through an initiative led by the Indonesian National Agency for Disaster Management tools are being developed (BNPB) to develop a practical tool to support sub-national disaster management agencies and introduced to help (BPBDs) during emergency contingency planning. A partnership between the BNPB, the city managers and planners… Australia-Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR), and the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) has developed a contingency planning tool based on hazard impact modeling. This tool is aimed at providing planners with prior knowledge of who will be impacted and what will be damaged in the event of a particular natural disaster event. This tool – named the Indonesia Scenario Assessment for 21 th Emergencies (InaSAFE) – was officially launched at the 5 Asian Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (AMCDRR) in October 2012. …which would Through answering a series of questions about a potential disaster scenario, the InaSAFE significantly increase hazard impact modeling tool can be used to produce maps and reports to estimate resilience and reduce potential damage, along with recommended actions for emergency managers. This tool vulnerability, if they are was tested during the 2011-2012 Jakarta flood season and proved effective in providing mainstreamed and constantly augmented on an understanding of hazard impacts and communicating them to support disaster risk with ever improving and management decisions. Participatory mapping tools (e.g., OpenStreetMap) have been accurate data used to collect high resolution baseline data of critical infrastructure in Jakarta through collaboration between the Jakarta Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBD), the Humanitarian OpenStreet Team (HOT) and University of Indonesia, supported by several international development organizations. These, together with hazard data from technical agencies and demographic data from the national census, were used to produce visualizations of the impact of different flood scenarios on critical infrastructure (e.g., roads, schools or hospitals) and populations in flood prone areas across Jakarta. The tool calculates the number of structures or areas that could be flooded under different scenarios, giving the exact location of the affected areas and infrastructure to support contingency planning. The tool can also be used to support risk-based land-use planning, determining priorities for infrastructure retrofitting, real-time impact forecasts, or for a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA). Through a combination of As Jakarta continues to undertake flood mitigation both through structural measures, such these different measures as river dredging, canal improvement or construction of retention basins, and non- Jakarta can be made structural measures such as catchment rehabilitation, community preparedness and more resilient to flood contingency planning, the city will better adapt to the increasing frequency and intensity of risks, supporting the economic development of flooding. While the poor have always been disproportionately affected, they also show the the city and the most resilience, mainly out of necessity and the lack of choices that they can make. But, livelihoods of its through increased awareness of flood risk, early warning and prediction, as well as real- population time flood information dissemination including through the social media, all inhabitants of Jakarta, be they individuals, corporations or public agencies, can adapt their lives and make their respective contingency planning to ensure safety, business continuity and secured livelihood. Jakartans have shown extreme patience in dealing and coping with problems on a daily basis. With a few more systematic and comprehensive flood mitigation investments, and an effective information dissemination and contingency system, Jakarta could emerge as a flood resilient city. 21 For more detail information, please visit : www.inasafe.org T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 31 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus C. INDONESIA 2014 AND BEYOND: A SELECTIVE LOOK 1. Indonesia’s successes in disaster reconstruction and preparedness The Indonesian Within the last decade, Indonesia has faced a series of natural disasters that have taken a Government and its significant toll in terms of human life, damage to buildings and infrastructure, and partners have been highly economic disruption. In responding to these disasters, the Indonesian Government has successful in their been highly successful in planning and executing the physical reconstruction of homes, reconstruction efforts after devastating natural buildings and infrastructure, and in restoring economic livelihoods. It has also established disasters in Aceh, Nias proven approaches and models that can be used when future disasters strike both in and Java Indonesia and other countries at risk of disaster. These accomplishments were achieved in partnership with donors, international institutions, local and international non- government organizations (NGOs), regional and local governments, and communities affected by the disaster. Two multi-donor funds, the Multi Donor Fund for Aceh and Nias (MDF) and the Java Reconstruction Fund (JRF), contributed to these processes. With these programs coming to a close, this section provides a brief overview of this experience and the lessons it holds for future post disaster recovery efforts and for building resilience against natural disasters, both in Indonesia and elsewhere around the world.22 a. The challenges posed by the Aceh, Nias and Java disasters were unprecedented A series of recent natural The earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 took the lives of over 200,000 people in disasters in Indonesia Aceh and North Sumatra and left over 600,000 homeless. It also destroyed infrastructure, caused enormous buildings, and disrupted the economy. This was followed by a devastating earthquake that casualties and damage in struck the island of Nias in March 2005, destroying about 30 percent of its buildings. In Aceh, Nias and parts of Java May 2006, an earthquake in Yogyakarta Special Region and Central Java claimed more than 5,700 lives; later that year another earthquake triggered a tsunami causing widespread damage along the southern coast of West Java. Further destruction occurred in 2010, when Mount Merapi, a volcano located between Yogyakarta and Central Java, erupted repeatedly, causing serious damage to housing and infrastructure. Some of the affected Since 1976, a rebel movement in Aceh had fought intermittently against the Indonesian areas were already Government. The conflict had a devastating impact on Aceh. Nearly 15,000 people were fragile, compounding the killed over the course of the conflict. Aceh province became economically isolated as the impact of the disasters conflict deterred both foreign and domestic investors, limited access to markets, and increased the costs of inputs. The island of Nias, located off the western coast of North Sumatra, suffered from isolation, poor infrastructure, and a lack of economic advantages. It was poorly positioned to compete with other parts of the country, leaving much of the population in poverty. 22 This section draws upon the knowledge notes and other materials prepared for an international conference on “Lessons from Indonesia’s Experiences in Disaster Reconstruction and Preparednessâ€? held in Jakarta in November 2012 to mark the closing of the MDF and JRF. See www.multidonorfund.org and www.javareconstructionfund.org for more details. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 32 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Managing the generous Both Indonesia and the international community were generous in providing aid in contributions in aid response to the disasters. Supplies, funding, and expertise were mobilized to support presented challenges in relief and reconstruction efforts. Total contributions from the Indonesian Government and the recovery process international donors reached USD 6.7 billion for the reconstruction of Aceh and Nias. Hundreds of organizations established themselves in Aceh and Nias. While this assistance was both needed and welcomed, managing such huge resources presented major challenges for government, which led the reconstruction effort. Defining a clear reconstruction strategy, directing resources to support it, and managing funds in an efficient, transparent way was critical for the success of the overall reconstruction effort. Coordination of the many players on the ground was also essential to avoid duplication of effort and ensure an efficient usage of resources. b. Multi-donor funds supported Government-led relief and reconstruction efforts The Indonesian The Government of Indonesia managed each stage of the relief and recovery process. Government led and Given the scale of the disaster in Aceh and Nias, it established the Agency for the coordinated the relief and Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Aceh and Nias (BRR) to coordinate and manage the reconstruction process in process until its closure in 2009. It also requested the establishment of a multi-donor fund Aceh and Nias with support from the MDF with the World Bank acting as trustee to support the overall reconstruction effort. This led to the formation of the MDF, which pooled USD 655 million in contributions from 15 donors, representing nearly 10 percent of total reconstruction funds.23 This approach was designed to simplify the management of funds, focus resources where they were most needed in line with government strategy, and ensure funds would be used in a transparent, cost-efficient way. As such, it was in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005, which calls for national governments to develop their own development strategies which are then supported by donors towards well-defined goals. The MDF model was In response to the 2006 earthquakes in Java a National Transition Team was established successfully replicated in for initial coordination until 2008. Later, this role was assumed by the National Java Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) in coordination with provincial governments and line agencies. Seven donors set up the JRF using the same inclusive governance structure as the MDF, pooling USD 94.1 million.24 The program was expanded in 2010 to address reconstruction efforts following the Merapi eruptions. With the MDF in operation for over a year by the time the Java earthquakes struck, the value of the model as a vehicle for managing aid to support reconstruction had been demonstrated. The multi donor funds The MDF and JRF contributed to the reconstruction efforts by providing an inclusive contributed to the governance mechanism that provided government, donors, and other key players a reconstruction efforts by platform for discussing issues and making decisions quickly. A Steering Committee providing a framework for consisting of representatives from the Indonesian Government, the World Bank as trustee, government-led partnerships… donors and civil society coordinated stakeholders, formulated a strategy, developed procedures, and allocated funds to proposed projects. …adopting a phased In support of the Government’s reconstruction agenda, the MDF program implemented a approach… strategy using a phased approach to meet the evolving needs of survivors throughout the reconstruction process. After their immediate needs were addressed by the Government, reconstruction support focused on rebuilding homes and communities. As rebuilding progressed, the focus was on major infrastructure to restore transportation links, ensure availability of safe water, provide sanitation, and manage waste. The third phase of the MDF laid the groundwork for long-term development by strengthening key economic sectors, such as coffee, cacao, fisheries and rubber. This approach reflected and reinforced the government’s strategy. The reconstruction efforts in Java also took this approach, starting with housing reconstruction before working on restoring livelihoods. 23 The MDF’s donors were the European Commission, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the World Bank, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, Canada, Belgium, Finland, the Asian Development Bank, the United States, New Zealand and Ireland. 24 The JRF’s donors were the European Commission, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Finland and Denmark. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 33 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus …emphasizing The MDF adopted an approach to housing reconstruction which proved highly effective - community-based involving local communities in the process, from planning to actual construction. In Aceh development… and Nias, community leaders and groups had direct input at all stages of the process. Block grants and training provided to these groups enabled them to rebuild thousands of high-quality earthquake-resistant houses at low cost (see Box 6). This approach was also effective for building local infrastructure. Community groups, including women, made decisions on what infrastructure was most needed and contributed to the rebuilding of roads, wells, and irrigation channels and other projects, and managed funds in a transparent manner. The community-led approach was successfully replicated in Java, and has been adopted as policy by the Indonesian Government for future post-disaster reconstruction of settlements. Box 6: Rekompak – community-led reconstruction of settlements after disaster Rekompak is the name of a community-based program for reconstruction of homes and local infrastructure that was pioneered in Aceh. What distinguished Rekompak from other post-disaster reconstruction projects was its approach, which puts responsibility - and funding - for rebuilding housing and local infrastructure directly into the hands of communities, ensuring ownership and transparency. Community members identified beneficiaries and developed a spatial plan for each village to serve as a guide for rebuilding. Groups of ten to fifteen families were formed to take charge of rebuilding their own houses. These groups were accountable for the funds and all group members contributed to the rebuilding process. Facilitators trained by the Ministry of Public Works provided technical support to community groups in earthquake-resistant construction methods. Because beneficiaries provided much of the labor and recycled materials, Rekompak houses cost 30 percent less than those built through contractors, with a high level of satisfaction. The Rekompak model was further adapted in Java following the 2006 earthquake and eruptions of Mount Merapi. Altogether, Rekompak rebuilt 35,000 high-quality homes and over 10,000 local infrastructure projects and created a replicable model for post-disaster community reconstruction that can be applied in Indonesia and other countries. …and employing cross- A number of core elements Figure 33: A strategic framework for effective disaster cutting elements to were designed into all MDF reconstruction deliver a comprehensive, and JRF projects, to sustainable recovery enhance the quality of effort reconstruction (Figure 33). Organizational These included disaster risk Structure reduction, which ensured Make partnerships the that new construction would basis of the organization be resistant to earthquakes and trained people, including Economic Development schoolchildren, so that they Gender and Safeguards • Livelihoods Capacity Development would know how to respond Disaster/Conflict Risk • Capacity Building during disasters. Another key element was gender Reconstruction inclusiveness, which gave a • Infrastructure voice to women in making • Environment Reduction decisions affecting their communities. Environmental Immediate Recovery protection was another • Housing important element. Former • Logistics combatants and illegal Base phasing on speed, Establish baseline and loggers were trained to quality &sustainability strategy at the start protect forest areas, and modern landfills were constructed to manage Source: MDF Secretariat, World Bank waste safely. Capacity building supported all these investments by providing individuals and institutions with essential knowledge and improved technical skills needed to maintain infrastructure, improve management and increase productivity. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 34 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus c. Applying the lessons that Indonesia has learned on disaster recovery Indonesia’s experience Over an eight-year period from 2004, the Indonesian Government responded to a series over the past decade has of natural disasters including, for example, earthquakes and tsunamis, landslides and generated a body of volcanic eruptions. It was able to apply freshly-learned lessons from one disaster to the critical knowledge on next. In this way, it built up a body of knowledge related to disaster response and disaster recovery preparedness. Its experience with the MDF and JRF enabled it to replicate and improve models and approaches to disaster response and preparedness. In the process, Indonesia is now well-positioned to contribute to the global body of knowledge on these issues, so that others can benefit from these lessons and experience to better manage future disasters and reduce their impact. The experience also Following the experience of the disasters in Aceh, Nias and Java, the Indonesian prompted the Government has put in place a number of new policies to improve disaster management, Government of Indonesia preparedness and response. In 2008 the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) to make policy changes was established. Its role includes formulating disaster management policy, coordinating in disaster planning and response, including the the government’s response to disasters, disaster preparedness, and providing information establishment of the relevant to disasters. It operates at both national and regional levels. The BNPB National Disaster coordinated the development of the National Disaster Management Plan for 2010-2014, Management Agency… which includes a number of components drawn from the MDF and JRF. These include the integration of disaster risk reduction in development programs, capacity building, community-based disaster management, and enhancing the role of government partners.25 …and the Indonesia In 2010, the Government also established the Indonesia Disaster Fund (IDF). The IDF Disaster Fund was established to fund and coordinate disaster recovery efforts and disaster preparedness with international support. This donor trust fund operates through two windows, one administered by the World Bank and the other by the United Nations. The IDF also incorporates a number of features successfully employed by the MDF and JRF, including alignment with government strategy, a steering committee, technical committee, and focus areas including housing, livelihoods, and capacity building. Some of the key lessons A number of important lessons for reconstruction efforts can also be drawn out from include the fact that Indonesia’s experience. In terms of overall strategies, a framework for reconstruction reconstruction efforts based on three interrelated strategies of strong partnerships, effective implementation, benefit from an over- and cross-cutting elements was found to be successful. Overarching organizational arching strategic framework… structures, such as those provided by the MDF and JRF, enable a government and its partners to make effective program decisions, design appropriate projects and execute them efficiently. In addition, a mix of partners and implementers brought together core competencies and comparative advantages to address a wide range of needs. For donor- funded support it is important to have solid monitoring and evaluation, regular reporting, clear communications, and good funds management to ensure that each project supports the Government’s reconstruction strategy. ...community-led The evidence from Indonesia shows that community-driven approaches can be adapted development delivers… effectively for post-disaster reconstruction to deliver cost-effective, equitable and sustainable local level recovery. As discussed in Box 6 on the Rekompak program, the experiences of community recovery projects implemented under the MDF and JRF demonstrate that disaster-affected communities are able to manage reconstruction resources and projects to high-levels of quality and satisfaction while benefitting from increased confidence and capacities brought by the consultative and participatory approaches. At the same time, the community driven approach encourages faster social recovery and builds capacities that will last well beyond the reconstruction. …building capacity Capacity building proved to be crucial in the sustainability of investments made in service should be an integral provision and economic development. Capacity-building strategies ranged from feature for sustainable empowering communities to participate in the rebuilding of housing and community results… infrastructure to strengthening skills and systems for local governments to manage reconstruction assets, to organizational development for local government to better 25 Indonesia National Agency for Disaster Management. Disaster Management Plan / 2010-2014, pp. 80-83. http://www.bnpb.go.id/website/file/pubnew/99.pdf T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 35 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus address public sector management. Capacity building was found to be most effective when woven into each project and program initiative at entry, with its design and intensity reflecting the challenges of sustainability and the exit strategy of the supporting actors. …post-disaster The experiences in Aceh and Nias demonstrate that a sequenced approach to reconstruction of infrastructure investments, and, indeed, to overall reconstruction, based on balancing the infrastructure can benefit need for urgency with the need for quality and ownership, can be highly effective in from a sequenced managing short-term expectations while delivering long lasting results. For example, the approach… MDF’s initial infrastructure investments focused on immediate logistics needs to restore vital transport links and provide access to affected areas. Once these were established, the MDF redirected attention to large scale infrastructure reconstruction. Investments in large infrastructure have critical quality and ownership requirements that may supersede speed considerations, and care needed to be taken to balance the cost of speed against the cost of delay. Later, the scope of this work expanded to provide training to agencies responsible for managing the newly created assets. …and gender equality Another important lesson that can be drawn from the experiences of the MDF and JRF and women’s was that supporting gender equality and women’s empowerment in reconstruction efforts empowerment improves led to better results and increased resilience. Women’s participation improved quality, cost results efficiency and increased satisfaction, and sped up economic recovery. Women benefited from stronger legal and land ownership rights, which in turn gave women entrepreneurs better access to credit. Their active participation in local decision-making processes increased social cohesion and improved outcomes, such as an increase in the provision of public goods such as water, sanitation and health clinics. Valuable knowledge As mentioned, the experience over nearly eight years of responding to a series of generated through disasters, and applying lessons learned, have given the Indonesian government extensive Indonesia’s experience experience and knowledge in disaster management. Much of this has been embedded in on disaster its policies and newly-formed government bodies, such as the BNPB, and in educational reconstruction and preparedness has been institutions such as the Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta and the Tsunami Research delivered back to the Center in Banda Aceh. Other countries, including Haiti and Pakistan, have studied global community… Indonesia’s disaster response methods in designing their own post-disaster strategies. Indonesia, which has benefitted from international support in the wake of disasters, is now able to give back to the global community lessons for the future. …including through In November 2012, the closing of the MDF and JRF were marked by an international knowledge-sharing conference in Jakarta on “Lessons from Indonesia’s Experiences in Disaster events across disaster- Reconstruction and Preparednessâ€? which shared global experiences in post-disaster prone countries… reconstruction and preparedness. The conference drew over 500 participants including dignitaries from disaster prone countries including Japan, Pakistan, and Haiti. It covered many aspects of post-disaster reconstruction and preparedness, including the community- led approach to housing reconstruction, post-disaster livelihoods recovery, gender and capacity development, mainstreaming disaster risk reduction, and knowledge sharing. …with the aim of Indonesia has set a new standard for disaster response through its experiences in Aceh, delivering a legacy of Nias and Java. This is critical in a country which, by virtue of geography, will face natural further improvements in disasters again. But the Indonesia government’s successful approach to natural disaster disaster response, response and preparedness will save countless lives in the future. Its approach is proven resilience and preparedness into the and has been successfully replicated to address different kinds of disasters and contexts. future As a significant contributor to the reconstruction results, the MDF and JRF programs have been documenting their models, approaches, and experiences. The lessons Indonesia has learned through its massive recovery efforts will ensure that a legacy of improved response, resilience and preparedness will endure into the future. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 36 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus 2. Village infrastructure for basic service delivery Positive trends in Since the turn of the millennium, Indonesian real incomes have grown rapidly and reliably Indonesia’s while steady progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals has been socioeconomic made. However, robust national averages and trends hide a more troubling regional development over the picture: individual provinces, districts, and villages are not all progressing at the same high past decade hide significant region-by- rate. While there are many likely factors behind this unequal distribution, an impossible-to- region inequality which is ignore constraint to better performance in all Indonesian regions lies in the availability of in part due to a lack of the human and physical capital necessary for basic service provision. Using the findings human and physical of the recent Village Infrastructure Census this section highlights some of the key spatial capital for basic services divergences in health, education and infrastructure service delivery across the country and discusses how this new highly disaggregated data may be used to inform future policies to address this inequality of progress. a. What is the Village Infrastructure Census and why is it necessary? The VIC provides insights A recent Village Infrastructure Census (VIC), commissioned by the Vice President’s Office into a more equitable, for the Acceleration of Poverty Reduction (TNP2K), developed in collaboration with the targeted and potentially PNPM Support Facility (PSF),26 and undertaken by the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), more rational system of demonstrates the size and shape of the deficiencies in the ability to provide basic health, resource transfers from the central government to education, and transportation services across different villages. The VIC is regarded by local governments… TNP2K and the Government as the first step toward remedying the inequality of progress. The insights from the VIC can be used to inform the development of a plan for spending resources more equitably; for improving the targeting of development spending priorities, and potentially for pointing the way towards a more rational system of resource transfers (from central to local governments) to better match needs and capacities. The portrait of basic service supply readiness in Indonesian regions drawn from the VIC can also be used to quantify the remaining gaps in health, education, and transportation, i.e. the investments required to meet basic service standards, and estimate the cost of filling those gaps. …by collecting detailed The VIC provides detailed facility-level information on public health and education facility-level information... facilities, covering a total of 166,506 health facilities and 164,561 schools across the country. The 2011 PODES (Potensi Desa) core survey (also a village-by-village census) is used to complement the VIC data by providing observations on the quantity and quality of intra- and inter-village transportation and the quantity of health and education providers. The resulting combined database provides in-depth information on the quantity, quality, and accessibility of existing basic, public service-oriented infrastructure. …and assesses supply- Combined with further analyses and reports, commissioned jointly by TNP2K and PSF, side weaknesses to this information provides a comprehensive assessment of the local-level availability of quantify the cost of basic facilities and services in health, education, and transport. The database is rich remedying them enough to generate a nuanced picture of “supply readinessâ€? through the construction of indices combining several different indicators of the human and physical capital necessary for the provision of services. The indicators entering the supply readiness indices are available at the village level, which provides a very high resolution picture and will enable policy recommendations to be tailored to any level of regional disaggregation. b. The VIC combines a range of indicators to provide Supply Readiness Indices The VIC provides Indicators entering the VIC-based supply readiness indices can be grouped into roughly information on three three categories, according to the type of information they provide, namely on the rough categories of basic availability and accessibility of facilities, on the presence and qualification of personnel, service supply quantity and on the physical characteristics of facilities. Table 7 provides more detail on the and quality… selected indicators for health , education, and transportation services, respectively. As a general rule, the selected indicators of supply readiness take a value between 0 and 1, reflecting the share of the population, facility or geographic area that meet a supply readiness norm or threshold. 26 The PNPM Support Facility (PSF) was established by the Government of Indonesia and supported by multi-donor grants provided by the Governments of Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States, and the European Union. The grants are administered by the World Bank. The VIC final report will be made available on both the TNP2K and PSF websites beginning February 2013. For more details see http://pnpm-support.org/. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 37 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Table 7: The composite Supply Readiness Indices include a range of indicators for health, education and transportation (indicators included in composite index) a. Health Supply Readiness Indicators Indicator Description Share of population that can easily reach a polyclinic, Puskesmas, Puskesmas Access to primary care Pembantu, or physician’s practice Access to secondary care Share of population that can easily reach a hospital Share of population that can easily reach a hospital, maternity hospital, Puskesmas, Access to delivery facility Polindes or midwife’s practice Physician at Puskesmas Share of Puskesmas with at least one physician present Midwife in the village Share of population living in villages with a midwife present Water supply Puskesmas Share of Puskesmas with water installation within facility or 10 min walk Electrification Share of health facilities with electricity (excluding Posyandu) b. Education Supply Readiness Indicators Indicator Description Share of population in villages with early childhood education post (PAUD) in village or Access to early childhood education kindergarten within 1 km of village Access to junior secondary school Share of population in villages with SMP within 6 (3) km (SMP) Teacher qualification, primary school Share of SD with at least 2 teachers holding advanced S1 degrees (SD) Teacher qualification SMP Average share of SMP teachers holding advanced S1 degrees Laboratory in SMP Share of SMP with laboratory Water Supply Share of schools with water in student bathroom Electrification Share of schools with electricity c. Transportation Supply Readiness Indicators Indicator Description Share of villages with main road surface being either asphalt/concrete or gravel/stone Surface of main road etc. Condition of main road Share of villages with main road with no or minor damages Condition of bridges Share of villages with bridges with no or minor damages Need for new bridges Share of villages that report no need for new bridge(s) Share of villages with public transport with fixed route to the office of the sub-district Public trans. to Camat head Public trans. to regent/mayor Share of villages with public transport with fixed route to the office of the regent/major …while composite The indices constructed from these indicators manage to absorb the immense amount of indices combine this information contained in the VIC – within which individual variables provide a breakdown information to create “at of various aspects of service delivery – and combine it into summary indicators allowing a glanceâ€? readability for an easy grasp of the overall situation (see Box 7 below for more detail on the index construction). Index construction in the VIC report also preserves the very high resolution of the VIC and PODES data and therefore the indices can provide the “at a glanceâ€? summary capability all the way down to subdistrict-level for policy makers. Box 7: A note on reliability in the Supply Readiness Rankings In the construction of any indicator that combines a number of separate, but not necessarily independent, observations on variables that are themselves proxies and are often measured in different units, there is always a worry that the system of implicit or explicit weights – or the share any one variable has in the determination of the final index score – that accompany such a combination will unfairly disadvantage one region or another and misrepresent the true distribution of performance. In the analysis accompanying the VIC, six different weighting schemes are suggested to combine the underlying variables into a composite index. Three of these weighting schemes are chosen formulaically to represent (1) a focus on access, (2) equal weights for each of three categories (availability and accessibility of facilities; presence and qualification of personnel; and physical characteristics of facilities), and (3) equal weights for each indicator. Another three weighting schemes were derived empirically through (4) a principal components analysis, (5) an OLS regression of utilization on all seven indicators, and (6) a T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 38 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus measure of each of the seven indicators’ contributions to inequality (measured by a concentration index) in service utilization. There are merits to each of these six weighting schedules, but of greater importance is that the ranking and relative position of sub-districts or districts does not depend on which weighting scheme is used. In other words, the correlations between the six different indices created from six different weighting schemes are positive and close to one, indicating that the information contained in the seven indicators tells a consistent story no matter how it is combined. For example for health the pairwise correlations between the composite indices calculated using these six methods ranged from 0.92 to 1.00. Further circumstantial confirmation of the value of information contained in the VIC is available in the high and positive spatial correlations between indices. For health, education, and transportation similar spatial patterns of supply readiness emerge across the sectors’ different dimensions. Positive correlations are visible also across the individual indicators of health, education and transportation infrastructure. The last two weighting schemes – OLS and inequality contributions – combine VIC information with an independently collected household survey (the Susenas household survey). The addition of an independent data source provides an outside reliability check on the PODES data itself. If PODES/VIC indicators of supply readiness are correlated with (and explain some of the variation in) utilization of the same services as measured by independent interviews of households, then there is good reason for believing that the VIC measures as constructed are good proxies for actual supply. c. Health Service Supply Readiness is highest in Java and Bali Health service supply The VIC data demonstrate the very wide variation in health service supply readiness readiness varies widely across provinces, districts, sub-districts, and village by village. Taking some rough-and- and generally decreases ready island groupings, Figure 34 shows that sub-districts in Bali (0.99) and Java (0.96) with distance from Java have achieved very high levels of health supply readiness; subdistricts in Sumatra (0.87), and Bali Sulawesi (0.82), Kalimantan (0.80), and Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT) and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) (0.77) exhibit approximately average scores; while the Molukas (0.68) and especially Papua and Papua Barat (0.42) indisputably lag the rest of the country. The national gap between urban (0.96) and rural (0.75) sub-districts in the supply and quality of basic services is substantial; on a regional level, the urban-rural dichotomy is most evident in areas with an overall low level of infrastructure supply readiness. For example, in Sulawesi and Kalimantan, urban areas are clearly much more reliable providers of health care service than are their rural hinterlands; while even urban areas in Papua have a very high risk of health service supply unavailability; and even primarily rural areas in Java and Bali enjoy high levels of health supply readiness. Figure 34: Health Supply Readiness is higher in Java and Bali and falls in eastern Indonesia (composite Index of Health Service Supply Readiness) Note: Index varies from 0 to 1 with higher value indicating higher supply readiness Source: PODES 2011 and the Village Infrastructure Census and Report The VIC report calculates The VIC analysis contains a “gapâ€? calculation – or the distance of each indicator to its the investments maximum value – in order to quantify the minimum investment needed to achieve basic necessary to fill the gaps health service standards throughout Indonesia. Table 8 gives an overview of total national in supply readiness gaps, defined as the sum of sub-district gaps, for select health-service supply readiness indicators. A striking finding demonstrates that as many as 15 percent of Indonesians (approximately 36 million citizens) have no easy access to secondary health care facilities T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 39 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus or services, leaving them essentially no alternatives should basic primary care be incapable or unequipped to treat their case. A concerted, multi-year investment in the physical and human capital necessary for secondary health care services is likely the only way to close this gap and provide all Indonesians access to a reliable and comprehensive health care system. This will be crucial for the next phase of Indonesia’s universal health insurance plan as embodied in the national social security system plans and associated legislation. Table 8: Some of the gaps in Health Service Supply Readiness are striking, such as access to secondary health care (Overall gaps in Health Service Supply Readiness for select indicators) Indicator and Associated Gap Total National Gap Number of citizens without access: primary care 6.2 million Number of sub-districts without Puskesmas 383 Number of citizens without access: secondary care 36 million Number of districts without hospital 42 Number of citizens without access: delivery facility 6.8 million Number of sub-districts without delivery facility 222 Number of Puskesmas without physician 732 (8 percent of all Puskemas) Number of villages without midwife 14,842 (population: 12 million) Number of Puskesmas without water installation 852 (9 percent of all Puskemas) Number of health facilities without electricity 10,629 (14 percent of all health facilities) Source: PODES 2011 and the Village Infrastructure Census and Report d. …with similar spatial patterns for Education Supply Readiness… As for health, education The VIC data demonstrate that regional patterns in education supply readiness look much supply readiness is much the same as those in health, with sub-districts in Bali (0.96) and Java (0.94) achieving the weaker in Eastern highest levels; Sulawesi (0.81), Sumatra (0.80), Kalimantan (0.74), and NTT & NTB (0.72) Indonesia... again in the middle of the distribution; while the Molukas (0.60) and, in particular, Papua and Papua Barat (0.30) lag far behind. The overall gap between urban (0.93) and rural (0.70) sub-districts is again significant. Here, the urban-rural dichotomy suggest there may be four distinct service delivery profiles currently common in Indonesia, In Java and Bali both urban and rural areas are relatively well-served while in the Molukas/Papua both urban and rural areas are noticeably under-served. For the rest of Indonesia, urban areas present a substantial advantage over the final profile of rural areas. Figure 35: The spatial pattern of Education Supply Readiness is similar to that for health (composite Index of Education Supply Readiness) Note: Index varies from 0 to 1 with higher value indicating higher supply readiness Source: PODES 2011 and the Village Infrastructure Census and Report T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 40 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus …while the VIC Table 9 below gives an overview of total national gaps in education supply readiness. demonstrates that even While Indonesia has already achieved near-universal access to, and approximately when physical supply is universal enrollment in, primary schooling, the gap analysis indicates that over 16 million adequate, quality may be citizens lack access to early childhood education (ECED) services and over 9 million will low not have access to junior secondary school. Furthermore, many existing schools would benefit from capital upgrades, maintenance, and modernization: between 13 and 36 percent of all public schools lack modern amenities like electricity, running water, or a science or skills laboratory. The size and distribution of these gaps limits access for some of the population to basic education while also indicating significant short- and medium- term challenges for students already participating. Without sustained efforts to address these gaps in supply it may be difficult to achieve a modern education system that produces graduates with the experience, skills, and motivation necessary to contribute to the development of an entrepreneurial, creative, and flexibly-deployed labor force. Table 9: The Education Supply Readiness Gaps indicates the need for to improve physical quality of supply (Overall Gaps in Education Supply Readiness for select indicators) Indicator and Associated Gap Total National Gap Number of citizens without access: ECED 16.6 million Number of villages without ECED 19,052 Number of citizens without access: SMP 9.5 million Number of sub-districts without SMP 230 Number of ‘S1’ teachers needed: SD 32,586 Number of ‘S1’ teachers needed: SMP 14,675 Number of SMP without laboratory 8,000 (36 percent of all SMP) Number of public schools without electricity 21,653 (13 percent of all public schools) Number of public schools without water in bathroom 30,207 (18 percent of all public schools) Source: PODES 2011 and the Village Infrastructure Census and Report e. …and both are highly correlated with Transportation Supply Readiness Patterns in transportation Patterns in the quantity and quality of transport infrastructure likely exacerbate the supply readiness run shortcomings in the provision of health and education services. Figure 36 below illustrates parallel to the health and one of the metrics of the availability of public transport and demonstrates that in those education sectors areas where health and education services are poorly supplied, households and communities often lack a low-cost option for accessing neighboring areas where the supply may be more reliable or accessing administrative centers to report service interruptions or lobby for better services. The VIC report findings make clear that there are unambiguous positive correlations between transportation indicators and those for health and education availability. This suggestion of the presence of common determinants for infrastructure investments (across sectors) indicates that addressing any individual gap or adopting a piecemeal approach may not substantially change the overall public service delivery environment that households and communities face. A combined index across The VIC report combines the health and education indices into a large meta index based health, education, and on all 14 sub-indicators (not shown here). Conclusions drawn from this larger index are transportation indicators similar in quality to conclusions from the sub-indices: in general, the islands of Java and shows similar patterns as Bali perform best with respect to the quantity and quality of available infrastructure. the sub-indices However, local needs for investment still exist, in particular in the provinces of West Java and Banten (as discussed below). Overall, the largest gaps in infrastructure supply readiness are found for the Papua region, the Maluku islands, NTT, as well as for the interior of Kalimantan. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 41 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Figure 36: Areas with poor supply of health or education services tend to also have poor accessibility by public transport (share of villages with public transport to Regent or Mayor’s office) Source: PODES 2011 and the Village Infrastructure Census and Report The VIC also allows The VIC’s very high resolution enables policymakers at any level to plan for development examination of the spending based either on locally appropriate targets or with reference to national targets. indicators or underlying For example, Figure 37 below shows that there is no mobile phone signal whatsoever in components all the way almost half of the sub-districts in the Papuan provinces. This indicator – which is included down to the village level. in the PODES database and which can be overlaid on VIC data – suggests that ICT- based solutions for improving service delivery may be less effective in Eastern Indonesia and Papua provinces. Figure 38, which provides a village-by-village summary of primary school teacher quality in West Java province, suggests that a unit of basic education may vary widely in quality and effectiveness, even within a subdistrict. Both indicators and both resolutions indicate that a “one size fits allâ€? development plan will not work within provinces or districts any better than for Indonesia as a whole. Figure 37: Half of the sub-districts in the Papuan provinces Figure 38: The quality of primary school teachers can vary do not have any mobile phone signal markedly even within sub-districts (share of population with any mobile phone signal in Papua (share of SD teachers with S1 degree in Java Barat Province and Papua Barat Provinces at subdistrict resolution) at village resolution) Source: PODES 2011 and the Village Infrastructure Census and Report T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 42 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus f. Extensions and policy applications The village-level The primary impetus behind the VIC (and associated report) was the need for more and resolution of the VIC better evidence-based strategies for financing, management, and targeting in the combined with its Government of Indonesia’s “Cluster 2â€? or community-driven development programs (of generality make it useful which the National Community Empowerment Program or PNPM Mandiri is perhaps the for pro-poor development planning in all sectors best-known). For example, for the competitively-awarded and community-managed block and at all levels… grants that are delivered through the PNPM program, the VIC data can be used to find and prioritize regions that would benefit from larger block grants or from eligibility for and receipt of more than one type of PNPM block grant. As PNPM block grants are most frequently used by communities to increase the infrastructure asset base – roads, irrigation and drainage structures, clean water facilities, etc – providing extra financing through PNPM for areas that face large supply readiness gaps could produce a substantial impact, even in the short-term. Policy planners involved with the PNPM- Generasi initiative – a PNPM variant targeted to the poorest regions where block grants are tied to spending on health and education services – are taking advantage of the VIC database to decide which regions will receive Generasi block grants over its 2013-2015 scale-up phase. …and its public The VIC’s native resolution means that any of the potential applications – for example, availability means that it using the VIC to revise public resource spending to better match needs and capacities or can be used by any user to improve the targeting of priority development initiatives in any sector – can be pursued to benchmark regional at any regional level and by any motivated politician or authority no matter his or her performance location. The VIC as developed also supports this evidence-based analysis with regard to local, regional, or even national comparisons, so any user will be able to determine his region’s performance against all relevant benchmarks and standards. By supporting the development of a database and tool that is applicable throughout Indonesia, TNP2K and the Government have provided a significant public service; by continuing to support the VIC’s dissemination and adoption outside of its own walls, TNP2K will be responsible for bringing one of the first widely-applicable, easy-to-use, and up-to-date methodologies for pro-poor policy planning to all regions and all sectors interested in evidence-based processes and outputs. Extensions of the VIC, to A number of ongoing extensions of the VIC analysis, which are being developed by the link it to measures of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) team in the PNPM Support Facility (PSF), can provide isolation and multi- additional insights into other dimensions of service provision. The first extension aims to dimensional poverty, are indicate relative levels of isolation in order to provide another Indonesia-wide layer of in process to inform further future policy relevant information for evidence-based targeting strategies for all government making development spending. As the maps above indicate, many supply-deficient regions are either surrounded by poor-performing regions or are situated a considerable distance away from the next-closest region with good performance. This type of isolation can impede progress on its own as there may be no best practices to learn from or high- performing neighbors to absorb internal migrants. A second extension is to link the VIC with data on multi-dimensional poverty (MDP). As the VIC data was collected by BPS as an add-on to one of its regularly produced products (the PODES village census, which is produced every 3 years), the VIC database is easy to merge with other BPS-produced datasets such as the 2010 Population Census and the quarterly Susenas household socioeconomic welfare survey. Data on MDP captures expenditures and outcomes within households and so provides a good demand-side counterpart to the supply-side information that the VIC contains. Combining the two databases should allow researchers and policymakers to see the entire economy of basic services in one place, facilitating analysis to discover areas where demand-side outcomes exceed expectations despite supply-side impediments, and their determinants. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 43 APPENDIX: A SNAPSHOT OF INDONESIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS Appendix Figure 1: Quarterly and annual GDP growth Appendix Figure 2: Contributions to GDP expenditures (real GDP growth, percent) (contribution to quarter-on-quarter seasonally-adjusted real GDP growth, percent) Percent Percent Percent Percent 4 8 4 4 Year-on-year (RHS) 3 3 3 6 2 2 1 1 QoQ seas. adjust (LHS) 0 0 2 4 Average (LHS)* -1 -1 -2 -2 1 2 -3 -3 Sep-09 Jun-10 Mar-11 Dec-11 Sep-12 Discrepancy Net Exports Investment 0 0 Sep-05 Jun-07 Mar-09 Dec-10 Sep-12 Gov cons. Private cons. GDP Note: *Average QoQ growth between Q3 2002 – Q3 2012 Source: BPS via CEIC and World Bank staff calculations Source: BPS, World Bank seasonal adjustment Appendix Figure 3: Contributions to GDP production Appendix Figure 4: Motor cycle and motor vehicle sales (contribution to quarter-on-quarter seasonally-adjusted real (monthly sales) GDP growth, percent) Percent Percent '000 '000 3 3 900 130 Motor cycles (LHS) 2 2 110 700 1 1 90 500 0 0 70 -1 -1 300 Motor vehicles (RHS) 50 Sep-09 Jun-10 Mar-11 Dec-11 Sep-12 Other (incl services) Trade, Hotel, & Rest. 100 30 Comm and Trans. Manufacture Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 Oct-12 Mining and Const Agriculture Source: BPS via CEIC and World Bank staff calculations Source: CEIC Appendix Figure 5: Consumer indicators Appendix Figure 6: Industrial production indicators (index levels) (year-on-year growth, percent) Index Index Percent Percent 160 160 15 60 BI Retail sales index Manufacturing production index (LHS) 140 140 10 40 BI Consumer Survey 120 Index 120 5 20 100 100 0 0 80 80 Cement sales (RHS) 60 60 -5 -20 Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 Oct-12 Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 Oct-12 Source: BI via CEIC Source: CEIC Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Appendix Figure 7: Real trade flows Appendix Figure 8: Balance of Payments (quarter-on-quarter real growth, percent) (USD billion) Percent Percent USD billion USD billion 20 20 16 16 Overall Balance 12 12 10 Imports 10 Current account 8 8 0 0 4 4 Exports 0 0 -10 -10 Errors and omissions -4 -4 -20 -20 -8 Capital and financial account -8 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Source: BPS (National Accounts) Source: BI Appendix Figure 9: Goods trade balance Appendix Figure 10: Reserves and capital inflows (USD billion) (USD billion) USD billion USD billion USD billion USD billion 20 5.0 150 5.0 Trade balance International Exports (RHS) Reserves (LHS) (LHS) 125 2.5 10 2.5 100 0.0 0 0.0 75 -2.5 -10 -2.5 50 -5.0 Non-resident portfolio inflows (RHS) Imports (LHS) -20 -5.0 Oct-09 Oct-10 Oct-11 25 Oct-12 -7.5 Nov-09 Nov-10 Nov-11 Nov-12 Source: BPS Source: BI, CEIC and World Bank staff calculations Appendix Figure 11: Indonesia’s major term of trade indices Appendix Figure 12: Inflation and monetary policy and other commodities (month-on-month and year-on-year growth, percent) (index 2007=100) Index Jan 2007 = 100 Index Jan 2007 = 100 Percent Percent 3 12 280 280 Headline inflation, YoY (RHS) 240 240 Core inflation, YoY (RHS) Indonesia's Major Export Energy 2 8 Commodities BI policy rate (RHS) 200 200 160 160 1 4 Food 120 120 0 0 80 80 Metals and Minerals Headline inflation MoM (LHS) 40 40 Jan-07 Jun-08 Nov-09 Apr-11 Sep-12 -1 -4 Nov-08 Nov-09 Nov-10 Nov-11 Nov-12 Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 45 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Appendix Figure 13: Monthly breakdown of CPI Appendix Figure 14: Inflation among neighboring countries (percentage point contributions to monthly growth) (year-on-year, November 2012) Percent Percent Percent 1.8 Volatile 1.8 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Administered Indonesia Core 1.2 Headline 1.2 Singapore * Philippines * Thailand 0.6 0.6 China USA* 0.0 0.0 Korea* Malaysia* Japan * -0.6 -0.6 Nov-09 Nov-10 Nov-11 Nov-12 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Percent Source: BPS and World Bank staff calculations *October is latest available month Source: National statistical agencies via CEIC, and BPS Appendix Figure 15: Domestic and international rice prices Appendix Figure 16: Poverty and unemployment rate (Wholesale price, in IDR per kg) (percent) IDR/Kg IDR/Kg Percent Percent 11,000 11,000 25 25 Medium quality: Muncul I (domestic) 9,000 Thai 100% B 2nd grade 9,000 20 20 (international) Poverty rate 7,000 7,000 15 15 5,000 5,000 10 10 Low quality: Unemployment rate 3,000 IR 64 III (domestic); 3,000 5 5 Thai A1 Super (international) 1,000 1,000 0 0 Nov-08 Nov-09 Nov-10 Nov-11 Nov-12 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Note: Dashed: international Thai rice (cif) prices. Solid: Note: Labor data from February Sakernas domestic wholesale rice Source: BPS Source: PIBC, FAO and World Bank Appendix Figure 17: Regional equity indices Appendix Figure 18: Dollar index and Rupiah exchange rate (daily, index January 2009=100) (daily, index and levels) Index (Jan 2009=100) Index (Jan 2009=100) Index (5 Jan 2009=100) IDR per USD 350 350 120 8,000 JCI IDR/USD (RHS) 300 300 110 9,000 250 250 SET IDR Appreciation 200 BSE 200 100 10,000 150 150 SGX 90 11,000 100 100 Shanghai Dollar Index (LHS) 50 50 80 12,000 Jan-09 Dec-09 Nov-10 Oct-11 Sep-12 Jan-09 Dec-09 Nov-10 Oct-11 Sep-12 Source: CEIC and World Bank staff calculations Source: CEIC and World Bank staff calculations T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 46 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Appendix Figure 19: 5-year local currency government bond Appendix Figure 20: Sovereign USD Bond EMBI spreads yields (daily, basis points) (daily, percent) Percent Percent Basis points Basis points 15 15 1000 250 Indonesia 750 125 10 10 Indonesia spreads less overall EMBIG Index spreads (RHS) Philippines 500 0 5 5 Malaysia 250 -125 Thailand United States Indonesia EMBIG bond spreads (LHS) 0 -250 0 0 Jan-09 Dec-09 Nov-10 Oct-11 Sep-12 Jan-09 Dec-09 Nov-10 Oct-11 Sep-12 Source: CEIC and World Bank staff calculations Source: JP Morgan and World Bank staff calculations Appendix Figure 21: International commercial bank lending Appendix Figure 22: Banking sector indicators (monthly, index January 2009=100) (monthly, percent) Index (Jan 2009=100) Index (Jan 2009=100) Percent Percent 200 200 100 10 Loan to Deposit Ratio 180 180 (LHS) India 80 8 Indonesia 160 160 60 6 Singapore 140 140 Non-Performing Loans Malaysia (RHS) Return on Assets Ratio 40 (RHS) 4 120 120 Thailand 20 2 100 100 USA Capital Adequacy Ratio (LHS) 80 80 0 0 Jan-09 Dec-09 Nov-10 Oct-11 Sep-12 Source: CEIC and World Bank staff calculations Source: BI Appendix Figure 23: Government debt Appendix Figure 24: External debt (percent of GDP; USD billion) (percent of GDP; USD billion) Percent USD billion Percent USD billion 50 250 50 250 Government debt ratio to GDP (LHS) External debt ratio to GDP (LHS) 40 200 40 200 30 150 30 150 20 100 20 100 10 50 10 50 0 0 0 0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012* External debt, RHS Private external debt, RHS *September *September Domestic debt, RHS Public external debt, RHS Source: MoF, BI and World Bank staff calculations Source: BI and World Bank staff calculations T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 47 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Appendix Table 1: Budget outcomes and projections (IDR trillion) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012 (p) 2013 MoF Budget Outcome Outcome Outcome Semester I Budget Revision projections A. State revenue and grants 849 995 1,211 1,358 1,362 1,530 1. Tax revenue 620 723 874 1,016 1,017 1,193 2. Non-tax revenue 227 269 331 341 345 332 B. Expenditure 937 1,042 1,295 1,548 1,553 1,683 1. Central government 629 697 884 1,070 1,071 1,154 2. Transfers to the 309 345 411 479 482 529 regions C. Primary balance 5 42 9 -72 -79 -40 D. SURPLUS / DEFICIT -89 -47 -84 -190 -191 -153 (percent of GDP) -1.6 -0.7 -1.1 2.2 -2.3 -1.7 Note: * MoF estimates based on MoF Semester I 2012 report Source: MoF Appendix Table 2: Balance of Payments (USD billion) 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Balance of Payments 12.5 30.3 11.9 11.3 7.7 11.9 -4.0 -3.7 -1.0 -2.8 0.8 Percent of GDP 2.3 4.3 1.4 6.0 3.9 5.6 -1.8 -1.7 -0.5 -1.3 0.4 Current Account 10.6 5.1 1.7 0.9 2.9 0.3 0.8 -2.3 -3.1 -7.7 -5.3 Percent of GDP 2.0 0.7 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.1 0.3 -1.1 -1.4 -3.5 -2.4 Trade Balance 21.2 21.3 24.2 6.4 7.4 6.1 7.1 3.5 1.7 -2.1 0.6 Net Income & Current Transfers -10.6 -16.2 -22.5 -5.6 -4.5 -5.8 -6.4 -5.8 -4.9 -5.6 -5.9 Capital & Financial Accounts 4.9 26.6 13.5 9.7 4.8 11.6 -3.3 0.4 2.4 5.1 6.0 Percent of GDP 0.9 3.8 1.6 5.2 2.4 5.5 -1.5 0.2 1.1 2.3 2.7 Direct Investment 2.6 11.1 11.5 4.4 3.8 2.5 2.1 3.1 1.6 3.7 3.6 Portfolio Investment 10.3 13.2 4.0 1.4 3.3 4.9 -4.7 0.4 2.7 4.0 3.8 Other Investment -8.2 2.3 -2.1 3.8 -2.3 4.2 -0.8 -3.2 -1.9 -2.7 -1.5 Errors & Omissions -3.0 -1.5 -3.4 0.7 -0.1 0.0 -1.4 -1.8 -0.3 -0.2 0.2 Foreign Reserves* 66.1 96.2 110.1 96.2 105.7 119.7 114.5 110.1 110.5 106.5 110.2 Note: * Reserves at end-period Source: BI and BPS T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 48 Indonesia Economic Quarterly Policies in focus Appendix Table 3: Indonesia’s development indicators at a glance 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2012 1 Demographics Population (million) 184 199 213 227 240 242 .. Population growth rate (%) 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 .. Urban population (% urban to total) 30.6 35.6 42.0 45.9 49.9 50.7 .. Gender ratio, female (% of total) 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.1 50.1 50.1 .. Dependency ratio (% of working-age population) 67.3 60.8 54.7 51.2 48.3 47.8 .. 2 Labor Force Labor force, total (million) 75 84 98 106 117 117 .. Male 46 54 60 68 72 72 .. Female 29 31 38 38 45 45 .. Agriculture share of employment (%) 55 43 45 44 38 36 .. Industry share of employment (%) 14 19 17 19 19 21 .. Services share of employment (%) 31 38 37 37 42 44 .. Unemployment, total (% of labor force) 2.5 7.0 8.1 11.2 7.1 6.6 .. Male 2.5 5.4 7.2 9.3 6.1 5.9 .. Female 2.7 9.8 9.6 14.7 8.7 7.6 .. 3 Poverty and Income Distribution Median household consumption (IDR 000) .. .. 104 211 374 421 446 National poverty line (IDR 000) .. .. 73 129 212 234 249 Poor (million) .. .. 38 35 31 30 29 Poverty (% of population below national poverty line) .. .. 19.1 16.0 13.3 12.5 12.0 Urban (% of population below urban poverty line) .. .. 14.6 11.7 9.9 9.2 8.8 Rural (% of population below rural poverty line) .. .. 22.4 20.0 16.6 15.7 15.1 Male-headed households .. .. 15.5 13.3 11.0 10.2 9.5 Female-headed households .. .. 12.6 12.8 9.5 9.7 8.8 GINI index .. .. 0.30 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.41 Percentage share of consumption: lowest 20% .. .. 9.6 8.7 7.9 7.4 7.5 Percentage share of consumption: highest 20% .. .. 38.6 41.4 43.5 46.5 46.7 4 Public expenditure on social security and welfare (% of GDP) .. .. .. 4.4 3.9 3.9 4.2 1 Health and Nutrition Physicians (per 1,000 people) 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 .. .. Hospital beds (per 1,000 people) 0.7 .. .. .. 0.6 .. .. Child malnutrition (% of children under 5) .. 27 25 24 18 .. .. 5 Under five mortality rate (per 1000 children under 5 year) 98 .. 46 .. 44 .. .. 5 Neonatal mortality rate (per 1000 live births) 27 .. .. .. 19 .. .. 5 Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 67 .. 35 .. 34 .. .. Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births) 600 420 340 270 220 .. .. Life Expectancy at birth (total years) 62 64 66 67 69 69 .. Skilled birth attendance (% of total births) 36 .. 66 .. 82 .. .. Measles vaccination (% of children under 1 year) 0 .. 72 .. 76 .. .. Total health expenditure (% of GDP) .. 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.6 .. .. Public health expenditure (% of GDP) .. 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.3 .. .. 1 Water and Sanitation Access to an improved water source (% of population) 70 74 78 80 82 .. .. Urban (% of urban population) 91 91 91 91 92 .. .. Rural (% of rural population) 61 65 68 71 74 .. .. Access to improved sanitation facilities (% of population) 32 38 44 50 54 .. .. Urban (% of urban population) 56 60 64 69 73 .. .. Rural (% of rural population) 21 26 30 35 39 .. .. 1 Others Disaster risk reduction progress score (1-5 scale; 5=best) .. .. .. .. .. 3.3 .. 6 Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%) .. .. 8.0 11.3 18.0 18.2 18.6 Source: 1 World Development Indicators, 2 BPS (Sakernas), 3 BPS (Susenas) and World Bank, 4 MoF and World Bank staff calculation and only includes spending on Raskin, Jamkesmas, BLT, BSM, PKH and actuals except 2012 which is from revised budget. 5 Indonesia Demographic and Health Survey, 6 Inter-Parliamentary Union. T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A December 2012 49 INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY Pressures mounting March 2013 INDONESIA ECONOMIC QUARTERLY Pressures mounting March 2013 Preface The Indonesia Economic Quarterly (IEQ) has two main aims. First, it reports on the key developments over the past three months in Indonesia’s economy, and places these in a longer-term and global context. Based on these developments, and on policy changes over the period, the IEQ regularly updates the outlook for Indonesia’s economy and social welfare. Second, the IEQ provides a more in-depth examination of selected economic and policy issues, and analysis of Indonesia’s medium-term development challenges. It is intended for a wide audience, including policymakers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Indonesia’s evolving economy. The IEQ is a product of the World Bank’s Jakarta office. The report is compiled by the Macro and Fiscal Policy Cluster, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Network, under the guidance of Sector Manager and Lead Economist, Jim Brumby, Economic Advisor and Lead Economist, Ndiame Diop, and Senior Economist, Ashley Taylor. The core project team, with responsibility for Part A (economic update), editing and production, comprises Arsianti, Magda Adriani, Fitria Fitrani, Brendan Coates, Faya Hayati, Ahya Ihsan, Shakira Jones, Alex Sienaert and Ashley Taylor, with invaluable administrative support provided by Titi Ananto and Sylvia Njotomihardjo. Dissemination is organized by Dini Sari Djalal, Farhana Asnap, Indra Irnawan, Jerry Kurniawan, Nugroho, Marcellinus Winata and Randy Salim. This edition of the IEQ also includes contributions from Ahya Ihsan (Section B.1 on the 2012 Budget outturn), Fitria Fitrani and Brendan Coates (Section B.2 on trade), Taimur Samad, Renata Simatupang and Chandan Deuskar (Section C.1 on urbanization) and Bill Wallace and Ahya Ihsan (Section C.2. on infrastructure investment, with support from Jonathan Sariaatmadja and Yus Pakpahan). Key input was also received from Kiyoshi Taniguchi (box on beef prices), Djauhari Sitorus, Neni Lestari and The Fei Ming (banking sector, credit and corporate sector update), and Cindy Paladines and Matthew Wai-Poi (poverty update). Mark Ahern, Bert Hoffman, Yue Man Lee, Hari Purnomo, Sjamsu Rahardja, Theo Thomas and Soekarno Wirokartono provided in-depth comments. This report is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, supported by funding from the Australian Government –– AusAID, under the Support for Enhanced Macroeconomic and Fiscal Policy Analysis (SEMEFPA) program. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors of The World Bank or the governments they represent, AusAID or the Australian Government. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. Cover and chapter photographs are copyright Juferdy, SECO and Sri Probo. All rights reserved. For more World Bank analysis of Indonesia’s economy: For information about the World Bank and its activities in Indonesia, please visit www.worldbank.org/id. In order to be included on an email distribution list for this Quarterly series and related publications, please contact madriani@worldbank.org. For questions and comments relating to this publication, please contact asienaert@worldbank.org. Table of contents Preface iii Executive summary: Pressures mounting viii A. ECONOMIC AND FISCAL UPDATE 1 1. Global economic conditions have improved modestly 1 2. Indonesia’s economy continued to grow steadily through the end of 2012 2 3. Current account deficit places focus on external financing needs and sources 6 4. Credit extension and asset price growth remain strong in early 2013 9 5. Low economy-wide inflation in 2012 but the CPI has recently accelerated 12 6. The fiscal deficit is likely to expand in 2013 on higher fuel subsidy spending 16 7. The official poverty rate continues to decline slowly 19 8. Risks to the outlook are being heightened by domestic factors 21 B. SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA’S ECONOMY 23 1. A closer look at the preliminary 2012 Budget outturn 23 a. The preliminary figure for the overall deficit was 1.8 percent of GDP… .................................. 24 b. …as falling revenue growth was offset by underspends on core expenditures...................... 24 2. Understanding the value-added in Indonesia’s trade 27 a. What can be learnt from looking at trade in value added? ........................................................ 27 b. Commodities have driven the patterns of Indonesia’s value added in exports ....................... 27 c. Imported intermediates are increasingly going towards domestic production ....................... 28 d. Integration into international supply chains could help export diversification ....................... 29 C. INDONESIA 2014 AND BEYOND: A SELECTIVE LOOK 31 1. Preparing for Indonesia’s urban future: harnessing agglomeration economies 31 a. Cities as the future of Indonesia .................................................................................................. 31 b. Urban agglomeration brings both benefits and challenges ...................................................... 32 c. The way forward: making the most of urbanization and agglomeration in Indonesia ............ 36 2. Piecing together the picture of Indonesia's infrastructure investment trends 37 a. Infrastructure investment has not recovered to pre-Asian crisis levels .................................. 38 b. What has been driving the recent trends in infrastructure investment? .................................. 39 c. Linking infrastructure, growth and development outcomes ..................................................... 42 APPENDIX: A SNAPSHOT OF INDONESIAN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 43 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Real GDP growth has stayed steady but nominal GDP and real final sales growth have slowed ............................................................................................................................. x Figure 2: Infrastructure investment in real terms and as a share of GDP remains below pre- Asian crisis levels ......................................................................................................... xi Figure 3: US Treasury yields remain close to historic lows and emerging market sovereign credit spreads are tight… .............................................................................................. 2 Figure 4: …while the prices of some of Indonesia’s key commodity exports show signs of stabilization and recovery ............................................................................................. 2 Figure 5: Private consumption and investment continue to be the key drivers of growth, offsetting net export weakness ..................................................................................... 4 Figure 6: Services and Industry performed robustly ......................................................................... 4 Figure 7: Weak capital goods imports suggest further possible moderation in investment growth ............................................................................................................................. 4 Figure 8: A wider current account deficit has kept the basic balance of payments in deficit… .... 6 Figure 9: … as a combination of weak prices and export volumes weighed on most commodity exports ............................................................................................................................ 6 Figure 10: A sizable oil and gas trade deficit has recently weighed on the external accounts ..... 7 Figure 11: Despite strong growth, FDI inflows into Indonesia remain modest compared to its peers ................................................................................................................................ 8 Figure 12: Reserves declined in January and February despite the return of portfolio investment inflows ............................................................................................................................. 8 Figure 13: Gross external financing needs have trended higher ...................................................... 9 Figure 14: …although foreign currency lending has been decelerating, to below the pace of domestic lending ............................................................................................................ 9 Figure 15: Bond yields remain low and the Rupiah has depreciated ............................................. 10 Figure 16: The recent dip in credit growth appears to have bottomed out for now ...................... 10 Figure 17: Indonesia’s banking system assets as a share of GDP remains small compared with its peers… ..................................................................................................................... 10 Figure 18: …despite comparatively rapid nominal credit growth in recent years ......................... 10 Figure 19: Residential house price growth has been modest, especially in real terms, but is now accelerating… ............................................................................................................... 11 Figure 20: …while property sector lending accelerated to mid-2012 but has since slowed as LTVs have taken effect................................................................................................. 11 Figure 21: Inflation in 2012 was the lowest in 12 years… ................................................................ 12 Figure 22: …helped by food price disinflation over the second half of 2012 before this accelerated in early 2013 ............................................................................................. 12 Figure 23: CPI weights of the food items affected by recent restrictive trade policies influence their CPI impact… ........................................................................................................ 12 Figure 24: …with some prices recently soaring ............................................................................... 12 Figure 25: The domestic beef price has risen sharply ..................................................................... 13 Figure 26: Large variation in regulated minimum wage increases across provinces................... 14 Figure 27: Food prices increased due to floods ............................................................................... 15 Figure 28: Prudent fiscal policy set to continue in 2013.................................................................. 16 Figure 29: Spending on fuel subsidies is likely to overshoot the Budget in 2013… ..................... 17 Figure 30: …and, along with budget execution challenges, continue to constrain the quality of spending ....................................................................................................................... 17 Figure 31: Revenue collection is expected to improve in 2013....................................................... 17 Figure 32: Poverty continues to decline, but is lagging the pace required to meet the Government’s RPJM targets ....................................................................................... 20 Figure 33: Much of the population remains close to the official poverty line, indicating high vulnerability to poverty ................................................................................................ 20 Figure 34: The 2012 deficit came in lower than in the revised Budget ........................................... 24 Figure 35: Revenue collection came in near target but performance varied across categories .. 25 Figure 36: Budget execution challenges remain for core spending, energy subsidy spending rose markedly ............................................................................................................... 25 Figure 37: As in previous years, a significant share of annual spending was disbursed in December ...................................................................................................................... 25 Figure 38: Value-added exports accounted for only 8 percent of Indonesia’s growth in the decade to 2011.............................................................................................................. 28 Figure 39: Indonesia’s gross merchandise exports show a high domestic value-added, and low services, content .......................................................................................................... 28 Figure 40: The share of foreign value-added in some of Indonesia’s manufactured product exports is sizable… ...................................................................................................... 28 Figure 41: ...while China’s exports embody more imported inputs than Indonesia’s, except for machinery and TCF ...................................................................................................... 28 Figure 42: Indonesia’s intermediate merchandise imports support both domestic and export- oriented production… .................................................................................................. 29 Figure 43: …while in China, a larger share of imported intermediate products are re-exported . 29 Figure 44: Capital goods have risen as a share of Indonesia’s total imports ............................... 30 Figure 45: Indonesia has one of the fastest urbanization rates in Asia ......................................... 31 Figure 46: Important agglomeration and densely populated areas exist across Indonesia ......... 33 Figure 47: Megacities and smaller agglomeration centers perform well, but mid-sized agglomerations less so................................................................................................ 33 Figure 48: Per capita spending on infrastructure varies widely across agglomeration sizes ..... 34 Figure 49: Urban areas of Jakarta have expanded rapidly between 2000 and 2010...................... 35 Figure 50: Despite the strong increase seen over 2007 to 2009, infrastructure investment fell again in 2010 and 2011................................................................................................. 39 Figure 51: Unlike infrastructure investment, the overall fixed investment ratio has surpassed pre-1997/1998 crisis levels .......................................................................................... 39 Figure 52: Private sector infrastructure investment-to-GDP has fallen markedly… ..................... 40 Figure 53: …while the share of sub-national governments has increased with the process of decentralization ............................................................................................................ 40 Figure 54: Private sector infrastructure investment in Indonesia has fallen off since 2008 ........ 40 Figure 55: After recovering over 2007 to 2009 energy sector infrastructure has fallen off, as has that in telecoms,… ....................................................................................................... 41 Figure 56: …but investment in transport infrastructure has risen, recently accounting for one half of total investment ................................................................................................ 41 LIST OF APPENDIX FIGURES Appendix Figure 1: Quarterly and annual GDP growth ................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 2: Contributions to GDP expenditures ................................................................. 43 Appendix Figure 3: Contributions to GDP production..................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 4: Motor cycle and motor vehicle sales ............................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 5: Consumer indicators ......................................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 6: Industrial production indicators ....................................................................... 43 Appendix Figure 7: Real trade flows ................................................................................................. 44 Appendix Figure 8: Balance of payments ......................................................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 9: Goods trade balance ......................................................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 10: Reserves and capital inflows .......................................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 11: Terms of trade and export and import chained-Fisher price indices .......... 44 Appendix Figure 12: Inflation and monetary policy ......................................................................... 44 Appendix Figure 13: Monthly breakdown of CPI .............................................................................. 45 Appendix Figure 14: Inflation comparison across countries .......................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 15: Domestic and international rice prices .......................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 16: Poverty and unemployment rate .................................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 17: Regional equity indices ................................................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 18: Dollar index and Rupiah exchange rate ......................................................... 45 Appendix Figure 19: 5-year local currency government bond yields ............................................. 46 Appendix Figure 20: Sovereign USD Bond EMBI spreads .............................................................. 46 Appendix Figure 21: International commercial bank lending ......................................................... 46 Appendix Figure 22: Banking sector indicators ............................................................................... 46 Appendix Figure 23: Government debt ............................................................................................. 46 Appendix Figure 24: External debt .................................................................................................... 46 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Under the baseline scenario Indonesia’s growth is projected at 6.2 percent in 2013 ..... ix Table 2: Under the baseline scenario GDP growth of 6.2 percent is projected for 2013, rising to 6.5 percent in 2014 ......................................................................................................... 5 Table 3: The World Bank projects a fiscal deficit of 1.9 percent of GDP in 2013, slightly higher than that in the Budget ................................................................................................ 19 Table 4: Actual macro outcomes were mixed relative to the 2012 Budget assumptions ............. 23 Table 5: Capital goods and the rising role of China and the NIEs in Indonesia’s imports ........... 30 LIST OF APPENDIX TABLES Appendix Table 1: Budget outcomes and projections..................................................................... 47 Appendix Table 2: Balance of Payments .......................................................................................... 47 Appendix Table 3: Indonesia’s historical macro-economic indicators at a glance ....................... 48 Appendix Table 4: Indonesia’s development indicators at a glance .............................................. 49 LIST OF BOXES Box 1: Property prices, lending growth and risks to financial stability ......................................... 11 Box 2: A look at the drivers of increasing beef prices in Indonesia ............................................... 13 Box 3: Serious floods in Jakarta caused tragic loss of life, and also serious economic disruption and price increases ................................................................................... 15 Box 4: Indonesia’s changing import mix: the growth of capital goods imports and the growing role of Asia .................................................................................................................... 30 Box 5: Methodological note on infrastructure investment data in Indonesia ................................ 38 Pressures mounting Indonesia Economic Quarterly Executive summary: Pressures mounting Indonesia’s economic Indonesia’s economy continued to grow at a steady pace in the final quarter of 2012, growth rate has remained taking full-year GDP growth to 6.2 percent. This was only a modest reduction from the 6.5 steady but pressures are percent growth recorded in 2011—a resilient performance considering the weak global mounting environment and unsettled financial market conditions which prevailed for much of the year. Looking ahead, Indonesia should be able to maintain a solid pace of growth, but there is no room for complacency, as a number of pressures are mounting which could move the economy off this trajectory. Global economic uncertainties remain elevated, Indonesia’s investment growth has moderated and, as highlighted in the December 2012 IEQ, the quality of domestic policies is increasingly in focus, particularly in the run-up to the 2014 elections. Even if growth of 6.0 to 6.5 percent is maintained, there is a risk that, without more progress on policy reform and implementation, the opportunity could be missed to boost growth at a time when the economy is benefiting from a growing labor force and the agglomeration effects of urbanization. Future appointments to key economic policy roles, following the nomination of the Minister of Finance as the next Governor of Bank Indonesia (BI), will also frame the macroeconomic policy environment going forward. Global economic The final quarter of 2012 remained challenging for many of Indonesia’s major trading indicators have improved partners; growth in the US and Japan was flat and the Euro Area recession deepened, slightly, commodity though growth in China firmed. Moving into 2013, global growth remains subdued but prices have lifted off their international economic conditions have turned somewhat more supportive for growth in recent lows and financial markets have been Indonesia. Global industrial production is increasing at a modest pace, and global trade is generally well-supported expanding again, with broad-based increases for developing countries’ exports. Commodity prices have also generally posted modest gains since December, including those of some of Indonesia’s key export products like copper, rubber and palm oil. The improved global economic data, and diminishing fears over the risks of extreme adverse scenarios in the Euro Area, US and China, coupled with accommodative monetary policy in most high income economies, have been broadly supportive of financial markets. Global equity markets rallied in the final two months of 2012 and have generally held these gains, with some developed country equity indices at or near record highs in nominal terms. Emerging market sovereign credit spreads have widened so far in 2013 but still remain close to their tightest levels since the global financial crisis. 2013 should see global The World Bank expects global growth to increase only slightly in 2013, rising to 2.4 growth increase percent from 2.3 percent in 2012, before moving up to 3.1 percent in 2014. Even this modestly, but uncertainty modest growth is subject to risks, with significant policy uncertainty still clouding the remains elevated outlook. While the US skirted the “fiscal cliffâ€? at the start of the year, the extent of fiscal consolidation is not yet clear and will depend on how long-lived the sequester spending cuts prove to be. Economic conditions in the Euro Area remain extremely challenging. The pick-up recorded in China’s growth rate has been a major bright spot amongst the world’s biggest economies but has come with a rapid expansion in credit and property values. GDP growth was solid in Economic growth in Indonesia in the final quarter of 2012 continued the recent pattern of Q4 but investment cooled remaining steady despite challenging external conditions. GDP expanded by 6.1 percent and net exports remained year-on-year (yoy), down just slightly from 6.2 percent in Q3, and accelerating in a drag on growth March 2013 T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A vi i i Pressures mounting Indonesia Economic Quarterly sequential terms to a seasonally adjusted 1.7 percent quarter-on-quarter (qoq) compared with 1.3 percent in Q3. Private consumption, accounting for 55 percent of GDP, made the biggest contribution to growth. Government consumption, however, contracted, reflecting in part spending restraints imposed in mid-2012. Central government capital spending continues to grow strongly, with the provisional 2012 Budget outturn showing a 19 percent annual increase in nominal terms (though the disbursement rate relative to the significantly increased revised Budget allocation was only 80 percent). However, public investment spending accounts for only a small share of total fixed investment, the growth of which has slowed markedly, to 7.3 percent yoy in Q4, down from the 12.5 percent yoy peak recorded in Q2 2012. The major recent drag on growth has been net exports, which reduced growth in 2012 by 1.5 percentage points, reflecting weak exports and strong import growth. The current account saw The current account deficit widened to 3.6 percent of GDP in Q4 2012, taking the deficit a significant reversal in for 2012 as a whole to USD 24.2 billion, or 2.7 percent of GDP (compared with a 0.2 2012, moving from a percent surplus in 2011). Through mid-2012 most of the decline came from a rapidly small surplus in 2011 into shrinking non-oil and gas trade surplus, followed in recent months by a widening of the oil a 2.7 percent of GDP deficit, but financial deficit, which reached a record USD 23 billion for 2012. The overall balance of payments inflows, notably of FDI, remained in surplus in Q4, on the back of strong net capital inflows, with inbound FDI as have also been strong measured by BI rising 3 percent over 2011 to USD 20 billion. However, the basic balance (current account balance plus net direct investment) remains negative, implying a continued reliance on potentially volatile portfolio investment. In addition, external debt has risen quite significantly over the past year, and while debt sustainability metrics remain strong, gross external financing needs have grown as a result. There is therefore a need to continue increasing FDI, and supporting portfolio inflows, to meet financing needs. The aggregate fiscal The provisional official 2012 budget deficit was IDR 146 trillion (1.8 percent of GDP). This position remains sound was narrower than the revised Budget target of 2.2 percent of GDP, reflecting lower than but energy subsidy expected capital and material expenditures, outweighing higher energy subsidy spending, spending continues to which reached 3.7 percent of GDP (up from 3.4 percent in 2011), or almost one third of impose a high opportunity cost total central government spending. In 2013, the Government is set to maintain its prudent fiscal stance, targeting a budget deficit of 1.7 percent of GDP. The challenge remains to improve the allocation and efficiency of spending which, despite the electricity tariff adjustment, will continue to be weakened by energy subsidies. Fuel subsidies, in particular, have also contributed to the above-mentioned recent pressure on the external trade accounts, adding to their opportunity costs, poor targeting and distortionary impacts on energy usage. The Government has recently indicated that it plans soon to announce reforms to the fuel subsidy system. Inflation pressures, Annual average CPI inflation in 2012, at 4.3 percent yoy, was the lowest in 12 years. although contained over Headline CPI has since risen sharply, climbing 1 percentage point since December 2012 2012, picked up in to 5.3 percent yoy in February 2013, on the back of high food price inflation (impacted by February new trade measures and severe floods in Greater Jakarta) and electricity tariff increases. Core inflation, however, remains stable at 4.3 percent. Going forward, inflation is likely to trend closer to the top of Bank Indonesia’s 4.5-5.5 percent target band, as domestic demand and credit growth are expected to remain relatively high, and cost-push pressures are projected to increase due to administered price rises, higher minimum wages, and pass-through from the weaker Rupiah. Price pressures in the property market, pockets of which have seen strong price growth, and the pace of credit growth (which has cooled but remains high) will also require careful monitoring. Table 1: Under the baseline scenario Indonesia’s growth is projected at 6.2 percent in 2013 2011 2012 2013 2014 Gross domestic product (Annual percent change) 6.5 6.2 6.2 6.5 Consumer price index* (Annual percent change) 5.4 4.3 5.5 5.2 Budget balance** (Percent of GDP) -1.2 -1.8 -1.7 -1.4 Major trading partner growth (Annual percent change) 3.6 3.4 3.7 4.0 Note: *Annual average. **Government figures for Budget deficit: 2012 is preliminary outturn, 2013 is approved Budget and 2014 is from the 2013 Draft Budget Financial Note Source: Ministry of Finance; BPS; Consensus Forecasts Inc.; World Bank staff calculations March 2013 T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A ix Pressures mounting Indonesia Economic Quarterly The baseline outlook is The World Bank projects near-term GDP growth to remain close to its recent pace, at 6.2 for Indonesia’s GDP to percent in 2013 and 6.5 percent in 2014 (Table 1). Private consumption is expected to continue growing at close continue to underpin growth, potentially boosted by election-related spending as the 2014 to its recent pace elections draw nearer. Although still solid in the baseline outlook, the future path of investment spending is the key uncertainty in the World Bank’s growth projections, as discussed below, with the recent moderation in investment growth in year-on-year terms contributing to a slight 0.1 percent reduction in projected GDP growth for 2013 from that in the December 2012 IEQ. Net exports will likely still subtract from growth in 2013, as exports should stage a slow recovery but imports are also expected to continue to grow robustly. Moving into 2014, a further improvement in export performance, as Indonesia’s major trading partners’ growth climbs further, is expected to help lift growth to 6.5 percent. However, some signs of While GDP growth is expected to Figure 1: Real GDP growth has stayed steady but strain in the recent data remain steady, risks to the nominal GDP and real final sales growth have slowed suggest there is no room outlook remain skewed to the (GDP and real final sales growth, percent, year-on-year) for complacency as to the Real final sales downside. Real output growth growth outlook… Real final domestic sales has been resilient but decreased Real GDP momentum is discernible in Percent Nominal GDP Percent nominal output growth, and in 30 30 terms of measured real final sales, i.e. overall GDP excluding 25 25 inventory accumulation and the statistical discrepancy (Figure 1). 20 20 Nominal GDP declined in Q4 15 15 2012 to 9.3 percent yoy, the slowest pace since 2004. Real 10 10 final sales growth has trended lower since mid-2011, due 5 5 primarily to the drag from net exports, but domestic sales 0 0 growth also fell short of overall Dec-04 Dec-06 Dec-08 Dec-10 Dec-12 GDP growth in Q4 2012. These Note: Real final (domestic) sales = consumption + fixed relative dynamics should be investment + government consumption + net exports (- interpreted cautiously due to net exports) Source: BPS; World Bank staff calculations measurement difficulties in the national accounts data, but they are at least suggestive of demand growth having softened somewhat, with some inventory accumulation so far shielding output growth. …with the potential for The key domestic risk to growth concerns the investment outlook. Private investment, further moderation in which accounts for the bulk of fixed capital formation, is expected to continue growing investment growth of strongly through 2014, but reduced capital goods imports suggest that the recent particular focus moderation in investment growth may extend, particularly if a number of risks to the outlook are realized. First, the weaker commodity market conditions which have been in place since mid-2011 may continue to impact aggregate investment spending with a lag, particularly in capital-intensive resource sectors where investment is lumpy. Second, investment has been fueled by the growth of Indonesia’s domestic consumer base, and while this is expected to continue, there are risks that higher inflation could erode real purchasing power growth. Both consumer and investment borrowing costs would be affected should BI tighten monetary policy, which is currently accommodative. Finally, investment is likely to face some headwinds from ongoing, and possibly further, regulatory uncertainties and political noise as the 2014 elections approach, while Indonesia faces stiff regional competition for export-oriented investment. Should investment indeed slow, the growth impact would be material. As an indicative example, a halving of investment growth from its 2012 level, to 5 percent in 2013, would reduce real GDP growth by approximately 1 percentage point. Poverty continues to The official poverty rate has continued to decline, falling to 11.7 percent in September decline but vulnerability 2012, down from 12.5 percent in 2011. Vulnerability, however, remains high, with nearly remains high and a faster 40 percent of the population at consumption levels below 1.5 times the national poverty rate of poverty reduction line. More rapid progress will also be required for the Government to meet its target of is needed to meet the Government’s targets reducing officially-defined poverty to 8-10 percent by 2014. The above-mentioned fall in nominal GDP growth, coupled with the weaker Rupiah, has also cut gains as measured in March 2013 T H E W O R L D B AN K | B AN K D U N I A x Pressures mounting Indonesia Economic Quarterly current US dollars. According to BPS figures, GDP per capita in 2012 was USD 3,563, up only 1.8 percent on USD 3,498 in 2011 when the growth rate had reached 17.5 percent. New data on Indonesia’s The relatively weak performance of exports, which declined by 6 percent in US Dollar trade in value-added terms in 2012 on the back of falling commodity prices, has put the spotlight on Indonesia’s terms shed light on trade trade patterns. New data from the OECD and WTO on trade in value-added terms—i.e. dynamics, which have the value of the economy’s goods and services embodied in its exports, after accounting recently weighed on growth for the use of imported intermediate goods and services inputs—provide a valuable fresh perspective on this. Measuring Indonesia’s trade in value-added terms shows that while the bulk of overall exports embody domestic value-added due to the high share of commodities, a significant share of manufactured exports consists of imported value- added. About a third of imported intermediate goods are in fact re-exported, highlighting the tight link between import availability and the performance of manufactured exports. In addition, services value-added in Indonesian exports is particularly low. This could reflect limited development of domestic ancillary services for supporting exports. Encouraging the development of these services would likely help overall export performance. Infrastructure investment Better infrastructure is also vital Figure 2: Infrastructure investment in real terms and as a as a share of total output if Indonesia is to improve its share of GDP remains below pre-Asian crisis levels remains below its pre- export performance and unlock (infrastructure investment as share of GDP, percent; Asian financial crisis its economic po