

# 8 Distressed migrants


## Preserving dignity



### Key messages

- The circumstances surrounding distressed migration are often irregular and painful. This type of migration also entails costs for destination countries, but these countries have no international legal obligation to host distressed migrants. Many countries seek to prevent the entry of distressed migrants, but restrictive policies often undermine migrants’ dignity, which creates difficult policy trade-offs.
- In this context, the challenge is to reduce the need for distressed migration, including by extending the scope of international protection, shifting incentives through the establishment of legal entry pathways, and strengthening the match of migrants’ skills and attributes with the needs of destination economies through development.
- Transit countries face particular issues, which can be addressed only through bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation.
- Overall, migrants’ inherent dignity should be the yardstick of migration policies (figure 8.1).

**Figure 8.1** The policy challenge is to reduce distressed movements while treating migrants humanely



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant’s skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country.

## Acknowledging policy trade-offs

Some of the most difficult challenges for immigration policy arise when migrants do not bring skills and attributes that match the needs of the destination country, nor are they entitled to international refugee protection. An example is people who leave a low-income country where their life is not at risk, but who do not have the basic literacy skills that would enable them to contribute to a middle- or high-income economy. In such cases, the costs of accommodating them often exceed the benefits for the destination country. International law gives this country a large degree of discretion about whether to accept such migrants in its territory.

Because the movements of many such migrants are irregular and harrowing, those movements are referred to here as *distressed migration*. Indeed, many distressed migrants are very vulnerable and at risk of marginalization, both while in transit and once at their destination. They therefore pose important development issues, including in the context of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its central pledge to “leave no one behind.”

Such movements are also causing political controversies in middle- and high-income countries. Although they represent only a fraction of people crossing borders, distressed movements are relatively visible. They contribute to shaping perceptions in destination countries,<sup>1</sup> including concerns that some migrants are abusing the immigration system or that the authorities have “lost control.” These perceptions may, in turn, translate into xenophobic narratives and discriminatory practices.<sup>2</sup> In some cases, they could undermine the entire architecture of sound migration management and so reduce the development benefits of mutually beneficial movements.

### Difficult trade-offs at the border

At the root of many distressed migrations are the vast economic differences between countries of origin and possible countries of destination. When these differences—and the corresponding drivers of migration—are acute, some people try to move even if they face high risks.<sup>3</sup>

Many destination countries do not allow entry of distressed migrants. In crafting their immigration policies, they prioritize their own interests, considering the labor market effects of migration as well as the broader effects on society. They typically give preference to migrants who have skills and attributes that match their needs.<sup>4</sup>

The conflation of high pressures to move, on the one hand, and severe entry restrictions, on the other, has led to the emergence of an illegal market for people smuggling and irregular movements. Most visible are the irregular entries—for example, at the US southern border, on the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, or at the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Yet in many countries the majority of irregular migrants enter legally and overstay their visas.<sup>5</sup> In the United States, from 2010 to 2016 there were twice as many visa overstayers as irregular border crossings.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, in the United Kingdom the number of visa overstays exceeds illegal entries, even in 2021 when irregular inflows across the English Channel were at an all-time high.<sup>7</sup>

In the absence of legal pathways, some distressed migrants, upon entering their destination country, ask for asylum—that is, to be recognized as refugees (a status granted to those who have a “well-founded fear” of persecution or violence in their countries of origin). This request generally prevents their immediate deportation because it initiates a review process of the merits of their application for international protection. A large share of such requests are rejected, but the adjudication process takes time, allowing some distressed migrants to disappear into the fringes of society<sup>8</sup> so they cannot be identified and

deported. Indeed, many asylum and reception systems are ill-equipped to process large numbers of people efficiently.<sup>9</sup> The delays create large backlogs, with extended waiting times. In the European Union, for example, more than 950,000 asylum cases were pending at the end of November 2022.<sup>10</sup> Such delays prolong the uncertainty under which all asylum-seekers live—including those who will eventually be recognized as refugees—and thus their vulnerability.<sup>11</sup>

Against this backdrop, many destination countries face difficult challenges in maintaining effective control of their borders. To deter distressed migration, some countries have adopted approaches that aim to make the movements less attractive to potential migrants. They include intentional policy measures, as well as toleration of situations—both in transit and at destination—that discourage unlawful entry and stay. However, when human distress becomes the modulator of migration flows, many destination countries have adopted policies that reflect the difficult trade-offs between their migration objectives and their commitments to respecting migrants’ human rights:

- *Many destination countries have taken measures to deter irregular migration, especially of migrants who do not bring skills and attributes that match their labor market’s needs.*<sup>12</sup> Such measures include penalties such as fines and imprisonment.<sup>13</sup> Some countries maintain provisions in their laws that include corporal punishment, such as judicial caning in Malaysia and Singapore.<sup>14</sup> In 2018, the US government implemented a program at its border with Mexico that separated children and infants from their parents or guardians with whom they had entered the United States in an explicit effort to deter irregular movements. In recent years, several high-income destination countries have entered into arrangements with third countries to “externalize” border control (box 8.1).<sup>15</sup>
- *When distressed migrants manage to enter, most destination countries do not provide them with any status, often as part of an explicit effort to reduce incentives for such movements.* As a result, distressed migrants are exposed to higher risk of abuse and marginalization. Migrants are three times as likely as citizens to work in situations of forced labor<sup>16</sup>—especially in sectors such as construction and domestic work<sup>17</sup>—and this particularly affects distressed migrants. Undocumented distressed migrants typically have only limited or no recourse in such situations. Moreover, in some countries undocumented status restricts migrants from access to education or health care services.<sup>18</sup>
- *In some cases, destination countries tolerate situations that aggravate migrants’ distress and discourage their movements.* Nearly 50,000 migrants have died while in transit since 2014. Half of them perished while trying to cross the Mediterranean Sea,<sup>19</sup> but the deaths on other routes are also increasing (figure 8.2).<sup>20</sup> Distressed migrants are taking increasingly dangerous routes, and some have become victims of kidnapping, trafficking, sexual violence, and exploitation.<sup>21</sup> About 45 percent of those arriving in Italy in 2018 reported experiencing physical violence while in transit through African countries.<sup>22</sup> Some worked without pay, and some were held captive by criminal gangs.<sup>23</sup> Many undocumented migrants on their way to the US border through Central America face similar risks from criminal gangs.<sup>24</sup>

Harsh policies against migrants may effectively deter irregular migration, but they also undermine the fundamental principle that all migrants deserve fair and humane treatment. The challenges are particularly pressing for high-income destination countries—such as the United States and the southern European Union countries—that are in the immediate geographical vicinity of low- and middle-income origin countries. They are less urgent in destination countries farther removed such as Australia and Canada because of the significantly smaller numbers involved.

## Box 8.1 The externalization of migration policy

In response to irregular migration pressures, several high-income destination countries have entered into agreements with other countries—typically low- or middle-income countries—to shift border control or asylum processing functions away from their physical borders.<sup>a</sup> This externalization of border control takes various forms,<sup>b</sup> as described in these examples:

- Italy entered into a series of bilateral agreements with Libya to cooperate on coast guard patrols and to provide development financing and technical and material support to combat irregular migration in the Mediterranean and in Libya.<sup>c</sup>
- Australia entered into an agreement with Papua New Guinea and Nauru in which these countries would process the claims of people seeking asylum in Australia and would settle those whose claims were successful (the agreement with Papua New Guinea ended at the end of 2021).<sup>d</sup> Under this arrangement, Australia provided a “package of assistance and other bilateral cooperation.”<sup>e</sup>
- Türkiye and the European Union agreed on the return of irregular migrants who had crossed from Türkiye into the Greek islands, while the European Union committed to (1) resettling some Syrian refugees; (2) providing financial support for Syrian refugees in Türkiye; and (3) facilitating the issuance of Schengen visas to Turkish citizens.<sup>f</sup>
- The United States and Mexico entered into an arrangement in 2019 in which Mexico would take “unprecedented steps” to increase border enforcement to curb irregular migration and would hold asylum-seekers who had crossed the border from Mexico while their asylum claims were being adjudicated in the United States.<sup>g</sup>
- The United Kingdom established a partnership with Rwanda whereby asylum-seekers who reached the United Kingdom irregularly would be sent to Rwanda to lodge their asylum claims there. The arrangement also included financial commitments to supporting Rwanda’s development.<sup>h</sup> This partnership is currently under legal review.

Such arrangements have been controversial. In the absence of sufficient safeguards, their implementation can contravene countries’ legal obligations related to due process and the nonpenalization of asylum-seekers (*non-refoulement*) and human rights. For example, Italy’s arrangement with Libya was condemned by the European Court of Human Rights in 2012<sup>i</sup> and denounced by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants as exposing distressed migrants to death, torture, sexual and gender-based violence, labor exploitation, and other forms of contemporary slavery.<sup>j</sup>

Similarly, in 2016 the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea found that detention of migrants and asylum-seekers transferred from Australia contravened Papua New Guinea’s constitution.<sup>k</sup> Ongoing debates in the United Kingdom and the United States, among others, have yet to be settled.

a. FitzGerald (2019); Gammeltoft-Hansen (2011); Longo (2018); Sandven (2022); Shachar (2019, 2020).

b. Hatton (2017); Kaufmann (2021); Lutz, Kaufmann, and Stünzi (2020); UNHCR (2021).

c. See, for example, the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 2008 (MPISOC 2014); Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Development, the Fight against Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking and Fuel Smuggling and on Reinforcing the Security of Borders between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic, 2017 (Odysseus Network 2017).

d. Andrews (2021).

e. See, for example, the 2013 Australia–Papua New Guinea Memorandum of Understanding (DFAT 2013).

f. EC (2015); European Council (2016).

g. US State Department (2019).

h. Home Office (2022).


i. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application 27765/09 (Judgment, European Court of Human Rights, November 16, 2016). See also Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States, Case 10.675 (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 51/96, March 13, 1997).

j. OHCHR (2017).

k. Namah v. Pato, SCA 84 (Supreme Court of Justice of Papua New Guinea, 2013).

**Figure 8.2** Thousands of migrants die every year in transit

Number of migrants dead or missing, by origin region



Source: Missing Migrants Project (dashboard), International Organization for Migration, Geneva, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>.


## The peculiar situation of transit countries

Some distressed migrants travel through several countries before reaching their destination. In some cases, they merely pass through for a few days or a few weeks. In others, they stay longer—a few months or a few years—for a variety of reasons, including at times to earn the income needed to pay for the next stage of their journey. In still other cases, they try to settle, and only when they fail do they engage in further movements.<sup>25</sup> These distinct situations call for various responses by transit countries.

Most transit countries are part of broader corridors, with the longest corridors leading to high-income countries (map 8.1). These routes are highly dynamic, responding to legal restrictions and border controls by the transit and destination countries. Among those are the following:

- *The corridor from Latin America to the southern border of the United States through the Darien Gap and Central America.*<sup>26</sup> This corridor is primarily used by irregular migrants originating from Latin America, although there are increasing numbers of distressed migrants from other parts of the world.<sup>27</sup> The share of children and unaccompanied minors along this corridor has fluctuated according to the US policies affecting undocumented migrants' families.<sup>28</sup>
- *The corridors leading from Sub-Saharan Africa to the European Union.*<sup>29</sup> These corridors are composed of a set of distinct routes across the Sahara and the Mediterranean Sea that originate in West Africa and East Africa. The use of these routes is also fluctuating in the face of circumstances in countries of origin and restrictive measures adopted by destination countries. Irregular crossings on the Western Mediterranean route, through Morocco and Algeria, peaked in 2018 and are now declining, but irregular crossings on the Central Mediterranean route have been picking up since 2019 after a period of decline.<sup>30</sup>
- *The corridors leading from South Asia and the Middle East to the European Union through Türkiye.* This route was used extensively by refugees and distressed migrants in the mid-2010s, but it is now less significant.

## Map 8.1 Main transit migration routes



Sources: WDR 2023 team calculations based on Conant (2015) and World Bank (2018b).

Additional corridors include convoluted routes to high-income countries, such as the Arctic route used by over 5,000 migrants in 2016 that involved traveling through the Russian Federation and crossing its border with Norway.<sup>31</sup> They also include some relatively less visible corridors leading to middle-income destination countries such as South Africa and Thailand. In some cases, transit countries have actively encouraged migrants to come and cross from their territory to a destination country with which they have poor relations. For example, in 2021–22 Belarus provoked a crisis at its border with Poland in a situation referred to as the “instrumentalization” or the “weaponization” of migration.<sup>32</sup>

Some transit countries—the last countries before the border with attractive high-income destinations—face special challenges. When high-income destinations restrict entry into their territory, some distressed migrants end up stranded in the “last border” countries of transit. Some choose to return or are deported to their country of origin, but others stay—either to establish themselves in a second-best destination or, more commonly, to prepare for another attempt at border crossing.<sup>33</sup> Such stays can last for years.

For last border transit countries, accommodating an often-vulnerable population of distressed migrants comes at a cost. The distressed migrants’ skills and attributes are not a strong match with the needs of their intended destination country, but they also may not meet the labor market needs of the last border transit country. Distressed migrants intending to continue their journey from the last border transit country also have limited incentives to integrate in its economy and in the broader society. Moreover, their demand for the services of smugglers fuels criminal networks and organizations, with heightened risks for the migrants and negative impacts on public safety.

The challenges faced by last border transit countries and the intended destination countries are inextricably linked. The situation of the last border transit countries is the result of restrictive policies adopted by the intended destination countries. However, the effectiveness of these restrictive policies depends on the ability of last border transit countries to manage distressed movements across their territory.

Thus the management of distressed migration cannot be resolved through unilateral approaches by destination countries; it requires cooperation. Most pressing is bilateral cooperation between the intended destination countries and the last border transit countries to ensure that the respective entry


and asylum policies, and their implementation, are consistent (although not necessarily identical). Such coordinated policies must be grounded in the central tenets of international human rights law and recognize the inherent dignity of all migrants. In some situations, cooperation may also entail arrangements to ensure that the costs generated by high-income countries' policies and incurred by last border transit countries are shared adequately.

But what happens when the intended destination country and the last border transit country create a coordinated migration area? The border of this area then becomes the last border and another country finds itself in a difficult situation. Ultimately, then, for such an approach to achieve its full intent, a broader set of multilateral cooperation arrangements must be adopted along the entirety of a corridor.

## Beyond the trade-offs

Distressed migration often entails much suffering—in transit and at destination—for those who undertake such movements. That leads to difficult trade-offs between managing borders and respecting human rights that frequently are not resolved satisfactorily. Reducing the need for such movements is thus critical. Progress will require short-term action to expand protection to the most at risk among irregular migrants, to develop legal channels for entry that can shift migrants' incentives, and to use development to provide alternatives to cross-border movement and strengthen the match of migrants' skills and attributes with the needs of destination economies (figure 8.3).

**Figure 8.3** Coordinated policy action in origin and destination countries can reduce distressed migration



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: Match refers to the degree to which a migrant's skills and related attributes meet the demand in the destination country. Motive refers to the circumstances under which a person moves—whether in search of opportunity or because of a “well-founded fear” of persecution, armed conflict, or violence in their origin country. The dashed vertical line in the lower-left quadrant highlights the distinction between distressed migrants who have some needs for international protection and those who do not.

## Extending international protection

Some distressed migrants are facing high risks if they return—or are deported—to their countries of origin. For example, they may be moving to escape gang violence, severe economic deprivation, or other forms of harm. The simple dichotomy between refugees and nonrefugees masks, in fact, a continuum of international protection needs (figure 8.4). International law distinguishes between refugees (who are entitled to international protection and its associated rights) and other migrants (who are not entitled to any particular rights or status beyond what national legislation may provide).<sup>34</sup> Yet the degree of harm to which people would be exposed if they were to return—or be sent back—to their country of origin varies, along a range of possible threats with different levels of severity.

In this context, some distressed migrants have international protection needs but not to a level that would qualify them as refugees. The risks they are willing to take to cross borders reveals a degree of despair and suggests that the conditions in their country of origin are worth risking their life to escape. These migrants may need some form of protection, but for reasons that fall outside of the 1951 Refugee Convention such as acute humanitarian crises. Others may not receive international refugee protection because of different interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention and other applicable legal instruments (box 8.2).<sup>35</sup>

There is no consensus, however, on how to precisely identify or define those who fall between the cracks of the international protection system. Several terms and concepts have emerged to serve a variety of academic, institutional, advocacy, and statistical purposes, although they do not determine legal status. Some categorizations are based on legal protection needs (whether people would be at risk of serious harm if returned and whether their country of origin is willing and able to mitigate such risks). This approach is exemplified by the term *persons in need of international protection* used by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.<sup>36</sup> Other categorizations focus on the vulnerabilities of migrants in a specific situation, such as the references in the Global Compact on Migration to “migrants who face situations of vulnerability” and “missing migrants” or the concept of “migrants in vulnerable situations,” which is used by the International Organization for Migration and other international organizations.<sup>37</sup> Still other categorizations reflect the motivations for movements, proposing terms such as *climate refugees*,<sup>38</sup> *survival migrants*,<sup>39</sup> or *flee-ers of necessity*.<sup>40</sup>

Amid pressing situations, some destination countries have acknowledged that some distressed migrants, although not refugees, still need a form of international protection, even if it comes at a cost. They have developed instruments to provide complementary protection for these people<sup>41</sup> and to regularize their entry or stay.<sup>42</sup> These instruments are defined by national or regional laws and include a variety

**Figure 8.4** A continuum of needs falls under international protection




Source: WDR 2023 team.

## Box 8.2 The evolving definition of *refugee*

Although the 1951 Refugee Convention provides the overarching legal framework for international refugee protection, there are substantive variations in the way the corresponding principles are implemented:

- Within the framework of international refugee law, states exercise discretion in how they process and adjudicate asylum claims. A person whose claim for international protection would succeed in one destination country may not succeed in another, as evidenced by the wide variations in the recognition rates for Afghan asylum-seekers across European Union countries in 2021 (figure B8.2.1). Although some of the differences are due to the way these rates are computed, they also stem from the different legal instruments, interpretations, and priorities in these countries.
- The definition of *refugee* also varies across regions, reflecting historical circumstances and the varied nature of displacement crises. For example, the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa expanded the definition of *refugee* to include those who flee due to “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order.”<sup>a</sup> This definition was drafted not only to protect those in Africa not covered by the individualized, persecution-based refugee definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention,<sup>b</sup> but also to ensure that refugee issues would not be a source of friction between states and that individuals fleeing colonial and apartheid rules would receive refugee protection.<sup>c</sup> Similarly, in Latin America the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees extended international protection to several groups,<sup>d</sup> including

**Figure B8.2.1** Recognition rates for Afghan asylum-seekers varied greatly across EU countries in 2021



Source: Refugee Data Finder (dashboard), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://popstats.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/>.

Note: The figure excludes some European Union (EU) countries that received very few applications from asylum-seekers from Afghanistan.

(Box continues next page)

## Box 8.2 The evolving definition of *refugee* (continued)

those who flee “because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.”<sup>e</sup>

In a growing number of situations, host countries opt to provide complementary or subsidiary protection to those fleeing conflict and violence rather than recognize them as refugees. For example, countries hosting the largest numbers of people fleeing from recent crises—about 20 million people from Myanmar, República Bolivariana de Venezuela, South Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, and Ukraine—have provided them with some temporary or ad hoc protection. The reasons vary for using such protection instruments rather than a refugee status. They range from political considerations about the country of origin, to the practicality of processing large numbers of asylum claims, to concerns about setting precedents, to attempts to minimize obligations on the host country.<sup>f</sup>


- a. United Nations (1976, 47).
- b. Okoth-Obbo (2001).
- c. Sharpe (2013).
- d. Reed-Hurtado (2013).
- e. Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Conclusion 3 (UNHCR 1984, 36).
- f. These arrangements include: (1) the Temporary Protection Directive of the European Union (EU), which enables Ukrainians to reside and work in EU countries without undergoing refugee status adjudication; (2) a regime of temporary protection for Syrians in Türkiye that was eventually codified as part of Türkiye's 2014 Law on Foreigners and International Protection; (3) a Temporary Statute of Protection for Venezuelan Migrants in Colombia, which granted 10-year residency, work permits, and other rights. On (1), see EU (2001); Ukraine Refugee Situation (dashboard), Operational Data Portal, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine>; UNHCR (2022). On (2), see *T.C. Resmî Gazete* (2013). On (3), see MRE (2021); Venezuela Refugee Situation (dashboard), Operational Data Portal, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/vensit>.

of rights, legal statuses, and scopes of application based on humanitarian principles or national interests. They take a variety of forms, such as subsidiary protection or temporary protection measures (figure 8.5). They also provide flexibility and enable international protection to be provided quickly without placing much additional pressure on asylum systems. For example, the United States provided Honduran nationals with complementary protection in 1999 in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch<sup>43</sup> and Haitians with such protection in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 earthquake.<sup>44</sup> The global share of people receiving such complementary forms of protection has been increasing over time, particularly since 2011.

Such ad hoc systems have, however, proved insufficient to address what has become a growing human and political crisis. Complementary protection measures can be withdrawn through simple executive decisions, as occurred in the United States for Salvadorans in 2018. For some destination countries, there is simply no legal route to entry for those in need of some degree of international protection. Complementary protection regimes are also inconsistent across destination countries, with wide variations in terms of who can benefit from complementary protection and what status they receive. Although some of these differences reflect national or regional circumstances, they also lead to inconsistencies that have detrimental consequences for the affected individuals, and they diminish the potential for an effective system of responsibility-sharing.

A forward-looking approach based on coordinated, flexible international responses is needed. There is no reason to believe that the number of crises, conflicts, natural disasters, and other situations that give rise to distressed cross-border movements will significantly decline in the coming period. In fact, the acceleration of climate change suggests that extraordinary measures may be needed (box 8.3).

**Figure 8.5** Complementary protection is a complex maze



Source: WDR 2023 team.

Note: RSD = Refugee Status Determination.

### Box 8.3 Climate-related mobility in Small Island Developing States

Some countries are facing high risks from climate change. For example, if and when climate change imperils the local adaptation and habitability of the Small Island Developing States and low-lying coastal settlements, the populations of these areas may need some planned relocation and a managed retreat.<sup>a</sup> The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration includes specific commitments to better protect those involved in or affected by these movements.<sup>b</sup>

Many Small Island Developing States have proactively integrated climate change-related mobility into national policy frameworks. The objective is to help people to remain in place where it is viable to do so and ensure that those who choose to move have opportunities to do so. For example, Vanuatu's National Policy on Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement, adopted in 2018, includes actions on return and reintegration, local integration, and planned relocation. It also incorporates mobility into development planning.<sup>c</sup> Fiji's Displacement Guidelines emphasize the interconnections among environmental change, human rights, and mobility.<sup>d</sup> In the Caribbean, two free movement agreements by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) grant protection to Caribbean nationals displaced by catastrophic hurricanes, including a right of entry to other islands, a waiver of work permit requirements, and a mutual recognition of skills.<sup>e</sup>

Depending on the magnitude of climate impacts, migration may become unavoidable for Small Island Developing States, and planned relocation may be an option of last resort. Plans for relocation will need to empower people to make their own decisions. International assistance may be needed, including to develop a form of international protection or similar status to enable migration.<sup>f</sup>

a. Cissé et al. (2022).

b. Martin et al. (2018).

c. NDMO (2018).

d. Ministry of Economy, Fiji (2019).

e. Francis (2019).

f. UNHCR, Brookings Institution, and Georgetown University (2015); UNHCR, Georgetown University, and IOM (2017).

Accordingly, coordination among destination countries is needed to adopt a more coherent, predictable approach that offers some type of international protection quickly and efficiently to those who warrant it. This approach could include providing *prima facie* protection to specific groups—that is, granting protection to all persons in that group, such as citizens of a certain country of origin or members of a minority—instead of going through an individual refugee status determination process. It also could include adapting or expanding complementary protection mechanisms in particular crises and ensuring that individuals are able to secure safe legal pathways from their country of origin. Moreover, this approach would require building the institutional capacity needed for timely, transparent adjudication of protection status and for safeguarding human rights for those who need to be returned once their applications have been denied following due process.

## Shifting migrants' incentives through legal pathways

Establishing legal pathways for people at all levels of skills to enter destination countries and work in the formal sector—and doing so at scale—can help reduce the incentives for distressed movements. It can also transform distressed movements into mutually beneficial migration, in which migrants bring skills and attributes in demand in the destination labor market. Such legal pathways can include temporary or even seasonal arrangements.

By providing legal pathways, destination countries shift potential migrants' incentives, including for those who otherwise would engage in high-risk movements through irregular channels.<sup>45</sup> For example, by offering legal entry pathways to people with certain qualifications, destination countries can encourage would-be migrants—and the communities that often help finance their movements—to acquire the skills and other attributes needed to contribute in the new country. This process can help shift the composition of migratory movements—who moves and under what circumstances—toward an outcome that more closely matches the needs and preferences of the destination society. Moreover, the availability of legal pathways reduces the incentives for migrants who are already in the country to overstay their visas and end up in a protracted irregular situation.

In designing legal pathways, destination countries need to closely reflect the needs of their labor market. In many countries, legal entry pathways are primarily available to high-skilled migrants. However, many destination countries also need lower-skilled workers. By recognizing and acknowledging unmet needs in their labor markets and providing migrants who have the corresponding skills with legal entry pathways—including for relatively lower-skilled jobs, such as in agriculture, construction, or household services—destination countries can shift potential migrants' incentives and reduce the pressure for distressed movements. This effort requires engaging with employers, labor unions, and other stakeholders to determine which skills are in demand.

In parallel, some destination countries have strengthened their cooperation with countries of origin to develop skills that are in demand and to facilitate win-win movements—for example, through Global Skills Partnerships.<sup>46</sup> Under this approach, destination countries finance the training of potential migrants in their origin countries and provide them with entry upon graduation. These programs can also shift incentives for would-be migrants and the communities who support them to acquire skills that are in demand. To date, such programs have largely focused on relatively high-skilled occupations, but they could be extended to include workers with lower levels of qualifications.

In addition to developing legal pathways for entry—and to ensure their sustainability—destination countries need to ensure enforcement of the existing laws and regulations aimed at discouraging irregular entries. Enforcement often requires action in several directions:

## Box 8.4 Smugglers and traffickers

The people smuggling industry is complex, dynamic, and constantly evolving. According to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), at least 2.5 million migrants were smuggled in 2016 for an economic return of US\$5.5–\$7 billion, making it an important part of the illegal economy. This amount was roughly equivalent to the humanitarian aid budget of the United States or of the European Union that year.<sup>a</sup>

The organization and scale of smuggling operations vary. Smugglers may work largely on their own, within a small network in one or two countries, or as part of large, complex multinational criminal organizations. They may provide legal services such as taxi transportation or be part of sophisticated transnational criminal networks. At times, smuggling operations are based on independent actors loosely linked via social networks and communicating via digital technology, complicating efforts to combat this phenomenon. Ethnographic research suggests that portraying smugglers as criminals and migrants as their victims may oversimplify a complex and often symbiotic relationship.<sup>b</sup>

The line between *smuggling* (a voluntary movement of migrants by a smuggler who receives payment to take them to a destination) and *human trafficking* (movement that includes an element of extortion, exploitation, or coercion) is often blurred. Undocumented migrants make up a significant share of the victims of human trafficking: 65 percent in Western and Southern Europe, 60 percent in the Middle East, 55 percent in East Asia and the Pacific, 50 percent in Central and Southeastern Europe, and 25 percent in North America.<sup>c</sup> In 2014, the International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated the profits of trafficking and forced labor at about US\$150 billion a year.<sup>d</sup> Two-thirds of this amount stems from commercial sexual exploitation and the rest from forced economic exploitation.

a. McAuliffe and Laczko (2016); UNODC (2018).

b. Achilli (2018); Campana (2018); Maher (2018); Majidi (2018); McAuliffe and Laczko (2016); UNODC (2018).

c. Koser (2010); McAuliffe and Laczko (2016); Nicot and Kopp (2018); Triandafyllidou (2018a, 2018b); UNODC (2018).

d. ILO (2014).

- *Combat smuggling.* Human smuggling operations take many forms (box 8.4), and they are increasingly assuming professionalized forms. Some smugglers behave as professional businesspersons, guaranteeing services and agreeing to receive final payment when the migrant reaches the final destination.<sup>47</sup> Other smuggling operations are far less benign, with migrants undergoing traumatic ordeals throughout their transit. Destination countries have launched far-reaching programs to combat smuggling through law enforcement, educational programs, and efforts to protect the rights of those who have been smuggled.<sup>48</sup> The programs have to rely on effective international cooperation along entire corridors.
- *Clamp down on irregular labor markets.* The attractiveness of irregular channels depends on whether there is a demand for irregular labor from employers. For distressed migrants—whose skills are not a strong match for the needs of the destination economy—such irregular labor is often exploitative. Yet the welfare gaps between origin and destination countries are often so large that they create formidable market forces that drive people to move. Efforts to restrict distressed migration cannot succeed if employers are willing and able to hire these migrants. Most countries have laws and regulations against such irregular—and often exploitative—employment,

but they are unevenly enforced, if at all. Clamping down on the irregular labor market—and reducing the costs of compliance with the law—is critical. For countries with large numbers of migrants in an irregular situation, transitioning to regular status requires policies that often include some amnesty for migrants and their employers.

- *Return migrants humanely.* Destination countries may choose to return some distressed migrants who do not face risks in their countries of origin. Deportation is always a tragedy for the individuals involved, but it may be necessary to ensure the sustainability of the migration system because it demonstrates to both citizens and would-be migrants that rules are enforced. However, enforcing returns is fraught with risks, including possible human rights violations.<sup>49</sup> Accordingly, the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration calls for cooperation between states in facilitating safe, dignified return and readmission for migrants, as well as sustainable reintegration.<sup>50</sup> In practice, forced returns are exceedingly difficult if the origin countries do not cooperate. Thus to be sustainable, such agreements should reflect the interests of both the destination and origin countries<sup>51</sup> and possibly be framed within the broader context of bilateral migration arrangements. Some destination countries have attempted to accompany involuntary returns with support for their reintegration into their countries of origin, but with mixed results.

In some destination countries, efforts are also needed to strengthen the capacity of the institutions that process entries, including when people require asylum. For example, following the arrivals of large numbers of migrants and refugees in the summer of 2015, Germany’s Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) engaged in a modernization and digitalization effort that dramatically increased its ability to process requests for asylum.<sup>52</sup> Processing requests for asylum or for visas expeditiously can reduce the incentives for distressed migrants’ use of irregular channels for entry.

## Strengthening the match of migrants’ skills and attributes through development

Over time, development can reduce the need for distressed migration. As countries develop, their citizens become better educated, and their skills better match the needs of the domestic and global labor markets. They also become more resilient to shocks, and domestic alternatives reduce the need for distressed cross-border movements.

The effects of economic development on the propensity to emigrate are complex. A review of the existing evidence suggests several patterns.<sup>53</sup> As middle-income countries develop, emigration steadily increases, and it is increasingly directed toward higher-income countries. By contrast, as low-income countries develop, emigration initially declines until they reach middle-income levels of development. These effects depend significantly on the size of a country’s population: they are significant in smaller, less populous countries (which account for half of all countries but only 3.5 percent of the global population), and they are much more muted in larger countries. On average, emigrants from middle-income countries have more skills and easier access to attractive destinations when compared with those from low-income countries.<sup>54</sup>

How countries develop also matters. The gains of development are typically not distributed uniformly within a country. When development and income gains disproportionately benefit particular segments of the population, migration patterns are affected. For example, if domestic income gains accrue only to those who are relatively well-off and educated—and who are more likely to emigrate to high-income destinations—then emigration to those destinations may increase even though emigration to low-income

countries remains unchanged. On the other hand, if domestic income gains from development accrue to the poorest people in low-income countries, emigration to low-income countries and neighboring countries may fall without increasing emigration to high-income countries (which is costlier).

Discussions of the effects of foreign aid on emigration<sup>55</sup> are taking place in a context where some donors aim to use their assistance to address the “root causes” of migration—especially distressed migration.<sup>56</sup> As for many development activities, the impacts vary across countries and sectors, and programs need to be tailored to each context. For example, in some countries support for better governance has dampened emigration by improving government capacity and reducing grievances.<sup>57</sup> Infrastructure projects can enhance market integration and increase local incomes.<sup>58</sup> In the long term, development assistance also helps transform the origin society, with profound consequences for migration patterns.

Development is typically associated with an improvement in institutional capacity. As countries become wealthier, they are better equipped to manage migration for their own purposes, as well as through cooperation with other countries. Development is also associated with demographic changes—a reduction in fertility rates and an increase in life expectancy. These changes affect, in turn, social dynamics, the size of the pool of potential migrants, and opportunities in the domestic labor market that can provide alternatives to cross-border movements.

## Better skills matching

Economic development is almost always accompanied by improvements in human capital such as education and skills. People and countries invest more in education as they become wealthier, and, in return, their better-educated workforce becomes an engine of economic development and growth. For example, as Bangladesh’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita doubled between 1960 and 2015, the average years of schooling for the adult population increased drastically—from 1.0 years to 6.9 years—and the share of adults with some tertiary education grew from 0.33 percent to 8.6 percent.<sup>59</sup> This experience matches that of almost all low- or middle-income countries that have experienced economic growth.


Higher educational attainment shifts migration patterns toward better-educated and higher-skilled workers. As countries of origin develop, the skills composition of their emigrants changes. Lower-educated workers tend to be better qualified with stronger language and vocational skills, and a larger share of emigrants tends to be tertiary-educated (figure 8.6). Emigrants from more developed countries thus tend to be a stronger match for the needs of destination labor markets. This is especially true where the expectations for low-skilled workers are increasing—for example, in terms of communication, interpersonal skills, and the ability to work with autonomy—in parallel with the stepped-up demand in service occupations, such as caregiving and hospitality.<sup>60</sup>

## Strengthened resilience

As origin countries develop, governments become increasingly able to help citizens strengthen their resilience to shocks, such as those produced by economic downturns and natural disasters.<sup>61</sup> Social protection systems serve as a safety net for the poor and vulnerable and for people who because of personal circumstances, such as illness or accidents, are facing temporary hardship. In Ethiopia, for example, the Productive Safety Net Programme provides assistance through public works in an adaptive manner: it expands when shocks and crises materialize.<sup>62</sup> Evidence of the impacts of such programs on international migration is scant, but they have reduced the need for domestic movements. An example is a place-based public works program in India.<sup>63</sup> Such programs essentially give people going through a difficult period more options.

**Figure 8.6 Economic development changes the composition of migration flows: The education level of emigrants improves as countries develop**

*Education level of emigrants, by GDP per capita growth rate of origin countries*



Source: Adapted from figure 9 in Shrestha (2023).

Note: The figure plots the educational composition of migrants from low- and middle-income countries to the United States as origin countries develop. The vertical axis represents the increase in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of origin countries relative to the baseline year, defined for each origin country as the year in which GDP per capita (in constant 2017 US dollars in purchasing power parity terms, 2017 PPP\$) was at its lowest level since 1960. Observations are grouped by growth, and the bars represent the average share in each group. Low- and middle-income countries were among the bottom two-thirds of all countries circa 1960 in terms of GDP per capita (2017 PPP\$). Estimates exclude outliers in terms of emigration rates (Antigua and Barbuda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and West Bank and Gaza).

Development also increases the economic options at home, especially in relatively large countries. As low-income countries develop, economic activities and people shift from largely rural subsistence agriculture to manufacturing and service activities in the cities.<sup>64</sup> Indeed, the share of the population in urban areas in low- and middle-income countries has risen steadily, from 23 percent in 1960 to 51 percent in 2020.<sup>65</sup> Domestic migration offers higher incomes than in the region of origin, and it typically entails lower costs and risks than international migration. In fact, it can act as a substitute for international migration, particularly for distressed movements. Inclusive development, the availability of decent jobs at home, and their accessibility to all increase the range of options, so that migration, when it occurs, becomes the outcome of a larger rather than a smaller opportunity to choose.

Finally, development allows countries, communities, and households to adapt to the effects of climate change. Building domestic resilience to climate change means enabling people to adapt where they live when viable or to move under better circumstances, and it prepares destination areas to receive them.<sup>66</sup> The cities that will serve as key destinations for internal mobility in many regions will have to account for climate risks in urban planning and land use management,<sup>67</sup> including in the form of climate-resilient housing and infrastructure investments, connectivity networks, social services, and employment opportunities.

International migration, when it occurs, can thus take place under better circumstances. Most people putting their lives at risk while trying to enter a destination country irregularly are from low- or lower-income countries. The journeys of migrants from middle- or upper-middle-income countries tend to be less perilous. Their movement is a choice made under less stringent constraints, typically involving less suffering on their part and less excruciating policy dilemmas in their destination countries. “Leave no one behind”—the principle underpinning the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development—implies making migration less distressed for migrants and more fruitful for origin and destination countries.

## Notes

1. Azevedo et al. (2021); Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2009); Heidenreich et al. (2020); Innes (2010); Madrigal and Soroka (2023); Průchová Hružová (2021); Slovic et al. (2017).
2. Hatton (2017); Lutz, Kaufmann, and Stünzi (2020); Pereira, Vala, and Costa-Lopes (2010); Poynting and Briskman (2020); Průchová Hružová (2021); Ravn et al. (2020).
3. Harris and Todaro (1970).
4. IOM (2002); Triandafyllidou, Bartolini, and Guidi (2019).
5. Irregular Migration and Return (dashboard), Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, Brussels, [https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/irregular-migration-return\\_en](https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/irregular-migration-return_en).
6. Warren (2019).
7. Walsh (2020).
8. Bertoli, Brücker, and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2022); McAuliffe and Laczko (2016).
9. Hatton (2009); Himmelreich (2019); Kaufmann (2021); Lutz, Kaufmann, and Stünzi (2020).
10. EUAA (2022). Eurostat data on pending cases at all instances in November 2022 were available for 28 EU+ countries, and the October value was used for the missing country. EU+ refers to the European Union, Switzerland, and Norway.
11. Bertoli, Brücker, and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2022); McAuliffe and Laczko (2016).
12. Harris and Todaro (1970).
13. Gibney (2008); Global Detention Project (dashboard), Global Detention Project, Geneva, <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/>; Könönen (2022); Majcher, Flynn, and Grange (2020).
14. See Commissioner of Law Revision, Malaysia (2006); Singapore Statutes Online (2021).
15. Burnett (2018); Rosenberg (2018).
16. *Forced or compulsory labor* is “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.” See Article 2, Forced Labour Convention, Convention C029 (adopted at the 14th Session of the International Labour Conference, June 28, 1930), NORMLEX, International Labour Organization, Geneva, [https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100\\_ILO\\_CODE:C029](https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029).
17. ILO, Walk Free, and IOM (2022).
18. Klugman and Pereira (2009); Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020 (dashboard), Migration Policy Group and Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Barcelona, <https://www.mipex.eu/>; Ravn et al. (2020).
19. GMDAC (2020).
20. Black and Sigman (2022).
21. Bossard (2009); Busetta et al. (2021); Cornelius (2001); Gathmann (2008); IOM (2021); Jacobsen, Ayoub, and Johnson (2014); Koser (2000); Leyva-Flores et al. (2019); OHCHR (2016); Reques et al. (2020); Vogt (2018); WHO (2022); World Bank (2018a).
22. World Bank (2018a).
23. World Bank (2018a).
24. Albuja (2014); Infante et al. (2012).
25. Allie et al. (2021).
26. Vogt (2018).
27. Solomon (2019).
28. US Border Patrol (USBP) and Office of Field Operations (OFO) official year-end reporting for fiscal 2020 to fiscal 2022 and fiscal 2023, as of January 4, 2023. Beginning in March 2020, US Border Patrol Encounters statistics include both Title 8 Apprehensions and Title 42 Expulsions. *Apprehensions* refers to the physical control or temporary detention of a person who is not lawfully in the United States, which may or may not result in an arrest. Since 2008, there has been a significant increase in unaccompanied children apprehended at the US southern border. Initially, Mexican children predominated, but as of 2012 the number of children from Central American countries was higher.
29. Düvell (2012); Nonnenmacher and Yonemura (2018); Wajsberg (2020); World Bank (2018a).
30. Frontex (2023).
31. Reuters (2016).
32. Łubiński (2022).
33. Kuschminder and Waidler (2020); Sačer et al. (2017); Wajsberg (2020).
34. Bakewell (2021); Crawley and Skleparis (2018); Erdal and Oeppen (2018).
35. Türk and Dowd (2014).
36. UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms (dashboard), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary/>.
37. UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms (dashboard), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary/>.
38. Apap (2021).
39. Betts (2013).
40. Aleinikoff and Zamore (2019).

41. Paoletti (2023); UNHCR Master Glossary of Terms (dashboard), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, <https://www.unhcr.org/glossary/>.
42. Johns, Loschmann, and Arekapudi (2023).
43. US Immigration and Naturalization Service (1999).
44. USCIS (2010).
45. Auriol, Mesnard, and Perrault (2021); Czaika and de Haas (2013, 2017); Czaika and Hobolth (2016).
46. See chapter 5 for further details.
47. Martin (2000).
48. Martin (2000).
49. Some countries have put in place incentives and programs to soften the impact of forced returns on affected migrants. Such schemes are typically aimed at facilitating the return and reinsertion of those who are forced to return to their origin country. They may include outreach and counseling (OECD 2020) or financial incentives (Black, Collyer, and Somerville 2011). Their uptake, however, has been relatively low, and their actual impact is unclear (OECD 2020).
50. United Nations (2019).
51. Newland and Salant (2018).
52. Koch et al. (2023).
53. See spotlight 8.
54. For example, visa costs are higher for migrants traveling from low-income countries to high-income destinations. Ortega and Peri (2013) also find that migration flows to OECD destinations are very responsive to immigration policies.
55. Clemens and Postel (2018).
56. Bermeo and Leblang (2015); see also NSC (2021).
57. Dustmann and Okatenko (2014); Gamso and Yuldashev (2018).
58. Morten and Oliveira (2023).
59. Barro-Lee Estimates of Educational Attainment in the World (Barro and Lee 2013); Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer (2015); Penn World Table (database version 10.0), Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, the Netherlands, <https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/>.
60. According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the top three occupations that will add the highest number of jobs in the United States by 2030 are home health and personal care aides, cooks, and fast food and counter workers. Less than 20 percent of workers in these occupations have a college degree. See Occupational Outlook Handbook (portal), Office of Occupational Statistics and Employment Projections, Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor, Washington, DC, <https://www.bls.gov/ooh/>.
61. For example, OECD countries spend, on average, 12 percent of their GDP on social benefits to households. World Bank data show that low- and middle-income countries spend 1.5 percent of their GDP on social assistance, with low-income countries lagging middle-income countries. See ASPIRE (Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity) (dashboard), World Bank, Washington, DC, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/aspire>; Social Benefits to Households (dashboard), Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, <https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/social-benefits-to-households.htm>.
62. Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia (dashboard), Capacity4dev, European Commission, Brussels, [https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/project\\_psnp\\_ethiopia](https://europa.eu/capacity4dev/project_psnp_ethiopia).
63. Imbert and Papp (2020); Morten (2019).
64. McMillan, Rodrik, and Sepúlveda (2017).
65. Crock and Parsons (2023).
66. Clement et al. (2021).
67. Clement et al. (2021).

## References

- Achilli, Luigi. 2018. "The 'Good' Smuggler: The Ethics and Morals of Human Smuggling among Syrians." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 676 (1): 77–96.
- Albuja, Sebastián. 2014. "Criminal Violence, Displacement, and Migration in Mexico and Central America." In *Humanitarian Crises and Migration Causes, Consequences, and Responses*, edited by Susan F. Martin, Sanjula Weerasinghe, and Abbie Taylor, 113–37. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Aleinikoff, T. Alexander, and Leah Zamore. 2019. *The Arc of Protection: Reforming the International Refugee Regime*. Stanford Briefs Series. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Allie, Feyaad, Darin Christensen, Guy Grossman, and Jeremy Weinstein. 2021. "Using IOM Flow Monitoring Data to Describe Migration in West and Central Africa." IPL Report (September), Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. [https://immigrationlab.org/content/uploads/2021/09/IPL-Report\\_African-Migration.pdf](https://immigrationlab.org/content/uploads/2021/09/IPL-Report_African-Migration.pdf).
- Andrews, Karen. 2021. "Joint Media Release with the Hon. Westly Nukundj MP: Finalisation of the Regional Resettlement Arrangement." Media release, October 6, 2021. <https://minister.homeaffairs.gov.au/KarenAndrews/Pages/finalisation-of-the-regional-resettlement-arrangement.aspx>.
- Apap, Joanna. 2021. "The Concept of 'Climate Refugee': Towards a Possible Definition." With Capucine du Perron de Revel. EPRS Briefing (October 18), European Parliamentary Research Service, Brussels. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS\\_BRI\(2021\)698753\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698753/EPRS_BRI(2021)698753_EN.pdf).
- Auriol, Emmanuelle, Alice Mesnard, and Tiffanie Perrault. 2021. "Controlling Irregular Migration: Can a Market for Temporary Foreign Work Permits Help?" CEPR Discussion Paper DP 16777, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
- Azevedo, Ruben T., Sophie De Beukelaer, Isla L. Jones, Lou Safra, and Manos Tsakiris. 2021. "When the Lens Is Too Wide: The Political Consequences of the Visual

- Dehumanization of Refugees." *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 8 (1): 115.
- Bakewell, Oliver. 2021. "Unsettling the Boundaries between Forced and Voluntary Migration." In *Handbook on the Governance and Politics of Migration*, edited by Emma Carmel, Katharina Lenner, and Regine Paul, 124–36. Elgar Handbooks in Migration Series. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Barro, Robert J., and Jong-Wha Lee. 2013. "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950–2010." *Journal of Development Economics* 104 (September): 184–98.
- Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, and David Leblang. 2015. "Migration and Foreign Aid." *Industrial Organization* 69 (3): 627–57.
- Bertoli, Simone, Herbert Brücker, and Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga. 2022. "Do Applications Respond to Changes in Asylum Policies in European Countries?" *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 93 (March): 103771.
- Betts, Alexander. 2013. *Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Black, Julia, and Zoe Sigman. 2022. "50,000 Lives Lost during Migration: Analysis of Missing Migrants Project Data 2014–2022." Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, International Organization for Migration, Berlin.
- Black, Richard E., Michael Collyer, and Will Somerville. 2011. "Pay-to-Go Schemes and Other Noncoercive Return Programs: Is Scale Possible?" Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC.
- Boomgaarden, Hajo G., and Rens Vliegthart. 2009. "How News Content Influences Anti-Immigration Attitudes: Germany, 1993–2005." *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (4): 516–42.
- Bossard, Laurent. 2009. "The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries: Regional Note West Africa." Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Paris.
- Burnett, John. 2018. "Transcript: White House Chief of Staff John Kelly's Interview with NPR." NPR: National, May 11, 2018. <https://www.npr.org/2018/05/11/610116389/transcript-white-house-chief-of-staff-john-kellys-interview-with-npr>.
- Busetta, Annalisa, Daria Mendola, Ben Wilson, and Valeria Cetorelli. 2021. "Measuring Vulnerability of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Italy." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47 (3): 596–615.
- Campana, Paolo. 2018. "Out of Africa: The Organization of Migrant Smuggling across the Mediterranean." *European Journal of Criminology* 15 (4): 481–502.
- Cissé, Guéladio, Robert McLeman, Helen Adams, Paulina Aldunce, Kathryn Bowen, Diarmid Campbell-Lendrum, Susan Clayton, et al. 2022. "Health, Wellbeing and the Changing Structure of Communities." In *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*, 1041–1170. Sixth Assessment Report. Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Clemens, Michael A., and Hannah M. Postel. 2018. "Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-Income Countries." *Population and Development Review* 44 (4): 667–93.
- Clement, Viviane, Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Susana Adamo, Jacob Schewe, Nian Sadiq, and Elham Shabahat. 2021. *Groundswell Part 2: Acting on Internal Climate Migration*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Commissioner of Law Revision, Malaysia. 2006. "Act 155: Immigration Act 1959/63, Incorporating All Amendments Up to 1 January 2006." Reprint, 2006, Persekutuan Nasional Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/64031/99464/F1916438079/MYS64031.pdf>.
- Conant, Eve. 2015. "The World's Congested Human Migration Routes in 5 Maps." *National Geographic*, September 19. <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/150919-data-points-refugees-migrants-maps-human-migrations-syria-world>.
- Cornelius, Wayne A. 2001. "Death at the Border: Efficacy and Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Control Policy." *Population and Development Review* 27 (4): 661–85.
- Crawley, Heaven, and Dimitris Skleparis. 2018. "Refugees, Migrants, Neither, Both: Categorical Fetishism and the Politics of Bounding in Europe's 'Migration Crisis.'" *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (1): 48–64.
- Crock, Mary, and Christopher Robert Parsons. 2023. "Australia as a Modern Migration State: Past and Present." Background paper prepared for *World Development Report 2023*, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Czaika, Mathias, and Hein de Haas. 2013. "The Effectiveness of Migration Policies." *Population and Development Review* 39 (3): 487–508.
- Czaika, Mathias, and Hein de Haas. 2017. "The Effect of Visas on Migration Processes." *International Migration Review* 51 (4): 893–926.
- Czaika, Mathias, and Mogens Hobolth. 2016. "Do Restrictive Asylum and Visa Policies Increase Irregular Migration into Europe?" *European Union Politics* 17 (3): 345–65.
- DFAT (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia). 2013. "Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea and the Government of Australia, Relating to the Transfer to, and Assessment and Settlement in, Papua New Guinea of Certain Persons, and Related Issues." DFAT, Barton, Australian Capital Territory, Australia. <https://www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/joint-mou-20130806.pdf>.
- Dustmann, Christian, and Anna Okatenko. 2014. "Out-Migration, Wealth Constraints, and the Quality of Local Amenities." *Journal of Development Economics* 110 (September): 52–63.
- Düvell, Franck. 2012. "Transit Migration: A Blurred and Politicised Concept." *Population, Space and Place* 18 (4): 415–27.
- EC (European Commission). 2015. "EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan." *Memo*, October 15, 2015. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO\\_15\\_5860](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_15_5860).
- Erdal, Marta Bivand, and Ceri Oeppen. 2018. "Forced to Leave? The Discursive and Analytical Significance of

- Describing Migration as Forced and Voluntary.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 44 (6): 981–98.
- EU (European Union). 2001. “Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts between Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof.” *Official Journal of the European Communities* L 212 (August 7): 12–23. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:212:0012:0023:EN:PDF>.
- EUAA (European Union Agency for Asylum). 2022. *Asylum Report 2022: Annual Report of the Situation of Asylum in the European Union*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. [https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022\\_Asylum\\_Report\\_EN.pdf](https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2022-06/2022_Asylum_Report_EN.pdf).
- European Council. 2016. “EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016.” Press release, March 18, 2016. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/>.
- Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel Peter Timmer. 2015. “The Next Generation of the Penn World Table.” *American Economic Review* 105 (10): 3150–82.
- FitzGerald, David Scott. 2019. *Refuge beyond Reach: How Rich Democracies Repel Asylum Seekers*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Francis, Ama Ruth. 2019. “Free Movement Agreements and Climate-Induced Migration: A Caribbean Case Study.” Sabin Center for Climate Change Law White Paper (September), Columbia University, New York.
- Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency). 2023. “Detections in the Central Mediterranean More Than Doubled in the First Two Months of 2023.” News release, March 10, 2023. <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news/news-release/detections-in-the-central-mediterranean-more-than-doubled-in-the-first-two-months-of-2023-wKyDkV>.
- Gammeltoft-Hansen, Thomas. 2011. *Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control*. Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law 77. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gamso, Jonas, and Farhod Yuldashev. 2018. “Targeted Foreign Aid and International Migration: Is Development-Promotion an Effective Immigration Policy?” *International Studies Quarterly* 62 (4): 809–20.
- Gathmann, Christina. 2008. “Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets: Evidence from Migrant Smuggling along the Southwestern Border.” *Journal of Public Economics* 92 (10–11): 1926–41.
- Gibney, Matthew J. 2008. “Asylum and the Expansion of Deportation in the United Kingdom.” *Government and Opposition* 43 (2): 146–67.
- GMDAC (Global Migration Data Analysis Centre). 2020. “Calculating ‘Death Rates’ in the Context of Migration Journeys: Focus on the Central Mediterranean.” GMDAC Briefing Series: Towards Safer Migration in Africa, Migration and Data in Northern and Western Africa, GMDAC, International Organization for Migration, Berlin.
- Harris, John R., and Michael P. Todaro. 1970. “Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis.” *American Economic Review* 60 (1): 126–42.
- Hatton, Timothy J. 2009. “The Rise and Fall of Asylum: What Happened and Why?” *Economic Journal* 119 (535): F183–F213.
- Hatton, Timothy J. 2017. “Refugees and Asylum Seekers, the Crisis in Europe and the Future of Policy.” *Economic Policy* 32 (91): 447–96.
- Heidenreich, Tobias, Jakob-Moritz Eberl, Fabienne Lind, and Hajo G. Boomgaarden. 2020. “Political Migration Discourses on Social Media: A Comparative Perspective on Visibility and Sentiment across Political Facebook Accounts in Europe.” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 46 (7): 1261–80.
- Himmelreich, Johannes. 2019. “Asylum for Sale: A Market between States That Is Feasible and Desirable.” *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 36 (2): 217–32.
- Home Office, United Kingdom. 2022. “Migration and Economic Development Partnership.” *Impact Assessment*, July 4, 2022. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/migration-and-economic-development-partnership-with-rwanda>.
- ILO (International Labour Organization). 2014. “ILO Says Forced Labour Generates Annual Profits of US\$ 150 Billion.” *News: Economics of Forced Labour*, May 20, 2014. [https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS\\_243201/lang-en/index.htm](https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_243201/lang-en/index.htm).
- ILO (International Labour Organization), Walk Free, and IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2022. *Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage*. Geneva: ILO; Nedlands, WA: Walk Free Foundation; Geneva: IOM.
- Imbert, Clément, and John Papp. 2020. “Costs and Benefits of Rural-Urban Migration: Evidence from India.” *Journal of Development Economics* 146 (September): 102473.
- Infante, César, Alvaro J. Idrovo, Mario S. Sánchez-Domínguez, Stéphane Vinhas, and Tonatiuh González-Vázquez. 2012. “Violence Committed against Migrants in Transit: Experiences on the Northern Mexican Border.” *Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health* 14 (3): 449–59.
- Innes, Alexandria J. 2010. “When the Threatened Become the Threat: The Construction of Asylum Seekers in British Media Narratives.” *International Relations* 24 (4): 456–77.
- IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2002. *International Comparative Study of Migration Legislation and Practice*. Dublin: Stationery Office.
- IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2021. *World Migration Report 2022*. Geneva: IOM.
- Jacobsen, Karen, Maysa Ayoub, and Alice Johnson. 2014. “Sudanese Refugees in Cairo: Remittances and Livelihoods.” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 27 (1): 145–59.
- Johns, Melissa, Craig Loschmann, and Nisha Nicole Arekapudi. 2023. “Mexico’s Policy Response as an Emerging Destination for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Persons in Need of International Protection.”

- Background paper prepared for *World Development Report 2023*, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Kaufmann, David. 2021. "Debating Responsibility-Sharing: An Analysis of the European Parliament's Debates on the Common European Asylum System." *European Policy Analysis* 7 (1): 207–25.
- Klugman, Jeni, and Isabel Maria Medaño Pereira. 2009. "Assessment of National Migration Policies: An Emerging Picture on Admissions, Treatment and Enforcement in Developing and Developed Countries." Human Development Research Paper HDRP-2009-48 (October), Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme, New York.
- Koch, Anne, Nadine Biehler, Nadine Knapp, and David Kipp. 2023. "Integrating Refugees: Lessons from Germany since 2015/2016." Background paper prepared for *World Development Report 2023*, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Könönen, Jukka. 2022. "Borders in the Future: Policing Unwanted Mobility through Entry Bans in the Schengen Area." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*. Published ahead of print, January 31, 2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2029375>.
- Koser, Khalid. 2000. "Asylum Policies, Trafficking and Vulnerability." *International Migration* 38 (3): 91–111.
- Koser, Khalid. 2010. "Dimensions and Dynamics of Irregular Migration." *Population, Space and Place* 16 (3): 181–93.
- Kuschminder, Katie, and Jennifer Waidler. 2020. "At Europe's Frontline: Factors Determining Migrants Decision Making for Onwards Migration from Greece and Turkey." *Migration and Development* 9 (2): 188–208.
- Leyva-Flores, René, César Infante, Juan Pablo Gutierrez, Frida Quintino-Perez, María Jose Gómez-Saldivar, and Cristian Torres-Robles. 2019. "Migrants in Transit through Mexico to the US: Experiences with Violence and Related Factors, 2009–2015." *PLOS ONE* 14 (8): e0220775.
- Longo, Matthew. 2018. *The Politics of Borders: Sovereignty, Security, and the Citizen after 9/11*. Problems of International Politics Series. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Łubiński, Piotr. 2022. "Hybrid Warfare or Hybrid Threat: The Weaponization of Migration as an Example of the Use of Lawfare; Case Study of Poland." *Polish Political Science Yearbook* 51 (1): 43–55.
- Lutz, Philipp, David Kaufmann, and Anna Stünzi. 2020. "Humanitarian Protection as a European Public Good: The Strategic Role of States and Refugees." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 58 (3): 757–75.
- Madrigal, Guadalupe, and Stuart Soroka. 2023. "Migrants, Caravans, and the Impact of News Photos on Immigration Attitudes." *International Journal of Press/Politics* 28 (1): 49–69.
- Maher, Stephanie. 2018. "Out of West Africa: Human Smuggling as a Social Enterprise." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 676 (1): 36–56.
- Majcher, Izabella, Michael Flynn, and Mariette Grange. 2020. *Immigration Detention in the European Union: In the Shadow of the "Crisis."* European Studies in Population Series 22. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
- Majidi, Nassim. 2018. "Community Dimensions of Smuggling: The Case of Afghanistan and Somalia." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 676 (1): 97–113.
- Martin, Susan F. 2000. "Best Practices to Combat Smuggling and Protect the Victims of Traffickers." Paper presented at the expert group meeting, "Best Practices for Migrant Workers," University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, April 26–28, 2000. <https://migration.ucdavis.edu/cf/more.php?id=100>.
- Martin, Susan F., Elizabeth Ferris, Kanta Kumari, and Jonas Bergmann. 2018. "The Global Compacts and Environmental Drivers of Migration." KNOMAD Policy Brief 11 (July), Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- McAuliffe, Marie, and Frank Laczko, eds. 2016. *Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A Global Review of the Emerging Evidence Base*. Geneva: International Organization for Migration. <https://publications.iom.int/books/migrant-smuggling-data-and-research-global-review-emerging-evidence-base>.
- McMillan, Margaret S., Dani Rodrik, and Claudia Sepúlveda. 2017. *Structural Change, Fundamentals, and Growth: A Framework and Case Studies*. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Ministry of Economy, Fiji. 2019. "Displacement Guidelines: In the Context of Climate Change and Disasters." Ministry of Economy, Suva, Fiji. <https://www.adaptationcommunity.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Displacement-Guidelines-Fiji-2019.pdf>.
- Morten, Melanie. 2019. "Temporary Migration and Endogenous Risk Sharing in Village India." *Journal of Political Economy* 127 (1): 1–46.
- Morten, Melanie, and Jacqueline Oliveira. 2023. "The Effects of Roads on Trade and Migration: Evidence from a Planned Capital City." NBER Working Paper 22158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA.
- MPISOC (Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy). 2014. "Treaty of Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation between the Italian Republic and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya." Policy Document, SPLASH Database, MPISOC, Munich. <https://splash-db.eu/policydocument/treaty-of-friendship-partnership-and-cooperation-between-the-italian-republic-and-the-great-social/>.
- MRE (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombia). 2021. "Decreto 216 del 1 de Marzo de 2021: Por medio del cual se adopta el Estatuto Temporal de Protección para Migrantes Venezolanos Bajo Régimen de Protección Temporal y se dictan otras disposiciones en materia migratoria." MRE, Bogotá, Colombia. <https://dapre.presidencia.gov.co/normativa/normativa/DECRETO%202021%20DEL%201%20DE%20MARZO%20DE%202021.pdf>.
- NDMO (National Disaster Management Office, Vanuatu). 2018. "Vanuatu: National Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement Policy." NDMO, Port Vila,

- Vanuatu. [https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press\\_release/file/iom-vanuatu-policy-climate-change-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf](https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/iom-vanuatu-policy-climate-change-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf).
- Newland, Kathleen, and Brian Salant. 2018. "Balancing Acts: Policy Frameworks for Migrant Return and Reintegration." Policy Brief 6 (October), Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/policy-frameworks-migrant-return-and-reintegration>.
- Nicot, Morgane, and Bianca Kopp. 2018. "Policy Perspective." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 676 (1): 223–25.
- Nonnenmacher, Sophie, and Akemi Yonemura. 2018. "Migration and Education in West Africa." Background paper, Document ED/GEMR/MRT/2018/P1/15/REV, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, Paris.
- NSC (National Security Council). 2021. "U.S. Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration in Central America." White House, Washington, DC. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf>.
- Odysseus Network. 2017. "Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Fields of Development, the Fight against Illegal Immigration, Human Trafficking and Fuel Smuggling and on Reinforcing the Security of Borders between the State of Libya and the Italian Republic." *EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy* (blog), October 2, 2017. [https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM\\_translation\\_finalversion.doc.pdf](https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/MEMORANDUM_translation_finalversion.doc.pdf).
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2020. *Sustainable Reintegration of Returning Migrants: A Better Homecoming*. Paris: OECD.
- OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2016. "Situation of Migrants in Transit." Report A/HRC/31/35, OHCHR, Geneva. [https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/INT\\_CMW\\_INF\\_7940\\_E.pdf](https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/INT_CMW_INF_7940_E.pdf).
- OHCHR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights). 2017. "EU 'Trying to Move Border to Libya' Using Policy That Breaches Rights—UN Experts: Moving Europe's Borders." Press Release: Special Procedures, August 17, 2017. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2017/08/eu-trying-move-border-libya-using-policy-breaches-rights-un-experts>.
- Okoth-Obbo, George. 2001. "Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa." *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 20 (1): 79–138.
- Ortega, Francesc, and Giovanni Peri. 2013. "The Effect of Income and Immigration Policies on International Migration." *Migration Studies* 1 (1): 47–74.
- Paoletti, Sarah. 2023. "Temporary Protected Status in the United States: An Incomplete and Imperfect Complementary System of Protection." Background paper prepared for *World Development Report 2023*, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Pereira, Cícero, Jorge Vala, and Rui Costa-Lopes. 2010. "From Prejudice to Discrimination: The Legitimizing Role of Perceived Threat in Discrimination against Immigrants." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 40 (7): 1231–50.
- Poynting, Scott, and Linda Briskman. 2020. "Asylum Seekers in the Global Context of Xenophobia: Introduction to the Special Issue." *Journal of Sociology* 56 (1): 3–8.
- Průchová Hrůzová, Andrea. 2021. "What Is the Image of Refugees in Central European Media?" *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 24 (1): 240–58.
- Ravn, Stiene, Rilke Mahieu, Milena Belloni, and Christiane Timmerman. 2020. "Shaping the 'Deserving Refugee': Insights from a Local Reception Programme in Belgium." In *Geographies of Asylum in Europe and the Role of European Localities*, edited by Birgit Glorius and Jeroen Doomernik, 135–53. IMISCOE Research Series. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
- Reed-Hurtado, Michael. 2013. "The Cartagena Declaration on Refugees and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence in Latin America." Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2013/03 (June), Division of International Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva.
- Reques, Laura, Ezequiel Aranda-Fernández, Camille Rolland, Adeline Gripon, Nora Fallet, Christian Reboul, Nathalie Godard, and Niklas Luhmann. 2020. "Episodes of Violence Suffered by Migrants Transiting through Libya: A Cross-Sectional Study in 'Médecins du Monde's' Reception and Healthcare Centre in Seine-Saint-Denis, France." *Conflict and Health* 14 (1): 12.
- Reuters. 2016. "Norway Will Build a Fence at Its Arctic Border with Russia." *New York Times*, August 24, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/25/world/europe/russia-norway-border-fence-refugees.html>.
- Rosenberg, Eli. 2018. "Sessions Defends Separating Immigrant Parents and Children: 'We've Got to Get This Message Out.'" *Politics* (blog), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2018/06/05/sessions-defends-separating-immigrant-parents-and-children-weve-got-to-get-this-message-out/>.
- Sačur, Sabina, Mirko Palić, Marko Grünhagen, and Tihomir Kundid. 2017. "Determinants of Choice of Migration Destination: Evidence from the Western Balkan Transit Route." *International Journal of Sales, Retailing and Marketing* 6 (1): 48–60.
- Sandven, Hallvard. 2022. "The Practice and Legitimacy of Border Control." *American Journal of Political Science*. Published ahead of print, August 28, 2022. <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajps.12736>.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2019. "Bordering Migration/Migrating Borders." *Berkeley Journal of International Law* 37 (1): 93–151.
- Shachar, Ayelet. 2020. *The Shifting Border: Legal Cartographies of Migration and Mobility*. Critical Powers Series. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Sharpe, Marina. 2013. "The 1969 OAU Refugee Convention and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence in the Context of Individual Refugee Status Determination." Legal and

- Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2013/01 (January), Division of International Protection, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva.
- Shrestha, Maheshwor. 2023. "A Deeper Dive into the Relationship between Economic Development and Migration." Policy Research Working Paper 10295, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Singapore Statutes Online. 2021. "Immigration Act 1959: An Act Relating to Immigration into, and Departure from, Singapore." Revised Edition, Incorporates All Amendments Up to and Including 1 December 2021 and Comes into Operation on 31 December 2021. Legislation Division, Attorney-General's Chambers of Singapore, Singapore. <https://sso.agc.gov.sg//Act/IA1959>.
- Slovic, Paul, Daniel Västfjäll, Arvid Erlandsson, and Robin Gregory. 2017. "Iconic Photographs and the Ebb and Flow of Empathic Response to Humanitarian Disasters." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 114 (4): 640–44.
- Solomon, Daina Beth. 2019. "U.S. Dream Pulls African Migrants in Record Numbers across Latin America." *Editor's Picks*, July 5, 2019. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-africa-idUSKCN1U01A4>.
- T.C. *Resmî Gazete* (Official Gazette of the Republic of Türkiye). 2013. "Law on Foreigners and International Protection." Law 6458 (adopted April 4), *T.C. Resmî Gazete* 53 (5): 28615 (April 11). [https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/LoFIP\\_ENG\\_DGMM\\_revised-2017.pdf](https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2017/04/LoFIP_ENG_DGMM_revised-2017.pdf).
- Triandafyllidou, Anna, ed. 2018a. *Handbook of Migration and Globalisation*. Handbooks on Globalisation Series. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna. 2018b. "Migrant Smuggling: Novel Insights and Implications for Migration Control Policies." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 676 (1): 212–21.
- Triandafyllidou, Anna, Laura Bartolini, and Caterina Francesca Guidi. 2019. "Exploring the Links between Enhancing Regular Pathways and Discouraging Irregular Migration: A Discussion Paper to Inform Future Policy Deliberations." International Organization for Migration, Geneva. <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/61251>.
- Türk, Volker, and Rebecca Dowd. 2014. "Protection Gaps." In *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, edited by Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona, 278–89. Oxford Handbooks Series. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 1984. "Cartagena Declaration on Refugees Adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico, and Panama, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 22 November 1984." Media Relations and Public Information Service, UNHCR, Geneva. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/about-us/background/45dc19084/cartagena-declaration-refugees-adopted-colloquium-international-protection.html>.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2021. "UNHCR Note on the 'Externalization' of International Protection." May 28, UNHCR, Geneva. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/60b115604.html>.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2022. "The Implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive: Six Months On." October, Regional Bureau for Europe, UNHCR, Geneva.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Brookings Institution, and Georgetown University. 2015. "Guidance on Protecting People from Disasters and Environmental Change through Planned Relocation." October 7, UNHCR, Geneva. <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/562f798d9/planned-relocation-guidance-october-2015.html>.
- UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), Georgetown University, and IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2017. "A Toolbox: Planning Relocations to Protect People from Disasters and Environmental Change." July 28, UNHCR, Geneva. <https://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/596f1bb47/planned-relocation-toolbox.html>.
- United Nations. 1976. "OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa." Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, September 10, 1969. Treaty Series 14691, Volume-1001-I-14691: 45–52, Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New York.
- United Nations. 2019. "Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 19 December 2018: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration." Document A/RES/73/195 (January 11), United Nations, New York. [https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A\\_RES\\_73\\_195.pdf](https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_73_195.pdf).
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2018. *Global Study on Smuggling of Migrants 2018*. June. Vienna: UNODC.
- USCIS (US Citizenship and Immigration Services). 2010. "Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status." *Federal Register* 75 (13) (January 21): 3476–79, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.
- US Immigration and Naturalization Service. 1999. "Designation of Honduras under Temporary Protected Status." *Federal Register* 64 (2) (January 5): 524–26, Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC.
- US State Department. 2019. "U.S.-Mexico Joint Declaration." *Media Note*, June 7, 2019. <https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-mexico-joint-declaration/index.html>.
- Vogt, Wendy A. 2018. *Lives in Transit: Violence and Intimacy on the Migrant Journey*. California Series in Public Anthropology 42. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.
- Wajsborg, Mirjam. 2020. "'I Am Not Moving Life, But Life Moves Me': Experiences of Intra-EU (Im)Mobility among West African Migrants." In *Migration at Work: Aspirations, Imaginaries and Structures of Mobility*, edited by Fiona-Katharina Seiger, Christiane Timmerman, Noel B. Salazar, and Johan Wets, 91–110. CeMIS

- Migration and Intercultural Studies Series 5. Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press.
- Walsh, Peter William. 2020. "Irregular Migration in the UK." COMPAS Briefing, September 11, Migration Observatory, Centre on Migration, Policy, and Society, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK. <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/irregular-migration-in-the-uk/>.
- Warren, Robert. 2019. "Sharp Multiyear Decline in Undocumented Immigration Suggests Progress at US-Mexico Border, Not a National Emergency." February 27, Center for Migration Studies, New York. <https://cmsny.org/publications/essay-warren-022719/>.
- WHO (World Health Organization). 2022. *World Report on the Health of Refugees and Migrants*. Health and Migration Programme. Geneva: WHO.
- World Bank. 2018a. "Asylum Seekers in the European Union: Building Evidence to Inform Policy Making." World Bank, Washington, DC.
- World Bank. 2018b. "Transit Migration." Migration and Development Brief 29 (April), Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, World Bank, Washington, DC.