33593 No. 22 / August 2005 Conflict and Recovery in Aceh: An Assessment of Conflict Dynamics and Options for Supporting the Peace Process On August 15th the Government of Indonesia and the GAM signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at ending almost 30 years of armed conflict in Aceh. This note summarizes the results of a rapid conflict assessment prepared by the World Bank to understand conflict dynamics, to analyze possible scenarios after signing of the agreement, and to identify tools and mechanisms that the government, donors, and other stakeholders could use to support the peace process. The assessment was carried out from July 26 to August 19, 2005. On August 15th, 2005 the Government of Indonesia (GoI) and leadership and the Government of Indonesia. Instead, it the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace accord in assumes these parties are willing to find a solution to the Helsinki aimed at ending a 30-year armed conflict which has conflict, and considers the local dynamics that may make or resulted in almost 15,000 deaths. Changes in the political break the agreement. The paper combines a consideration of environment--and in the demands of both sides--have the broad dynamics of the conflict (with a focus on events allowed for the development of an agreement that many see as post-tsunami) with an exploration of the views of different being the best hope for peace in Aceh for years. Many of the local actors, their incentives, and the agency they have to most crucial lessons from the failed Cessation of Hostilities either spoil, or consolidate, the accord. Consideration of this, Agreement (COHA) of 2002-03 appear to have been learned. as well as of the broad political dynamics in Jakarta and Banda The current agreement represents a more comprehensive Aceh, is necessary in comprehending the likelihood of the strategy for bringing peace to Aceh, with many of the social, agreement contributing to a sustainable peace in Aceh. It is political and economic factors that have kept Aceh in a state of also necessary to help illuminate the ways in which the World perpetual war since the failure of COHA considered by the Bank and others can help support the peaceful development of authors of the peace agreement, even if not all of them are Aceh in years to come. fully addressed. The assessment was conducted from July 26th - August 19th, Yet while the agreement is more holistic, and the political will 2005 and utilized a number of methods: key informant surveys from both sides is seemingly stronger, many challenges of facilitators from two Bank funded local development remain. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) outlines projects (the Kecamatan Development Project and the Support just the bare bones of a settlement. Many issues remain for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Project); ii iii newspaper unresolved. Implementation details are unclear. The conflict monitoring; two field trips to eight districts plus agreement has largely involved elite actors on both sides, with discussions in Banda Aceh; a review of lessons learned from civil society actors and the communities they represent given COHA and other peace processes; and interviews with little space to contribute. There is a massive perceived gap Acehnese in Medan and Jakarta. between the discussions in Jakarta, Helsinki and, to a lesser extent, in Banda Aceh, and realities on the ground for those in The note consists of four parts. Section 1 gives a brief the regions. The signing of the accord does not in itself bring overview of conflict on the ground in Aceh today, using peace. Whether the conflict ends and peace is sustainable will survey and qualitative data. Section 2 sets out potential depend very much on the ways in which a range of different scenarios post-August 15th, with an emphasis on dynamics that actors (including the combating parties, but also others) work could negatively impact upon the likelihood of sustainable through the myriad issues that will arise post-August 15th. peace. Section 3 gives suggestions for broad tools that development actors, such as the World Bank and others, may This note summarizes a preliminary assessment of conflict use to address these, and, more broadly, to support the dynamics on the ground in Aceh today, and, particularly, of peaceful recovery of Aceh, and outlines principles for conflict- how the conflict is experienced by the people who make up sensitive development planning. Section 4 concludes. the vast majority of the populace of this beautiful but tragic place: rural Acehnese villagers.i The note does not seek to I. Conflict Dynamics in Aceh Post-Tsunami analyze the conflict at the macro-level or the intentions of elite Despite the fact that conflict levels dropped immediately after actors, including the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) GAM the tsunami, they have been steadily increasing over the year and since the beginning of this year, 178 deaths and 170 II. Obstacles to Peace: Possible Scenarios Post-August 15th injuries have resulted from 108 GAM-GoI conflict incidents. There are a number of potential scenarios that could However, both incidents of conflict and their violent impacts undermine the peace agreement. are concentrated in four "hot spots" districts: North Aceh, South Aceh, East Aceh and Bireuen. With the exception of Incentives for Resistance and Security Concerns South Aceh, these districts are on the east coast of Aceh, One set of spoilers is local actors--including GAM which has traditionally been GAM's stronghold. combatants, the TNI and the police--who will resist the implementation of the peace agreement because of economic However, there is both quantitative and qualitative evidence to incentives and/or ideological reasons. Particularly at the sub- suggest that the conflict is moving west, and particularly to district level, these actors possess considerable scope for South Aceh district. Indeed, conflict levels have risen sharply autonomous action and many are involved in illegal activities in South Aceh in the past two months (June and July) whereas on the side. Maintaining control over these actors will require levels have dropped off in central and eastern Aceh. This is the use of both sticks and carrots. due to two factors: one, GAM members from other parts of Aceh are moving west to seek protection; and, two, the Monitoring Capacity command line within the GAM leadership functions less well Partly because there are spoilers within the ranks of both sides, in the west coast region. as well as because the high levels of distrust between GAM and GoI, an independent third party monitor has been charged Although conflict incidents are concentrated, conflict's with overseeing the peace process. The list of tasks that the impacts on human security and perceptions of safety are felt Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) is responsible for is vast. across the province. In almost every district, villagers told us There is a risk that this team will be unable to satisfactorily of how their lives are affected. Many are unable to tend their cover and respond to all incidents and all aspects of its forest gardens, the center of most village economies, for fear mandate. How local people view the team, and understand its of running into GAM who have retreated to the foothills. role, is key. Similarly, tension between those who nominally sympathize with GAM and those who sympathize with GoI is high across Reintegration of GAM the province, regardless of recent local conflict incidents. Thirty years of conflict has eroded trust and relations: amongst Highly relevant for targeting purposes, these cleavages exist communities, between communities and the state, as well as within villages. Sympathies for either GAM or GoI tend to be between communities and GAM. Communities could reject at the household level and therefore differences of opinion and GAM because of past abuses or because of the fear that mistrust exist within villages. Cleavages along ethnic and welcoming back ex-GAM combatants with open arms will put religious lines are weak. them at risk. Similarly, the provision of significant support and aid to ex-GAM combatants could result in serious tensions The main forms of GAM-GoI related conflict continue to be and social jealousies among other victims of conflict. firefights between armed actors and kidnapping which almost always involves civilians. Extortion is rampant across the Population Movements and Village-level Conflict province, particularly on main highways, and is almost Over the course of the conflict, large numbers of transmigrants entirely carried out by the TNI and the police. Sweeping is and Acehnese fled the province. Their return post-August 15th more common in "black areas", that is villages that, according could cause problems relating to property, including land, left to the TNI, sympathize with GAM. More positively, militias behind. Although the numbers of returnees is unlikely to be or anti-separatist groups, as they are more commonly referred high in the short-run, the conflict may have weakened the to in Aceh, are unlikely to be a problem. They have very little capacity of village level mechanisms to handle these issues. legitimacy in the eyes of communities--many members are reluctant recruitees--and in the past six months have been in The two most problematic obstacles, at least in the short-term, involved in almost no incidents (total of 3 incidents in Each will be managing local resistance and crime, as well as Aceh and Lhokseumawe in 2005). ensuring the smooth integration of ex-GAM combatants. There is a significant chance that even if the peace agreement Local community leaders are the key dispute resolution actors. is successful at the macro-level (e.g., in ending the decades - Even for GAM-GoI related conflicts, the Village Head often long conflict between the GoI and GAM), that the conflict will plays a key role, for example in negotiating in kidnapping fragment and morph from that of a separatist struggle (and cases and settling disputes relating to extortion. Despite the government's attempt to control it), to one underpinned by conflict, community leaders have managed to maintain the local economic interests and criminality (premanism). If this trust and faith of their communities. Their participation in occurs, in the short-term the Aceh Monitoring Mission is socializing and monitoring the peace process, as well as in likely to struggle to fulfill its mandate to investigate and facilitating the trust required for development projects, will be adjudicate on apparent violations. In the longer-term, existing crucial. security and judicial institutions will have problems controlling these activities without developing greater trust and legitimacy from communities. 2 There is a risk that early mistakes in the reintegration of GAM · In the longer-term consider truth and reconciliation members could derail the whole peace process. All those who mechanisms that relieve the burden and heal the memories of have a stake in reintegration, including receiving communities, past violence and abuses. GAM leadership and combatants, and the GoI, will watch this · Support local level monitoring programs that augment and process, which is set to begin on the 15th September. It will be complement the AMM. a litmus test for both Jakarta and GAM's good intentions (and their ability to control their armed members). Success will Reintegration of GAM depend on getting the incentives and messages right. The Program development for the reintegration of GAM is already schedule is tight. underway. Those designing such programs should consider the following suggestions: III. Intervention Mechanisms and Principles for · We suggest that the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization Development Actors and Reintegration) programs be given a name and acronym There is significant scope for donors such as the World Bank that means more to local people. One suggestion is to rename to support the peace process. Generally, development actors the program P-KBG. This stands for Pulang Kampung, should think about interventions in the following areas: Pulang Barak, Pulang Gudang (Going home to the village, · Socialization of the peace process Going home to the barracks, Giving back the weapons). · Bringing people in to the process · In order to ensure support to receiving communities, · Reintegration of GAM consider issuing returnees with a voucher that is redeemable · Provision of a peace dividend upon reentry into a village. The voucher would provide a set · Institution building amount to the returnee (either in cash or kind) but would also provide a set amount to receiving communities. Socialization of the Peace Process · Use Ulamas (religious leaders) to add legitimacy and to aid The importance of disseminating the content and processes of in reconciliation. the peace agreement cannot be understated. This could be done in a number of ways: Provision of a Peace Dividend · Support existing networks and mechanisms, including civil The cornerstone of a donor strategy to support the peace society actors, religious and local media networks. process should be the provision of widespread development · Consider creating a fund within one of the existing multi- programming in areas previously affected by conflict. donor trust fund already established to help Aceh recover from Complementary peace dividend activities in the immediate, the tsunami--that local organizations could apply to for medium, and longer-term could include: funding for socialization activities. · Highly visible immediate activities: · Utilize KDP's comprehensive socialization network. In o rebuilding and/or repainting health posts and schools particular, hire another 45 KDP Information Facilitators in (the latter were often targeted in the conflict); order to expand their coverage to include all of Aceh. o rebuilding bridges (many destroyed by conflict) through · Develop a multi-media based awareness campaign that uses cash-for-work programs; and community radio, newspapers, and religious networks to o clearing trails to forest gardens (many of which became promote local awareness and dialogue over the peace inaccessible due to the conflict). agreement. · Medium term: We suggest that more money is put through the next round of KDP and other community projects across Bringing People in to the Process Aceh to ensure that all villages receive a project through the A major weakness of the Helsinki process has been the lack of program. involvement of Acehnese civil society. Their inclusion in · 2006-onwards: SPADA, which expands the scope of the implementing the peace process is of particular importance. community work to include joint community­local There are multiple ways to ensure their inclusion, including: government planning and service delivery, could be expanded · Public dialogues at the district and sub-district levels to: to the remaining districts in Aceh; if the first round of SPADA elicit communities' social and economic development needs; is successful, more money could be channeled through the build dialogue around mechanisms for peace; and improve program. information flows. · Livelihoods programming. · Commission a series of publicly-announced needs assessments. These should cover: Institution Building o Ex-GAM combatants' reintegration needs; There is widespread dissatisfaction with the state of o Survey of local government needs, including governance in Aceh. Further, the MoU maps out significant assessments of schools, health clinics and other public changes to the structure of governance in Aceh. infrastructure; and, o Surveys of the justice and security sector. Donors should support a transition to accountable, transparent · Support cultural events that tap into the community's and participatory governance in Aceh. Concrete support could widespread desire for an end to conflict and hopes for peace. include: 3 · Provide technical and funding support for those responsible · Focus on ensuring transparency and accountability to limit for the implementation of the MoU's governance agenda. corruption and suspicion · Commission a Public Expenditure Review at the provincial · Use independent civil society and district levels. Civil society is surprisingly strong, if over-stretched, in many · Strengthen and support Rakorbang (Development districts of Aceh. It is a vital resource. Coordination Meetings). · Don't forget the Government · Support the establishment of a joint team to monitor and Long-term and sustainable strategies must involve provincial control illegal logging. and district level governments. · Commission a comprehensive needs assessment of the · Provide support to field staff justice sector. Specifically, focus on both the capacity of the Field staff, such as local facilitators, are often over-looked. In Courts and Prosecutor's Office to "supply" justice as well as a conflict context they are on the front-lines and thus require the capacity of civil society and communities to "demand" extra support. Consider: conflict resolution and negotiation justice. training; strong and responsive reporting structures; and early warning information systems for when things go wrong. Security Sector Reform Support will also need to be provided for security sector IV. Conclusions reform. Police will have new and unfamiliar roles (and have The unprecedented response (national and international) to the been a problem in the past). There are many arms and armed tsunami has created opportunities for a response to the conflict groups circulating in Aceh. Research from elsewhere shows in Aceh. Human resources and aid delivery mechanisms are that prompt, well-managed police responses do actually stop already in place. In many parts of Aceh, those affected by local conflicts from spiraling upwards. Areas to focus on conflict, and especially those in the mountainous interior, are include: now worse off than those who were directly impacted by the · Commission a comprehensive needs assessment of the tsunami. Villages in conflict-afflicted areas, and particularly security sector. Lessons could be learnt from a World Bank in the rural mountainous interior, have received almost no participatory research program that looked at how police at the development aid from government, NGOs or international district and sub-district level in East Java and Flores learn and donors while the conflict has raged. The improvement in respond to problems. security that the peace process, if successful, will bring, · USAID and Japan have been sponsoring programs provides new opportunities for reaching some of the poorest elsewhere in Indonesia that have already shown promise and people in Aceh. can be brought to Aceh. · Bringing credible reformists might be useful as would be If the peace agreement holds, the "vertical conflict" between providing high-level backup for the provincial police in Aceh. GAM and the government is likely to transform into one · Addressing issues related to illegal economic activities involving a horizontal scramble for resources and revenue conducted by the security sector in Aceh, such as taxes, streams, underpinned by widespread violent criminality. military businesses, etc. Addressing these issues requires the use of frameworks that take into account the multiple layers of conflict in Aceh, as Conflict-Sensitive Development Principles well as a focus on longer-term institution and peace-building. It is important that development interventions are i implemented in ways that take into account the history of The note is based on the report of the same title prepared by Patrick Barron, Samuel Clark and Muslahuddin Daud of the World Bank's Jakarta Office. The conflict and how development interventions interact with ideas and views are those of the authors. The full report is available on-line at conflict dynamics. Development actors in Aceh should www.conflictanddevelopment.org. consider the following conflict-sensitive development ii KDP (Kecamatan Development Program) is a billion dollar Bank/GoI principles: community development program which has operated in over 28,000 villages (40% of the total) in Indonesia since 1998. · Distributional issues and targeting iiiSPADA (Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas) is a Bank/GoI project Programs targeted at particular population groups, at the scheduled to become operational in early 2006, covering 42 districts in nine expense of others, are more likely to be problematic than those provinces in Indonesia, including Aceh. targeted more widely. _______________________________________________________________ · Community-driven approaches This Note was prepared by Patrick Barron, Samuel Clark, and Muslahuddin Community projects that use demand-driven approaches are Daud of the World Bank, Indonesia. more likely to reflect actual community needs and receive buy-in. This Note was also published as Social Development Note No. 101 and is part of a series intending to disseminate good practice andkey findings on conflict · Concentrate on processes as well as outputs prevention and reconstruction. This series is edited by the CPR Unit in the The processes development programs utilize are more likely to Social Development Department of the Environmentally and Socially contribute to sustainable peace than their outputs. Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank. CPR Dissemination Notes are distributed widely to Bank staff and are available on the CPR · Build-in complaints mechanisms website http://www.worldbank.org/conflict and can also be requested via e- Clear and transparent complaints mechanisms can help to mail at cpr@worldbank.org prevent conflicts when problems do occur. 4