62232 April 2011 · Number 85 DOES THE MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA REGION EXPERIENCE ‘CONFLICT TRAPS’ ? Lene Lind and Steven A. Zyck1 significant portion of the population has no economic stake in peace, given high levels of Introduction - The Concept of a Conflict Trap: poverty and unemployment, while others have The 2011 World Development Report (WDR) a material incentive for conflict to recur. on ‘Conflict, Security and Development’ has reaffirmed global research that conflict is in The Relatively Influential Role of Governance many respects a self-perpetuating cycle. Put Quality in Driving Conflict Risk in MENA: simply, factors related to the onset of conflict Scholars have recently found that economic are reinforced by ensuing violence trapping factors may be a less significant driver of countries in a cycle which is hard to break, with conflict in the MENA region than in other parts ominous implications for development of the world.3 Per capita income has a relatively assistance. How does this model fit the weak impact upon conflict risk, and several evidence from the MENA region? MENA countries have demonstrated an impressive ability to recover economically after The best known exposition of the conflict trap is war or to continue growing amid conflict (e.g., based on economic factors. Collier et al. wrote the Lebanese Civil War).4 It appears that the in 2003 that a “country that first falls into the linkages between economic decline and trap may have a risk of new war that is 10 times increased levels of conflict in MENA are higher just after that war has ended than before tenuous at best. Even though case studies (as the war started. If the country succeeds in well as recent experience in Tunisia, Egypt and maintaining post-conflict peace for 10 years or elsewhere) suggest that high unemployment so, the risk is considerably reduced, but combined with large youth bulges likely play a remains at a higher level than before the contributory role, development agencies should conflict”.2 According to this 2003 study, war not look to broader models to explain the drivers of only erodes and complicates economic conflict. conditions, it also allows particular groups to accumulate wealth and, hence, gain a financial As the 2011 WDR 2011 itself suggests, some of stake in continued or renewed violence. the most integral drivers of conflict and Accordingly, in the post-conflict phase, a fragility may relate to institutions and the quality of governance. The WDR states “areas with the weakest institutions and governance 1 Lene Natasha Lind, Senior Social Development Specialist, MNSSO, Steven A. Zyck is Associate, Post-war are the most vulnerable to repeated violence Reconstruction & Development Unit, University of York and the least able to respond to internal and and Director, International Development Innovations. This brief is extracted from a series of background papers prepared for a regional study on ‘Conflict, Fragility and 3 Nicholas Sambanis and Julia Choucair-Vizoso, “Conflict Development’ prepared by MNSSD. It is cleared by Colin and Development in the Middle East and North Africa”, Scott, Acting Sector Manager, SDV-URBAN background paper for the 2011 World Bank Study on 2 Paul Collier, V. L. Elliott, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Conflict and Development in the MNA Region, 2010. Marta Reynal-Querol, and Nicholas Sambanis, Breaking the 4 Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, and conflict trap: Civil war and development policy Håvard Strand, “Consequences of Armed Conflict in the (Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University MENA Region”, a background paper to the World Bank Press, 2003), p. 104. Study on Conflict and Fragility in the MENA Region. external stresses”. Examining the role of A recent study by the Peace Research Institute institutions in the MENA region in managing Oslo (PRIO) found that while globally conflict or driving conflict, recent research suggests that often acts as a catalyst for social change, forcing poor governance tends to increase conflict risk, leaders to become more participatory and to particularly the potential for conflict grant increased civil liberties, such recurrence.5 Countries with positive transformative outcomes of conflict have been governance ratings according to a wide range less evident in the MENA region. While the of criteria are between 30 and 50 percent less ongoing political transitions in Egypt, Tunisia, likely to experience conflict recurrence than and elsewhere may chllenge this trend, regimes poorly governed countries.6 Not only does the waging war in MENA have typically survived data suggest that governance deficits may and endured much longer than anywhere else increase conflict risk, research also in the world.8 To explain this difference, one demonstrates that conflict itself erodes study compared the global replacement of governance, thus generating what has been autocracy with democracy, the so-called “third labeled a “political conflict trap”. wave of democratization’ (Fig. 1) with the continuation of autocracy – mediated by an Political Conflict Traps in MENA: A political increase in incomplete/semi-democracies – in conflict trap has a similar dynamic to an MENA (Fig. 2).9 economic conflict trap. Conflict within the MENA region drives leaders to become increasingly authoritarian. They may increase oppression and narrow or eliminate opportunities for political expression or opposition. Spending on the military and other security services increases, and a so-called “garrison state” is established. Such a state of affairs persists not only during the conflict but also in the post-conflict years as leaders come to fear that any loosening of their political and military grip could invite further opposition. 7 This vicious cycle may also limit economic growth, curtail public spending on non-security Figure 1 sectors (e.g., health, education, welfare, etc.), and lead to widespread discontentment. Devoid of legitimate channels to express dissatisfaction peacefully, citizenry may turn to protests, riots, violent extremism, insurgency, or outright civil war. The state responds to these challenges by further oppression charging the political conflict cycle. The erosion of political legitimacy and the social contract between the state and its citizenry has clear detrimental impacts on development progress. 5 Håvard Hegre and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, “The Governance- Conflict Trap in the ESCWA Region”, a paper for the UN- ESCWA study on “The Governance Deficit and Conflict Relapse in the ESCWA Region”, Jan. 2011. Figure 2 6 The aspects of governance considered in this study include the following: formal political institutions, political exclusion and repression, the rule of law, corruption, bureaucratic quality, 8 Gates, et al., “Consequences of Armed Conflict in the MENA military influence in politics, and economic policies. Region”.The paper was produced for the MNA Regional Study on 7 See Gates, et al., “Consequences of Armed Conflict in the Conflict Fragility and Development, see MNA Fast Brief no.68. MENA Region”. 9 Ibid. April 2011 · Number · What Accounts for Entrenched need to diversify their economies.12 As such the Authoritarianism in MENA? As Figures 1 and countries remain vulnerable to price shocks in 2 demonstrate, according to the PRIO study, the the price of oil – which research shows may maintenance of autocracy in MENA is, in global increase conflict risk – and are unlikely to terms, unique. In other parts of the world, new develop new industries which are able to elites have led – whether peacefully or through provide employment for large youth cohorts. rebellion and conflict –to the institutions of new and more inclusive political systems. The Accordingly it may be more accurate to view outcome has been, in many respects, MENA’s conflict trap as neither simply transformative. While political change has been economic or political but rather as a dynamic common in the MENA region in the past interaction between the two, which hinders several decades, it has commonly led to the growth and impedes genuine improvements in institution of new elites practicing new forms of governance. exclusion. Put another way, political change has commonly brought countries from one Conclusion: When assessing conflict traps in autocratic and poorly governed regime to MENA, drivers of conflict are better another rather than from one regime type understood as more than individual statistical (autocracy) to another (democracy). Natural correlates which operate in isolation. They fuel resource revenues, or “rents”, play a major role one another in a process which may defy in the maintenance of autocracy and weak statistical analysis. Considering the recent governance in MENA. political changes in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere other less measureable dynamics are Resource Curses and Rentier States: The recent at play. In particular the transmission of MNA Fast Brief no. 82, entitled “The “Resource uprising and outspoken political opposition – Curse” in MENA: Resource Wealth, Economic what some have referred to as the “Contagion” Shocks and Conflict Risk”, suggests that or “Copycat Effects” – suggests that hard to resource endowments have a significant impact measure dynamics may drive democratic upon institutional quality (and hence upon pressure and increase the potential for conflict governance and conflict risk). 10 Research in this (while also creating opportunity for the sorts of field suggests that oil and gas resources, which transformational political changes seen in other are particularly prevalent within MENA and regions). For development actors, the premium which are difficult to “capture”, are used to on broad analysis to accommodate and respond sustain a coercive state insulated from civil to these dynamics is self-evident. society. Contact MNA K&L: Semi-democracies propped up by oil money Director, MNACS: Emmanuel Mbi also have less incentive to promote internal Regional Knowledge and Learning Team: economic development (i.e. to expand their tax Omer Karasapan, Roby Fields, and Hafed Al- base) or to enhance their political legitimacy Ghwell. Tel #: (202) 473 8177 among their own citizenry and civil society 11. So-called ‘rentier states’, those which benefit MNA K&L Fast Briefs: from substantial natural resource rents, are free http://go.worldbank.org/OXADZV71I0 from most governments’ obligation to earn a The MNA Fast Briefs are intended to summarize degree of popular support and legitimacy in lessons learned from MNA and other Bank order to facilitate taxation. Indeed, oil-rich Knowledge and Learning activities. The briefs do not states not only have little interest in extracting necessarily reflect the views of the World Bank, its taxes from their citizens, they also have less board or its member countries. 10 See also Ross, Mazaheri, and Kaiser: “The “Resource 12 This dynamic is labelled a “modernization effect” by Curse” in MENA? Resource Wealth, Economic Shocks and Hegre and Nygard. See Hegre and Nygaard, “ the Conflict Risk” (2011) Governance-Conflict Trap in the ESCWA Region” and 11 Nazih N Ayubi, Over-stating the Arab State (New York: Ross, Mazaheri and Kaiser: The ‘resource Curse in MENA”: I.B. Tauris, 1995): 400 Resource Wealth, Economic Shocks and Conflict Risk”. April 2011 · Number ·