IFD44 September 2001 DISCUSSION PAPER Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries Statistics for 1970-2000 and the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption and the Quality of Public Investment Stephen S. Everhart Mariusz A. Sumlinski INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION IFC Discussion Papers No. 1 Private Business in Developing Countries: Improved Prospects. Guy P. Pfeffermann No. 2 Debt-Equity Swaps and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America. Joel Bergsman and Wayne Edisis No. 3 Prospects for the Business Sector in Developing Countries. Economics Department, IFC No. 4 Strengthening Health Services in Developing Countries through the Private Sector. Charles C. Griffin No. 5 The Development Contribution of IFC Operations. Economics Department, IFC No. 6 Trends in Private Investment in Thirty Developing Countries. Guy P. Pfeffermann and Andrea Madarassy No. 7 Automotive Industry Trends and Prospects for Investment in Developing Countries. Yannis Karmokolias No. 8 Exporting to Industrial Countries: Prospects for Businesses in Developing Countries. Economics Department, IFC No. 9 African Entrepreneurs-Pioneers of Development. Keith Marsden No. 10 Privatizing Telecommunications Systems: Business Opportunities in Developing Countries. William W. Ambrose, Paul R. Hennemeyer, and Jean-Paul Chapon No. 11 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries, 1990-91 edition. Guy P. Pfeffermann and Andrea Madarassy No. 12 Financing Corporate Growth in the Developing World. Economics Department, IFC No. 13 Venture Capital: Lessons from the Developed World for the Developing Markets. Silvia B. Sagari with Gabriela Guidotti No. 14 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries, 1992 edition. Guy P. Pfeffermann and Andrea Madarassy No. 15 Private Sector Electricity in Developing Countries: Supply and Demand. Jack D. Glen No. 16 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries 1993: Statistics for 1970-91. Guy P. Pfeffermann and Andrea Madarassy No. 17 How Firms in Developing C,ountries Manage Risk. Jack D. Glen No. 18 Coping with Capitalism: The New Polish Entrepreneurs. Bohdan Wyznikiewicz, Brian Pinto, and Maciej Grabowski No. 19 Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer. Edwin Mansfield No. 20 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries 1994: Statistics for 1970-92. Robert Miller and Mariusz Sumlinski (Continued on the inside back cover.) I INTERNATIONAL 1uw@ FINANCE =_.____J CORPORATION DISCUSSION PAPER NUMBER 44 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries Statistics for 1970-2000 and the Impact on Private Investment of Corruption and the Quality of Public Investment Stephen S. Everhart Mariusz A. Sumlinski The World Bank Washington, D.C. Copyright C 2001 The World Bank and International Finance Corporation 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America First printing September 2001 1 23404030201 The International Finance Corporation (IFC), an affiliate of the World Bank, promotes the economic development of its member countries through investment in the private sector. It is the world's largest multilateral organization providing financial assistance directly in the form of loan and equity to pri- vate enterprises in developing countries. To present the results of research with the least possible delay, the typescript of this paper has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures appropriate to formal printed texts, and the IFC and the World Bank accept no responsibility for errors. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions ex- pressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the IFC or the World Bank, or to members of their Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and accepts no responsibility for any consequence of their use. Some sources cited in this paper may be in- formal documents that are not readily available. The material in this publication is copyrighted. The World Bank encourages dissemination of its work and will normally grant permission promptly. Permission to photocopy items for internal or personal use, for the internal or personal use of specific clients, or for educational classroom use, is granted by the World Bank, provided that the appropriate fee is paid directly to Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, U.S.A., telephone 978-750-8400, fax 978-750-4470. Please contact the Copyright Clearance Center before photocopying items. For permission to reprint individual articles or chapters, please fax your request with complete information to the Republication Department, Copyright Clearance Center, fax 978-750-4470. All other queries on rights and licenses should be addressed to the World Bank at the address above or faxed to 202-522-2422. ISSN: 1012-8069 (IFC Discussion Papers) ISBN: 0-8213-5010-2 Stephen S. Everhart is a Senior Economist and Mariusz A. Sumlinski is an Economist in the IFC Economics Department Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data has been applied for. Table of Contents Foreword .......................................................v Abstract ...................................................... vii Chapter 1. Trends In Private and Public Investment . . .....................................................I Chapter 2. Private Investment: the Impact of Corruption and the Quality of Public Investment ............7..........................................7 I. The Nature of Corruption and Its Effects on Private Investment .......................7 II. Public Investment and Corruption: Is There an Interaction Effect? .................. 8 III. The Link Between Private and Public Investment ............................................. . 9 IV. Econometric Analysis ..................................... 14 V. Conclusions ...................................................... . 19 References ....................................................... 21 Appendix A. Inter-Temporal Dynamics: Private Investment/GDP ... 27 Appendix B. Methods and Sources ....................................................... 29 Appendix C. Country Charts ...................................................... 31 Sub-Saharan Africa ...................................................... 33 Latin America and the Caribbean ...................................................... 37 Middle East and North Africa ...................... ................................ 43 Europe and Central Asia ...................................................... 45 East Asia ...................................................... 49 South Asia ...................................................... 53 iii Foreword This twelfth annual edition of Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries presents annual data on private and public investment for 63 developing countries. The report attempts to fill a gap in data collection and analysis. Information on the breakdown of total investment into its public and private components is not readily available from standard national account statistics. Where it may be available, the concept of public investment is not always precise. Most standard measures classify capital expenditures of state-owned enterprises as private investment. In contrast, the definition used here counts all investment undertaken by the public sector-including through state enterprises-as public sector investment. It is based on data compiled by the World Bank and IMF. iGuy effernann Director, Economics Department and Economic Adviser of the Corporation v Abstract The 2001 edition of Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries continues the investigation of the relationship between public and private investment. The focus this year is on the quality of public investment, its interaction with corruption, and the resulting impact on private investment. The first chapter provides descriptive statistics, reporting trends in private and public fixed investment in 63 developing countries. This year, coverage of the Eastern Europe and Central Asia Region has been substantially expanded. In addition, a few smaller economies have been added to the Latin America and the Caribbean sample. On average, the ratio of private investment to GDP declined in 1999 from 15 percent to 14.1 percent of GDP compared to 1998, and from 16.2 percent to 15.7 percent in weighted average terms. Public investment increased from 7.3 percent to 7.5 percent of GDP in simple average terms, and remained at the 1998 level in weighted average terms. The 1999 decline brings investment ratios back to their 1995 level. Preliminary and incomplete estimates for the year 2000 suggest that private investment may be poised for a return to growth. The second chapter examines whether higher levels of public investment are associated with higher or lower levels of private investment, the impact of corruption on this relationship, and the long-run implications for growth and sustainable development. The paper provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that corruption lowers the quality of public investment and that this reduced quality of public investment is associated with lower private investment. These findings have important implications for policymakers and private investors. Policymakers have further evidence to justify anti- corruption campaigns in their countries. Private investors may use these findings to determine where the best opportunities are today-and as the business climate in emerging markets changes, where to invest tomorrow. vii Chapter 1. Trends in Private and Public Investment In 1999, the latest year for which national accounts data exist, private investment in the 60 countries included in the data set fell slightly below the 1998 level, in both average and in GDP weighted terms.' (For a discussion of the definitions, methods, and sources used in this publication, see appendix B.) Meanwhile, public investment increased slightly on average, but remained level in GDP weighted terms.2 The ratio of average private investment to GDP fell to 14.1 percent (15.7 percent in GDP weighted terms) in 1999 (see figure 1.1). Public investment, on the other hand, increased on average to 7.5 percent of GDP from 7.3 percent in 1998 but remained at 8.2 percent of GDP in 1998-99 in GDP weighted terms (see figure 1.2). Figure 1.1. Private Investment in Developing Countries, 1970-2000 _Simple average -Weighted average 25 20 _ ____ __ O 15 CD 4- 0 10 O' 5 o?c e C) ur L) (0 o- (00 o-u N C' ur It) (0 co (00- o C') t ur ) 0 N- (00 0 N- N- - N- - N- N- N N- N- co O C Co oo oo oo XO co Co 0) 0 0) 0) 0) 0)0)00 0 0o 0) 0 0 0) 0) 0) 0L C 00 0) C) 0 0 0 0) Lo 0) 0) 00 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 -- - -…- - - -,. * N 3 Note: This volume reports 2000 projections for about half the sample, which represents 50 percent of GDP of the full sample. These projections should be considered very preliminary and should be treated with caution. This document focuses on 1999 results. This volume reports 2000 projections for about half the sample, which represents 50 percent of GDP of the full sample. These projections should be considered very preliminary and thus should be treated with caution. This document focuses on 1999 results. 2 Investment refers to gross domestic fixed investment, and encompasses both national and foreign from whatever finance source investment. 1 Figure 1.2. Public Investment in Developing Countries, 1970-2000 -_- Simple average -Weighted average 25 20 ( 15 _ __ _ 00 10 _ __'______ _| 5 ___.- __ ___ ___ _ 0 o Z NM s- uS (0 jN 0 r c 0 CD M U) Lo L mm o °-c N 0 t LO It 0 N- mm °o m- m- mm_ m- mm m mm mcom mm mm mm mm mmmm mmmc Note: This volume reports 2000 projections for about half the sample, which represents 50 percent of GDP of the full sample. These projections should be considered very prelirminary and should be treated with caution. This document focuses on 1999 results. Regional Trends Regional trends mirrored the overall figures, with the exception of the Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East and North Africa regions, as shown in figures 1.3 through 1.6. Most notably, it appears that East Asia is still suffering the aftershocks of the financial crisis which erupted in 1997, with private investment continuing to decline in 1999, both in average and GDP weighted terms and public investment declining as well in 1999. In Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Europe and Central Asia, private investment fell and public investment rose slightly in 1999. Figure 1.3. Private Investment by Developing Region, 1970-2000 (weighted averages) 25 20 e < f* 25 _ ____ ....__ _ 0~ 10 0 o - N e) sJ 1) (D N WD C) 0 N C' t ,5) ID 1- OD 0 0) N e' < CI 5) N ) 0) 0 - - East Asia --- ECA 0LAC I MENA - South Asia -- SSAFR| 2 Figure 1.4. Private Investment by Developing Region, 1970-2000 (simple averages) 25 20 15, 0 ,O F1, .......... .. O tCil C7 t Lff (D N- a:)O) 0 (N CD~ £ IS1 () N- 0 0) O (N (tl £ 0S (0 N- CO0 0 - N- N- N- N- N- N- N- N- N- ( X0 X0 X0 ( ( ( X 0 0 0t ) 0) 0) 0) 0) 0 0) 0u 0) 0o 0 0 0 0 0 0 ) 0) 0c 0 ) 0 0 0 ox m 0L a 0 0) 0) 0 0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 o v C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~N - East Asia ----- ECA O LAC I-MENA - South Asia -eSSAFR| Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In 1998, Latin America and the Caribbean led all other regions in private investment growth. However, in 1999 the ratio of private investment to GDP fell by one percentage point, to 15.1 percent of GDP on average. The ratio of public investment to GDP went up by a half percentage point on average, and reached 7.2 percent of GDP in 1999. In GDP weighted terms, LAC's public investment figures were the lowest of all the regions in 1999, at 3.3 percent of GDP, down by almost half a percentage point from 1998. The largest LAC economies in the sample reported declining private investment to GDP ratios. In Argentina, private investment as a share of GDP decreased by almost two percentage points, in Brazil by less than a half percentage point, in Chile and Colombia by more than four percentage points, and in Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela, by almost two percentage points. Mexico recorded an increase of more than half a percentage point. The balance of the LAC countries in the sample recorded modest increases in private investment as a share of GDP. 3 Figure 1.5. Public Investment by Developing Region, 1970-2000 (weighted averages) 25 _ _ _ 20 015 a - a a }XX a / X |-- East Asia ---*-- ECA --LAC - MENA - South Asia ---- SSAFR| Figure 1.6. Public Investment by Developing Region, 1970-2000 (simple averages) 25 20 ._-- _-_ 20 0 "z10 CD~~~ Cl 1 O-a,. a, a aM DC o-c,ua- a ab I 8 -.-- East Asia ---A-- ECA - LAC -I- MENA South Asia --- SSAFR Sub-Saharan Africa. Private investment on average continued its moderate increasing trend for the third year in a row in 1999, reaching 11.3 percent of GDP. In GDP weighted terms, however, private investment declined slightly in 1999 to 10.6 percent of GDP from 11.1 percent in 1998. Public investment in Africa remained level in simple average terms and declined by almost one percentage point in weighted average terms. Private investment increased in Cote d'Ivoire and Mauritius, but remained flat or nearly flat in Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar and Seychelles. The remaining African countries covered in the data set recorded declines in private investment to GDP ratios. 4 South Asia. Private investment fell as a proportion of GDP in 1999, both in average and GDP weighted terms, but minimally. Nevertheless, private investment is expected to keep increasing in importance in this region, as it has done for more than 25 years. Private investment increased in Bangladesh, declined in India, and remained nearly flat in Pakistan. Public investment on average and in GDP weighted terms followed a declining trend as well, and remained at a level of about half of private investment. East Asia. The region's average private investment ratio declined in 1999 for the third year in a row to a level last recorded in 1985. The fall, however, was not as dramatic in GDP weighted terms. Not surprisingly, the most prominent declines in private investment were registered in the crisis countries: Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Private investment increased in Cambodia but remained flat in China (although at a high level) and Thailand. Public investment increased only slightly on average and in GDP weighted terns. In 1999, East Asia had the highest average level of public investment to GDP among the regions, exceeding the global average by almost 2 percentage points. Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Private investment in 1999 declined on average to 14.3 percent of GDP from the high of 15.9 percent in 1998, declining in GDP weighted terms as well. The largest declines were recorded in Azerbaijan, Estonia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania reported increasing private investment to GDP ratios. Public investment in this region remained flat on average in 1999, at a level of 6.8 percent of GDP, declining slightly in GDP weighted terms. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Private investment increased slightly in 1999 to 14.1 percent of GDP on average. In GDP weighted terms, investment remained flat over 1998-99 period. Egypt and Morocco recorded increases in the private investment to GDP ratios, while Iran and Tunisia remained virtually flat. Public investment went up on average (in GDP weighted terms as well), to 8.8 percent of GDP. Individual country trends are shown in appendix C, along with the statistics. Table 1.1 lists private investment ratios by country, listing them in descending order as of 1999 and comparing them to 1980 and 1990 (when data are available). Ratios for 2000 are also presented; as noted, these should be considered very preliminary and thus treated with caution. 5 Tabe 11. rivteInVestmeni (In 198;0, 190,199 and 20O00 pecent of GDP1) 1980 i 1 9 90 1 999 21~ 0 00 Grenada 6 .9 2 5.8 2 8.8 2 8.8 A z erb aij an 28.2 2 3.6 P a nam a 7.4 2 6.3 2 6.4 Seychelles 1 4.8 24. 1 7.3 N icaragua I11.2 2 2.0 1 9.0 Korea, Republic of 25.5 32.2 2 2.0 M aUFitiUS 1 4.9 1 9.2 2 1.8 1 8.6 E stonia 2 1.4 2 34 Thailand 1 8.9 3 4.2 1 9.4 1 8.5 Dominican Republic 1 6.3 182 1 8.9 1 7.5 M ex ico 1 3.9 1 3.6 1 8.9 1 8.6 St. Vincent1818. D om inic a 2 0.8 1 8.7 2 1.6 Morocco 1 1.8 1 6.4 1 7.3 1 6.0 China 3 .7 8.3 . 1 7.0 St. Lucia 2 5.1 13.8 1 6.9 1 5.8 Peru 1 2.9 1 6.8 1 7.0 Brazil 17.0 17.6 ~ 1 6.3 Turkey 1 3.3 1 5.8 1 6.1 1 7.0 Argentina 192 9.4 16115.4 Bangladesh 8 .2 9.8 1 5.5 1 5.7 India 10.1~ 1 3.9 1 4.9 G uatem ala 10 .5 1 0.4 1 4.8 1 4.0 Chile I11.2 1 8.4 14.5 1 6.4 L ith uan ia 1 4.3 Paraguay 25.7 1.1421 4.2 T rinidad & Tobago 1 0.7 1 4.2 1 6.3 k azakh stan 14.0 Tu n is ia 13 .3 1 9.7 1 3.1 Barbados 1 8.5 1 5.5 1 3.1 12.'9 E gy pt 1 6.7 1 3.0 1 4.0 El Salvador 6.4 11.~2 I13.0 13.0 Iran I11.4 8.5 1 3.0 1 9.0 Indonesia 19512.9 P h iIip p in es 1 8.8 1 8.9 1 2.~9 1 2.2 N am ibia I11.41312. Poland 8 .5 1 2.7 1 2.8 Guyana 14. 12.~6 1 2.5 B elIi ze 11.111.4 1 2.5 Cole d'lvoire 4.9 ~ 1 2.1 1 2.9 Bolivia 5.0 1 2.0 I11.5 Yugoslavia., FedeaR 1.4 13. M alaysia 1 9.5 2 0.9 1 1.3 1 0.8 Uruguay I11.9 8.3 A10.6 1 2.1 B en i n 6.0 1 0.6 1 1.3 South A frica 1 3.3 12.9 10. K en ya 1 3.3 1 1.3 1 0.1 U zbek istan 9.7 7.5 C am bodia 8 .8 9.6 Venezuela, Rep.Boliv 4.9 8.8 8.4 P a kistan 7 .7 8.9 8.3 8.6 B ulgara 0.8 8. Co m oros 6.7 7.4 7 .4 Roman ia ~~ 6.9 Ecuador 1 4.1 12.4 6 .9 1 5.4 Madagascar 6.9 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~6.8 8.2 H aiti 7 .0 5.7 Colom bia 9.8 1 0. 2 ~ 55 6.9 G uin ea-B issau 8.4 5 .2 5.3 Matawi . 86 22 4.1 Papua New Guinea 2 0.0 ,Costa Rica 14.7 1 7.7 6 Chapter 2. Private Investment: the Impact of Corruption and the Quality of Public Investment This chapter focuses on the effects of corruption on public and private investment and their long-term implications for economic growth. Specifically, it raises the question whether corruption affects the quality of public investment and the level of private investment. Three fundamental questions are raised: * is public investment associated with higher or lower private investment? * does corruption influence this relationship? and * what may be the long-term implications of these interactions for economic growth? The chapter first reviews the literature exploring the impact of corruption on private investment. Section two explores the interaction effect between corruption and public investment, section three examines the linkages between private and public investment, section four presents our empirical analysis, and section five concludes. L The Nature of Corruption and Its Effects on Private Investment Corruption is a pervasive and universal phenomenon. As witnessed throughout history, corruption can affect democratic and non-democratic countries, rich and poor countries, alike. In very recent times, corruption, or allegations of corruption of some sort, was instrumental in the reorganization of the political system in several countries. There are many types of public corruption, including accepting bribes to shorten processing time, obtain monopoly power, or secure government procurement and contracts. Tanzi (1998) offers a common definition of corruption: the abuse of public power for private benefit.3 Research on corruption has expanded in recent years, yet work investigating its impact on private investment is still in its infancy. Mauro (1995) finds that an aggregate institutional indicator, a "corruption indicator," is negatively associated with aggregate investment in his sample of countries. Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) present results from a survey of entrepreneurs that suggest that perceived unreliability of the judiciary, government instability, and corruption negatively influence cross-country differences in aggregate investment. Brunetti and Weder (1997) find that among institutional factors, lack of rule of law, high corruption and real exchange rate distortions are the most detrimental for investment. A number of recent studies have examined the impact of the business environment on investment. Pfeffermann, Kisunko, and Sumlinski (1999) investigated in a limited number of countries the link between private investment and perceived business obstacles in developing countries, obstacles such as corruption, unpredictability of the judiciary, 3 Theobald (1990) provides a number of definitions of corruption. 7 onerous regulations for starting a business, tax and labor regulations, and others. Countries where these obstacles were perceived to be fewer had higher levels of private investment. One reason why corruption seems to depress investment is that it acts as a tax on private investment.4 A "corruption tax" is particularly burdensome for activities such as investment projects that by nature involve a long time horizon and a multiplicity of logistic, administrative and legal steps. Each of these steps is liable to incur corruption taxes, each cascading over the other. The result is an increase in the cost of capital, hence a reduction in anticipated profitability, as well as a relative incentive toward investments involving fewer administrative steps: that is, the tax is distorting, too. Investigating the impact of corruption on private enterprise and public finance is not a new concept, yet quantifying the impact remains elusive.5 A recent IMF note reports a survey by a resident representative in a CIS country suggesting that almost 40 percent of a new enterprise's expenses in the first year are "informal payments."6 Forty percent is likely an extreme case, but table 2.1 below presents some results from a recent OECD/World Bank report that provides estimates of social losses for three eastern European countries.7 TABLE 2.1. CORRUPTION AND LOST REVENUE (PERCENT) INDICATOR ALBANIA GEORGIA LATVIA Enterprises willing to pay higher taxes if corruption were eliminated 53 71 30 Additional taxes as a share of revenue that enterprises would be willing to pay if 11 22 15 corruption were elirninated Bribes typically paid as a share of firms' revenue 7 15 7 Source: Kaufmann, Pradhan, and Ryterman, (1998). Based on 1998 World Bank Surveys of 438 enterprise managers in Latvia (with Latvia Facts), 350 enterprise managers in Georgia (with GORBI), and 356 enterprise managers in Albania (with ACER). One implication is that less corruption might translate into more resources available for private investment. In addition, strengthened public revenues as a result of less "leakage" due to corruption could translate into more public services and/or reduced taxes. Most important might be the impact on incentives: with high corruption, investment simply might not occur. II. Public Investment and Corruption: Is There an Interaction Effect? Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) investigate the impact of corruption on public investment, using infrastructure investment as their proxy for public investment and the 4 See Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Wei (1997). 5See Jain (2001) for a review. 6 "Improving Governance and Fighting Corruption in the Baltic and CIS Countries," IMF Economic Issues Series, No. 21, 2000. 7These countries do not represent the extreme in commonly used index measures of corruption. Albania and Latvia are in the "moderate" range of the ICRG corruption index. Georgia is not rated. 8 Political Risk Service's International Country Risk Guide index as their measure of corruption. They find that corruption tends to increase the number of projects undertaken and to expand their size. Corruption increases the share of public investment to GDP, and also lowers the quality of public investment put in place. The logic behind these findings is straightforward. Infrastructure projects can be large and the implementation is often carried out by private firms. The incentive for the private enterprise to pay a "commission" to secure the contract is strong, particularly when the contract is large. When the approval of investment projects is influenced by corrupt public officials, rates of return and cost-benefit analyses become mere exercises. The firm paying the "commission" is unlikely to bear the cost of the bribe. It is more likely this cost will be recouped in some inefficient way. Perhaps project costs will be pared by adhering poorly to plan specifications or by using poor quality materials or workmanship. Perhaps an "understanding" will be reached with the bribed official that the initial low estimate will be revised upward as the project progresses. Or the bid may be padded initially. In the more rare instances of cost-plus contracting, the firm can hide the bribe expense through overpricing. All of these work to make the public investment in infrastructure more costly and less likely to meet specifications. 8 We investigate the effect on private investment of possible interaction between corruption and public investment empirically in section four. HII. The Link Between Private and Public Investment There is a growing consensus that private investment is more efficient and productive than public investment, yet the number of studies on the respective roles of private and public investment in developing economies is somewhat limited. Using relatively small sample sizes and limited time series, a number of studies have concluded that private investment has a larger positive impact on growth than public investment, among them, Khan and Reinhart (1990), Coutinho and Gallo (1991), and Serven and Solimano (1990). Khan and Kumar (1997) expand the country coverage over previous works and examine a relatively long time period, 1970-1990. The authors find private and public investment both have a statistically significant positive association with growth. The magnitude differs considerably, however, with private investment having an estimated coefficient almost one-and-a half times as large as that of public investment. Bouton and Sumlinski (2000) confirmed Khan and Kumar's results and found for a longer period an even larger coefficient on private investment and smaller coefficient on public investment. Thus, the degree of association of private investment with sustainable development and growth appears well established in the economics literature. 8Corruption appears to be particularly problematic in infrastructure investment, see Wade (1982) and Rose- Ackerman (1996). 9 A more difficult relationship to discern is that between public and private investment. Crowding-in of private investment by public investment is defined to occur when increased public investment is associated with increased private investment. This may arise because public infrastructure provision affects returns on private investment positively, hence enhancing the incentive to carry out such private investment. Crowding out occurs when the opposite is the case. A vast literature covers this subject, some recent works are presented in table 2.2 below. The table suggests that not only is there no consensus on the topic, but there are contradictory results, even for the same regions and countries. 10 TABLE 2.2. SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW, CROWDING IN - CROWDING OUT CITATION SAMPLE COUNTRIES FINDINGS Oshikoya (1994) African For most countries in this sample, public investment in infrastructure is complementary to private sector investment de Oliveira Cruz and Brazil Private investment is crowded out by public investment in the short term, Teixeira (1999) but in the long term these two variables are complements Clements and Levy (1994) Caribbean Crowding out Blejer and Khan (1984) Developing Government investment in infrastructure is complementary to private investment, other types of government investment are not Balassa (1988) Developing Crowding out Greene and Villanueva Developing Crowding in (1991) Heng (1997) Developing Shows that public capital can crowd in private capital by raising the marginal productivity of labor and savings Ghura and Goodwin (2000) Developing - Overall sample suggests crowding in - Public investment crowds in private investment in SSAFR, but crowds out in Asia and LAC Shafik (1992) Egypt Effects of government policy on private investment are mixed, evidence of crowding out in credit markets and crowding in as a result of government investment in infrastructure Sobhee (1999) Mauritius Empirics suggest expenditures on health and infrastructure stimulate private investment, expenditure on education does not Nazmi and Ramirez (1997) Mexico Crowding out Musalem (1989) Mexico Crowding in Looney and Frederiken Pakistan Crowding in (1997) Sakr (1993) Pakistan When government investment is disaggregated into infrastructure and non-infrastructure components, the latter crowds out private investment Ahmed and Miller (2000) OECD and Developing - Government expenditure crowds out for both samples, plus pooled sample - For developing countries, government expenditure on transport and communication crowds in Argimon, Gonzalez-Paramo, OECD Crowding in effect of private investment by public investment through Alegre (1997) the positive impact of infrastructure on private investment productivity Monadj emi and Huh (1998) OECD (Australia, UK, USA) Empirics provide limited support for crowding out effects of government investment on private investment Pereira and Flores de Frutos USA Crowding in (1999) Pereira (2000) USA Crowding in Pereira (2001) USA - At the aggregate level, public investment crowds in private investment - Disaggregating private investment shows that the crowding in effect of public investment is strong for equipment and only marginal for structures - Public investment marginally crowds out private investment in information equipment 11 A simple investigation of the relationship between public and private investment is presented in table 2.3 below, where the within-country correlations between public and private investment for all 63 countries in our sample are presented.9 The table shows that there is sometimes crowding out and sometimes crowding in, with an almost even split between the two. This may explain the contradictory findings in the literature (the studies summarized in table 2.2). And it is also important to note that in addition to the axiom "correlation does not prove causation," its corollary is "partial correlations are not necessarily preserved in a multi-variable framework." More rigorous testing is therefore presented in the next section. 9 Periods for the correlations vary by country, ranging from the entire sample period of 1970-2000, to as brief as 1995-2000. 12 TABLE 2.3. INVESTMENT CORRELATIONS *denotes significance at 5% level Region Income Country Private vs. Public ECA Lower middle Bulgaria -88% ECA Lower middle Lithuania -83% SSAFR Low Mauritania -77% ECA Upper middle Turkey -76% LAC Lower middle Bolivia -74% ECA Low Azerbaijan -70% ECA Upper middle Poland -70% LAC Upper middle Grenada -68% LAC Lower middle St. Vincent -66% East Asia Low Indonesia -62% East Asia Low Cambodia -61% LAC Upper middle Mexico -57% ECA Lower middle Romania -55% LAC Upper middle Chile -55% SSAFR Low Benin -40% LAC Lower middle Belize -39% South Asia Low Pakistan -36% MENA Lower middle Morocco -35% LAC Lower middle Paraguay -34% ECA Upper middle Estonia -32% LAC Upper middle Argentina -31% SSAFR Upper middle Seychelles -25% LAC Upper middle Dominica -24% LAC Upper middle St. Lucia -23% SSAFR Lower middle Namibia -22% LAC Upper middle Brazil -21% LAC Lower middle Colombia -17% SSAFR Low Comoros -17% LAC Upper middle Barbados -17% LAC Upper middle Venezuela, R. B. -15% LAC Lower middle Costa Rica -14% LAC Lower middle Dominican Republic -12% ECA Lower middle Kazakhstan -5% SSAFR Low Madagascar -4% South Asia Low India -2% LAC Lower middle Ecuador -2% LAC Lower middle El Salvador 1% MENA Lower middle Tunisia 4% East Asia Upper middle Korea, Rep. of 6% LAC Upper middle Uruguay 6% SSAFR Low Cote d'lvoire 8% LAC Lower middle Guatemala 9% East Asia Lower middle Thailand 9% East Asia Lower middle Papua New Guinea 11% ECA Low Uzbekistan 15% MENA Lower middle Egypt 17% LAC Upper middle Trinidad & Tobago 20% LAC Lower middle Peru 23% East Asia Lower middle Philippines 24% SSAFR Upper middle Mauritius 25% East Asia Upper middle Malaysia 27% LAC Lower middle Guyana 37% SSAFR Low Kenya 38% SSAFR Low Malawi 50% LAC Low Haiti 51% MENA Lower middle Iran 52% SSAFR Low Guinea-Bissau 56% East Asia Low China 59% South Asia Low Bangladesh 64% LAC Lower middle Panama 64% LAC Low Nicaragua 67% SSAFR Upper middle South Africa 78% ECA Lower middle Yugoslavia, Fed. Rep. 97% 13 IV. Econometric Analysis This section presents the econometric investigation of the questions of interest for the study. First, we investigate the impact of corruption on public investment; then we continue our investigation of the "crowding-in vs. crowding-out" debate, focusing on the impact of corruption; we conclude this section with the possible long-run implications of the empirical findings of the first two subsections. a) Impact of corruption on public investment Following Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), we investigate the impact of corruption on public investment by tracing the impact of corruption on the quality of public infrastructure. We measure infrastructure quality through three proxies: paved roads in good condition as a percentage of total roads; electric power system losses as a percentage of total power output; and telephone faults per 100 mainlines per year.'0 A priori, if corruption leads to lower quality public investment, then in more corrupt countries we expect the percentage of paved roads to be lower, and the number of telephone faults and electrical system losses to be higher. The first two measures are available in the World Bank Development Indicators database. Telecommunications faults are from the International Telecommunications Union data base. Our measure of corruption is from the Political Risk Service's International Country Risk Guide. This publication attempts to measure the phenomenon by investigating whether high ranking government officials are likely to demand special payments and if officials in lower levels of government generally expect illegal payments in the form of bribes connected with import-export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans. The ICRG provides a numeric, time-series measure of corruption ranging from zero to six, with higher values indicating less corruption. Studies of corruption using this measure include Knack and Keefer (1995), Svensson (1998), and Tanzi and Davoodi (1997, 2000). Regressing the corruption index on each of the proxies for quality of public investment yields econometric results consistent with Tanzi and Davoodi (1997). We are, however, using only developing country economies and cover a longer time period, 1970-1999. Our results are presented in table 2.4 below.'" As expected, more corrupt countries have more telephone faults per 100 lines, more electrical system losses as a percentage of output, and a lower percentage of paved roads. '1 These proxies are not perfect but they do provide some measure of the quality of public investment, further, a review of the literature reveals few alternative measures available for large numbers of developing countries. " Tanzi and Davoodi also control for per capita GDP and find, unsurprisingly, that countries with higher per capita GDP tend to have better quality infrastructure. They present a number of other specifications and control variables, with mixed results. 14 TABLE 2.4. THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON QUALITY OF INFRASTRUCTURE Telephone faults per Roads, paved Electric power transmission and distribution Dependent variable 100 main lines (% of all roads) losses (% of output) Constant 129.6 20.2 19.8 16.2 i . 4 Corruptiona -17.1 4.8 - 1.7 -3.4 3,4 * Note: Shaded cells are t-statistics. a Higher index indicates less corruption. b) Crowding-in vs. crowding-out and the impact of corruption In specifying a model to investigate the impact of public investment and corruption on private investment, a survey of the literature provided an array of techniques, possible control variables, and specifications.12 After investigating of a number of specifications, the following model was selected: Concept Ip / GDP = (Ip / GDP)_l lagged private investment to GDP Broad Money/GDP financial deepness, availability of credit Extemal Debt/GDP debt overhang CAB/GDP external balance (Ig / GDP)*Corruption interaction between corruption index, public investment 1g / GDP public investment to GDP: crowding in/out constant all other effects Lagged private investment is undoubtedly a significant component in current private investment, hence it is an obvious choice for the model. The next three variables: broad money to GDP, external debt to GDP, and the current account balance to GDP, are 12 Considerable debate exists in the econometrics literature about the proper unbalanced panel data technique. As our interest lies more with the economics than the econometrics of the investigation, we have chosen to present the standard OLS, or pooled least squares estimates, as well as the random effects results (which are virtually the same). Hausman (1978) and Wu (1973) tests suggest random effects specification is indicated over fixed effects. The results of the Breusch-Pagan (1980) test for choice between OLS and random effects indicated OLS is the proper specification. For a review of issues in panel data estimation, see Arellano and Bover (1995), Ahmed and Miller (2000), Baltagi (1995), Bhargava and Sargan (1983), Boehmer and Megginson (1990), Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990), Chang (1979), and Pesaran and Smith (1995). 15 included as control variables.'3 The variables of interest for our research are the interaction term between on one hand, public investment to GDP and the corruption index, and on the other, public investment to GDP. The full sample results are presented in table 2.5 below. As one would expect, lagged private investment is highly significant. Its steadiness over time as a share of GDP virtually assures the significance. Broad money, our measure of the financial depth of the economy, is also significant. The debt overhang is also significant, with the expected negative sign. The significant negative coefficient on the current account balance is consistent with our expectations. A higher level of private investment is associated with an increased current account deficit (or a reduced surplus). Note that private FDI typically finances a large portion of the current account in emerging economies. TABLE 2.5. PRIVATE INVESTMENT, CORRUPTION, AND CROWDING OUT: FULL SAMPLE RESULTS Independent variable Means RE PLS Constant 1.548 1.704 P S - .. f5.1 - X ; S t 5.3 Private investment/GDP lagged 13.5 0.899 0.886 540.0 50.0 Broad money/GDP 42.2 0.019 0.020 Extemal debt/GNP 81.8 -0.006 -0.006 C. 0- - 4.70 ti;: .; ;;- -. . - :;-4.7 Current account balance/GDP -4.5 -0.131 -0.137 -6.1 ~~~~~~~~~-6.3 (Public inv./GDP)*Corruption 7.8; 3.0 0.023 0.022 2.2 ~~~~~~~~~2.0 Public investment/GDP 7.8 -0.156 -0.160 C - .4.0 .. ........................... ;..-;xtWf.; -3.9 RE - random effects estimation, PLS - pooled least squares estimation. Note: Shaded cells are t-statistics. aHigher index indicates less corruption. The primary relationships of interest for this research, the interaction between public investment and corruption, and the measure of crowding-out vs. crowding in, are also significant and of the "correct" sign. The explanation is as follows: We know from Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) that corruption is associated with poor quality public investment, consistent with our own results, summarized in table 2.4, and that it also inflates public investment levels. These effects are captured in our model by two variables. First, controlling for the other variables in the model above, a higher level of public investment is associated with a lower 13 A review of the literature reveals numerous possible determinants of investment and possible control variables. Some authors have used institutional factors such as education or civil unrest as control variables but we have chosen to limit the variables to those we consider most germane for the questions of interest. Useful references include Bier (1992), Blejer and Kahn (1984), Bouton and Sumlinski (2000), Brunetti and Weder (1997), Cardoso (1993), Fischer (1991, 1993), Ghura and Goodwin (2000), Greene and Villanueva (1991), Larrain and Vergara (1993), Oshikoya (1994), Ozler and Rodrik (1992), Sakr (1993), Serven and Solimano (1992), and Solimano (1989). 16 level of private investment, i.e., crowding out. The negative relationship is statistically significant. Second, the interaction between the corruption index and the level of public investment captures the indirect effect of corruption via its impact on the quality of public investment. The coefficient on the (Public inv./GDP)*Corruption variable is positive and statistically significant. A larger value for the corruption index signifies less corruption, which implies that any given level of public investment will be of higher quality than it would be with higher corruption (a lower index). Less corruption leads to higher quality public investment, and this is associated with a higher level of private investment. In summary, the evidence comes out in favor of the crowding out hypothesis, with the crowding out stronger in the presence of corruption. It is important to note, however, that due to data limitations, we were only able to work with figures for total public investment. Numerous studies14 have shown that certain types of infrastructure and public investment facilitate both growth and private investment. Table 2.6 below presents regional results. With the exception of Africa, all conclusions are similar to the overall sample discussion presented above. The positive coefficient on the interaction term for all regions except Africa suggests that public investment typically has a negative influence on private investment. Why then should African public investment be associated with a higher level of private investment (i.e., crowds-in)? One possible explanation is that the low initial endowment of capital means that the addition of any investment, regardless of quality, yields high returns. 14 Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that public investmnent in commnunication and transport infrastructure has a strong positive effect on growth. Infrastructure such as paved roads, telephone density per worker and adequate electricity generation have been found to have a strong effect on subsequent growth (Easterly and Levine 1997, Canning 1999, Canning and Bennathan 2000). Odedokun (1997) shows that in developing countries, public investment in infrastructure facilitates private investment and growth, whereas non- infrastructure public investment has the opposite effect. 17 TABLE 2.6. PRIVATE INVESTMENT, CORRUPTION, AND CROWDING OUT: REGIONAL RESULTS Independent variable Full LAC ASIA SSAFR ECA MENA Sample Constant 1.704 2.680 4.451 3.944 3.953 2.989 - - 01I5.3 4 ;- 4.6 i O - 1.2- - I 1.7 1.4 Private investment/GDP lagged 0.886 0.807 0.886 0.098 0.865 0.694 0 t-50.0- 0 25.5 t < 26A40 0 p O.G; 06 0.6 10.2 6.3 Broad money/GDP 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.165 -0.021 -0.002 0-t--p0--03.4 2A t4B0-;002t-0j00ij1.5} j0 ;0 2.8i-;ij -0.6 -0.1 External debt/GNP -0.006 -0.008 -0.034 -0.016 0.001 0.019 -.;''A' -4.an2'.'.#t. 44 -2Rd 'MetA''w''' 'tEi 4.*0 -2 'SE S000.t40'; i 0.1 1.5 Current account balance/GDP -0.137 -0.183 -0.138 -0.061 0.089 -0.006 -6.3 -57. - .2 -0.9; 0.8 ! -0.1 (Public inv./GDP)*Corruption 0.022 0.042 0.033 -0.190 0.022 0.018 ti. - i j2.0 0 --0 2.0 0 0z1} --0 0 1.7 -00 0 ;S;-1.8 0.5 0.2 Public investment/GDP -0.160 -0.260 -0.323 0.695 -0.204 -0.069 tV 0000'-- -3.9 ;- i-3.5- ; -3- 4.0- 0 2.6 -1.0 -0.3 Note: Shaded cells are t-statistics. Method of estimation: pooled least squares. c) Long-run implications of the empiricalfindings Of particular interest to policymakers and private investors are the long run consequences of their investment decisions. We find that in the full sample, public investment tends to crowd out private investment in the short-run analyses presented in tables 2.5 and 2.6. If the 'crowding-out in the presence of corruption' finding is correct, then estimates of the long-ran negative impact of any increase in public investment on the level of total investment would provide additional ammunition for policy-makers intent on combating corruption. We solve for long-run effects by performing a Koyck'5 transfonnation on equation (1) above, the details are provided in appendix A. This transformation changes the short-run effects of table 2.6 into the long-run effects presented in table 2.7 below. In table 2.7 the short-run effects of each variable from table 2.6 (full sample results) are presented above the Koyck-transformed, long-run effects. 5See Koyck (1954) and Evans (1969). 18 TABLE 2.7. PRIVATE INVESTMENT DYNAMICS: TABLE2.8. IMPACTONPRIVATEINVESTMENTOF1% LONG- AND SHORT-RUN EFFECTS POINT RISE IN PUBLIC INVESTMENT Indirect Effect via Full Direct Interaction Total Independent Variable Sample effect Term Effect Constant 1.704 Long-Run Coefficient -1.408 0.191 Private investment/GDP lagged 0.886 Broad money/GDP SR 0.020 Level of Corruption LR 0.178 High (index=0) -1.41 0.00 -1.41 Extemal debt/GNP SR -0.006 Middle (index=3) -1.41 0.57 -0.84 LR -0.055 Low (index=6) -1.41 1.14 -0.26 Current account balance/GDP SR -0.137 LR -1.203 (Public Inv./GDP)*Corruption SR 0.022 LR 0.191 Public investment/GDP SR -0.160 LR -1.408 Table 2.8 and figure 2.1 present the long-run impact on private investment of a Fue Point Rise In Pubrite Investmentof I percentage point rise in public investment. With high corruption, a 1 0.00 - percentage point increase in public E4.20: investment leads to a 1.41 percent decline 4 0.40 Z a -0.60 in private investment, resulting in a 0.41 .0.60 percent decline in total investment. When *- 40.84 corruption is low, crowding out still occurs - . -1.20 but the decline in private investment is only ' 140 0.26 percent of GDP. This value is, -1.60 -1.41 however, not statistically different from High (Index04) Middle (index=3) Low (index=6) zero. Thus in an environment of low Corruption Level corruption, there may well be no crowding out. V. Conclusions This paper provides evidence consistent with the hypothesis that corruption lowers the quality of public investment, and this poor quality public investment is associated with lower private investment. The result is that if a highly corrupt country raises the level of public investment, the productivity of the new public investment put in place is low, and private investment falls. It also appears from the data that as this poor 19 quality public investment is put in place, private investors are able to discern the difference and react by reducing their investment. 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Assume that the long-run equilibrium level of our dependent variable is determined as in equation (1) below: Y =a+bXt, (1) where b is a vector of long-run effects. Assume further that the adjustment process is described by equation (2) below. Investment levels change between periods but do not equilibrate in a single period, changing only by some proportion, d, of the gap between the previous period's output and the equilibrium level, Y: Yt- Yt-I = (l-d)(Yt - Yt-1) + et (2) where d is the inter-temporal adjustment coefficient, and et is the error term Substituting (1) into (2) and collecting terms yields: Yt= (l-d)a + (l-d)bXt + dYt I + et (3) where (l-d)b is the vector of short-run effects. Then, using an estimate of the inter-temporal adjustment coefficient d, which is equal to a coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, and estimates of (1 - d)a and (1 - d)b, which are equal to the respective estimates of a constant and coefficients on independent variables, we solve for long run effects. Estimates of long run effects are reported in table Al below. 16 See Koyck (1954), Evans (1969). 27 TABLE Al. PRIVATE INVESTMENT DYNAMICS: LONG- AND SHORT-RUN EFFECTS Independent variable Full LAC ASIA SSAFR ECA MENA Sample Constant 1.704 2.680 4.451 3.944 3.953 2.989 Private investment/GDP lagged 0.886 0.807 0.886 0.098 0.865 0.694 Broad money/GDP SR 0.020 0.023 0.022 0.165 -0.021 -0.002 LR 0.178 0.122 0.192 0.183 -0.152 -0.007 Extemal debt/GNP SR -0.006 -0.008 -0.034 -0.016 0.001 0.019 LR -0.055 -0.039 -0.297 -0.018 0.011 0.062 Current account balance/GDP SR -0.137 -0.183 -0.138 -0.061 0.089 -0.006 LR -1.203 -0.947 -1.215 -0.067 0.658 -0.020 (Public inv./GDP)*Corruption SR 0.022 0.042 0.033 -0.190 0.022 0.018 LR 0.191 0.217 0.286 -0.211 0.161 0.059 Public investment/GDP SR -0.160 -0.260 -0.323 0.695 -0.204 -0.069 LR -1.408 -1.346 -2.844 0.771 -1.505 -0.226 28 Appendix B. Methods and Sources Fixed InvestmentData National accounts normally do not break down gross domestic investment into its private and public sector components. When they do, "private" investment often includes investment by state-owned enterprises such as state steel mills and so on. In this publication, we attempt to determine total public investment, inclusive of public investment undertaken by any state-owned enterprises. Private investment is then defined as the difference between total gross domestic investment (from national accounts) and consolidated public investment. Consolidated public investment data for each country were compiled mainly from World Bank Country Economic Memoranda, Public Investment Reviews, Public Expenditure Reviews, and other World Bank country reports. They reflect efforts by World Bank missions to compile public sector data. Where World Bank data were not available, country data were used. The countries included in this edition represent all the developing countries for which the relevant data are available. Minor changes were made in the last two or three years for most countries because of revisions in their national accounts data. Updates are not available for Costa Rica, Mauritania, and Papua New Guinea. Appendix C presents figures for each country in the sample displaying patterns of private fixed investment (PRIVATE I/GDP) and public fixed investment (Public I/GDP) from 1970 to 2000. The underlying data for these figures appears in table C.1, along with ratios on total fixed investment (GDFI/GDP). The ratios are computed using local currency units at current prices. 29 Appendix C. Country Charts Sub-Saharan Africa Benin Comoros Cote d'Ivoire Guinea-Bissau Kenya Madagascar Malawi Mauritania Mauritius Namibia Seychelles South Africa 33 Benin Guinea-Bissau . b - --- -- ....................~~~~~~... 35S-------- ---_................ .. ... ........ .° ------------.......... .... 30 ,. ~: ... ?,hA 25.D1ip 25 - - --- --- ----- - ---................... .................... .................... 2 '........... 20 1-7-0 .977 ,9Z0 1955 5990 1995 210 1 0 1 5 Comoros Kenya 2 5 2 . . . . . L~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. . . .......... 15 -- --- ------- ------._ _..,,." ................. ........... ......,--,,,,, ng ~~~~~~~~~~~~.................. . ........................ 5 Ž2 i r5 ,9 3 - - -1krr - --. ---)]'.............. 0 5: ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.................. ...... .................. ..... 5 ,............'.' 9T 197 190 15 199 1995 2000 m 1975 90 iU985 19 199 O3te d' Ivoire Madagascar t o 1 = ....... ... == . = ........................... . , .35 .._3_5,-_-_--_- _ ....,........................._ ................. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~................ .~~-.--..-..-............----.. -...--.................... , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ... . ............ -.... 25 ., . .... ........................ ...... ...--- - -- ............ o5 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ....... .... ............... . ........................... ....I............................ ........2 ........ .......... ......................................... aZ)t~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~........ .......................... ................................. 0 15 s -- - - -- - --- ----- ----- -----~~~~~~15. --... ............ ...... ....... --- - .... ................. 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S .............................%..................... .................................................... C ....................................e.............. ....... ...................... ................ le Latin America and the Caribbean Argentina Barbados Belize Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Grenada Guatemala Guyana Haiti Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru St. Lucia St. Vincent Trinidad & Tobago Uruguay Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana de 37 SE COOZ 9.61 0661 586 091[ 561 0z61 Ooo 9Pi 066 S86l 0861 5461 (X1 ,~~~ ~ ~ ~ , . E'1 . ,,,,,,,C, , ,,. eK fo-/x%-s%°* 1 10N u or ~ ............................................................... ......................... ...... .......O--- {D6oU I P%13 Izj ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Jn /. SE~. --- I6 .a.. 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SC I/o / OXZ 5661 0661 5861 ol6 9L61 (}:6 ooxE ffll 0661 SEi 0Ei61 9L61 CV61 - - -- .:,:- Srn ......... ................................................. ...........',.,.:'.01............................. .... . ........,_.'01 ,O ................... ........................................... ............................ lof ....... ... ............... I........... .......................................................................... 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A U r u 0 ........................................ ............ .............................PA'U~ .......... .... 00.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. ..... ~~~~~~~~~JP t4o............ ........... -............... ...... ...................... ,\d S£....................... .... ==.---- i _______O.. ......... . .. .. .. . .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. .. .. . . -- -- - --I- -- - -- -- -- - lo zLtjqndaN 'EaJoN E po qti.i,3 Philippines Thailand 35 --- ------- ---------------------- ----------------__ ___ 35 -------------___ _,, __ _. .... - %Ofcul\ 25 . .............. .............. ............."Il,............25 .............................. .......1Y..................... . ,...... : 15\< )\j_2 . ......... ........... . - ......... 2 10 ,. ....: ,.. 10 ...... .......... ............. .............. S ^t ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '~~~~~~~~~.xh_.._,........ -................ . .................... L .............. o ......... . ..... .......... 1970 1975 1980 19&5 MO 1995 m1970 1975 193D 1935 1990 1995 2ECO 51 South Asia Bangladesh India Pakistan 53 Bangladesh Pakistan CEP 7~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~9 30 .... 35. ........... K--RiIm%Ofcc 51 25 .... .. .-.-..-.-...--.. 25 ................................... ..................... .............................. L_- CInV /GOfaS I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 0 ......... .......... . . ..................... 10- :N.. 197YJ 975 1980 19R7 1930 1995 Ig00 1970 1975 1CS 1935 03)q l 995 YI5r India 3... 35 - --- ---- ----------------------.I- ------------ 25 J1 .. .................................................................................... 15 iO .. .......... ........ 5 [.2.,'.... 5 ......................................... ....................................... 9,70 I15 1980 1985 1929 1995 2033 54 TABLE Cl. INVESTMENT AS A SHARE oF GDP (IN %) oun tJyNear ~~1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 rgentina GDFI/GDP 21.2 20.9 20.7 18.2 19.3 25.9 26.8 27.2 24.4 22.7 25.3 22.7 21.8 20.9 20.0 17.6 17.5 19.6 18.6 15.5 14.0 14.6 16 7 19.1 19.9 17 9 18.1 19.4 19 9 17.9 16.3 Private I/GDP 13.1 12.8 12.5 11.6 12.5 15.1 15 1 15.0 13.4 14.1 119.2 16.9 16.6 14.8 14.9 12.5 13.2 15.7 14.4 12.2 9.4 12 7 14.9 18.1 19.1 15.8 16.11 17.3 17.9 16.1 15. Public I/GOP 8.1 8.1 8.2 6.6 6.8 9.8 11.7 12.2 11.0 8.6 6.1 5.8 5.2 6.1 5.0 51 4.3 3.9 4.3 3.3 4.6 1.9 1.8 1.0 0.8 2 2 2.0 2.0 2.0 1 8 1. Azerbaijan GDFI/GDP 15.6 29.1 37.0 40.0 32.5 27.6 Private I/GDP 10.7 27.1 33.6 37 7 28 2 23.6 Public I/GOP 5.0 2.0 3.3 2.3 4.3 4.1 Bangladesh GDFI/GDP 3.0 7 1 6.3 9.9 11.1 11.8 11.3 15.3 23.5 22.6 19.7 18. 1 19.1 18.5 19.0 18.4 19.1 17.1 16.9 17.3 17 9 18.4 19.1 20.0 20.7 21.6 22.2 22.4 PrivatelI/GDP 2.9 4.2 3.4 5.4 4.9 5 6 5.7 8.2 13.6 12.4 10.0 9.6 12.7 11.4 11.4 11.5 11.7 9.8 10.3 103 11.5 11.8 12.4 13.6 13.7 15 3 15.5 15.7 _______Public I/GOP 0.1 2.9 2.9 4.6 6.2 6.2 5.6 7.1 9.9 10.2 9 8 8.4 6.4 7.2 7.7 6.9 7.3 7.2 6.6 7.0 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.4 7.0 6.4 6.7 6.7 Barbados GDFI/GDP 23.7 22.7 22,2 22.8 27.2 22,8 19.6 16.5 15.1 16.1 15.8 17.3 18.8 18.9 16.2 9.5 12.7 14.5 15.1 14.2 16.7 18.5 19.4 19.5 Private I/GDP 19.7 18.7 17.5 18.5 22.0 19.5 17.3 15.6 13.3 12.6 13.5 14 9 16.3 15.5 14.0 5.6 8.3 10.9 11.7 9.1 10.4 12.6 13.1 12.9 Public I/GOP 4.0 4.0 4.6 4.3 5.2 3. 2,4 0.9 1.8 3.6 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.5 2.2 3.9 4.4 3.6 3.4 5.2 6.3 5.9 6.3 6.6 Belize GDFI/GDP 26.2 23.5 27.1 25.3 28.7 28.0 28.5 26.6 22.7 24.8 22.5 18.9 20.3 17.4 17.4 21.5 25.7 27.4 25.6 28.5 29.3 29 8 24.1 20.6 18.8 23 3 22.6 23.8 Private I/GDP 17.8 15.2 14.8 16.6 18.5 16.1 11.7 9.8 11.1 13.5 9.8 8.5 11.8 8.7 8.4 13.8 17.1 17.4 11.4 8.1 10.0 16.3 12.7 12.4 11.1 12.7 10.3 12.5 PubliclI/GDP 8.4 8.3 12.3 8.7 10.2 11.9 16.8 16.8 11.5 11.3 12.7 10.4 8.6 8.7 9.0 7.7 8.6 10.0 14.2 20.4 19.3 13.5 11.3 8.2 7.7 10.6 12.3 11.3 Benin GDFI/GDP 13.4 13.6 13.2 15.0 15.5 17.2 16.6 18.5 17.0 17.6 18.6 Private I/GDP 6.0 6.1 6.7 7.9 6.2 6.9 9.1 11.0 10.5 10.6 11.3 _____________Public I/GOP 7.4 7 4 6.6 7.1 9.3 10.4 7.5 7.5 6.5 7.0 7.3 Bolivia DFl/GDP 12.1 12.7 12.0 12.6 14.5 16.3 16.7 14.9 15.5 16.2 19.0 22.8 19.4 17.9 1Private I/GDP 5.9 4.0 3.6 5.0 5.8 6.6 7,7 6.4 7.6 6.1 13.1 18.3 12.0 11.5 Public I/GOP 6.2 8.7 8.4 7.6 8.7 9.7 9.0 8.5 8.0 10.1 5.9 4,5 7.5 6. Brazil GDPI/GOP 18.8 19.7 20.2 21.4 22.8 24.4 22.5 21.3 21.8 22.8 23.6 24.3 23.0 19.9 18.9 18,0 20.0 23.2 24.3 26.9 22.9 19.6 19.6 20.4 20.7 20.5 19.1 19.5 19.9 18.9 Privatel/IGDP 12.8 14.2 14.4 16.2 15.8 16.9 14.2 14.7 14.1 12.5 17.0 16.6 16.0 13.8 13.7 12.9 14.4 16.8 17.9 21.1 17.6 14.4 13.9 15.5 15.8 16.8 15.3 15.7 16.5 16.3 _____________Public I/GDP 6.0 5.5 5.8 5.2 7.0 7.5 8.3 6.6 7.7 10.3 6.6 7.7 7.0 6.1 5.2 5.1 5.6 6.4 6.4 5.8 5.3 5.2 5.7 4.9 4.9 3.7 3,9 3.8 3.4 2.6 Bulgaria GDPI/GOP 21.3 18.2 16.2 13 0 13.8 15.3 13.6 10.8 13.2 15.9 Private I/GDP 0.8 0.5 0.3 2.9 5.4 6,8 5.3 5.5 7.0 8.0 Public I/GOP 20.5 17.7 15.9 10.0 8.4 8.5 8.4 5.3 6.2 7.9 Cambodia GDFI/GDP 9.4 11.0 9.8 9.9 12.7 9.2 11.3 12.7 13.5 13.0 12.9 15.8 Private I/GOP 8.0 9.5 8.8 9.5 12.4 5.3 5.9 6.0 7.6 8.2 7.3 9.6 _________ Public I/GOP 1.4 1.5 1.0 0.3 0.3 3.9 5.4 6.7 5.9 4.8 5.7 6.2 Chile GDFI/GOP 16.4 14.5 12.2 7.9 21.2 13.9 12.8 14.5 17.8 17.8 16.6 18.6 14.2 12.0 12.4 16.8 17 1 19 4 20.3 23.0 23.1 19.9 22.4 24~9 23.3 23.9 24.9 25.5 25.2 21.3 22.8 Private I/GOP 9.5 6 5 4.5 0.5 9.2 3.2 4 8 7.6 11.4 12.6 11.2 13.4 9.5 7.4 6.4 14.1 13.6 13.1 14.4 18.2 18.4 15.0 16.7 18.9 1 8.0 19.9 19.7 20.6 19.0 14.5 16.4 _____________Public I/GOP 6.9 8.0 7.7 7.4 12.0 10.7 8.0 6.9 6,4 5.2 5.4 5.2 4.7 4.7 6.0 2.8 3.5 6.4 5.9 4,8 4.8 4.9 5.8 6.0 5.3 3.9 5.2 4.9 6.3 6.8 6.4 hina ~~~GFl/GDP 20.2 19.8 23.2 24.1 25.6 28.4 30.6 31.7 31.8 26.1 24.4 25.9 30.3 37.7 36.4 34.2 33.8 33.5 36.3 36.4 Prvate I/GOP 3.7 6. 7.3 8.1 9.0 9.6 10.2 11.2 11.6 9.5 8.3 8.7 9.7 14.9 15.9 15.6 16.1 15.9 16.6 17 0 ____________ bli/ GOP 16.5 13.7 16.0 16.0 16.5 18.7 20.4 20.5 20.2 16.6 16.1 17.2 206 22.9 20.6 18.6 17.7 17.6 19.6 1. Contlnued TABLE Cl. INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP (IN %) (Continued) CountryNYear 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Colombia GDFI/GDP 18.0 11.5 16.1 15.8 16.4 15.3 15.9 14.5 15.4 15.4 16.8 17.7 17.0 19.7 11.1 16.7 17.7 16.5 18.2 16.6 16.6 15.0 15.1 18.9 23.3 22.4 21.5 20.2 17.6 14.1 14.3 Privatel/IGDP 12.4 11.6 9.8 10.1 11.5 9.9 10.3 7.9 9.9 10.0 9.8 10.3 9.4 9.7 8,5 8.4 11.6 10.2 11.4 9.6 10.2 8.4 8.3 10.8 16.7 14.5 13.0 11,0 9.9 5.5 6.9 ___________Publicl/GDP 5 6 6.0 6.3 5.7 4.9 5.4 5.6 6.6 5.5 5.4 7.0 7.4 7.6 10.0 9.2 8.3 6.1 6.3 6.8 7.0 6.4 6.5 6.7 8,1 6.6 7.9 8.5 9.2 7.7 8.6 7.4 Comoros --DFI/GDP 1 1.9 18.9 20.1 17.0 19.8 16.1 13.5 15.5 16.6 14.6 15.0 Private I/GDP 6.7 14.3 9.2 9 8 9.5 9.2 7.3 8.9 8.1 7.4 7.4 Public I/GDP 5.2 4.6 10.9 7.2 10.4 6.9 6.2 6.6 8.5 7.2 7.6 Costa Rica GDFI/GDP 19.4 22.1 21.9 20.5 21.3 20.7 23.5 22.4 23.0 26.2 23.9 24.1 20.3 18.0 20.0 19.3 18.7 19.8 18.9 20.5 22.4 19.7 20.8 23.2 19.5 18.9 17,1 19.2 23.7 Private I/GDP 15.0 16.4 15.1 14.7 15.8 14.4 15.1 14,2 15.6 17.3 14,7 15.2 13.1 11.6 13.7 12.3 12.9 15.4 14.8 16.0 17.7 15.5 16.6 18.3 14.6 13.8 12.2 14.0 18.2 Public I/GDP 4.4 5.7 6.8 5.8 5.5 6.3 8.4 8.2 7.4 8.9 9.2 8.9 7.2 6.4 6.4 7.0 5.8 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.9 4.8 5.1 4.8 5.1 5.5 Cote dilvoire GDFI/GDP 14.8 14.1 13.8 12.2 8.5 8.6 8.5 7.8 11.1 13.6 15.6 15.5 16. 16.3 17.6 Private IIGDP 7.9 6.7 6.8 5.9 4.9 5.1 4.7 4.1 7.0 9.5 11.4 10.2 9.9 12.1 12.7 _____________ ublic IIGDP 6.9 7.4 7.0 6.3 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.2 5.3 6.1 4.2 4.] Dominica 3DFI/GDP 36.8 28.5 22.3 23.3 31.~1 39.6 39.7 30.5 28,4 25.5 25.5 30.8 28.1 28.5 28.5 27.7 29.1 P1rivate I/GDP 18.6 18.6 7.8 10.2 13.2 24.0 20.8 16.2 20.2 20.1 16.8 19,0 16.7 17.9 19.3 18.7 21.6 ____________ Public I/GDP 18.2 9. 14,5 13.1 17.9 15.6 18.9 14.4 8.1 5.4 8.8 11.8 11.4 10.5 9.2 9.0 7.5 Dominican Rep. ODFI/GDP 19.1 17.9 19.8 22.2 23.3 24.5 22.3 21.7 21.0 23.9 23.9 22,8 18.7 20.3 21.0 17.3 19.3 23.7 24.3 28.2 24.9 21.6 22.5 26.4 21.1 19.2 18.7 19.5 23.1 24.8 23.2 Drivate I/GDP 14,0 12.4 12,2 15.1 15.9 16.5 16.0 15.6 14.8 18,8 16.3 16.1 14.3 15.6 17.6 12.9 16.0 16.2 16,8 18.1 18.2 15.3 15.4 16.4 12,6 11.0 10.2 12.7 16.6 18.9 17.5 ___Public I/GDP 5.1 -5.5 7.6 7.1 7,4 8 0 6.3 6.1 6.2 5.1 7.6 6.7 4.4 4.7 3.4 4,3 3.3 7.5 7.5 10.2 6.7 6.3 7.1 10.0 8.5 8.1 8.5 6.8 6.5 5.9 5.8 Ecuador ODFt/GDP 16.7 21.8 18.0 17.6 18.2 23.2 22.2 23.6 26.2 23.7 23.6 22.3 22.7 16.6 15.4 16.1 18.8 22.7 21.3 20.7 18.4 197 19.5 19.9 18.8 18.6 17.8 19.0 21.0 14.0 15.9 P'rivate IIGDP 10.0 14.7 11.4 10.8 10.2 14.5 13.0 13.4 16.8 14.5 14.1 11.7 13.0 86 9.0 9.5 9.6 13.4 12.7 11.6 12.4 12.6 12.4 13.2 12.8 13.1 11.2 12.8 15.2 6.9 15.4 ____________ ublic I/GDP 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.8 8.0 8.7 9.2 10.2 9.4 9.2 9.5 10.6 9.7 8.0 6.4 6.6 9.2 9.3 8.6 9.2 6.1 7.0 7.1 6.7 6.0 5.5 6.6 6.3 5.7 7.1 0.5 Egypt SDFI/GDP 3. 423. 213. 733. 062. 221. 621. 621. 761. 002. Private I/GDP 911. 311. 321. 922. 671. 05 921. 071. 211. 301. 3ublic I/GOP P102. 901. 131. 521. 0. . . . . . . . . . El Salvador 3DFI/GDP 10.7 11.2 14.1 12.4 14.2 23.0 20.1 21.2 21.4 17.6 13.6 13.6 12.6 11.6 11.5 12.0 13.1 13.6 12.6 13.3 13.7 15.2 17.2 17.8 18.6 18.6 15.8 16.1 16.6 16.2 16.2 DrivatelI/GDP 8.4 8.3 10.1 8.8 9.5 15.0 13.9 13.9 15.6 11.5 6.4 6.2 6.5 7.0 7.6 8.7 10.6 10.7 9.5 9.8 11.2 12.3 13.2 13.7 14.7 15.0 12.1 12.7 13.2 13.0 13.0 ____________ Dublic I/GOP 2.3 2.9 4.0 3.6 4.7 8.0 6.2 7.3 5.8 6.1 7.1 7.3 6.1 4.6 3.9 3.3 2.5 2.9 3.1 3.5 2.5 2.8 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.7 3.3 3.3 3.1 3.2 Estonia OjFI/GDP 26.9 26.9 27.6 26.7 27.8 31.7 29.7 25.7 26.9 :rivate IUGOP 25.5 24.0 23.5 21.9 22.6 27.0 25.1 21.4 23.1 ____________ ublic I/GOP 1.3 2.9 4.2 4.8 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.2 3.8 Grenada 3DFI/GDP 11.5 8.6 24.6 23.3 38.4 41.7 39.1 26.9 28.0 30.1 31.4 32.2 31.5 35.3 34.7 27.7 29.2 33.9 305 33,7 35.0 35.9 39.6 39.6 :rivate I/GDP 5.9 4.3 2.3 6.9 6.1 4.5 4.7 3.4 4.6 11.4 24.2 21.6 25.6 25.8 27.4 24.0 24.5 24.1 23.3 24.3 25.8 27.2 28.8 28.8 Oublic I/GDP 5.6 4.3 22.4 16.4 32.3 37.2 34.4 23.5 23.4 18.7 7.2 10.6 5.9 9.5 7.3 3.7 4.7 9.8 7.1 9.5 9.2 8.7 10.8 10.8 Guatemala ODFI/GDP 12.6 13.3 13.0 13 9 14.8 15.6 20.6 18.9 20.0 18.7 16.4 16.8 15.0 10.5 9.6 11.0 10.1 12.4 13.4 13.7 13.0 12.2 15.6 16.1 14.2 14.5 13,3 15.1 16.6 17.9 16.8 rivate I/GDP 10.2 10.4 9.8 10.5 11.9 12.1 14.0 13.0 14.4 12.4 10,5 8.9 8.9 6.6 6.7 8.3 8.1 9.7 10.5 10.6 10.4 9.8 13.2 13.4 11.7 12.0 10.8 12.1 13.7 14.8 14. _____________ublic I/GOP 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.4 2.9 3.5 6.6 5.9 5.6 6.3 5.9 7.8 6.1 3.9 2.9 2.7 2.0 2.7 2.9 3.2 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.7 2.6 2.5 2.5 3.1 3.0 3.1 2.1 Continued TABLE Cl. INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP (IN %) (Continued) CountrylYear 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1998 1997 1998 1999 2000 Guinea-Bissau ODFI/GDP 35.2 44.7 39.0 29.9 31.0 48.4 30.9 21.8 22.3 23.0 21.6 11.3 16.3 19.2 Private I/GDP 7.3 14.1 8.7 8.4 7.8 20.0 6.3 1.4 7.1 8.3 6.1 5.2 5.2 5.3 ____________ Public I/GDP 27.9 30.6 30.3 21.5 23.2 28.4 24.6 20.4 15.2 14.8 15.6 6.2 11.1 13.9 Guyana OjFI/GDP 27.8 18.0 18.9 27.7 42.2 42.3 41.5 27.2 31.7 30.0 30.3 28.8 24.5 28.7 Irivate U/GDP 13.6 8.2 10.7 14.4 27.2 26.2 22.1 15.6 15.5 10.9 12.3 14.3 12.6 12.5 ____________ ublic I/GDP 14.2 9.8 8.2 13.3 15.1 16.1 19.4 11.6 16.3 19.1 18.1 14.5 11.8 16.2 Haiti SDFI/GDP 16.3 15.9 16.7 14.5 14.3 13.4 14.3 12.2 10.3 3.2 4.8 3.4 8.7 9.5 10.2 8.2 11.0 Drivate I/GOP 10.4 11.2 8.5 6.4 8.1 6.7 6.5 7.0 6.2 2.9 3.9 3.0 2.7 4.0 4.5 4.7 5.7 Dublic I/GDP 5.9 4.7 8.1 8.0 6.2 6.7 7.8 5.1 4.2 0.3 0.9 0.4 6.0 5.5 5.7 3.5 5.3 India ODFI/GDP 14.0 14.7 15.3 14.0 14.4 16.2 17.3 17.2 17.4 17.9 18.5 18.9 19.2 18.8 19.6 20.6 21.1 21.4 21.6 22.4 22.9 22.0 22.4 21.4 21.9 24.4 22.8 21.7 21.2 21.2 PrivatelI/GDP 8.5 8.7 8.3 7.7 8.6 9.2 9.2 9.3 9.5 9.3 10.1 10.1 9.1 9.3 9.9 10.5 102 11.5 12.0 13.2 13.9 12.9 14.2 13.4 13.2 16.7 15.9 15.4 15.0 14.9 Public I/GDP 5.5 6.0 7.0 6.3 5.8 7.0 8.1 7.8 7.9 8.5 8.4 8.9 10.1 9.5 9.7 10.1 10.9 10.0 9.6 9.2 9.0 9.2 8.2 8.0 8.8 7.7 6.9 6.4 6.3 6.4 Indonesia GDFI/GDP 24.2 30.5 25.1 22.5 23.6 24.2 24.9 26.1 27.3 28.0 27.2 25.6 26.3 27.6 28.4 29.6 28.3 24.6 21.2 Private I/GOP 13.7 18.2 13.2 12.5 13.5 16.2 17.3 17.7 18.7 19.5 18.4 16.9 17.0 19.2 20.8 22,9 22.5 17.4 12.9 ___________Public I/GOP 10.5 12.3 11.9 9.9 10.1 8.0 7.5 8.4 8.6 8.5 8.8 8.7 9.3 8.4 7.7 6.7 5.8 7.1 8.3 Iran GDFI/GDP 21.7 19.1 17.5 21.5 20.9 17.5 15.4 13.3 13.3 13.3 15.8 22.3 22.7 22.1 23.1 23.0 25.7 24,9 22.1 22.2 27.6 Private I/GDP 11.4 9.3 7.4 12.0 12.4 10.6 8.6 7.8 7.9 8,2 8.5 13.6 13.4 11.4 12.8 12.6 14.2 14.2 13.4 13.0 19.0 ___________Public I/GDP 10.4 9.8 10.0 9.4 8.5 6.9 6.7 5.5 5.4 5.1 7.3 8,7 9.3 10.7 10.3 10.4 11.5 10.7 8.7 9.2 8.6 Kazakhstan GDFI/GOP 16.3 17.3 15.9 Private I/GDP 13.6 14.8 14.0 ____________Public I/GDP 2.7 2.5 1.9 Kenya GDFI/GOP 19.7 22.7 22.1 20.8 19.2 20.2 20.0 21.0 25.1 23.7 23.6 23.9 19.0 18.0 18.1 17.9 19.6 19.6 20.1 19.3 20.7 19.3 17.0 19.6 18.9 21.4 19.8 17.6 16.5 15.1 Private I/GDP 13.7 14.0 13.6 11.4 10.5 11.7 11.6 12.1 15.6 12.8 13.3 13.6 10.7 11.4 10.9 10.9 11.6 12.6 12.0 11.6 11.3 11.0 9.8 11.5 10.4 13.9 12.7 11.2 10.8 10.1 ____________Public I/GDP 6.0 8.7 8.5 9.4 8.7 8.5 8.4 8.9 9.5 10.9 10.3 10.2 8.4 6.7 7.2 7.0 8.0 7.1 8.0 7.8 9.4 8.3 7.1 8.0 8.5 7.4 7.0 6.4 5.6 5.0 Korea, Rep. of DFI/GDP 21.5 19.9 23.2 25.1 25.2 23.9 26.7 30.7 32.7 32.1 28.0 28.4 29.2 28.9 28.6 28.2 29.1 29.6 31.9 37.1 38.4 36.6 36.2 360 36.7 36.8 35.1 29.8 28.0 rivate I/GDP 15.6 14.6 19.1 20.8 20.1 19.2 21.8 25.4 26.9 25.5 21.4 23.0 24.0 23.8 23,3 23.8 24.8 25.3 27.7 32.2 33.1 30.7 30.9 31.0 31.5 31.1 29.0 23.2 22.0 _____________ublic I/GOP 5.9 5.3 4.2 4.2 5.1 4.7 4.9 5.3 5.8 6.7 6.5 5.3 5.2 5.1 5.2 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.9 5.4 5.9 5.3 5.0 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.0 Lithuania ODFI/GDP 23.0 23.0 24.4 24.3 22.5 Drivate I/GDP 11.8 12.3 13.3 15.6 14.3 ____________ ublic IIGDP 11.2 10.7 11.1 8.7 8.2 Madagascar 3DFI/GOP 8.5 9.0 10.1 13.3 13.4 14.8 10.6 11.3 11.4 10.9 10.9 11.6 11.9 12.5 12.9 16.1 Private I/GDP 2.6 3.6 3.1 6.4 3.7 6,9 4.6 3.7 3.7 4.7 4.9 5.0 6.3 6.9 6.8 8.2 _____________ublic I/GOP 6.0 5.4 7.0 6.9 9.7 7.9 5.9 7.6 739 6.2 6.0 6.7 5.6 5.6 6.1 7.9 Malawi GDFl/GDP 20.4 18.9 24.9 22.1 22.2 30.9 26.8 22.2 15.1 14.6 13.7 13.0 13.3 12.0 13.8 15.3 16.7 16.7 17.0 17.2 13.0 26.8 14.5 9.1 9.8 11.0 12.8 13.9 Private I/GDP 7.8 7.3 7.8 8.5 9.4 12.3 7.5 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.4 3.3 5.0 2.8 5.9 7.2 9.0 8.6 8.7 6.9 4.6 11.6 5.1 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.2 4.1 ____________Public I/GDP 12.6 11.6 17.1 13.6 12.8 18.6 19.3 17.5 10.2 8.4 8.3 9.8 8.3 9.2 7.9 8.2 7.6 8.0 8.3 10.2 8.4 15.1 9.4 6.1 7.1 8.6 10.6 9.8 Continued TABLE Cl. INVFSTMENT AS A SIIARE OF GDP (IN %) (Continued) ount IYear ~~~~1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Malaysia O~FI/GDP 18.9 22.1 23.9 23.7 26.9 26.6 23.4 24.3 24.7 26.4 31,1 36.0 36.3 36.0 31.9 29.8 26 3 23.0 24.1 29.3 32.4 34.9 36.0 38.3 40.1 44.3 42.5 43.1 26.8 22.3 21.9 rivate (/GDP 12.8 15.5 15.2 16.5 19.3 16.6 14.0 14.2 15.7 17.5 19.5 19.9 18.2 17.7 16.8 15.8 14.3 13.8 15.4 18.5 20.9 23.7 21.5 23.8 27.2 31.7 31.3 31.8 15.6 11.3 10.8 ____________Ppublic I/GDP 6.1 6.6 8.7 7.2 7.6 10.0 9,4 10.1 9. 8.9 11.6 16.1 18.2 18.4 15.1 14.0 12.1 9.1 8.7 10.8 11,5 11.1 14.5 14.6 13.0 12.6 11.2 11.3 11.2 11.0 11.1 Mauritania GDFI/GDP 24.5 26.4 25.3 25.1 16.8 17.9 17.9 19.3 22.0 14.5 19.3 18.6 17.7 20.0 Private I/GDP 16.1 19.9 17.8 19.0 11.8 12.4 91 11,2 8.7 3.1 8.1 3.6 5.2 7.3 ____Public I/GDP 8.4 6.5 7.5 6.1 5.1 5.6 8.8 8.1 13.3 11.4 11.2 15.0 12.4 12.7 Mauritius ~ DPI/GOP 28.4 27.7 28.3 25.7 23.3 21.9 17.9 18.0 17.8 16B.7 197 21.6 28.7 26.5 30.6 28.6 27.8 28.5 30.8 24.2 26.1 27.3 24.4 27.7 24.6 Private I/GDP 20.3 18.9 18.3 17.7 14.9 13.5 11.5 11.6 11.8 12.6 12.8 14.3 16.6 19.5 19.2 20.4 18.3 20.6 21.7 16.3 16.7 20.8 18.3 21.8 18.6 ___________ ubliclI/GDP 8.1 8.8 10.0 8.0 8.4 8.5 6.4 6.4 6.1 6.0 7.0 7.3 12.2 7.1 11.4 8.2 9.6 7.9 9.1 8.0 9.3 6.5 6.1 5.9 6.0 Mexico 3DFI/GDP 19 .8 17.8 18.9 19.2 19.9 21.4 21.0 19.7 21.2 23.7 24.8 26.3 23.0 17.5 18.0 19.2 19.6 18.5 18.5 17.2 17,9 18.7 19.6 18.6 19.4 16.2 17.9 19.5 20.9 21.0 20.8 Drivate I/GDP 13.2 13.2 12,8 11.7 12.3 12.4 12.8 11.9 12.8 13.5 13.9 14.3 12.8 11.0 11.4 12.5 13.0 13.3 14.1 13.0 13.6 14.6 15.8 14.8 14.3 12.4 14.9 16.4 18.3 18.9 18.6 ____________ ublic IIGDP.6. 6 4.6 6.1 7.5 7.6 9.0 8.2 7.8 8.4 10.2 10.9 12.1 10.2 6.6 6.6 6.7 6.6 .5.2 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.1 3.8 3.8 5. 0 3.7 3.0 3.1 2.6 2.1 2.1 Morocco GDFI/GDP 24.8 29.7 32.0 24.9 24.0 22.2 26.0 27.3 24.4 23,1 23.1 21.3 20.2 19.3 22.8 25.0 22.2 22.4 22.8 20,7 21.4 19.4 20.7 22.4 24.3 24.8 Private I/GDP 9.8 12.9 14.5 13.5 11.4 11.8 11.4 13.4 11.8 11.2 12.1 12.2 11.6 11.8 13.2 16.4 12.7 12.8 11.0 10.6 12.5 12.6 13.6 15.7 11.3 16.0 ___________Public I/GDP 15.0 16.7 17.5 11.4 12.6 10.4 14.5 13.9 12.6 11.9 11.0 9.1 8.6 7.6 9.6 8.6 9.6 9.5 11.8 10.1 8.9 6.8 7.1 6.6 7.0 8.8 Namibia DFV/GDP 27.2 27.5 23.0 18.3 15.2 14.1 13.8 14.5 15.3 16.7 21.3 16.2 21.0 21.1 19.5 22.2 23.5 20.1 23.5 23.2 Private I/GDP 11.4 10.2 7.2 6.4 6.2 50O 5.9 6.7 8.2 10.8 13.1 8.6 10.9 13.8 12.5 15.1 16.2 11.9 15.7 12.9 ____________Public I/GOP 15.7 17.2 15.8 11.9 9.0 9.1 1.8 7.8 7.1 5.9 8.2 7.6 10.1 7.3 7.0 7.1 7.3 8.2 7.8 10.4 Nicaragua GDFi/GDP 20.4 18.3 19.5 18.9 22.0 24.0 29.2 31.9 32.4 42.7 36.8 Private I/GDP 11.2 10.7 9.7 8.9 9.6 10.6 11.6 18.2 19.8 22.0 19.0 ____________Public I/GOP 9.3 7.6 9.8 10.0 12.4 13.4 17.6 13.7 12.6 20.7 17.8 Pakistan GDFI/GDP 14.3 14.0 12.6 11.5 12.2 14.4 18.2 18.6 17.3 17.0 17.1 17.1 16.8 17.0 16.5 16.5 17.0 17.5 16.5 17.3 17.3 17.4 18.6 19.1 17.9 16.9 17.4 16.4 15.1 13.3 13.3 Private IIGDP 7.3 7.0 6.6 5.6 4.4 4.6 5.9 6.2 5.8 5.8 7.7 7.8 7.2 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.7 8.3 8.9 8.9 9.8 10.0 9.6 8.7 9.1 10.3 9.5 8.3 8.6 Public I/GOP 7.0 7.0 6.0 5.9 7.8 9.8 12.3 12.4 11.5 11.2 9.4 9.4 9.7 9.6 9.0 8.9 9.2 9.7 8.8 9.0 8.4 8.5 8.8 9.1 8.3 8.2 8.3 6.1 5.6 5.0 4.7 Panama GDFI/GDP 15.4 17.0 19.3 8.8 6.5 8.5 15.0 18.5 23.2 23.6 26.0 25.3 26.5 28.1 29.6 29.9 Private I/GOP 11.8 13.4 16.8 5.7 4.5 7.4 12.0 15.1 19.2 20.8 21.8 21.2 22.3 23.2 26.3 26.4 ___________Public I/GDP 3.7 3.7 2.4 3.1 2.0 1.1 3.0 3.4 4.0 2.9 4.3 4.0 4.2 4.8 3.3 3.5 Papua N. Gu~inea GDFI/GDP 26.8 33.0 29.7 23.9 18.4 21.0 19.3 23.3 26. 25.1 28.0 23.8 18.8 14.5 19.4 27.9 27.1 30.3 Private I/GDP 18.1 26.1 23.6 17.6 12.1 14.5 14.0 18.3 21.2 20.0 23.3 18.6 12.5 11.6 15.7 24.2 21.6 23.3 ____________Public I/GDP 8.7 6.9 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 5.3 5.0 4.7 5.1 4.7 5.2 6.3 2.8 3.6 3.7 5.4 6.9 Paraguay WFI/GDP 14.8 14.0 15.5 15.6 17.9 19.9 22.7 23.8 25.2 21.0 30.2 30.2 24.0 20.1 21.6 20.7 23.5 23.7 23.1 22.7 22.0 23.7 21.9 22.0 22.5 23.1 22.6 22.7 22.1 22.1 22.1 Private I/GOP 10.8 10.3 11.0 12.3 15.2 15.7 13.5 15.2 17.9 20.7 25.7 25.7 22.7 13.3 13.2 14.2 18.5 17.6 16.3 16.0 19.2 204 18.2 18.8 19.0 17.7 18.2 15.2 14.4 14.2 14. -____ Publi-c I/GOP 4.0 3.7 4.5 3.3 2.7 4.2 9.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 4.5 4.5 1.3 6.9 8.4 6.5 5.1 6.1 6.9 6.7 2.8 3.3 3.7 3.2 3.5 5.3 4.4 7.5 7.7 7.9 7.9 Peru GDFI/GDP 28.8 29.5 23.7 20.2 18.2 18.5 17.8 19.7 16.6 16.1 16.6 16.5 18.3 21.2 24.3 22.6 24.0 23.8 21.6 21.4 Private I/GDP 21.5 20.8 15.1 12.1 12.0 13.2 13.4 15.5 13.1 12.9 13.1 12.4 13.7 16.4 19.5 18.3 19.6 19.4 16.8 17.0 Public I/GOP 7.3 8.7 8.7 8.1 6.1 5.4 4.4 4.2 3.5 3.2 3.5 4.1 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.8 4.4 Continued TABLE Cl. INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP (IN %) (Continued) CountryNVear 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Philippines SDFIIGDP 24.7 26.4 25.1 25.2 27.5 27.2 27.8 27.5 29.8 24.5 17.5 16.8 16.5 17.8 20.8 23.1 20.0 20.9 23.8 24.3 22.0 23.6 25.1 20.2 18.6 17.6 P1rivate IIGDP 20.6 16.1 17.9 18.2 20.1 18.8 16.8 20.0 23.7 19.1 13.7 14.0 13.7 14.9 17.3 18.9 15.9 16.0 18.8 19.4 17.7 19.2 20.1 15.3 12.9 12.2 _____________ ublic I/GDP 4.1 10.3 7.2 7.0 7.4 8.5 10.9 7.5 6.1 5.4 3.7 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.6 4.2 4.1 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.3 4.4 5.0 4.9 5.7 5.4 Poland SDFI/GDP 16.0 20.7 20.9 17.5 15.9 15.1 15.4 17.0 19.3 20,4 20.5 20.1 Irivate I/GDP 2.7 8.5 12.3 7.7 6.4 6.7 6.8 7.8 10.3 11.8 12.7 12.8 _____________ ublic I/GDP 13.3 12.1 8.5 9.8 9.4 8.5 8.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 7.8 7.4 Romania 3DFI/GOP 14.2 14.7 14.1 16.1 18.0 19.2 17.4 16.4 13.5 :rivate I/GOP 1.4 2.3 3.7 5.9 7.1 7.6 6.2 6.6 6.9 ___________ ublic I/GDP 12.9 12.4 10.4 10.2 10.9 11.6 11.3 9.8 6.6 Seychelles 3DFI/GDP 23.0 21.3 21.0 26.8 24.7 30.3 49.1 30.7 38.0 37.1 29.3 ndvate I/GOP 14.8 8.4 11.5 15.6 17.1 23.6 41.0 21.9 24.6 24.8 17.3 ____________ ublic I/GDP 8.2 12.9 9.4 11.2 7.5 6.8 8.1 8.9 13.4 12.3 12.0 South Africa 7DFI/GDP 24.7 26.2 26.9 25.4 25.1 29.4 30.1 28.0 26.4 26.2 26.2 27.8 27.9 26.8 24.4 23.3 20.2 18.5 19.8 20.6 19.6 17.2 15.7 14.7 15.2 15.9 16.1 16.3 16.5 14.9 DrivatelI/GDP 14.1 14.5 14.0 13.5 13.4 14.8 14.7 13.7 13.0 12.7 13.3 15.5 15.9 15.6 14.6 13.1 11.6 11.2 13.2 13.2 12.9 11.0 10.4 10.3 11.0 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.1 10.3 ___________ ublic I/GDP 10.6 11.7 12.8 11.9 11.7 14.6 15.5 14.3 13.4 13.5 12.9 12.3 12.0 11.2 9.9 10,2 8.6 7.3 6,7 7.4 6.8 6.1 5.2 4.4 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.4 4.6 St. Lucia 3DFI/GDP 34.3 34.2 33.5 21.7 19.6 24.1 24.6 24.5 29.9 34.6 25.8 25.3 24.1 24.8 23.9 18.7 21.4 24.6 23.9 26.4 24.6 Drivate IIGDP 25.1 26.1 24.7 13.0 12.3 15.7 14.6 14.1 16.8 20.7 13.8 12.0 10.6 11.6 12.3 10.4 14.6 18.2 15.5 16.9 15.8 Dublic I/GOP 9.2 8.1 8.8 8.7 7.3 8.4 10.0 10.4 13.1 13.9 12.0 13.3 13.5 13.2 11.6 8.3 6.8 6.4 8.4 9.5 8.8 St. Vincent 3DFI/GDP 26.2 29.7 29.4 24.3 25.6 28.2 30.2 28.3 29.7 31.8 32.6 Drivate I/GDIP 14.6 18.1 17.5 11.3 15.7 16.0 24.2 21.4 17.5 18.1 18.8 :ublic I/GDP 11.6 11.6 12.0 13.0 9.9 12.2 6.0 6.9 12.2 13.8 13.8 Thailand ODFI/GDP 23.8 23.3 22.7 22.4 23,3 22.9 22.9 26.0 25.3 25.6 27.8 28.0 26.9 28.5 28.6 27.2 25.8 27.6 30.7 34.6 40.4 41.6 39.3 39.5 39.9 40.9 41.0 33.8 29.0 28.7 26.6 ~rivate I/GOP 16.7 16.6 16.0 17.3 19.6 17.7 16.1 18.6 17.6 18.0 18.9 19.0 19.1 20.5 20.3 18.5 18.4 21.7 25.6 29.6 34.2 34.4 31.1 31.6 31.2 32,0 30.8 22.2 19.4 19.4 18.5 Dublic I/GDP 7.1 6.7 6.7 5.1 3.7 5.2 6.8 7.4 7.7 7.6 8.8 8.9 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.7 7.4 6.0 5.0 5.0 6.1 7.2 8.1 7.9 8.7 8.9 10.2 11.6 9.6 9.3 8.1 Tinidad & Tobago ODFI/GOP 26.1 18.8 21.6 19.3 13.1 16.6 12.6 16.6 14.1 14.3 20.2 20.8 24.3 36.1 28.0 21.0 21.8 rivate I/GOP 19.6 13.6 19.4 17.0 11.4 14.7 10.7 10.7 8.6 9.6 15.2 17.3 19.9 30.1 22.3 14.2 16.3 Dublic I/GOP 6.4 5.2 2.2 2.4 1.7 1.9 1.9 6.0 5.5 4.8 5.0 3.5 4.4 5.9 5.7 6.7 5.5 Tunisia ODFI/GDP 20.4 19.8 19.8 20.5 20.8 25.7 29.0 30.7 30.9 30.5 28.3 31.0 34.0 31.8 32.1 28.1 25.0 21.6 20.5 22.5 30.7 30.1 32.3 28.1 27.0 24.2 23.2 24.7 24.7 25.2 ridvate I/GD1P 8.5 7.7 8.8 10.7 10.5 12.3 11.6 10.9 11.7 12.0 13.3 14.8 15.4 15.9 15.7 13.3 12.1 11.3 11.5 12.5 19.7 19.9 20.3 12.8 13.3 11.9 11.9 12.7 13.2 13.1 DubliclI/GDP 11.9 12.1 11.0 9, 10.3 13.4 17.4 19.8 19.2 18.5 15.0 16.2 18.6 16.0 16.4 14.8 12.8 10.4 9.0 10.0 11.0 10.2 12.0 15.3 13.7 12.3 11.3 11.9 11.6 12.0 Turkey 3DFI/GDP 22.5 20.2 21.7 21.4 119.9 22.1 24.4 25.7 23.1 21.9 22.1 20.1 19.4 20.1 19.5 20.3 22.8 24.7 26.1 22.8 22.9 23.7 23.0 25.5 24.5 24.2 25.4 26.8 24.9 22.3 23.8 ridvatelI/GDP 12.6 11.6 13.0 12.9 11.3 11.7 13.2 13.2 12.4 10.7 13.3 11.0 11.1 11.4 11.4 111.1 12.6 14.7 17.2 15.2 15.8 16.1 15.6 18.3 19.4 20.0 20.2 20.6 18.8 16.1 17.0 ___________Public IIGOP 9.9 8.6 8.7 8.5 8.6 10.4 11.2 12.5 10.7 11.2 8.8 9.2 8.3 8.7 8.1 9.2 10.2 10.0 8.9 7.6 7.0 7.6 7.4 7.3 5.0 4.2 5.2 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.8 Uruguay ODFI/GDP 11.8 11.5 9.8 9.0 10.3 13.3 15.5 15.2 16.0 16.2 16.7 16.1 15.2 13.7 10.9 9.6 9.9 11.4 12.5 13.0 12.1 13.4 14.2 14.8 14.5 13.5 14.0 14.3 14.9 14.6 15.7 livate I/GOP 8.8 8.3 7.5 7.1 7.7 8.7 9.0 8.2 8.0 9.7 11.9 10.9 8.0 8.6 6.4 6.1 6.2 7.4 7.6 8.4 8.3 9.3 9.9 10.3 10.1 9.9 10.5 10.6 10.9 10.6 12.1 ____________ ublic I/GOP 3.0 3.2 2.3 1.9 2.6 4.6 6.5 7.0 8.0 6.5 4.9 5.2 7.3 5.1 4.5 3.5 3.7 4.0 4.9 4.5 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.4 3.7 3.5 3.6 4.0 4.0 3.6 Confinued TABLE Cl. INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP (IN %) (Continued) CountryNYear ______ 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Uzbekistan GDFI/GDP 26.2 33.0 36.8 33.8 30.4 28.6 21.8 Private I/GDP 8.3 14.8 10.0 109 12.3 9.7 75 Public I/GDP -17.9 18.2 26.7 22.9 18.0 18.9 14.3 Venezuela, R. B. GDF1/GDP 16.0 17.3 20.4 21.2 22.8 16.9 14.1 18.2 21.1 20.0 17.6 16.5 15.8 18.7 19.0 15.7 14.5 Private I/GDP 10.5 11.1 10.9 12.1 12.3 7.2 4.9 7.6 8.9 9.0 8.2 7.1 7.0 9.4 10.7 8.8 8.4 Public I/GDP ________ _____ 5.5 6.2 9.5 9.1 10.5 9.7 9.2 10.6 12.2 11.0 9.4 9.4 8.8 9.4 8.4 6.9 6.2 ugoslavia, F.R. SDPI/GOP 11.2 13.0 15.4 Drivate I/GOP 9.8 11 4 13.1 _____________ ublic I/GDP -1.4 1.6 2.3 GDFIIGDP 21.3 22.3 22.2 23.1 25.1 24.8 241 25.5 26.5 28.0 27.7 27.2 29.4 28.9 26.5 24.8 24.7 24.6 24.1 25.9 27.5 28.2 28.1 28.7 28.8 29.8 31.1 29.9 26.2 24.4 22.0 Kst Asia ~Private IIGDP 14.8 15.9 15.3 17.6 19.9 18.7 16.3 18.1 19.2 20,6 17.3 16.4 18.8 18.7 17.0 15.2 15.9 16.7 17.1 19.0 20.3 20.9 19.6 19.3 20.2 21.4 22.9 21.4 17.3 15.0 13.8 ____________PubliclIIGDP 6.6 6.4 6.9 5.5 5~2 6.1 7.8 7.4 7.2 7.4 10.4 10.8 10.6 10.2 9.5 9.5 8.8 7.9 7.0 6.9 7.2 7.4 8.5 9.4 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.5 9.0 9.4 8.2 South Asia GDFI/GDP 14.1 14.3 13.9 9.5 11.2 12.3 15.1 15.6 15.5 15.4 17.0 19.9 19.6 18.5 18.0 18.7 18.9 19.3 18.8 19.6 19.1 18.8 19.5 19.5 19.4 20.1 20.1 19.6 19.3 18.9 17.9 P/vate//IGDP 7.9 7.8 7.4 5.4 5.7 5.7 6.8 6.8 7.0 6,9 8.7 10.5 9.6 8.9 9.0 10.3 9.8 10.2 10.4 11.1 10.9 10.7 11.5 11.7 11.5 12.6 12.9 13.1 13.2 12.9 12.2 Public I/GDP 6.2 6.5 6.5 4.1 5.5 6.6 8.3 8.8 8.5 8.4 8.3 9.4 10. 9.6 9.1 8.5 9,1 9.1 8.4 8.5 8.2 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.9 7.6 7.2 6.5 6.1 6.0 5.7 LAC GDFI/GDP 16.6 16.9 17.4 16.7 19.0 20.5 21.1 20.5 20.9 21.9 22.4 24.0 22.2 18.9 18.8 17.9 18.5 19.7 19.6 20.5 20.0 20.4 20.0 21.1 20.6 20.8 20.7 22.5 22.8 22.5 22.3 Private IIGDP 11.5 11.6 11.5 11.1 12.5 13.2 13.1 12.8 13.3 13.1 14.5 15.0 13.5 10.9 11 6 11.4 12.1 13.4 12.8 13.7 13.3 13.4 13.1 14.3 14.1 14.4 13.9 15.5 16.1 15.1 15.9 Public IIGDP 5.1 5.3 6.0 5.6 6.5 7.3 8.0 7.7 7.6 8.8 7.9 9.0 8.7 8.0 7.2 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.8 6.7 6,7 7.0 6.9 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.2 6.4 SSAFR GDPI/GOP 22.2 24.4 24.5 22.2 21.1 24.8 25.2 24.7 27.7 25.6 24.5 23.2 20.5 19.0 17.7 17.2 17.0 19.2 21.8 20.1 19.0 18.3 20.0 19.0 19.1 19.0 20.2 18.5 18.6 19.0 19.3 Private I/GDP 13.9 14.2 13.8 10.9 10.4 11.4 13.8 13.5 14.8 12.7 11.5 11.6 10.3 10.1 9.3 9.3 9.5 9.5 11.5 10.5 10.4 9.6 10.3 9.7 9.7 10.9 12.2 10.7 10.9 11.3 10.6 ____________Public IIGDP 8.3 10.2 10.7 11.3 10.7 13.4 11.4 11.2 12.9 12.9 13.0 11.7 10.2 8.9 8.4 7.8 7.4 9.7 10.3 9.7 8.6 8.7 9.8 9.2 9.4 8.1 8.0 7.9 7.7 7.7 8. ECA GDPI/GOP 22.5 20.2 21.7 21.4 19.9 22.1 24.4 25.7 23.1 21.9 22.1 20.1 19.4 20.1 19.5 20.3 22.8 24.7 26.1 19.4 21.6 19.2 19.7 19.1 20.6 21.4 24.0 24.2 22.8 21.0 22.6 Private IIGDP 12.6 11.6 13.0 12.9 11.3 11.7 13.2 13.2 12.4 10.7 13.3 11.0 11.1 11.4 11.4 11.1 12.6 14.7 17.2 8.9 8.4 7.6 10.3 11.1 11.5 12.5 14.1 15.7 15.9 14.3 16.2 ____Public I/GDP 9.9 8.6 8.7 8.5 86 10.4 11.2 12.5 10.7 11.2 8.8 9.2 8.3 8.7 8.1 9.2 102 10.0 89 10.4 13.2 11.7 9.4 8.0 9.0 8.9 9.9 8.5 6.8 6.8 6.4 MENA DPI/GOGP 20.4 19.8 19.8 20.5 20,8 25.3 29.3 31.3 27.9 27.2 24.1 25.3 27.2 28.0 27,1 25.2 24,0 206 21.9 22.3 24.6 24.2 24.1 22,3 21.8 21.2 21.1 22,0 22.2 22.9 24.7 Private I/GDP 8.5 7.7 8.8 10.7 10.5 11.1 12.3 12.7 12.6 11,7 12.2 11.8 11.3 13.4 13.1 12.2 11.5 11.5 12.6 13.5 15.3 14.8 14.3 11.1 11.8 11.9 12.3 13.1 13.6 14.1 16.4 ____________Public l/GDP 11.9 12.1 11.0 9.8 10.3 14.2 17.1 18.6 15.3 15.6 11.9 13.5 15.9 14.6 14.0 13.0 12.5 9.1 9.3 8.8 9.3 9.4 9.8 11,2 10.1 9.3 8.8 8,8 8.5 8.8 8.~ Continued TABLE Cl. INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP (IN %) (Continued) CountrlYear 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total GDFI/GDP 17.9 18.4 18.7 17.6 19.2 21.1 22,2 22.2 22.6 23.0 23.2 24.2 23.6 21.7 20.8 19.7 19.8 20.5 21.0 213 21.2 21.2 21.4 21.5 21.4 21.7 22.4 22.7 22.2 21.7 21.7 Total Private l/GDP 11.6 11.9 11.8 11.2 12.2 12.8 12.9 13.0 13.6 13.3 13.7 14.1 13.5 12.4 12.2 11.7 12.0 12.8 13.2 13.6 13.4 13.2 13.2 13.4 13.5 14.1 14.6 15.1 15.0 14.1 14.7 Total Public l/GDP 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.4 7.0 8.4 9.3 9.1 9.0 9.7 9.5 10.1 10.1 9.4 8.6 8.0 7.8 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.8 8.0 8.2 8.1 7.9 7.6 7.8 7.7 7.3 7.5 7.1 Notes: Unless otherwise noted the sources are: national authorities & World Bank/IMF staff estimates. - Data for 1998/99 are prelimninary/estimates. - Azerbaijan: public investment includes mostly government investment as investment by state owned units is considered negligible. - China: private investment includes: investment by collective-owned units, joint-owned units, share-holding units, foreign-funded units, Hong Kong-Macao-Taiwan-funded units and by individuals. - Costa Rica: due to the revisions of the National Accounts methodology data for private, public investments are unavailable for 1999. - Brazil: source-1990-1998: FIBGE e Centro de Estudos de Economia e Governo/IBRE/FGV, previous years World Bank. Private investment includes investment by enterprises controlled by state and local municipalities for the period 1990-98. - Kazakhstan: public investment includes mostly government investment as investment by state owned units is considered negligible. Korea, Republic of: source-Economic Statistics Yearbook various issues. - Mauritania: 1999 private investment data are not available. - Mexico: 1988-99 data based on a new INEGI methodology. - Morocco: up to 1990 public investment are estimated by investment of 14 biggest public companies; 1990-1999 data for the whole economy. - Papua New Guinea: 1999 data are unavailable. South Africa: source-Quarterly Bulletin of South African Reserve Bank. Distributors of World Bank Group Publications Prices and credo terms vary From CZECH REPUBLIC INDIA Eulyoo Publishing Co.. Ltd. 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Edwin Mansfield No. 28 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries. Statistics for 1970-94. Frederick Z. Jaspersen, Anthony H. Aylward, and Mariusz A. Sumlinski No. 29 International Joint Ventures in Developing Countries: Happy Marriages? Robert R. Miller, Jack D. Glen, Frederick Z. Jaspersen, and Yannis Karmokolias No. 30 Cost Benefit Analysis of Private Sector Environmental Investments: A Case Study of the Kunda Cement Factory. Yannis Karmokolias No. 31 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-95. Lawrence Bouton and Mariusz A. Sumlinski No. 32 The Business of Education: A Look at Kenya's Private Education Sector. Yannis Karmokolias and Jacob van Lutsenburg Maas No. 33 How Businesses See Government: Responses from Private Sector Surveys in 69 Countries. Aymo Brunetti, Gregory Kisunko, and Beatrice Weder No. 34 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-96. Jack D. Glen and Mariusz A. Sumlinski No. 35 Corporations Use of the Internet in Developing Countries. John A. Daly and Robert R. Miller No. 36 Trends in Venture Capital Finance in Developing Countries. Anthony Aylward No. 37 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-97. Guy P. Pfeffermann, Gregory V. Kisunko, and Mariusz A. Sumlinski No. 38 Time to Rethink Privatization in Transition Economies? John Nellis No. 39 Primary Securities Markets: Cross Country Findings. Anthony Aylward and Jack Glen No. 40 A Market-Oriented Strategy for Small and Medium Scale Enterprises. Kristin Hallberg No. 41 Trends in Private Investment in Developing Countries: Statistics for 1970-1998. Lawrence Bouton and Mariusz A. Sumlinski No. 42 Leapfrogging? India's Information Technology Industry and the Internet. Robert R. Miller No. 43 Firm Size and the Business Environment: Worldwide Survey Results. Mirjam Schiffer and Beatrice Weder INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION Headquarters 1818 H Street, N.W. 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